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Purpose
Europe is experiencing a financial and economic crisis. This began 
with the ‘credit crunch’ in the financial services sector and evolved as a 
sovereign debt crisis. Fiscal consolidation and austerity measures have 
been deployed in response to the crisis to reduce public deficits and 
debt. This crisis is still unfolding so that the analysis and findings of this 
report must remain a work in progress.
This report aims to assess the impact of this crisis on the situation 
of women and men in Europe and on gender equality policies. This 
is important as economic crises are deeply gendered. Past experience 
cannot provide sufficient insight into the gender impact of this crisis as 
the position of women has changed considerably since the last major 
recession. This crisis offers opportunities for radical change, including 
a potential to advance equality for women and men. However, the cri-
sis also poses challenges where gender equality may be seen as an issue 
only for the good times.
This report is a product of the EGGE and the EGGSI expert networ-
ks of the European Commission. It covers twenty seven Member States, 
the EEA-EFTA countries and three candidate countries: Turkey, Croa-
tia and FYROM. The core reference period for analysis of the labour 
market impact is the (nearly) four years between the second quarter of 
2008 - when the crisis technically started for the EU as a whole1 - and 
the first quarter of 2012 - the latest quarter for which Eurostat data is 
available at the time of writing. Analysis of the social impact extends 
over the period between 2005 and 2010. 
Four Main Conclusions
Four main conclusions can be drawn from this report. The first 
conclusion is that there has been a levelling down of gender gaps in 
employment, unemployment, wages and poverty over the crisis. This 
however does not reflect progress in gender equality as it is based on 
1    See European Commission, 2010e: Table 1. A recessionary episode technically occurs 
when the GDP records quarter-on-quarter negative variations for two consecutive quarters. 
exeCutive summary
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Executive Summary
lower rates of employment, higher rates of unemployment and reduced 
earnings for both men and women.
In the first years of the crisis labour market segregation has effec-
tively sheltered women’s employment, labour market activity and pay 
during the crisis to date. This segregation involves over-representation 
of women in service employment (including public sector jobs) and un-
der-representation in manufacturing, construction and male dominated 
branches of the financial sector. The overall level of segregation in a 
country associates positively and significantly with the difference in em-
ployment losses for men and women. Men experienced comparatively 
higher employment losses than women in countries where this segrega-
tion is greater. Further, labour market segregation may eventually ex-
pose women to a greater extent where fiscal consolidation significantly 
curtails public sector jobs.
The second main conclusion of this report is that the labour market 
behaviour of women over the crisis has been similar to that of men. 
The traditional view that women behave as employment buffers, called 
in when demand expands but pushed back when it contracts, has been 
challenged for previous crises, but has been definitely refuted by the 
experience of this crisis. The contemporary ‘buffers’ are young men 
and women on temporary employment contracts and migrant workers.
This similarity of behaviour starts with the changed income role of 
women. Dual earner couples lost ground in the downturn almost exclu-
sively  to the advantage of female breadwinner couples that increased 
their share to almost 10%. 
Similarity of behaviour is evident in that discouragement from see-
king work affected men more than women, in percentage terms. There 
is further evidence in that no fewer women than men accepted part-
time work ‘involuntarily’. The increase in the numbers of involuntary 
part-time workers was actually larger among women, although in per-
centage terms the surge was stronger among men.
The worsening of employment conditions affected women and men 
differently rather than ‘more’ or ‘less’. There is evidence of infringe-
ment and curtailment of rights over the crisis, but there is no clear 
indication whether men or women have been more affected. Men do 
report themselves as more affected by the crisis with more frequent 
complaints of heightened job insecurity, cuts in pay and having to ac-
cept less interesting work. 
There are repercussions from the crisis that specifically concern wo-
men. The rights of pregnant women to maternity leave and benefits 
have been curtailed and discrimination against pregnant women has 
been documented in at least four countries. 
There is limited evidence on developments in relation to unpaid 
work. However, in the depth of the first recessionary episode (2008-
2009) household expenditure went down in most European countries 
for the consumption of items for which unpaid work may provide a 
good substitute. 
The third main conclusion of this report is that, while there is evi-
dence of contained but uneven retrenchment in welfare provisions in 
the first years of the crisis, there is a threat that fiscal consolidation 
13
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may ultimately reduce both the welfare provisions being made and the 
related employment with associated gender equality impacts.
The crisis has slightly reduced the gender gaps in poverty in the first 
two years, albeit by increasing the risk of poverty among men more 
than among women. Without social transfers, the crisis would have 
produced larger increases in poverty rates in a large number of countri-
es for both men and women. This redistribution has been important in 
reducing the gender gap in poverty rates.
Education and training appear to have been less affected by budget 
cuts until 2010. National strategies during the crisis have focused on 
extending pre-school and out-of-school programmes. Such schemes are 
advantageous not only for children but also for the caring parents and 
in particular for women. Vulnerable groups in the education and trai-
ning domain include migrant women, the homeless and those at risk of 
early school leaving (among whom men are over-represented). 
The housing crisis in some countries is seriously affecting the lives 
of the most vulnerable households, including single mothers and low-
income households (among whom women are over-represented). Ho-
melessness and long-term homelessness have increased during the crisis 
and this is a gendered phenomenon in several countries. 
Men’s and women’s health status is reported to have deteriorated 
as a result of the crisis. Recent health reforms in several countries have 
focused on cost containment and new or higher prescription fees have 
been also introduced in several countries. Cost containment has a re-
gressive effect since the cost of healthcare impinges proportionally more 
on people with lower incomes and this weighs more heavily on women. 
Budget cuts in the health sector also hit women harder than men on the 
supply side as more women are employed in the sector.
Some countries have boosted health and long-term care facilities but 
many others have raised fees or reduced health or care-related cash 
benefits as part of public expenditure cuts. In countries that underwent 
the most significant fiscal consolidation long-term care allowances and 
monetary benefits have been reduced and this has a disproportionate 
impact on women.
Fiscal consolidation poses a risk for gender equality. The consolida-
tion measures likely to have the most impact on gender equality include 
wage freezes or wage cuts in the public sector; staffing freezes or per-
sonnel cuts in the public sector; pension reforms; cuts and restrictions in 
care related benefits/allowances/facilities; reduction of housing benefits 
or family benefits; tightening of eligibility criteria for unemployment 
and assistance benefits or reductions in replacement rates; tax measu-
res; VAT increases; and increases in fees for publicly subsidized services. 
The most recent evidence gathered at country level suggests that the 
specific impact of fiscal consolidation on gender equality varies consi-
derably among countries. While in some countries the impact is modest 
and not consistently pro-inequality, in others considerable retrench-
ment in employment, social transfers and social services may be rolling 
back past progress. It cannot be ruled out that disparities in gender 
equality within Europe may widen back as an unintended consequence 
of fiscal consolidation.  
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The fourth main conclusion of this report is that in the vast majority 
of countries gender mainstreaming has not been implemented in policy 
design and policy implementation over the crisis. Neither recovery nor 
consolidation measures have been assessed from a gender perspective in 
the vast majority of cases. Gender impact has been taken into account 
at all policy process stages in about one tenth of the policy initiatives 
announced or implemented in response to the crisis as part of the 2011 
National Reform Programmes. 
Fiscal consolidation packages have also impaired the functioning 
of the gender equality infrastructure in several Member States. A few 
countries have, however, taken steps to make the existing infrastructure 
more effective, and some Eastern European countries have introduced 
institutional innovations in the field of gender equality. 
What follows reviews in greater detail the most salient issues under-
pinning these broad conclusions.
Paid Work Issues
Employment and Unemployment
There has been a levelling downwards of gender gaps in employ-
ment and unemployment over the downturn, as male employment fell 
more and male unemployment rose faster.  The EU-wide gender gap in 
the employment rate has gone down some 3.2 percentage points from 
a 14.1 percentage points at (pre-crisis) peak level to 10.9 points in the 
first quarter of 2012. The gender unemployment gap reversed again in 
2012, with women displaying marginally lower unemployment than 
men (-0.2 percentage points). Reversal had already occurred in the first 
recessionary dip.
The choice of indicators to measure the impact of the crisis on 
employment and unemployment is however important. Women were 
slowly catching up in employment with men before the recession set in, 
and still need to do so. Thus, potential losses rather than actual losses 
are relevant. If we take deviations from trends to measure potential 
losses, men appear to have suffered losses nearly twice as high as wom-
en at the bottom of the first recessionary episode (or ‘dip’ ), and about 
one and a half times higher at the beginning of 2012 (first quarter). The 
comparison is bleaker in terms of actual losses, which are nearly three 
times as high among men between the peak and the bottom quarter of 
the first recessionary episode, and even higher over the entire four years 
of the recession.  
Whichever way employment losses are measured, men did bear the 
brunt of the fall in employment more than women: nearly three times 
more according to conventional indicators, nearly twice as much if the 
indicator takes into account pre-crisis trends. This latter option makes 
more sense from a gender equality perspective because a given loss of em-
ployment is more costly for the group that is still catching up (women). 
The choice of indicators is also important for examining develop-
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ments in unemployment. If we look at changes in the unemployment 
rate since the recession began, women behaved as ‘slow movers’, with 
the advantage of less sharp rises when unemployment went up and 
the disadvantage of comparatively slower re-absorption when it went 
down. If we look at levels rather than changes, female unemployment 
was higher to start with, and may not be as easily absorbed once a last-
ing recovery sets in precisely because unemployed women are ‘slower 
movers’.
Within each country the vulnerability of women and men differed 
primarily because of the role played by occupational and sectoral se-
gregation. Output and employment contractions were larger where ma-
nufacturing, construction and selected financial branches were hit the 
most. Since women are consistently under-represented in these sectors, 
their comparative vulnerability was lower. The differences in peak-to-
trough employment losses between men and women correlate positively 
with the level of sectoral segregation across countries, the correlation 
with occupational segregation also being significant but slightly lower. 
The ongoing process of fiscal consolidation is increasingly involving 
job cuts in feminized areas such as public social services and educa-
tion. This diminishes the prospects of a swift recovery for female em-
ployment in several countries.
Despite the leveling downward of employment and pay gaps, the in-
tegration of women in the labour market has been rolled back. At peak 
employment values, just before the recession begun, 10 Member States 
were above the 65% employment rate mark for women aged 15 to 64, 
but the number was down to 6 in the first quarter of 2012. 
Inactivity and Discouragement
The labour market behaviour of women in the crisis reflects the fact 
that their income roles are in transition between traditional situations 
of marginal earners and modern situations of co-primary earners. At 
the macro level for the whole of Europe:
•  Women, unlike men, increased their labour market participation. 
In the first quarter of 2012, twenty two and a half out of a hun-
dred men of working age were not in the labour market in Euro-
pe, slightly more than four years earlier (22.1% in 2008, second 
quarter for EU27). Many more women were inactive – 34.9 out 
of 100 in 2012 – but less so than four years earlier (-1.5%). These 
divergent activity patterns between men and women partly reflect 
structural trends pre-dating the recession, partly stem from the 
behaviour of partnered women, some of them having entered the 
labour market or increased hours in order to offset the drop in 
earnings of the male partner (added worker effect).   
•  Discouraged workers are more commonly found among women. 
However, if we take their numbers in ratio to the inactive popula-
tion, the rise following the crisis was more pronounced for men. In 
yearly terms, the EU27 share of discouraged workers in the inacti-
ve population rose from 3.3% to 5.3% among men between 2008 
and 2011, and from 3.9 % to 5.1% among women.   
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•  Male breadwinner households lost ground in favour of female bre-
adwinner households. In 2007 dual  earner couples were the vast 
majority of all working age couples where at least one member 
worked (74.1% on average in the 26 countries examined). Male 
breadwinner couples were a minority (21%) and female breadwin-
ner couples were a  small component (4.9%). In the first two ye-
ars of the crisis, dual earner couples lost ground (-5.1 percentage 
points share), but almost entirely in favour of female breadwinner 
couples. This is not yet the demise of the male breadwinner is-
sue however.  Within the majority of dual earner couples women’s 
contribution to the household’s income remains significantly lower 
than their partner’s, sufficiently so as to still qualify the female 
partners as ‘secondary’ earners. 
Involuntary Part-Time and Temporary Contracts
The worsening of working conditions has spared neither men nor 
women, but has affected them differently.
In 2010, the worst year of the crisis within our reference period, the 
involuntary share of total part-time work had risen to 38.1%, up 5.8 
points from 2007. Among women the corresponding value was 24%, 
up 3.8 percentage points. Absolute figures tell a different story. In 2010 
female involuntary part-time workers numbered 7.3 million as against 
3.2 million for men. The growth from 2007 totalled 1.3 million for 
women against 773 thousand for men. One year later – 2011, the lat-
est on record – involuntary part-time had decreased for both sexes, but 
remained considerably higher than pre-recession levels.
Temporary employment is fairly equally distributed between men 
and women, with a slight prevalence among the latter. The peak-to-
trough share of male temporary employment declined from 13.7% to 
12.5%, and a very similar contraction was recorded for the share of 
female temporary employment (from 15.2.% to 14.1%). Uncertainty 
about recovery in some countries and protracted recession in other 
countries account for a mixed pattern after the first recessionary dip.
 
In-Work Poverty
Yet, between 2008 and 2010, the incidence of in-work poors rose 
very slightly and only among women. This suggests that better paid 
workers found it easier to retain their employment while the low paid 
suffered the worst job losses, at least among men. The incidence of 
in-work poverty remains, in fact, higher for men (8.9% compared to 
7.8% for women). Estimates reported by the 2012 Employment and 
Social Developments in Europe indicate that all other things equal, be-
ing a man increased the odds of being in-work and poor by some four 
percentage points. Despite women’s over-representation among part-
timers, the low-paid and temporary employees, in-work poverty affects 
some women in these groups rather than all of them.
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Restrictions of Rights and Entitlements
In the 2010 European Social Survey men reported cuts in pay, 
heightened job insecurity and worsening quality of the work content 
more frequently than women. Women reported more frequently than 
men having to reduce work hours. In Greece, Ireland and Portugal, La-
bour Inspections recorded a surge in the infringement of rights protec-
ting pregnant women and mothers of young children during the crisis, 
while in Italy and the Czech Republic infringements are reported to 
have frequently occurred in ‘normal times’ as well. 
Age, Education and Nationality Diversity
Across Europe as a whole, the younger the worker the higher the 
employment losses experienced during the crisis. This age pattern is 
common to men and women, though it is less pronounced for the 
latter. 
In the current crisis, the average European worker with tertiary edu-
cation was comparatively shielded from dismissals in the crisis, but this 
does not hold for equally educated women in some Baltic and Medi-
terranean countries. In these countries it was middle-educated women 
who suffered the least and whose employment is recovering faster. Mo-
reover, in countries where recovery is under way, employment growth 
is often stronger among middle educated women and men than among 
the top educated. This waining protection afforded by education may 
be contributing to swell the numbers of young people not in education, 
employment or training (the so called NEETs). 
The most vulnerable group in this crisis is male migrants. Men from 
outside the EU were the worst hit by job losses, followed by mobile 
male workers from within the EU. Mobile female workers from within 
the EU were largely spared from job losses except in Ireland, Finland 
and the Netherlands. They proved less vulnerable to the crisis than local 
women in the EU27 as a whole. The converse holds for female migrants 
from outside the EU, but even among them the peak-to-trough fall in 
employment was not much higher than 3 percentage points compared 
with 8 points for male migrants from outside the EU. One plausible 
reason is, again, occupational and sectoral segregation.
Pay Gap Issues
The gender pay gap decreased in the whole of the EU as well as in 
the majority of Member States for which data are available. According 
to Eurostat data, the unadjusted gender pay gap declined in 16 out of 
25 Member States for which complete data are available between 2007 
and 2010. National sources indicate that the instances of decline may 
be higher.
Three main factors contributed to the decline in the gender pay gap:
•  Cuts in the non basic components of the pay packet. Overtime, 
productivity related pay and bonuses are first to be foregone in a 
crisis and tend to accrue disproportionately to men.
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•  Sectoral segregation with over-representation of women in the pu-
blic sector – where the gender pay gap is generally lower – and 
under-representation in the sectors that shed more labour where 
men tend to earn well.
•  A number of countries have had policy programmes designed to 
lessen the gender pay gap. In all these countries the gender pay gap 
declined or did not increase, indicating that equal pay policy may 
have contributed to the decline.
Unpaid Work Issues
A decrease in expenditure by households is observable for 19 out of 
the 22 European countries for which the 2009 value can be compared 
to 2008. The fall in consumption in catering, outpatient services and 
routine maintenance can be substituted by unpaid work. It is therefore 
unlikely that unpaid work did not rise during the crisis.
The findings of time use surveys in four countries offer some eviden-
ce that the gender gap in the allocation of unpaid work may have gone 
up during the crisis in countries where gender disparities in housework 
and care work are especially pronounced. 
Gender Mainstreaming, Employment Policies,  
Fiscal Consolidation
Gender Mainstreaming
The European Economic Recovery Plan made no mention of ‘gen-
der’, ‘women’ or ‘equality’. The absence of gender mainstreaming is 
symbolic of a low sensibility towards gender equality in responding to 
the crisis. 
The European Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Oppor-
tunities for Women and Men has highlighted the low visibility of gen-
der in European-level responses to the crisis, as well as the need to take 
into account the gender dimension in current and future initiatives to 
tackle the crisis. The Joint Employment Report adopted by th Council 
in 2010 did identify women among the groups at risk in a period of ri-
sing unemployment and recognized the negative impact of the crisis on 
gender equality policies. It noted the need for gender mainstreaming to 
be more actively applied. A stronger recognition of the role that gender 
equality policies can play in recovery is still needed to ensure that gen-
der gaps do not re-open. 
Gender Equality Policies
In some Members States the institutional framework for gender 
equality policy has been reinforced in acts, action plans and strategies. 
However, the budget cuts imposed by fiscal consolidation measures en-
tail the risk of downgrading the status of equality policies or reducing 
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the budget allocated to them. This report found that in several Member 
States cuts in public budgets are seriously affecting the functioning of 
gender equality infrastructures. However, other Member States have 
decided not to reduce resources devoted to gender equality institutions 
and/or projects, or even to increase them.
Employment Policies 
Early recovery measures focused on the sectors first hit by the crisis, 
which were male-dominated in terms of employment. Counter-cyclical 
employment policies other than these temporary recovery measures 
focused on short-time working programmes and the management of 
unemployment benefit programmes. The evidence to date suggests that 
men were the main beneficiaries of both types of programmes not only 
because they suffered job losses on a larger scale but also because of the 
design of these programmes. The ‘male bias’ in these programmes may 
have worked to date because of the corresponding ‘bias’ in employment 
losses. However, the design of counter-cyclical employment and income 
policies may need to be made more ‘universal’ in the future. 
Fiscal Consolidation
This report makes a first attempt at an assessment of the repercus-
sions of fiscal consolidation from a gender perspective. The impact is 
not yet showing up fully in employment or wage statistics and ex-ante 
impact assessments have not been carried out from a gender perspec-
tive, with the exception of a few countries. This assessment therefore 
relies on two types of evidence, respectively the subjective evaluation of 
national experts in 19 countries and a review of the latest developments 
in 6 countries.   
According to the experts’ evaluation, the list of measures identified 
in the 19 countries reviewed as more consequential for gender equality 
are, on the expenditure side:
• Wage freezes or wage cuts in the public sector (10 countries)
• Staffing freezes or personnel cuts in the public sector (9 countries)
•  Pension reforms: postponing retirement and/or bringing the age of 
retirement for women in line with that for men (8 countries)
•  Cuts and restrictions in care related benefits/allowances/facilities 
(8 countries) 
• Reduction of housing benefits or family benefits (6 countries) and
•  Tightening of eligibility criteria for unemployment and assistance 
benefits or reductions in replacement rates (5 countries).
On the revenue side the list of such measures are:
• Tax measures (6 countries) 
• VAT increase (6 countries) and 
•  Increase in fees for publicly subsidized services (healthcare fees, 
transport fees, others) (3 countries).
Expectations that these measures will be disproportionately borne 
by women are qualified by the information gathered for 6 countries 
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concerning the latest developments. Evidence from the countries with 
relatively limited fiscal consolidation programmes (the Netherlands 
and Finland) or those where the most severe contraction of public fi-
nances occurred early on in the recession (Latvia) does not entirely sup-
port anticipations. In these countries, the direct, short – run effects of 
fiscal consolidation on women’s employment and their access/use of 
care services do not appear to be so large, nor do women appear to be 
systematically penalized by cuts in social transfers. However, informa-
tion is still very limited and the medium- and long-term effects are not 
known. There is much more cause for concern  in all respects with re-
gard to Ireland, Greece or Spain,  where fiscal consolidation has grown 
in importance since the crisis began, taking on progressively dramatic 
proportions. In these countries not only was female employment com-
paratively low at the onset of the recession but it has declined fairly 
consistently ever since. Restructuring of social security (pensions), cuts 
in public services, and public sector wages, as well actual or planned 
downsizing of public employment are sizeable and the increase in po-
verty has been more pronounced for selected group of women, e.g. 
female pensioners in Greece.
 
Income Poverty Issues
In almost all countries and years, women exhibit a higher at-risk-
of-poverty rate than men. At the EU27 level, the gender gap tended 
to increase up to 2007 and to decrease thenceforth. Income poverty, 
measured by the share of population earning a yearly income lower 
than 60% the median income, has risen for the whole of Europe in the 
first years of the crisis although the rise was not dramatic. In 2009 the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate (anchored at year 2005) was higher than the 
2007 rate by 2.3 points among men and by 1.7 points among women2. 
Higher increases were experienced in the countries severely hit by the 
crisis. 
In all European countries and at all times in the period conside-
red women suffer from a higher at risk of poverty rate before social 
transfers, to a degree that is considerably higher than the gender gap 
after social transfers (about 5% as opposed to 2%). Tax and welfare 
systems are fundamental in reducing the higher at risk of poverty rates 
that women face. A marginal worsening of men’s position before social 
transfers as a result of the crisis has slightly reduced the gender gap in 
at risk of poverty rates before social transfers from 5.1% in 2004 to 
4.8% in 2009. 
As a result of the crisis, several countries experienced a remarkable in-
crease in the number of beneficiaries of guaranteed minimum income sche-
mes with a predominant share of women. Some countries raised their gua-
ranteed minimum income payments through increased public expenditure.
2   The figures refer to the risk of poverty calculated using the 2005 poverty line in order 
to avoid obtaining a reduction in poverty when bottom incomes decline more than the 
median income. Note that the 2007 figures are drawn from the 2008 EU-SILC survey 
while those for 2009 refer to the latest survey to be released to date carried in 2010. 
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Family-related benefits are formally gender-neutral measures with a si-
gnificant gendered impact, as women dominate family-related payments 
recipients due to gender-specific division of care activities. Cuts in public 
expenditure due to the economic crisis affected existing family-related 
benefits in most countries with substantial gender effects. On the other 
hand, a small number of countries expanded their support to family-
related benefits and allowances as a response to the economic crisis.
In the field of childcare, public expenditure on monetary allowan-
ces has been reduced more consistently than public expenditure on the 
provision of services. Thus, in several European countries the supply of 
childcare facilities has grown in the last few years, even in the face of 
the economic crisis. However, in a number of countries social expendi-
ture retrenchments are felt also in the field of childcare services. 
Increases in Value Added Tax rates are expected to have a negative 
impact on gender equality given the generally higher at-risk-of-poverty 
rate and the lower disposable income of women compared to men. 
Social Exclusion Issues
Women suffer from greater severe material deprivation in almost all 
years and all countries. The index of severe material deprivation is de-
fined as the enforced inability to pay for a number of items considered 
necessary to a decent and adequate life. The crisis has slowed down the 
progress towards the reduction of material deprivation, with the levels 
recorded by the 2010 SILC survey higher than one year earlier but still 
lower than the pre-crisis average and than 2005 levels. The crisis has 
slightly reduced the gender gap, though worsening men’s position ra-
ther than improving women’s. Variations are on average small for the 
first years of the crisis, but to some extent they hide substantial hetero-
geneity between countries.
Education
Training and education appear to be less affected by budget cuts. 
National strategies during the crisis have focused on extending pre-
school and out-of-school time programmes. Such schemes are parti-
cularly advantageous for the children and for caring parents, among 
whom women in particular do the caring work. However, vulnerable 
groups have been affected including migrant women, the homeless and 
those at risk of early school leaving (where men are over-represented).
Housing 
The economic crisis is exerting a substantial impact on the housing 
and mortgage markets of several European countries. In a number of 
countries there is already evidence of rising housing debts, payment de-
fault risks, and forced evictions. The countries that suffered a housing 
crisis (or risk facing one) are primarily offering housing debt mana-
gement schemes in order to help people cope with over-indebtedness. 
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While most of these measures tend to be gender blind, they indirectly 
favour women who are known to be more vulnerable in some key re-
spects. For example, in those countries for which data are available, 
women tend to exhibit higher risks of rent or mortgage arrears than 
men. From a gender perspective, housing support measures are parti-
cularly important for some groups of women such as single mothers, 
who often find it difficult to buy a home of their own due to inadequate 
income. Lack of affordable housing is one of the main causes of home-
lessness. While there are severe data limitations, in the countries sup-
plying some data homelessness appears to have worsened during the 
crisis. In these countries men and women face apparently similar risks 
of homelessness, though women’s risk is higher than men’s at younger 
ages. Moreover, it is found that women are more often than men ‘invisi-
bly’ homeless, e.g. because they seek temporary solutions such as living 
with family, friends, ‘convenience partners’ or casual acquaintances. 
While this reflects genuine differences in behaviour between women 
and men, in some countries it could also be due to a lack of policies 
specifically targeting women in this area.
Health
Recent health reforms in several countries have focused on cost con-
tainment. New or higher prescription fees have been also introduced 
in several European countries. Cost containment has a regressive effect 
since the cost of healthcare impinges proportionally more on people 
with lower incomes and weighs more heavily on women due to their 
higher risk of poverty. 
Budget cuts in the health sector also hit women harder than men on 
the supply side. Women are primarily employed in the public sector and 
in the health sector. Cuts to public sector pay or staff reductions affect 
women disproportionally. 
Countries have generally not reduced public social expenditure by 
cutting provision of long-term care services. Women constitute the ma-
jority of care recipients and caregivers. In countries that underwent 
the most significant fiscal consolidation long-term care allowances and 
monetary benefits have been reduced. In some countries long-term care 
allowances were raised.
Recommendations
Ten recommendations are made that seek to advance gender equali-
ty as a means of assisting the economy to emerge out of the crisis.
•  Reconsider the formulation of gender equality indicators. The ap-
parent improvement in most gender gaps despite the worsening of 
employment, wages, working and income conditions for both men 
and women raises questions as to whether ‘gender gaps’ adequa-
tely capture trends in gender equality in recessionary times.
•  Encourage Member States to adopt effective gender budgeting sy-
stems for their main policy initiatives, including ongoing or future 
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recovery plans and expenditure reviews. Statutory requirements 
that policies be vetted ex-ante from a gender perspective may not 
be sufficient, as the experience in Austria and the UK indicates.
•  Closely monitor the risk that fiscal consolidation may significantly 
erode welfare provisions as well as equality infrastructure. 
•  Launch and support initiatives to raise the level of financial lite-
racy among women (and the population at large) and to ensure a 
‘critical mass’ female representation in key financial bodies of the 
European machinery. This crisis has made evident how far po-
licy decisions that are traditionally associated with women such 
as welfare, schooling or reconciliation have come to depend on 
macroeconomic and financial decisions women have traditionally 
been excluded from and which they know little about.  
•  Address the disproportionate burden of employment flexibility on 
young people. This includes re-designing customary counter-cycli-
cal policies like short-time work schemes and unemployment be-
nefit programmes. While both measures were important to counte-
ract the worst employment and wage effects of this crisis, they are 
often primarily geared to regular full-time workers.
•  Gender mainstream income support schemes. Social expenditure 
and tax expenditure should focus on women’s financial indepen-
dence as a central concern, especially if they are aimed at lifting 
men and women out of poverty.
•  Channel social expenditure so as to prioritize quality services over 
cash benefits in order to ensure a fair distributional impact of 
austerity programmes and alleviate the care burden for women. 
Channel recovery funds towards social and care infrastructure and 
not only physical infrastructure.
•  Strengthen the European Social Fund (ESF) and review procedures 
therein. Several low female employment countries in Southern and 
Eastern Europe are also countries where the recession and fiscal 
consolidation are downsizing welfare, reconciliation and generally 
equality enhancing provisions. The European Structural Fund re-
presents an important resource in these countries to compensate 
for cuts in local provisions and to sustain the 2020 employment 
goal. In some cases, however, ESF spending may need to be re-
viewed in order to warrant full effectiveness. In particular this re-
view should ensure that: (i) procedures for accessing and spending 
funds are simple; and (ii) key programmes being implemented con-
tinue to operate after ESF funds have been withdrawn.
•  Increase surveillance and heighten public awareness of cases of 
violations of maternity and leave rights. Infringements of mater-
nity/parental rights may be more frequent in small- and medium-
sized firms because of higher organizational costs. Their specific 
needs/constraints should be addressed, as this is also a problem in 
‘normal’ times.
•  Address the issue of poor integration of mobile and migrant wor-
kers, especially men. 
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L’Europe traverse actuellement une crise économique et financière 
qui a commencé dans le secteur des services financiers par ce qu’il a 
été convenu d’appeler le « resserrement du crédit » pour devenir au-
jourd’hui une crise de la dette souveraine. En réponse à cette crise et 
pour tenter de réduire la dette et les déficits publics, diverses mesures 
de consolidation et d’austérité budgétaires ont été mises en œuvre. Tou-
tefois, cette crise étant toujours d’actualité, son analyse et par  voie 
de conséquence les conclusions de ce rapport, demeurent  matière à 
évoluer.
Le présent rapport a pour but d’évaluer les conséquences de cette 
crise sur la situation des femmes et des hommes en Europe et sur les 
politiques d’égalité femmes/hommes, sujet d’autant plus important que 
l’on sait les crises économiques profondément liées à la notion d’égalité 
entre les sexes. Or, il est évident que l’expérience du passé ne suffit pas 
à expliquer les conséquences de cette crise sur l’égalité entre les sexes, 
alors même que la situation des femmes a considérablement évolué de-
puis la dernière récession majeure. De fait, si toute situation de crise 
offre des opportunités pour un changement radical en termes de pro-
motion de l’égalité des femmes et des hommes, il reste qu’elle comporte 
également des défis pour gérer l’égalité des sexes  lorsque la situation 
est stable.
Ce rapport est un produit de l’EGGE et des réseaux d’experts EGGSI 
de la Commission européenne qui regroupe vingt-sept États, les pays de 
l’EEE-AELE et trois pays candidats : la Turquie, la Croatie et l’ARYM. 
Dans ce rapport, la période de référence pour l’analyse des effets sur 
marché du travail est d’environ quatre années situées entre le deuxième 
trimestre de 2008, qui correspond techniquement au début de la crise 
à l’échelle de l’UE dans son ensemble3 , et le premier trimestre de 2012, 
c’est-à-dire le dernier trimestre pour lequel Eurostat a pu disposer de 
données pour la finalisation de ce rapport. L’analyse des conséquences 
sociales couvre la période comprise entre 2005 et 2010.
3  Voir Commission européenne, 2010e: tableau 1. Techniquement, un épisode de 
récession se produit lorsque le PIB enregistre des variations négatives trimestre sur 
trimestre avec au moins deux trimestres consécutifs.
résumé 
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Quatre conclusions principales
Quatre conclusions principales peuvent être tirées de ce rapport. La 
première conclusion permet d’observer que l’écart se trouve réduit, en 
temps de crise, entre les femmes/hommes en ce qui concerne l’emploi, le 
chômage, les salaires et la pauvreté. Toutefois, cela n’induit en rien une 
éventuelle réduction de l’’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes pui-
sque celle-ci repose sur la réduction des taux d’emploi, l’augmentation 
des taux de chômage et la diminution des rémunérations tant pour les 
hommes que les femmes.
 Au début de la crise et jusqu’à aujourd’hui, le marché du travail 
a efficacement protégé l’emploi des femmes, l’activité du marché du 
travail et la rémunération. Cette forme de disparité s’explique par la 
surreprésentation des femmes dans les emplois de service, y compris 
les emplois dans le secteur public et la sous-représentation dans la fa-
brication, la construction et les branches du secteur financier dominées 
par les hommes. La disparité globale dans un pays est associée posi-
tivement et significativement à la différence de pertes d’emplois en-
tre les hommes et les femmes. Les hommes ont subi relativement plus 
de pertes d’emplois que les femmes dans les pays où cette disparité 
est plus grande. En outre, la disparité sur le marché du travail peut 
éventuellement exposer davantage les femmes lorsque les mesures de 
consolidation fiscale restreignent les emplois dans le secteur public de 
manière plus importante.
La deuxième conclusion principale de ce rapport  permet de consta-
ter que, au cours de la crise, le marché du travail des femmes s’est com-
porté de manière similaire à celui des hommes. On pensait que l’emploi 
des femmes servait de tampon au marché de l’emploi, embauchées lor-
sque la demande augmente mais rejetées lorsqu’elle diminue, mais cela 
a été contesté au cours des précédentes crises et s’est avéré totalement 
inexact lors de l’actuelle. Pour l’heur, cette fonction de « tampons » est 
tenue par des jeunes, hommes et femmes, avec des contrats de travail à 
durée déterminée et par les travailleurs migrants.
Cette similitude de comportement est observée en premier lieu à tra-
vers le nouveau rôle du revenu des femmes. La proportion de couples 
vivant avec deux salaires a diminué au cours de la crise en faveur qua-
siment exclusive des couples dépendant du salaire de la femme, qui ont 
vu leur proportion s’accroitre de presque 10%.
 Cette similitude est par ailleurs d’autant plus flagrante que les hom-
mes ont été plus découragés que les femmes dans leur recherche d’em-
ploi, en termes de pourcentage que de valeurs absolues. On constate en 
effet, preuve supplémentaire s’il en fallait, qu’il y a eu autant de femmes 
que d’hommes pour se résoudre à accepter un travail à temps partiel 
. De fait, bien que les femmes aient effectivement été plus nombreu-
ses, l’augmentation, en termes de pourcentage, a été plus forte chez les 
hommes.
On constate par ailleurs que l’aggravation des conditions de l’em-
ploi affecte non pas plus ou moins les femmes que les hommes, mais 
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différemment. Il est évident que, pendant la crise, les droits n’ont pas 
toujours été scrupuleusement respectés, mais il n’y a aucune indica-
tion claire pour en déduire que les unes plutôt que les autres ont été 
plus affectés, même si les hommes eux-mêmes indiquent être plus 
touchés par la crise, se plaignant plus souvent de précarité accrue, 
de réduction salariale et de l’obligation d’accepter un travail moins 
intéressant. 
En revanche, certaines répercussions de la crise concernent spéci-
fiquement les femmes. Ainsi, les droits et avantages liés au congé ma-
ternité des femmes enceintes ont été malmenés et on a relevé une plus 
forte discrimination à l’encontre des femmes enceintes dans au moins 
quatre pays. 
Enfin, quelques données, mais en proportion limitée, ont pu être re-
levées concernant les développements du travail non rémunéré. Toute-
fois, au cœur de la première période de crise (2008-2009), les dépenses 
de consommation des ménages ont diminué dans la plupart des pays 
européens, souvent en lieu et place d’un travail non rémunéré. 
La troisième conclusion principale de ce rapport permet de penser 
que,  si l’austérité contenue mais inégale figure bien dans les disposi-
tions de protection sociale dans les premières années de la crise, il reste 
qu’une consolidation fiscale représente une réelle menace en ce qu’elle 
pourrait faire baisser le niveau de protection sociale et de l’emploi et 
que cela aurait une influence sur l’égalité femmes/hommes.
Au cours des deux premières années, la crise a légèrement réduit 
les écarts entre les sexes en ce qui concerne la pauvreté , bien que l’on 
constate une augmentation du risque de pauvreté chez les hommes da-
vantage que chez les femmes. Il apparaît également que, sans transferts 
sociaux, la crise aurait accru les taux de pauvreté dans un grand nom-
bre de pays, pour les hommes et les femmes. Cette redistribution a été 
importante pour réduire l’écart entre les sexes en ce qui concerne les 
taux de pauvreté.
L’éducation et la formation semblent avoir été moins touchées par 
les contraintes budgétaires jusqu’en 2010. Les stratégies nationales 
pendant la crise ont mis l’accent sur le développement des programmes 
préscolaires et les programmes extracurriculaires. De tels programmes 
sont réellement importants non seulement pour les enfants mais aussi 
pour les parents responsables et en particulier les femmes. Les groupes 
vulnérables dans le domaine de l’éducation et de la formation sont les 
femmes immigrées, les sans-abri et les personnes à risque de décrochage 
scolaire (parmi lesquels les hommes sont surreprésentés).
La crise du logement, dans certains pays, affecte gravement la vie 
des ménages les plus vulnérables, y compris les mères célibataires et 
les ménages à faible revenu (parmi lesquels les femmes sont surre-
présentées). Le nombre de sans-abri, à court comme à long terme, a 
augmenté pendant la crise, et ce phénomène est en lien avec la question 
de l’égalité des sexes dans plusieurs pays. 
En outre, du fait de la crise, on observe que l’état de santé des hom-
mes comme celui des femmes s’est détérioré. De récentes réformes de la 
santé, introduites dans plusieurs pays, ont mis l’accent sur la maîtrise 
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des coûts et celle des frais supplémentaires sur les ordonnances. De 
fait, la maîtrise des coûts a un effet régressif puisque le coût des soins 
de santé freine proportionnellement plus les personnes à faible revenu 
et pèse plus lourdement sur les femmes. Les contraintes budgétaires 
dans le secteur de la santé ont touché davantage les femmes que les 
hommes dans le domaine de l’offre puisque plus de femmes travaillent 
dans ce secteur.
Certains pays ont investi dans la santé et les établissements de soins 
de longue durée, mais beaucoup d’autres ont augmenté les frais ou 
réduit les prestations liées aux soins ou à la santé dans le cadre de la 
réduction des dépenses publiques. Dans les pays qui ont subi la plus 
grande consolidation fiscale, les indemnités pour soins de longue durée 
ont été réduites et cela a affecté les femmes en majeure partie de façon 
disproportionnée.
La consolidation budgétaire constitue un risque pour l’égalité des 
sexes. Parmi les mesures décidées et engagées à ce titre, celles qui sont 
susceptibles d’avoir le plus de conséquences sur l’égalité des sexes com-
prennent le gel des salaires ou la réduction des salaires dans le secteur 
public, le gel du recrutement ou le licenciement de personnel dans le 
secteur public ; la réforme des retraites, les suppressions ou restrictions 
des prestations/allocations/aménagements pour les soins, le logement 
ou la famille, la révision des critères d’admissibilité pour les indem-
nités de chômage et les prestations d’aide ou les réductions des taux de 
compensation ; les mesures d’imposition, l’augmentation de la TVA et 
l’augmentation des frais pour les services publics subventionnés. 
Les études les plus récentes faites à l’échelle nationale suggèrent que 
l’effet spécifique de la consolidation fiscale sur l’égalité des sexes varie 
de manière considérable selon les pays. Alors que dans certains pays 
cet effet reste modeste et pas toujours  en lien avec quelque inégalité, 
dans d’autres pays en revanche, une diminution considérable dans le 
domaine de l’emploi, des transferts et services sociaux a un effet néfaste 
sur les progrès acquis par le passé. On ne peut exclure un retour mesuré 
de l’inégalité entre les sexes en Europe comme étant une conséquence 
involontaire de la consolidation fiscale.
La quatrième conclusion principale de ce rapport permet d’affirmer 
que, dans la grande majorité des pays, l’égalité femmes/hommes n’a pas 
été prise en compte dans la conception de la politique ou dans la mise 
en œuvre de la politique concernant la crise. Les mesures de relance ou 
de consolidation n’ont pas été évaluées d’un point de vue de l’égalité 
entre les hommes et les femmes dans la grande majorité des cas. 
En réponse à la crise et dans le cadre des programmes de réforme 
nationales 2011, on observe que les conséquences sur l’égalité des sexes 
n’ont été prises en compte, sur l’ensemble des étapes des processus po-
litiques, que pour un dixième des initiatives politiques annoncées ou 
mises en œuvre.
Les politiques de consolidation fiscale ont également eu des réper-
cussions sur le fonctionnement de l’infrastructure en rapport avec l’éga-
lité des sexes dans plusieurs États membres. Quelques pays ont tou-
tefois pris des mesures pour améliorer l’efficacité des infrastructures 
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existantes et certains pays de l’Europe de l’Est ont introduit des innova-
tions institutionnelles dans le domaine de l’égalité des sexes. 
Les questions les plus importantes sous-jacentes à ces conclusions 
générales vont être étudiées plus en détail ci-après.
Questions concernant le travail rémunéré
Emploi et chômage
Au cours de cette récession, on constate un nivellement par le bas 
des écarts entre les sexes dans le domaine de l’emploi et du chômage  , 
et  plus particulièrement une plus forte diminution de l’offre d’emploi 
et un chômage qui augmente plus rapidement chez les hommes. L’écart 
entre les sexes à l’échelle de l’UE au regard du taux d’emploi a diminué 
de 3 points par rapport aux niveaux maxima (avant la crise), passant 
de 14,1 à 10,9 points au premier trimestre de 2012. L’écart des taux de 
chômage entre les hommes et les femmes s’est inversé en 2012, quand 
les femmes ont subi légèrement moins de chômage que les hommes 
(-0,2 points). L’inversion s’était déjà produite lors de la prémière étape 
de la récession. 
Le choix d’indicateurs pour mesurer les conséquences de la crise sur 
l’emploi et le chômage est cependant important. Avant la récession, le 
taux d’emploi des femmes  tendait à se rapprocher de celui des hommes 
et il faut s’attacher à faire perdurer cette situation. De fait, les potentia-
lités de perte d’emploi apparaissent comme nettement plus révélatrices 
que ne le sont les pertes d’emplois réelles. A lire les divergences des 
tendances en tant que mesure des pertes potentielles,  au pire de la pre-
mière période de crise (ou « creux »), les hommes semblent avoir subi 
presque deux fois plus de pertes d’emploi que les femmes et presque une 
fois et demie de plus au début de 2012 (premier trimestre). La compa-
raison est encore pire en termes de pertes réelles, lesquelles sont trois 
fois supérieures chez les hommes, du début à la fin du trimestre de la 
première période de récession et plus importantes encore sur les quatre 
années de la récession. 
Quoi qu’il en soit et quelle que soit la manière de mesurer les pertes 
d’emplois, les hommes ont subi cette régression de l’emploi plus que 
les femmes, presque trois fois plus, selon les indicateurs classiques, et 
presque deux fois plus dans le cas de figure où l’indicateur prend en 
compte les tendances avant la crise. Dans la perspective d’une observa-
tion de l’égalité entre les sexes, il est à noter que cette dernière option 
est par ailleurs plus logique puisque une perte d’emploi donnée est plus 
coûteuse pour le groupe qui se trouve à devoir remonter l’écart.
Le choix d’indicateurs est également important pour examiner les 
développements du chômage. Si nous considérons les variations du 
taux de chômage depuis le début de la récession, les femmes sont dites 
« moins réactives », avec l’avantage de moins souffrir lorsque le taux 
de chômage augmente et le désavantage d’une moindre réabsorption 
lorsque ce taux baisse. A observer les chiffres en eux-mêmes plutôt que 
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les variations, le taux de chômage des femmes est initialement supérieur 
à celui des hommes et elles ont plus de difficultés à réintégrer le marché 
du travail lorsque la reprise se présente puisque, précisément, elles sont 
dites « moins réactives ».
Dans chaque pays, la vulnérabilité des femmes et des hommes diffère 
principalement en raison du rôle joué par la disparité professionnelle et 
sectorielle. Les contractions de la production et de l’emploi étaient déjà 
plus fortes là où la fabrication, la construction et certaines branches 
financières ont été le plus touchées. Étant donné que les femmes sont 
toujours sous-représentées dans ces secteurs, leur vulnérabilité compa-
rative en est donc moindre. Les différences de pertes d’emploi au vu 
des pics inférieurs entre les hommes et les femmes sont corrélées posi-
tivement en termes de disparité sectorielle à travers les pays, alors que 
la corrélation à la disparité professionnelle est également significative, 
mais légèrement inférieure.
Le processus de consolidation fiscale implique de plus en plus la 
réduction de l’emploi dans les secteurs féminisés tels que les services 
sociaux et l’éducation. Cela diminue les chances d’une reprise rapide de 
l’emploi des femmes dans plusieurs pays.
Malgré le nivellement par le bas de l’emploi et des écarts de 
rémunération, l’intégration des femmes au marché du travail a pu être 
sauvegardée. De fait, si l’on observe le pic supérieur d’emploi en termes 
de valeurs, on constate que, juste avant le début de la récession, dix 
États membres étaient au-dessus d’un taux d’emploi de 65 % pour les 
femmes de 15 à 64 ans, alors que six pays seulement conservent ces 
résultats au premier trimestre de 2012.
Inactivité et recherche d’emploi
Le comportement des femmes vis-à-vis du marché du travail pen-
dant la crise reflète le fait que leur rôle en termes de revenu est en tran-
sition entre la situation traditionnelle de soutien marginal et la situation 
moderne de soutien paritaire. A l’échelle « macro » pour l’ensemble de 
l’Europe, on observe que :
Contrairement aux hommes, les femmes ont augmenté leur partici-
pation sur le marché du travail. Au premier trimestre de 2012, vingt-
deux et demi pour cent hommes en âge de travailler n’étaient pas sur le 
marché du travail en Europe, un peu plus que quatre ans auparavant 
(22,1% en 2008, deuxième trimestre pour UE27). Un plus grand nom-
bre de femmes étaient inactives – 34,9 % en 2012 - mais moins que 
quatre ans auparavant (-1,5 %). Ces divergences apparentes entre hom-
mes et femmes reflètent en partie des tendances structurelles antérieures 
à la récession, dues en partie au comportement des femmes en couple, 
certaines ayant réintégré le marché du travail ou augmenté le nombre 
d’heures travaillées pour compenser une baisse de revenu de leur parte-
naire (effet de travailleurs supplémentaires).
Le nombre de travailleurs en recherche d’emploi est plus élevé chez 
les femmes. Toutefois, à percevoir ce taux comme celui d’une popula-
tion inactive, l’augmentation du fait de la crise a été plus prononcée 
chez les hommes. En termes annuels, la part de l’UE27 des travailleurs 
30
Executive Summary
en recherche d’emploi, au sein de la population inactive, a augmenté 
de 3,3 à 5,3 % chez les hommes entre 2008 et 2011 et de 3,9 à 5,1 % 
chez les femmes. 
Les ménages, dont le soutien de famille est un homme, sont en dimi-
nution par rapport à ceux dont le soutien de famille est une femme. En 
2007 les ménages à deux salaires représentaient la majorité des couples 
en âge de travailler dans lesquels au moins un membre travaillait (74,1% 
en moyenne dans les 26 pays considérés). Les ménages ayant un homme 
pour soutien de famille étaient une minorité (21%) et les ménages ayant 
une femme pour soutien de famille représentaient un petit pourcentage 
(4,9%). Dans les deux premières années de la crise, la proportion de 
ménages à deux salaires a diminué (-5,1 points de pourcentage en part), 
mais presque entièrement en faveur des ménages dont le soutien de fa-
mille est une femme. Toutefois, on ne peut pas encore dire qu’il s’agisse 
d’une disparition du soutien de famille masculin. Au sein de la majorité 
des couples à deux salaires, la contribution des femmes au revenu du 
ménage reste significativement inférieure à celle de leur partenaire, et 
cela dans une proportion telle que l’on est toujours tenu de qualifier les 
partenaires féminins de « soutiens  secondaires». 
Contrats temporaires et à temps partiel par fait de nécessité
L’aggravation des conditions de travail n’a épargné ni plus ni moins 
les hommes que les femmes, mais les a affectés différemment.
En 2010, la pire année de la crise (2010) dans notre période de réfé-
rence, la part du travail à temps partiel accepté par nécessité a aug-
menté de 38,1 %, en hausse de 5,8 points par rapport à 2007. Chez 
les femmes, la valeur correspondante était de 24 %, en hausse de 3,8 
points. Les chiffres absolus démontrent également une autre chose. En 
2010, les femmes travaillant à temps partiel sans l’avoir choisi étaient 
au nombre de 7,3 millions contre 3,2 millions pour les hommes. L’au-
gmentation de ces catégories, depuis 2007, totalise 1,3 million pour 
les femmes contre 773.000 pour les hommes. Une année après – 2011, 
la plus récente année de référence – on observe que le travail à temps 
partiel par nécessité a baissé, pour les hommes comme pour les femmes, 
restant toutefois supérieur aux niveaux d’avant la récession.
L’emploi temporaire est également réparti entre les hommes et les 
femmes, avec légèrement plus de femmes. La part, au vu du pic inférieur, 
de l’emploi temporaire masculin a diminué, passant de 13,7 % à 12.5 
%, tout comme on observe une contraction très similaire enregistrée 
pour la part de l’emploi temporaire féminin (de 15,2 à 14,1 %). Après 
le premier creux de la récession, il en résulte un schéma très contrasté 
entre l’incertitude quant à la reprise dans certains pays et une récession 
plus longue dans d’autres.
La pauvreté de ceux qui ont un emploi
Toutefois entre 2008 et 2010, le nombre de pauvres qui ont un em-
ploi a augmenté légèrement et uniquement chez les femmes. Cela sug-
31
Executive Summary
gère que les travailleurs les mieux payés ont gardé leur emploi tandis 
que les employés moins bien payés ont été plus touchés, du moins pour 
ce qui concerne les hommes. La situation de pauvreté au travail est 
plus élevée chez les hommes (8,9% comparé à 7,8% pour les femmes). 
Comme souligné en 2012 dans Emploi et développements sociaux en 
Europe, tout bien considéré, un homme a davantage de probabilités 
d’être au travail et pauvre, et ce d’environ quatre points. Malgré la 
surreprésentation des femmes dans le travail à temps partiel, les salaires 
faibles et les emplois temporaires, la pauvreté au travail affecte certai-
nes de ces femmes, mais pas toutes.
Restrictions des droits et avantages
Dans l’enquête sociale européenne de 2010, les hommes ont rendu 
compte plus fréquemment que les femmes de réductions salariales, d’u-
ne insécurité de l’emploi accrue et d’une baisse de la qualité du contenu 
du travail. Les femmes, pour leur part, ont plus fréquemment rendu 
compte que les hommes qu’elles avaient dû réduire le nombre d’heures 
de travail. En Grèce et au Portugal, des inspections du travail ont enre-
gistré, au cours de la crise, une augmentation de la violation des droits 
de protection des femmes enceintes et des mères de jeunes enfants alors 
qu’en Italie et en République Tchèque on relève que des violations au-
raient eu souvent lieu également en « temps normal ». 
Âge, éducation et diversité de la nationalité
À travers toute l’Europe, au cours de la crise, plus le travailleur est 
jeune et plus il subit la perte d’emploi. Ce profil lié à l’âge est commun 
aux hommes et aux femmes, bien que moins prononcé pour ces der-
nières. 
Dans la crise actuelle, le travailleur européen moyen avec une édu-
cation supérieure a été relativement protégé des licenciements, mais on 
observe que, dans certains pays baltiques et méditerranéens, cela ne 
s’applique pas aux femmes issues de l’éducation supérieure. Dans ces 
pays, ce sont les femmes avec un niveau de collège qui ont souffert le 
moins et qui retrouvent le plus rapidement un emploi. En outre, dans 
les pays où la récupération est en cours, la croissance de l’emploi est 
souvent plus forte chez les femmes et hommes de niveau collège que 
chez ceux qui bénéficient d’une éducation de niveau supérieur. Cette 
protection décroissante de l’éducation contribue peut-être à grossir le 
nombre de jeunes gens qui ont quitté les circuits de l’éducation, de l’em-
ploi ou de la formation (appelés NEET). 
Le groupe le plus vulnérable face à la crise est celui des hommes mi-
grants. Les hommes issus de l’extérieur de l’Union européenne ont été 
les plus touchés par la perte d’emploi, suivi par les travailleurs mobiles 
au sein de l’UE. Toujours en termes de perte d’emploi, les travailleuses 
mobiles au sein de l’UE ont été en grande partie épargnées, sauf en Ir-
lande, en Finlande et aux Pays-Bas. Elles se sont révélées moins vulnéra-
bles à la crise que les femmes locales dans l’UE27 dans son ensemble. 
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L’inverse est vrai pour les migrantes de l’extérieur de l’UE, mais même 
parmi elles, la chute, au vu du pic inférieur en termes d’emploi, n’excède 
pas les 3 points, donc pas plus importante que celle de 8 points pour les 
hommes migrants venant de l’extérieur de l’UE. Une des raisons proba-
bles à cela reposerait une fois encore  sur les problèmes inhérents à la 
disparité professionnelle et sectorielle.
Questions d’écarts de rémunération
L’écart de rémunération entre les hommes et les femmes a diminué 
dans l’ensemble de l’UE ainsi que dans la majorité des États membres 
pour lesquels des données sont disponibles. Selon les données d’Euro-
stat, l’écart brut de salaires entre les sexes a diminué dans 16 des 25 
États pour lesquels les données complètes sont disponibles entre 2007 
et 2010. Les sources nationales indiquent que ces exemples de baisse 
peuvent être plus ou moins importants.
Trois facteurs principaux ont contribué à cette diminution de l’écart 
de rémunération entre les sexes :
Des réductions dans les composantes de rémunération supplémen-
taire au salaire de base. Les bonus et primes sont les premiers sacrifiés 
en temps de crise et cela semble toucher davantage les hommes.
Une répartition sectorielle avec une surreprésentation des femmes 
dans le secteur public (où l’écart est généralement inférieur) et une sous-
représentation dans les secteurs qui offrent plus de travail et où les 
hommes ont tendance à bien gagner. 
Un certain nombre de pays ont connu des programmes politiques 
ayant pour objectif de réduire l’écart de rémunération entre les sexes. 
Dans tous ces pays, l’écart de rémunération entre les sexes a diminué 
ou n’a pas augmenté, ce qui indique que la politique salariale peut avoir 
contribué à la baisse.
Questions liées au travail non rémunéré
On observe une diminution des dépenses des ménages dans 19 des 
22 pays européens pour lesquels la valeur de 2009 peut être comparée 
à celle de 2008. Or, l’on sait que la diminution de la consommation en 
matière de produits touchant à la restauration, l’entretien de routine et 
aux services de déplacement peut être compensée par le recours à du 
travail non rémunéré. Il est donc probable que le travail non rémunéré 
ait augmenté lors de la crise.
Les conclusions des enquêtes sur l’utilisation du temps dans quatre 
pays offrent certains éléments qui tendent à prouver que l’écart entre 
les sexes dans la répartition du travail non rémunéré a probablement 
augmenté au cours de la crise, mais dans des pays où les disparités entre 
les sexes dans les tâches ménagères et services de soins sont particulière-
ment prononcées. 
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Intégration de l’égalité des sexes, politiques de l’emploi, 
consolidation fiscale
Intégration de l’égalité des sexes
Le plan de relance économique européen ne fait pas référence aux « 
sexes », pas plus que spécifiquement à la « femme » ou à l’ « égalité». 
L’absence d’intégration de l’égalité des sexes est symbolique d’une fai-
ble sensibilité à ce problème d’égalité femmes/hommes en réponse à la 
crise. 
Le comité consultatif de la commission européenne sur l’égalité des 
chances pour les femmes et les hommes a mis en évidence la faible 
visibilité de l’égalité des sexes dans les réponses à la crise à l’échelle 
européenne, ainsi que la nécessité de prendre en compte la dimension 
femmes/hommes dans les initiatives actuelles et futures pour répondre à 
la crise. Le rapport conjoint sur l’emploi, adopté par le conseil en 2010, 
a identifié les femmes parmi les groupes à risque en période de hausse 
du chômage et a reconnu l’effet négatif de la crise sur les politiques 
d’égalité des sexes. Il a souligné qu’il était important d’intégrer plus 
activement les questions de l’égalité femmes/hommes. Une plus forte 
reconnaissance du rôle que peuvent jouer les politiques d’égalité des 
sexes dans la reprise est encore nécessaire pour s’assurer que les écarts 
entre les sexes ne réapparaissent pas. 
Politiques d’égalité entre les sexes
Dans certains États membres, le cadre institutionnel de la politique 
d’égalité des sexes a été renforcé dans les stratégies, les plans d’action 
et les actes. Cependant, les coupes budgétaires du fait des mesures de 
consolidation budgétaire risquent de réduire le statut des politiques 
d’égalité ou de réduire le budget qui leur est alloué. Ce rapport a conclu 
que, dans plusieurs États membres, les réductions budgétaires affectent 
sérieusement le bon fonctionnement des infrastructures d’égalité des 
sexes. Cependant, les autres États membres ont décidé de ne pas réduire 
les ressources consacrées aux organismes relevant de l’égalité des sexes 
et/ou projets, voire de les augmenter.
Politiques de l’emploi 
Les mesures de relance précoces se concentrent sur les secteurs initia-
lement atteints par la crise, dominés par les hommes en termes d’emploi. 
Les politiques d’emploi qui ne suivent pas cette ligne se concentrent sur 
les programmes de travail de courte durée et de la gestion des pro-
grammes d’allocations chômage. Les données relevées à ce jour laissent 
penser que les hommes seraient les principaux bénéficiaires des deux 
types de programmes non seulement parce qu’ils ont fortement subi les 
phénomènes liés à  la perte d’emploi mais aussi en raison de la concep-
tion de ces programmes. Le « sexisme » présent dans ces programmes a 
pu fonctionner à ce jour en raison du sexisme correspondant dans les-
dits phénomènes. Cependant, la conception des politiques de l’emploi 
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et de revenu qui ne suivent pas la ligne préalablement décrite se devra 
d’être plus « universelle » à l’avenir. 
Consolidation fiscale
Ce rapport fait une première tentative pour évaluer les répercussions 
de la consolidation fiscale d’un point de vue de l’égalité des sexes. D’u-
ne part les conséquences n’apparaissent pas encore complètement dans 
les statistiques sur l’emploi ou les salaires et d’autre part les évalua-
tions de ces conséquences n’ont pas été effectuées de ce point de vue, à 
l’exception de quelques pays. Cette évaluation s’appuie donc sur deux 
types de relevés de données, à savoir celui de l’évaluation subjective des 
experts nationaux dans dix-neuf pays et celui d’une observation des 
dernières évolutions dans six pays.
Selon l’évaluation des experts, la liste de mesures identifiées dans le 
19 Pays pris en consideration et considerées comme importantes pour 
l’égalité des sexes est la suivante, en ce qui concerne les dépenses:
gel ou réduction des salaires dans le secteur public (10 pays), 
gel du recrutement ou réductions du personnel dans le secteur public 
(9 pays), 
réformes des retraites : report de la retraite et/ou un âge de la retraite 
des femmes égal à celui des hommes (8 pays), 
suppressions ou restrictions en matière de prestations de soins / in-
demnités/installations (8 pays), 
réduction des prestations de logement ou prestations familiales (6 
pays), 
et un resserrement des critères d’admissibilité aux prestations d’ai-
des et allocations chômage ou réductions des taux de remplacement (5 
pays).
En ce qui concerne les recettes, la liste de mesures est la suivante :
mesures fiscales (6 pays), 
augmentation de la TVA : (6 pays), 
et augmentation des cotisations pour les services publics subven-
tionnés (soins de santé, transports, autres) (3 pays).
 La prévision selon laquelle ces mesures affecteront principalement 
les femmes repose sur la collecte d’informations concernant les der-
niers développements, dans six pays. Certaines informations issues de 
pays avec des programmes de consolidation fiscale limitée (Pays Bas et 
Finlande) ou de ceux dont la contraction des finances publiques s’est 
fait sentir dès le début de la récession (Lettonie) ne vont pas dans le 
sens de cette prévision. Dans ces pays, les effets directs à court terme 
de la consolidation fiscale sur l’emploi des femmes et sur leur accès 
aux services sociaux ont été faibles. En outre, les femmes ne semblent 
pas être pénalisées par la réduction des transferts sociaux. Toutefois, 
l’information reste limitée et les effets à moyen et long terme ne sont 
pas encore correctement connus. Enfin, il y a des raisons de s’inquiéter 
à tous points de vue en ce qui concerne l’Irlande, la Grèce ou l’Espagne 
où la consolidation fiscale s’est fait sentir dès le début de la crise et 
dans des proportions dramatiquement croissantes. Dans ces pays, non 
seulement l’emploi des femmes était comparativement bas au début de 
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la récession mais il continue de baisser régulièrement depuis. La re-
structuration de la sécurité sociale (retraites), la réduction des services 
publics et des salaires, et la réduction effective ou prévue de l’emploi 
public est considérable et l’augmentation de la pauvreté a été plus pro-
noncée pour certains groupes de femmes, dont par exemple les femmes 
retraitées en Grèce.
Questions liées à la pauvreté de revenu (2005-2010)
Dans presque tous les pays et presque chaque année de la période de 
référence, les femmes présentent un taux de risque de pauvreté plus éle-
vé que celui des hommes. A l’échelle de l’UE-27, l’écart entre les sexes 
a tendance à augmenter en 2007 et à diminuer par la suite. La pauvreté 
de revenu, mesurée par le taux de personnes gagnant un revenu annuel 
inférieur à 60 % du revenu moyen, a augmenté sur l’ensemble de l’Eu-
rope dans les premières années de la crise, bien que la hausse ne fût pas 
dramatique. En 2009 le risque de taux de pauvreté (établi en 2005) 
est supérieur au taux de 2007 de 2,3 points chez les hommes et de 1,7 
point chez les femmes4. Des augmentations plus fortes ont été relevées 
dans les pays plus gravement touchés par la crise. 
Dans tous les pays européens et tout au long de la période consi-
dérée, les femmes souffrent d’un plus haut risque de taux de pauvreté 
avant la mise en œuvre des transferts sociaux, à un degré plus élevé 
que l’écart entre les sexes après les transferts sociaux (environ 5 % 
par rapport à 2 %). Les régimes fiscaux et la protection sociale sont 
fondamentaux dans la réduction du taux de pauvreté en ce qui con-
cerne les femmes. Du fait de la crise, une aggravation marginale de la 
position des hommes, avant la mise en œuvre des transferts sociaux, a 
légèrement réduit l’écart entre les sexes en termes de risque de taux de 
pauvreté, de 5,1 % en 2004 à 4,8 % en 2009.
Du fait de la crise, plusieurs pays ont connu une augmentation re-
marquable du nombre de bénéficiaires des régimes de revenu minimum 
garanti, avec une part prédominante de femmes. Certains pays ont vu 
leurs dépenses publiques augmenter pour avoir dû augmenter le nom-
bre de paiements de revenu minimum garanti.
Les prestations familiales sont des mesures officiellement neutres et 
ce sont surtout les femmes qui bénéficient de ces versements, en raison 
de la répartition sexiste des activités de soins. Des réductions dans les 
dépenses publiques en raison de la crise économique ont touché les 
prestations familiales existantes dans la plupart des pays avec des effets 
importants sur la différence entre les hommes et les femmes. Cepen-
dant, un petit nombre de pays a élargi son soutien aux prestations et 
allocations familiales en réponse à la crise économique. 
4  Les chiffres font référence au risque de pauvreté calculé à l’aide de la ligne de 
pauvreté 2005 afin d’éviter d’obtenir une réduction de la pauvreté lorsque les revenus 
minima baissent plus que le revenu moyen. Notez que les chiffres pour 2007 sont tirés 
de l’enquête UE-SILC de 2008, tandis que ceux de 2009 se rapportent à la dernière 
enquête mise à jour et publiée en 2010.
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Dans le domaine de la garde d’enfants, les dépenses publiques pour 
allocation ont été réduites plus que les dépenses publiques pour la pre-
station de services. Ainsi, dans plusieurs pays européens, le nombre 
d’agréments de garderies a augmenté au cours des dernières années, 
malgré la crise économique. Toutefois, dans un certain nombre de pays 
la réduction des dépenses sociales se ressent également en ce qui concer-
ne les services liés à ce domaine.
Une augmentation du taux de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée devrait 
avoir un effet négatif sur l’égalité des sexes étant donné que le taux 
de risque de pauvreté généralement plus élevé et le plus faible revenu 
disponible touchent les femmes en proportion plus importante que les 
hommes. 
Questions d’exclusion sociale (2005-2010)
Presque chaque année de cette période et dans presque tous les pays, 
on observe que les femmes subissent davantage de privation matérielle. 
L’index de la privation matérielle grave est défini comme l’incapacité 
forcée à pouvoir payer un certain nombre d’éléments considérés comme 
nécessaires à une vie décente et adéquate. La crise a ralenti les progrès 
obtenus en ce qui concerne la réduction de la privation matérielle, où 
l’on peut constater une constante progression d’année en année, selon 
le sondage effectué par SILC en 2010, mais  une progression qui de-
meure inférieure aux taux moyens relevés avant la crise et aux taux de 
progression en 2005. La crise a légèrement réduit l’écart entre les sexes, 
bien que cette constatation relève plus d’une aggravation de la position 
des hommes plutôt que d’une amélioration de celle des femmes. Les 
variations sont en moyenne peu importantes pour les premières années 
de la crise, mais dans une certaine mesure, elles cachent une hétérogé-
néité importante sur l’ensemble des pays.
Éducation
La formation et l’éducation semblent moins touchées par les réduc-
tions budgétaires. Les stratégies nationales pendant la crise ont mis l’ac-
cent sur une meilleure prise en compte du domaine préscolaire et sur 
les activités extracurriculaires. De tels mesures sont particulièrement 
avantageuses pour les enfants et pour les parents qui en ont la charge, le 
plus souvent d’ailleurs des femmes. Cependant, les groupes vulnérables 
ont été touchés, parmi lesquels les femmes immigrées, les sans-abri et 
les personnes à risque de décrochage scolaire (avec une surreprésenta-
tion masculine).
Logement 
La crise économique a également des conséquences substantielles 
sur les marchés de l’immobilier et des hypothèques dans plusieurs pays 
européens. Dans un certain nombre de pays il existe déjà de relevés 
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de données concernant une hausse des dettes pour le logement, des ri-
sques de défaut de paiement ainsi qu’une augmentation des expulsions 
forcées. Les pays qui ont subi une crise du logement (ou qui risquent 
d’y faire face) offrent principalement des plans de gestion de dette au 
logement afin d’aider les gens à faire face au surendettement. Alors que 
la plupart de ces mesures tendent à ne pas faire de distinction entre 
les hommes et les femmes, elles favorisent toutefois indirectement les 
femmes qui sont connues pour être beaucoup plus vulnérables. En effet, 
dans les pays pour lesquels des données sont disponibles, les femmes 
ont tendance à s’exposer plus que les hommes à des risques plus éle-
vés d’arriérés de loyer ou d’hypothèque. Du point de vue de l’égalité 
des sexes, les mesures d’aide au logement sont particulièrement impor-
tantes pour certains groupes de femmes, comme celui des mères céliba-
taires pour qui il est souvent difficile d’acheter un logement par manque 
de revenus. En outre, le manque de logements à des prix abordables est 
l’une des principales causes de l’itinérance. Bien qu’il y ait une absen-
ce importante de données, dans les pays disposant de données sur les 
sans-abri, la situation semble avoir empiré au cours de la crise. Dans 
ces pays, les hommes et les femmes encourent des risques d’itinérance 
de manière apparemment similaire, bien que, pour les plus jeunes, les 
risques pour les femmes soient plus élevés que pour les hommes. En 
outre, on observe que les femmes sont plus souvent que les hommes des 
sans-abri « invisibles », entre autre parce qu’elles cherchent des solu-
tions temporaires comme vivre avec leur famille, des amis, des « par-
tenaires de commodité » ou des connaissances. Bien que ceci reflète de 
véritables différences de comportement entre les femmes et les hommes, 
dans certains pays cela pourrait également s’expliquer par l’absence de 
politiques ciblant spécifiquement les femmes dans ce domaine.
Santé
Les réformes récentes de santé dans plusieurs pays ont mis l’accent 
sur la maîtrise des coûts. Les nouveaux frais d’ordonnance ou frais 
de dépassement ont également été pris en compte dans plusieurs pays 
européens. La maîtrise des coûts a un effet régressif puisque le coût des 
soins de santé freine plus les personnes à faible revenu, toute propor-
tion gardée, et pèse plus lourdement sur les femmes en raison de leur 
risque plus élevé de pauvreté.
Les réductions budgétaires dans le secteur de la santé ont également 
atteint les femmes plus que les hommes en ce qui concerne les offres 
d’emploi. Les femmes sont principalement employées dans le secteur 
public et dans le secteur de la santé. La réduction des salaires du secteur 
public ou la réduction de personnel concerne les femmes de manière 
disproportionnée. 
Les pays n’ont généralement pas réduit les dépenses sociales publi-
ques en touchant au domaine des services de soins de longue durée. Les 
femmes représentent la majorité des patients comme aussi du personnel 
aide-soignant. Dans les pays qui ont subi la plus sévère consolidation 
fiscale, les indemnités pour soins de longue durée et les allocations ont 
été réduites, même si l’on a pu observer que les indemnités de soins de 
longue durée ont été augmentées dans certains pays.
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Recommandations
Dix recommandations sont formulées pour promouvoir l’égalité des 
sexes comme un moyen d’aide à l’économie pour sortir de la crise.
1. Réviser la formulation des indicateurs de l’égalité entre les sexes. 
L’amélioration apparente dans la plupart des écarts entre les hommes 
et les femmes, en dépit de la détérioration de l’emploi, des salaires, des 
conditions de travail et des revenus tant pour les hommes que les fem-
mes, soulève des questions quant à savoir si les « écarts entre les sexes » 
que l’on peut relever sont bien significatifs des tendances de l’égalité des 
sexes en période de récession et analysables en tant que tels.
2. Encourager les États membres à adopter des systèmes de gestion 
budgétaires efficaces à réduire les écarts hommes/femmes dans leurs 
initiatives politiques principales, y compris dans l’examen des dépenses 
et dans les plans de redressement en cours ou à venir. Tenir compte de 
ce que la mise en place d’exigences légales pour que les politiques soient 
contrôlées dans une perspective d’égalité entre les sexes n’est peut-être 
pas  une mesure suffisante, comme le prouve l’expérience en Autriche 
et au Royaume-Uni.
3. Surveiller de près le risque qu’une consolidation fiscale puisse nu-
ire à la protection sociale ainsi qu’aux infrastructures égalitaires. 
4. Lancer et soutenir des initiatives ayant pour objectif d’élever le 
niveau d’éducation dans les disciplines de la finance pour les femmes 
(comme pour l’ensemble de la population)  afin d’assurer une représen-
tation féminine plus importante dans les principaux organismes finan-
ciers de la machinerie européenne. Cette crise a montré clairement à 
quel point les décisions politiques traditionnellement associées aux 
femmes, comme la protection sociale, la scolarité ou l’harmonisation, 
viennent à dépendre de décisions macroéconomiques et financières dont 
les femmes ont traditionnellement été exclues ou auxquelles les femmes 
ont peu accès par manque de formation.
6. Résoudre le problème de la flexibilité de l’emploi des jeunes, 
dont la charge est particulièrement lourde. Cela signifie qu’il faut re-
voir la conception des politiques traditionnelles qui tiennent compte 
des différentes périodes, comme les régimes de temps de travail à court 
terme et les programmes d’allocations chômage. Alors que les deux 
mesures sont importantes pour contrer les pires effets de la crise de 
l’emploi et des salaires, ils s’adressent pourtant souvent en priorité aux 
travailleurs réguliers à plein temps.
7. En ce qui concerne les mesures de soutien des revenus en accord 
avec l’intégration de l’égalité des sexes, les dépenses sociales et les plans 
d’imposition devraient avoir, parmi leurs préoccupations principales, 
celle de l’indépendance financière des femmes, surtout si elles ont pour 
but de sortir des hommes et des femmes de la pauvreté.
8. Les dépenses sociales doivent être canalisées afin de donner la 
priorité à la qualité de services sur les prestations d’allocations com-
me d’indemnités, afin d’assurer un résultat réel sur la répartition équi-
table des programmes d’austérité et pour alléger la charge des soins 
pesant sur les femmes. Canaliser les fonds de relance vers les infra-
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structures sanitaires et sociales et non pas seulement sur les infrastruc-
tures physiques.
9. Renforcer le Fonds social européen et ses procédures de recours. 
Plusieurs pays avec un faible taux d’emploi des femmes dans le sud et 
l’est de l’Europe sont aussi des pays où la récession et la consolidation 
fiscale réduisent la protection sociale, l’harmonisation et les mesures en 
faveur de l’égalité des sexes. Le Fonds structurel européen représente 
une ressource importante dans ces pays pour compenser les réductions 
des dispositions locales et pour maintenir l’objectif d’emploi pour 2020. 
Dans certains cas, toutefois, les dépenses du FSE devront être révisées 
afin de justifier leur pleine efficacité. En particulier, cette révision doit 
assurer que : (i) les procédures pour accéder aux fonds et les dépenser 
soient simplifiées ; et (ii) les programmes clés mis en œuvre continuent 
de fonctionner après que les fonds du FSE ont été retirés.
10. Accroître la surveillance et sensibiliser le public aux cas de vio-
lation des droits de congé de maternité et autres congés. Les violations 
des droits de maternité/parentaux peuvent être plus fréquentes dans 
les petites et moyennes entreprises en raison de coûts organisationnels 
plus élevés. Leurs besoins spécifiques et contraintes doivent être pris en 
charge, d’autant que c’est aussi un problème en temps « normal ».
Aborder la question de la mauvaise intégration de travailleurs mobi-
les et migrants, en particulier celle des hommes.
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Zweck
Europa durchlebt derzeit eine finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Krise. 
Diese begann mit der „Kreditklemme“ im Finanzdienstleistungssektor 
und entwickelte sich in vielen Staaten zu einer Schuldenkrise. Als Re-
aktion auf die Krise wurden Konsolidierungs- und Sparmaßnahmen 
eingeleitet, um Haushaltsdefizite und Staatsverschuldung zu reduzieren. 
Die Krise wächst sich weiter aus, sodass die Analysen und Ergebnisse 
dieses Berichts als vorläufig angesehen werden müssen.
Dieser Bericht zielt darauf ab, die Auswirkung dieser Krise auf die Si-
tuation von Frauen und Männern in Europa und die Gleichstellungspo-
litik zu beurteilen. Dies ist wichtig, da Wirtschaftskrisen tiefgreifend 
geschlechtsspezifisch verlaufen. Erfahrungswerte aus der Vergangen-
heit erlauben keinen ausreichenden Einblick in die Auswirkungen die-
ser Krise auf die Geschlechter, da sich die Stellung von Frauen seit der 
letzten größeren Rezession beträchtlich verändert hat. Diese Krise bie-
tet die Chance auf eine radikale Veränderung, die durchaus Potential 
für Fortschritte bei der Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern haben 
könnte. Dennoch gehen mit der Krise auch Herausforderungen einher, 
bei deren Bewältigung die Berücksichtigung von Gleichstellungsfragen 
möglicherweise nur als ein Thema angesehen wird, das lediglich in gu-
ten Zeiten beachtet werden muss.
Dieser Bericht wurde von den Expertennetzwerken EGGE und EGGSI 
der Europäischen Kommission erstellt. Er deckt 27 Mitgliedstaaten, 
die EWR-EFTA-Staaten und die drei Beitrittskandidaten Türkei, Kroa-
tien und FYROM ab. Kern-Referenzperiode für die zu analysierenden 
Auswirkungen auf den Arbeitsmarkt sind die (fast) vier Jahre zwischen 
dem zweiten Quartal 2008, als die Krise formal in der gesamten EU 
begann5, und dem ersten Quartal 2012, welches zum Zeitpunkt der 
Redaktion dieses Berichts das letzte Quartal ist, für das Eurostat-Daten 
verfügbar sind. Die Analyse der sozialen Auswirkungen erstreckt sich 
über den Zeitraum zwischen 2005 und 2010.
5  Siehe Europäische Kommission, 2010e: Tabelle 1. Formal beginnt eine 
Rezessionsperiode, wenn das BIP in zwei aufeinander folgenden Quartalen 
negative Abweichungen gegenüber dem Vorquartal verzeichnet.
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Vier Hauptschlussfolgerungen
Aus diesem Bericht lassen sich vier Hauptschlussfolgerungen ziehen: 
Die erste Schlussfolgerung ist, dass sich die geschlechterspezifischen 
Unterschiede in Bezug auf Beschäftigung, Arbeitslosigkeit, Löhne und 
Armut während der Krise verringert haben. Dies deutet jedoch noch 
nicht auf Fortschritte in der Gleichstellung der Geschlechter hin, da 
diese Ergebnisse auf geringeren Beschäftigungsquoten, höheren Ar-
beitslosigkeitsquoten und reduziertem Einkommen sowohl für Männer 
als auch für Frauen basieren.
Seit Beginn der Krise bis heute hat die Arbeitsmarktsegregation 
von Männern und Frauen die Beschäftigung, die Arbeitsmarktakti-
vität und die Entlohnung von Frauen effizient geschützt. Zu dieser 
Segregation gehören die Überrepräsentation von Frauen in Dienstlei-
stungsverhältnissen, einschließlich Stellen im öffentlichen Sektor, und 
die Unterrepräsentation in den Bereichen Fertigung und Bau sowie in 
männlich dominierten Zweigen des Finanzsektors. Das Gesamtnive-
au der Segregation in einem Land korreliert positiv und signifikant 
mit der Differenz der Beschäftigungsverluste zwischen Männern und 
Frauen. Männer erlebten in den Ländern, in denen die Segregation 
größer ist, vergleichsweise höhere Beschäftigungsverluste als Frauen. 
Weiterhin kann die Arbeitsmarktsegregation dort Frauen letztlich 
stärker exponieren, wo die Haushaltskonsolidierung Arbeitsplätze 
im öffentlichen Sektor signifikant reduziert.
Die zweite Hauptschlussfolgerung ist, dass das Arbeitsmarktverhal-
ten von Frauen während der Krise dem der Männer ähnelte. Die tra-
ditionelle Sichtweise, dass Frauen sich als Beschäftigungspuffer verhal-
ten – also vermehrt eingestellt werden, wenn die Nachfrage expandiert, 
aber wieder entlassen werden, wenn sie kontrahiert –, wurde bei frühe-
ren Krisen infrage gestellt, durch die Erfahrung dieser Krise aber defini-
tiv widerlegt. Die heutigen „Puffer“ sind junge Männer und Frauen mit 
Zeitarbeitsverträgen und Arbeiter mit Migrationshintergrund.
Diese Ähnlichkeit des Arbeitsmarktverhaltens begann mit der verän-
derten Einkommensrolle von Frauen. So verringerte sich der Anteil 
doppelverdienender Paare im Abschwung fast ausschließlich zugunsten 
von Paaren mit weiblichem Alleinverdiener, die ihren Anteil auf fast 10 
% erhöhten.
Ein ähnliches Arbeitsmarktverhalten wird auch darin offensichtlich, 
dass Männer prozentual stärker von Entmutigung aufgrund der Ar-
beitssuche betroffen waren als Frauen. Es gibt dafür weitere Hinwei-
se, da nicht weniger Frauen als Männer „unfreiwillig“ Teilzeitarbeit 
akzeptierten. So erhöhte sich die Anzahl unfreiwilliger Teilzeitarbeiter 
bei den Frauen tatsächlich stärker, obwohl der prozentuale Anstieg bei 
den Männern höher ausfiel.
Die Verschlechterung der Beschäftigungsbedingungen betraf Frauen 
und Männer eher auf unterschiedliche Weise, als dass man von „mehr“ 
oder „weniger“ sprechen könnte. Es gibt Anzeichen für Verstöße gegen 
und Einschränkung von Rechten während der Krise, aber es gibt kei-
ne klaren Hinweise darauf, ob Männer oder Frauen stärker betroffen 
sind. Männer bezeichnen sich selbst als stärker von der Krise betroffen, 
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klagen häufiger über erhöhte Arbeitsplatzunsicherheit, Lohnkürzungen 
und unfreiwillige Annahme einer weniger interessanten Arbeit.
Bestimmte Auswirkungen der Krise betreffen dagegen spezifisch 
Frauen. Insbesondere die Rechte schwangerer Frauen auf Mutterschaf-
tsurlaub und soziale Leistungen wurden eingeschränkt, und in min-
destens vier Ländern wurde eine Diskriminierung von Schwangeren 
dokumentiert.
Es gibt in begrenztem Maße Hinweise auf Entwicklungen in Bezug 
auf unbezahlte Arbeit. Jedoch gingen die Ausgaben der Haushalte für 
den Verbrauch von Gütern, für die unbezahlte Arbeit ein naheliegender 
Ersatz ist, im Tal der ersten Rezessionsepisode (2008 – 2009) in den 
meisten europäischen Ländern zurück.
Die dritte Hauptschlussfolgerung dieses Berichts ist, dass trotz Hin-
weisen auf eine zurückhaltende, aber ungleiche Senkung der Soziallei-
stungen in den ersten Jahren der Krise die Gefahr besteht, dass durch 
die Konsolidierungsmaßnahmen letztlich sowohl die gezahlten Sozial-
leistungen als auch die damit zusammenhängende Beschäftigung redu-
ziert werden könnte, was entsprechende Auswirkungen auf die Gleich-
stellung der Geschlechter hätte.
Die Krise hat die geschlechterspezifischen Unterschiede von Armut 
in den ersten beiden Jahren geringfügig reduziert, allerdings durch 
eine Erhöhung des Armutsrisikos, die bei Männern stärker ist als bei 
Frauen. Ohne Sozialtransfers hätte die Krise in vielen Ländern sowohl 
bei Männern als auch bei Frauen zu höheren Armutsquoten geführt. 
Diese Umverteilung war für die Reduktion der geschlechterspezifischen 
Unterschiede in den Armutsquoten bedeutsam.
Weniger durch Sparmaßnahmen beeinträchtigt wurden bis 2010 
scheinbar Bildung und Ausbildung. Nationale Strategien während 
der Krise konzentrierten sich auf die Verlängerung von Vorschul- und 
außerschulischen Programmen. Derartige Herangehensweisen sind 
nicht nur für Kinder vorteilhaft, sondern auch für die betreuenden El-
tern, insbesondere für Frauen. Zu den anfälligen Gruppen im Bereich 
Bildung und Ausbildung gehören Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund, 
Obdachlose und diejenigen, die Gefahr laufen, zu frühen Schulabbre-
chern zu werden (hier sind Männer überrepräsentiert).
Die in einigen Ländern herrschende Immobilienkrise führt darüber 
hinaus zu schwerwiegenden Beeinträchtigungen des Lebens in den 
anfälligsten Haushalten, unter anderem bei alleinerziehenden Müt-
tern und Haushalten mit niedrigem Einkommen (hier sind wiederum 
Frauen überrepräsentiert). Daraus resultierend, sind Obdachlosigkeit 
und Langzeit-Obdachlosigkeit während der Krise angestiegen; wobei 
dieses Phänomen in vielen Ländern geschlechterspezifisch verläuft.
Berichten zufolge hat sich der Gesundheitszustand von Männern 
und Frauen als Folge der Krise verschlechtert. Bei den kürzlich in meh-
reren Ländern durchgeführten Gesundheitsreformen konzentrierte man 
sich auf Kostenbegrenzung, und in einigen Ländern wurden neue oder 
höhere Rezeptgebühren eingeführt. Diese Kostenbegrenzung wirkt sich 
negativ aus, da die Kosten der Gesundheitsversorgung für Menschen 
mit niedrigeren Einkommen eine größere Belastung darstellen, und 
hiervon sind in besonderem Maße Frauen betroffen. Auch auf der An-
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gebotsseite treffen Sparmaßnahmen im Gesundheitssektor Frauen här-
ter als Männer, da in dem Sektor mehr Frauen beschäftigt sind.
Einige Länder förderten Gesundheits- und Langzeit-Pflegeein-
richtungen, wohingegen zahlreiche andere Länder im Rahmen von 
Haushaltskürzungen Gebühren erhöht oder gesundheits- und pflegebe-
zogene Geldleistungen reduzierten. In den Ländern mit den umfangrei-
chsten Einsparmaßnahmen wurden Langzeitpflegebezüge und -leistun-
gen gekürzt, wovon mehr Frauen als Männer betroffen sind.
Die Konsolidierung der öffentlichen Haushalte stellt eine Gefahr für 
die Gleichstellung von Männern und Frauen dar. Zu den Konsolidie-
rungsmaßnahmen, die die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter am stärk-
sten bedrohen, gehören Lohnstopps und Lohnkürzungen im öffentli-
chen Sektor, Einstellungsstopps und Personalabbau im öffentlichen 
Sektor, Rentenreformen, Kürzungen und Begrenzungen pflegebezoge-
ner Leistungen, Bezüge und Zuschüsse, Einschnitte bei Mietzuschüssen 
und familienbezogenen Leistungen, Verschärfung der Kriterien für die 
Gewährung von Arbeitslosengeld und Unterstützungsleistungen und 
Senkung der Neubesetzungsquoten, Steuermaßnahmen, Mehrwert-
steuererhöhungen und Erhöhung der Gebühren für öffentlich subven-
tionierte Dienstleistungen.
Die neuesten auf Länderebene gesammelten Belege legen nahe, dass 
es bei der konkreten Auswirkung der Haushaltskonsolidierung auf die 
Gleichstellung der Geschlechter zwischen den Ländern erhebliche Un-
terschiede gibt. Während die Auswirkung in einigen Ländern moderat 
ist und die Gleichstellung nicht dauerhaft gefährdet, kann der Abbau 
von Beschäftigung, Sozialtransfers und sozialen Diensten in anderen 
Ländern dazu führen, dass in der Vergangenheit erreichte Fortschritte 
rückgängig gemacht werden. Es ist somit  nicht auszuschließen, dass 
geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede sich innerhalb Europas als unbeab-
sichtigte Folge der Haushaltskonsolidierung wieder vergrößern könn-
ten.
Die vierte Hauptschlussfolgerung dieses Berichts ist, dass das Gender 
Mainstreaming in der überwiegenden Mehrzahl der Länder während 
der Krise nicht in politischen Entwürfen und Umsetzungsmaßnahmen 
implementiert wurde. In der überwiegenden Mehrzahl der Fälle wur-
den weder Konjunkturbelebungs- noch Konsolidierungsmaßnahmen 
aus geschlechtsbezogener Sicht bewertet. Die Auswirkungen auf die 
Gleichstellung der Geschlechter wurden in etwa einem Zehntel der po-
litischen Initiativen, die in Reaktion auf die Krise als Teil der Nationa-
len Reformprogramme 2011 angekündigt oder umgesetzt wurden,  in 
allen Stadien des politischen Prozesses berücksichtigt.
In mehreren Mitgliedstaaten beeinträchtigten die Haushaltskon-
solidierungspakete auch die Funktion der Infrastruktur für die Glei-
chstellung der Geschlechter. Einige wenige Länder unternahmen je-
doch Schritte, um die Wirksamkeit der vorhandenen Infrastruktur zu 
erhöhen, und einige osteuropäische Länder führten auf dem Gebiet der 
Geschlechtergleichstellung institutionelle Neuerungen ein.
Im Folgenden werden die drängendsten Probleme, die diesen umfas-
senden Schlussfolgerungen zugrunde liegen, genauer untersucht.
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Probleme der Lohnarbeit
Beschäftigung und Arbeitslosigkeit
Während des Abschwungs verringerte sich das geschlechtsspezifi-
sche Gefälle bei Beschäftigung und Arbeitslosigkeit, da die Beschäfti-
gungsquote der Männer stärker zurückging als die der Frauen und die 
Männerarbeitslosigkeit stärker stieg. Die EU-weite Geschlechterkluft 
bei den  Beschäftigungsquoten ging um etwa 3,2 Prozentpunkte zurück: 
von den Spitzenwerten (vor der Krise) von 14,1 Prozentpunkten auf 
10,9 Punkte im ersten Quartal 2012. Die Geschlechterkluft bei der Ar-
beitslosigkeit drehte sich  2012 ,  sogar zum zweiten Mal seit Beginn der 
Rezession um, was sich in einer geringfügig niedrigeren Arbitslosigkeit 
von Frauen im Vergleich zu Männern äusserte   (-0,2 Prozentpunkte).
Die Wahl der Indikatoren zur Messung der Auswirkung der Krise 
auf Beschäftigung und Arbeitslosigkeit ist jedoch bedeutsam. 
Vor der Rezession waren die Frauen dabei, die Männer bei der Be-
schäftigung langsam einzuholen, und diese Entwicklung müssen sie 
fortsetzen. Daher sind eher potenzielle Verluste als tatsächliche Verluste 
relevant. Wenn wir die Abweichungen von Trends zugrunde legen, um 
potenzielle Verluste zu messen, scheinen Männer im Tal des ersten Re-
zessionszeitraums (oder „Delle“) fast doppelt so hohe Verluste erlitten 
zu haben wie Frauen, und etwa eineinhalb mal höhere als zu Beginn des 
Jahres 2012 (erstes Quartal). Düsterer ist das Ergebnis beim Vergleich 
der tatsächlichen Verluste, die bei Männern zwischen dem höchsten 
und dem niedrigsten Quartal der ersten Rezessionsepisode fast dreimal 
so hoch war, und über die gesamten vier Jahre der Rezession gesehen 
sogar noch höher.
Unabhängig davon, auf welche Weise die Verluste gemessen wer-
den, waren Männer stärker vom Beschäftigungsrückgang betroffen als 
Frauen: fast dreimal so stark, wenn man die konventionellen Indikato-
ren zugrunde legt, fast doppelt so viel, wenn der Indikator die vor der 
Krise bestehenden Trends berücksichtigt. Diese letztgenannte Option 
ist im Hinblick auf die  Gleichstellung der Geschlechter sinnvoller, weil 
ein gegebener Beschäftigungsrückgang diejenige Gruppe stärker bela-
stet, die immer noch ihren Rückstand aufholen muss (Frauen).
Die Wahl der Indikatoren ist für die Untersuchung der Entwicklung 
der Arbeitslosigkeit also bedeutsam. Wenn wir uns die Veränderungen 
der Arbeitslosenquote seit Beginn der Rezession ansehen, so verlief die 
Entwicklung bei den Frauen weniger dynamisch, mit dem Vorteil eines 
weniger starken Anstieg im Falle eines allgemeinen Anstiegs der Ar-
beitslosigkeit, und dem Nachteil einer vergleichsweise langsameren Neu-
beschäftigung bei einer Erholung des Arbeitsmarktes. Schaut man auf 
die jeweiligen Zahlen statt auf die Veränderungen, so war die Frauenar-
beitslosigkeit schon von Beginn an höher und wird möglicherweise nicht 
so leicht absorbiert, sobald eine Erholung einsetzt, und zwar gerade weil 
die Entwicklung bei arbeitslosen Frauen weniger dynamisch verläuft. 
Innerhalb des jeweiligen Landes resultierten die Unterschiede bei 
der Anfälligkeit von Frauen und Männern hauptsächlich aus der ge-
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schlechtsspezifischen Segregation nach Beschäftigungssektoren und 
Berufsfeldern. Der Produktions- und Beschäftigungsrückgang war dort 
größer, wo verarbeitendes Gewerbe, der Bausektor und ausgewählte 
Finanzbranchen am stärksten betroffen waren. Da Frauen in diesen 
Sektoren durchgängig unterrepräsentiert sind, war ihre relative Anfäl-
ligkeit niedriger. Die Unterschiede des „Spitze-bis-Talsohle“-Beschäfti-
gungsrückgangs zwischen Männern und Frauen korrelieren von Land 
zu Land positiv mit der geschlechtsspezifischen Segregation nach Be-
schäftigungssektoren, während die Korrelation mit der geschlechtsspe-
zifischen Segregation nach Berufsfeldern ebenfalls signifikant, aber 
etwas geringer ist.
Der andauernde Prozess der Haushaltskonsolidierung bewirkt einen 
zunehmenden  Beschäftigungsabbau in frauendominierten Bereichen 
wie öffentlichen soziale Dienste und Bildung. Dadurch verschlechtern 
sich in einigen Ländern die Aussichten auf eine schnelle Erholung des 
Frauenarbeitsmarktes.
Trotz des geringer werdenden Beschäftigungs- und Einkom-
mensgefälles erlitt die Integration von Frauen in den Arbeitsmarkt 
einen Rückschlag. Bei den höchsten Beschäftigungswerten lagen 10 
Mitgliedstaaten direkt vor Beginn der Rezession über der Beschäfti-
gungsmarke von 65 % bei Frauen im Alter von 15 bis 64 Jahren, aber 
die Zahl ging im ersten Quartal 2012 auf 6 % zurück.
 
Arbeitslosigkeit und Resignation
Das Arbeitsmarktverhalten von Frauen in der Krise zeigt, dass ihre 
Rollen in Bezug auf das Einkommen sich in einer Übergangsphase zwi-
schen der traditionellen Geringverdiener- Situation und der modernen 
Situation der Mit-Hauptverdienerin befinden. Auf der Makroebene 
sieht die Situation für ganz Europa folgendermaßen aus:
– Frauen erhöhten, anders als Männer, ihre Beteiligung am Ar-
beitsmarkt. Im ersten Quartal 2012 waren zweiundzwanzig von 
Hundert  Männern im arbeitsfähigen Alter nicht auf dem europäi-
schen Arbeitsmarkt beschäftigt. Diese Zahl liegt etwas höher als vier 
Jahre zuvor (22,1 % im zweiten Quartal 2008 in der EU27). Viel 
mehr Frauen waren inaktiv – 34,9 von Hundert im Jahr 2012 – aber 
weniger als vier Jahre zuvor (-0,5 %). Diese unterschiedlichen Akti-
vitätsmuster zwischen Männern und Frauen reflektieren zum Teil 
strukturelle Trends aus der Zeit vor der Rezession, teilweise erge-
ben sie sich aus dem Verhalten von Frauen mit Partnern, da einige 
von ihnen in den Arbeitsmarkt eingetreten sind oder die Stundenzahl 
erhöht haben, um den Einkommensrückgang des männlichen Part-
ners auszugleichen („Added Worker Effekt“).
– Die Zahl entmutigter Arbeitnehmer liegt bei Frauen häufi-
ger höher. Vergleichen wir aber ihre Zahl mit der Zahl der nicht 
Erwerbstätigen, so war der auf die Krise folgende Anstieg bei Män-
nern höher. Zwischen 2008 und 2011 stieg der Anteil entmutigter 
Arbeitnehmer an der nicht erwerbstätigen Bevölkerung in der EU27 
von 3,3 % auf 5,3 % bei den Männern und von 3,9 % auf 5,1 % 
bei den Frauen. 
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– Haushalte mit männlichem Alleinverdiener verloren an Boden 
zugunsten von Haushalten mit weiblichem Alleinverdiener. 2007 
waren Paare im erwerbsfähigen Alter, von denen mindestens ein 
Partner arbeitete, in der Mehrzahl doppelverdienende Paare (dur-
chschnittlich 74,1 % der 26 untersuchten Länder). Paare mit männli-
chem Alleinverdiener waren eine Minderheit (21 %) und Paare mit 
weiblichem Alleinverdiener hatten einen geringen Anteil (4,9 %). 
In den ersten beiden Jahren der Krise war bei doppelverdienenden 
Paaren ein Rückgang zu verzeichnen (5,1 Prozentpunkte), dies aber 
fast ausschließlich zugunsten von Paaren mit weiblichem Alleinver-
diener. Das Thema des männlichen Alleinverdieners bleibt jedoch 
weiter aktuell. Bei der Mehrzahl der doppelverdienenden Paaren 
blieb der Beitrag der Frauen zum Haushaltseinkommen signifikant 
niedriger als der ihrer Partner, und zwar in so umfassendem Maße, 
dass die weiblichen Partner immer noch als Zweitverdiener einge-
stuft werden. 
Unfreiwillige Teilzeit- und Zeitarbeitsverträge
Von der Verschlechterung der Arbeitsbedingungen waren sowohl 
Männer als auch Frauen betroffen, jedoch auf unterschiedliche Weise.
Im Jahr 2010, dem schlimmsten Jahr der Krise (2010) innerhalb un-
serer Referenzperiode, ist der Anteil der Unfreiwilligen an der gesamten 
Teilzeitarbeit auf 38,1 % gestiegen, 5,8 Punkte mehr als 2007. Bei den 
Frauen betrug der entsprechende Wert 24 %, ein Anstieg um 3,8 Pro-
zentpunkte. Absolute Zahlen ergeben ein anderes Bild. 2010 gab es 
7,3 Millionen unfreiwillige Teilzeitkräfte bei den Frauen gegenüber 3,2 
Millionen bei den Männern. Der Anstieg seit 2007 betrug insgesamt 
1,3 Millionen bei den Frauen gegenüber 773 000 bei den Männern. 
Ein Jahr später – 2011, dem letzten, für das Daten vorliegen – ist die 
unfreiwillige Teilzeitarbeit bei beiden Geschlechtern zurückgegangen, 
blieb aber auf deutlich höherem Niveau als vor der Rezession.
Zeitarbeitsverträge sind ziemlich gleichmäßig auf Männer und 
Frauen verteilt, mit einem geringen Vorsprung bei den Frauen. Der 
Anteil männlicher Beschäftigter mit Zeitarbeitsverträgen ging nach 
dem „Spitze-bis-Talsohle“-Indikator von 13,7 % auf 12,5 % zurück, 
und eine sehr ähnlicher Rückgang wurde für den Anteil weiblicher Be-
schäftigter mit Zeitarbeitsverträgen verzeichnet (von 15,2 % auf 14,1 
%). Ungewissheit über die Erholung in einigen Ländern und die anhal-
tende Rezession in anderen Ländern erklären ein gemischtes Muster 
nach der ersten Rezessionsdelle. 
Armut trotz Arbeit
Dennoch stieg der Anteil von Armut trotz Beschäftigung zwischen 
2008 und 2010 leicht an, und zwar nur bei Frauen. Dies legt nahe, dass 
es für besser bezahlte Arbeitnehmer leichter war, ihre Stelle zu behalten, 
während die Niedrigverdiener die schlimmsten Arbeitsplatzverluste er-
litten, und zwar insbesondere die männlichen. Der Anteil von Armut 
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trotz Beschäftigung bleibt nämlich höher bei Männern (8,9 % im Ver-
gleich zu 7,8 % bei Frauen). In der Studie Employment and Social De-
velopments in Europe 2012 enthaltene Schätzungen weisen darauf hin, 
dass die Tatsache, ein Mann zu sein, bei sonst gleichen Parametern, das 
Armutsrisiko trotz Beschäftigung um ca. vier Prozentpunkte erhöht. 
Trotz der Überrepräsentation von Frauen unter Teilzeit-, Niedriglohn- 
und Zeitvertragsarbeitskräften betrifft Armut trotz Beschäftigung eher 
einige Frauen in diesen Gruppen statt alle von ihnen.
Einschränkung von Rechten und Ansprüchen
Im European Social Survey 2010 berichteten Männer häufiger als 
Frauen von Lohnkürzungen, erhöhter Arbeitsplatzunsicherheit und 
sich verschlechternder Qualität des Arbeitsinhalts. Frauen berichteten 
häufiger als Männer, dass sie gezwungen waren, die Arbeitsstunden-
zahl zu reduzieren. In Griechenland und Portugal wurde bei Arbeitsin-
spektionen während der Krise ein Anstieg von Verstößen gegen Rechte 
zum Schutz von Schwangeren und Müttern junger Kinder verzeichnet, 
während in Italien und der Tschechischen Republik berichtet wird, dass 
auch in „normalen Zeiten“ häufige Verstöße auftreten.
Unterschiede hinsichtlich Alter, Bildung und Staatsangehörigkeit
In Europa als Ganzem ist der Arbeitsplatzrückgang umso größer, je 
jünger die Arbeitnehmer sind. Dieses Altersmuster ist bei Männern und 
Frauen gleich, obwohl es bei den Frauen geringer ausgeprägt ist.
In der aktuellen Krise war der durchschnittliche europäische Arbeit-
nehmer mit Hochschulbildung von krisenbedingten Kündigungen ver-
gleichsweise sicher; dies gilt jedoch nicht für gleichermaßen gebildete 
Frauen in einigen Ländern des Baltikums und des Mittelmeerraums. In 
diesen Ländern waren es durchschnittlich gebildete Frauen, die am we-
nigsten betroffen waren und deren Beschäftigungsquote sich schneller 
erholte. Außerdem war das Beschäftigungswachstum in Ländern mit 
einer sich erholenden Konjunktur bei Frauen und Männern mit mittle-
rem Bildungsniveau häufig stärker ausgeprägt als bei den hervorragend 
ausgebildeten Arbeitnehmern. Dieses Schwinden des durch Bildung ga-
rantierten Schutzes trägt möglicherweise dazu bei, dass immer mehr 
junge Menschen weder die Schule besuchen, noch einen Ausbildungs- 
oder Arbeitsplatz haben (die so genannten NEET).
Die anfälligste Gruppe in dieser Krise sind männliche Migranten. 
Männer aus Nicht-EU-Ländern sind am stärksten von Arbeitsplatzver-
lust betroffen, gefolgt von mobilen männlichen Arbeitnehmern aus 
der EU. Mobilen weiblichen Arbeitnehmern aus der EU blieben Ar-
beitsplatzverluste weitgehend erspart, mit Ausnahme von Irland, Finn-
land und den Niederlanden. Sie erwiesen sich als weniger krisenanfällig 
als in der EU27 insgesamt ansässige Frauen. Der umgekehrte Fall gilt 
für weibliche Migranten aus Nicht-EU-Ländern, aber selbst unter ihnen 
lag der „Spitze-bis-Talsohle“-Rückgang der Beschäftigung kaum höher 
als 3 Prozent verglichen mit 8 Prozent bei männlichen Migranten aus 
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Nicht-EU-Ländern. Ein plausibler Grund ist wieder die geschlechtsspe-
zifische Segregation des Arbeitsmarktes nach Beschäftigungssektoren 
und Berufsfeldern.
Probleme im Zusammenhang mit dem geschlechtsspezifi-
schen Lohngefälle
Das geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefälle verringerte sich ebenso in 
der Gesamt-EU wie in der Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten, für die Daten 
verfügbar sind. Gemäß Eurostat-Daten verringerte sich zwischen 2007 
und 2010 das unbereinigte geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefälle in 16 von 
25 Mitgliedstaaten, für die vollständige Daten verfügbar sind. Nationa-
le Quellen deuten darauf hin, dass  der Rückgang zahlenmäßig s höher 
sein könnte.
Drei Hauptfaktoren trugen zum Rückgang des geschlechtsspezifi-
schen Lohngefälles bei:
– Kürzungen bei den zusätzlichen Lohnkomponenten des Lohnpa-
kets: Boni und Prämien werden im Krisenfall als erstes gekürzt und 
steigen tendenziell zugunsten der Männer
– Geschlechtsspezifische Segregation nach Beschäftigungssektoren 
mit Überrepräsentation von Frauen im öffentlichen Sektor, bei ei-
nem üblicherweise geringerem geschlechtsspezifischen Lohngefälle, 
und Unterrepräsentation in den Sektoren, die mehr Arbeitsplätze 
verlieren, wobei in letzteren Maenner tendenziell besser verdienen.
– In einer Reihe von Ländern gab es politische Programme zur 
Verringerung des geschlechtsspezifischen Lohngefälles. In allen die-
sen Ländern ist das geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefälle zurückgegan-
gen oder nicht gestiegen, was darauf hindeutet, dass die Politik der 
Lohngleichheit zum Rückgang des Gefälles beigetragen hat.
Probleme im Zusammenhang mit unbezahlter Arbeit
Ein Rückgang der Ausgaben privater Haushalte ist bei 19 von 22 eu-
ropäischen Ländern zu beobachten, für die der Wert für 2009 mit 2008 
vergleichbar ist. Der Rückgang des Verbrauchs in Gastronomie, am-
bulanten Diensten und routinemäßigen Wartungsdiensten kann durch 
unbezahlte Arbeit ersetzt werden. Daher ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass 
unbezahlte Arbeit während der Krise keinen Anstieg verzeichnet hat.
Die Ergebnisse von Zeitnutzungsstudien in vier Ländern deuten 
darauf hin, dass die geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschiede bei der Zu-
teilung unbezahlter Arbeit während der Krise in Ländern, in denen 
geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede bei Haushaltsarbeit und Pflegear-
beiten besonders ausgeprägt sind, gewachsen sein könnten.
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Gender Mainstreaming, Beschäftigungspolitik, 
Haushaltskonsolidierung
Gender Mainstreaming
Im Europäischen Konjunkturprogramm fanden die Begriffe „Ge-
schlecht“, „Frauen“ und „Gleichberechtigung“ keine Erwähnung. Das 
Fehlen des Gender Mainstreaming symbolisiert eine geringe Sensibilität 
für die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter in der Reaktion auf die Krise.
Der Beratende Ausschuss für Chancengleichheit von Männern und 
Frauen der Europäischen Kommission wies auf die geringe Sichtbarkeit 
der Geschlechterproblematik in den Maßnahmen zur Krisenbewälti-
gung auf europäischem Niveau hin, sowie auf die Notwendigkeit, die 
Geschlechterdimension bei aktuellen und zukünftigen Initiativen zur 
Bewältigung der Krise zu berücksichtigen. Der 2010 vom Rat ange-
nommene Gemeinsame Beschäftigungsbericht ermittelte die Frauen als 
Risikogruppe in einer Periode steigender Arbeitslosigkeit und erkannte 
die negative Auswirkung der Krise auf die Politik der Geschlechterglei-
chstellung. Er wies auf die Notwendigkeit hin, das Gender Mainstrea-
ming aktiver umzusetzen. Eine stärkere Anerkennung der Rolle, die die 
Geschlechtergleichstellungspolitik bei der wirtschaftlichen Erholung 
spielen kann, wird nach wie vor gebraucht, um sicherzustellen, dass die 
geschlechtsspezifische Kluft nicht wieder aufbricht.
Geschlechtergleichstellungspolitik
In einigen Mitgliedstaaten wurde der institutionelle Rahmen für die 
Geschlechtergleichstellungspolitik durch Gesetze, Maßnahmenpläne 
und Strategien gestärkt. Die im Rahmen der Haushaltskonsolidierung 
ergriffenen Sparmaßnahmen beinhalten jedoch die Gefahr der Abwer-
tung des Status der Gleichstellungspolitik oder der Reduzierung der für 
diese zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel. Dem Bericht zufolge wird die 
Funktion der Infrastrukturen für die Geschlechtergleichstellung in meh-
reren Mitgliedstaaten durch Einschnitte in den öffentlichen Haushal-
ten ernsthaft beeinträchtigt. Andere Mitgliedstaaten haben jedoch 
beschlossen, die Mittel für Einrichtungen bzw. Projekte, die sich der 
Geschlechtergleichstellung widmen, nicht zu reduzieren oder sogar zu 
erhöhen.
Beschäftigungspolitik 
Frühe Konjunkturmaßnahmen konzentrierten sich auf die Sekto-
ren, die zuerst von der Krise betroffen waren. In diesem waren vor 
allem Männer beschäftigt. Andere antizyklische beschäftigungspoli-
tische Maßnahmen als diese vorübergehenden Konjunkturbelebung-
smaßnahmen konzentrierten sich auf kurzfristige Beschäftigungspro-
gramme und die Verwaltung von Arbeitslosenhilfeprogrammen. 
Bisherige Erkenntnisse legen nahe, dass Männer die Hauptnutznießer 
beider Arten von Programmen waren, und zwar nicht nur, weil sie in 
50
Kurzfassung
größerem Maßstab Arbeitsplatzverluste erlitten, sondern auch aufgrund 
der Ausgestaltung dieser Programme. Die „männliche Ausrichtung“ 
dieser Programme wirkt aufgrund der entsprechenden „tendenziöse 
Ausrichtung“ der Arbeitsplatzverluste möglicherweise bis heute nach. 
Die Ausgestaltung antizyklischer beschäftigungs- und lohnpolitischer 
Maßnahmen muss in Zukunft jedoch möglicherweise „universeller“ 
gestaltet werden.
Haushaltskonsolidierung
Dieser Bericht macht einen ersten Versuch der Beurteilung der 
Auswirkungen der Haushaltskonsolidierung aus einer Geschlechter-
perspektive. Die Auswirkungen zeigen sich noch nicht in ihrem ganzen 
Ausmaß in den Beschäftigungs- oder Lohnstatistiken, und Vorab-Beur-
teilungen der Auswirkungen aus einer Geschlechterperspektive wurden 
mit Ausnahme einiger Länder nicht durchgeführt. Diese Beurteilung 
basiert daher auf zwei Arten von Belegen, nämlich der subjektiven 
Bewertung durch nationale Experten in neunzehn Ländern bzw. einer 
Überprüfung der neuesten Entwicklung in sechs Ländern. 
Auf der Ausgabenseite wurden gemäß der Bewertung von 19 Län-
dern durch Experten folgende Maßnahmen als für die Geschlechterglei-
chstellung folgenreicher identifiziert:
–  Lohnstopps oder Lohnsenkungen im öffentlichen Sektor (10 
Länder),
–  Einstellungsstopps oder Personalabbau im öffentlichen Sektor (9 
Länder),
–  Rentenreformen: späterer Renteneintritt und/oder Anhebung des 
Renteneintrittsalters von Frauen auf das von Männern (8 Län-
der),
–  Kürzung und Begrenzung pflegebezogener Leistungen, Bezüge 
und Zuschüsse (8 Länder),
–  Einschnitte bei Mietzuschüssen und familienbezogenen Leistun-
gen (6 Länder),
–  und Verschärfung der Kriterien für die Gewährung von Ar-
beitslosengeld und Unterstützungsleistungen oder Senkung der 
Neubesetzungsquoten (5 Länder).
–  Auf der Einnahmenseite besteht die Maßnahmenliste aus:
steuerlichen Maßnahmen (6 Länder), 
–  MwSt.-Erhöhung: (5 Länder), 
–  und Erhöhungen der Gebühren für öffentlich subventionierte 
Dienstleistungen (Gebühren für Gesundheitsdienste, Gebühren 
für öffentliche Verkehrsmittel u.a.) (2 Länder).
Erwartungen, dass diese Maßnahmen überproportional von Frauen 
getragen werden, werden durch die Informationen untermauert, die in 
sechs Ländern über die neuesten Entwicklungen gesammelt wurden. 
Erkenntnisse aus Ländern mit relativ begrenzten Haushaltskonsolidie-
rungsprogrammen (Niederlande und Finnland) oder Ländern, in denen 
zu einem frühen Zeitpunkt der Rezession die schwerwiegendste Kon-
traktion der Staatsfinanzen stattfand (Lettland), stützen die Erwartun-
gen nicht ganz. In diesen Ländern scheinen die direkten, kurzfristigen 
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Auswirkungen der Haushaltskonsolidierung auf die Beschäftigung von 
Frauen und ihren Zugang zu bzw. ihre Nutzung von Pflegedienstleistun-
gen nicht so groß zu sein, noch scheinen Frauen durch Kürzungen bei 
Sozialtransfers systematisch benachteiligt zu werden. Dennoch sind die 
Daten noch sehr begrenzt und die mittel- und langfristigen Auswirkun-
gen unbekannt. Viel mehr Grund zur Besorgnis in jeder Hinsicht gibt 
es in Irland, Griechenland oder Spanien, wo die Haushaltskonsolidie-
rung seit Beginn der Krise an Bedeutung gewann und allmählich dra-
matische Proportionen annimmt. Nicht nur war in diesen Ländern die 
Beschäftigungsquote von Frauen zu Beginn der Krise vergleichsweise 
niedrig, sondern sie ist seitdem auch kontinuierlich zurückgegangen. 
Die Umstrukturierung der Sozialversicherung (Renten), Einschnitte bei 
öffentlichen Dienstleistungen und Löhnen im öffentlichen Sektor sowie 
der bereits erfolgte oder noch geplante Personalabbau im öffentlichen 
Dienst sind von erheblichem Umfang, und der Anstieg der Armut bei 
bestimmten Gruppen von Frauen, z. B. Rentnerinnen in Griechenland, 
war stärker ausgeprägt.
Probleme im Zusammenhang mit der Einkommensarmut 
(2005-2010)
In fast allen Ländern und Jahren verzeichneten Frauen eine höhere 
Armutsrisikoquote als Männer. Auf der Ebene der EU27 ging die Ten-
denz zur Vergrößerung der Geschlechterkluft bis 2007; danach setzte 
ein Trend zur Verringerung ein. Einkommensarmut, gemessen am An-
teil der Bevölkerung mit einem Jahreseinkommen von weniger als 60 
% des Medianeinkommens, ist in den ersten Jahren der Krise in ganz 
Europa angestiegen, auch wenn der Anstieg nicht dramatisch war. 2009 
war die Armutsrisikoquote (verankert im Jahr 2005) bei Männern um 
2,3 Punkte und bei Frauen um 1,7 Punkte höher als 20076. Ein stär-
kerer Anstieg wurde in den stärker von der Krise betroffenen Ländern 
verzeichnet.
In allen europäischen Ländern und zu jedem Zeitpunkt des unter-
suchten Zeitraums verzeichneten Frauen ein höheres Armutsrisiko 
vor Sozialtransfers, in einem Ausmaß, das erheblich höher ist als die 
Geschlechterkluft nach Sozialtransfers (etwa 5 % gegenüber 2 %). 
Steuer- und Wohlfahrtsysteme sind für die Reduzierung der höheren 
Armutsrisikoquote von Frauen von fundamentaler Bedeutung. Eine ge-
ringfügige Verschlechterung der Situation von Männern – vor Sozial-
transfers – als Folge der Krise führte zu einer leichten Verringerung der 
Geschlechterkluft bei den Armutsrisikoquoten vor Sozialtransfers von 
5,1 % im Jahr 2004 auf 4,8 % im Jahr 2009.
6  Die Zahlen beziehen sich auf das mit der Armutslinie 2005 berechnete Armutsri-
siko, um zu vermeiden, dass eine Reduktion der Armut berechnet wird, wenn die 
unteren Einkommen stärker abnehmen als das Medianeinkommen. Beachten Sie, 
dass die Zahlen für 2007 aus der SILC-Untersuchung 2008 stammen, während die 
für 2009 sich auf die letzte, heute noch herauszugebende Untersuchung beziehen, die 
2010 durchgeführt wurde.
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Als Ergebnis der Krise wurden mehrere Länder mit einem erhebli-
chen Anstieg der Zahl der Leistungsempfänger im Rahmen von garan-
tierten Mindesteinkommen konfrontiert, wobei überwiegend Frauen 
betroffen waren. Einige Länder erhöhten ihre Zahlungen für garantierte 
Mindesteinkommen durch eine Erhöhung der öffentlichen Ausgaben.
Familienbezogene Leistungen sind formal geschlechtsneutrale 
Maßnahmen mit eindeutig geschlechtsspezifischen Auswirkungen, da 
Frauen unter den familienbezogenen Leistungsempfängern aufgrund 
der geschlechtsspezifischen Aufteilung von Betreuungsaktivitäten do-
minieren. Einschnitte bei den öffentlichen Ausgaben aufgrund der 
Wirtschaftskrise führten in den meisten Ländern mit substanziellen ge-
schlechtsspezifischen Beeinträchtigungen zu Kürzungen bei bestehen-
den familienbezogenen Leistungen. Auf der anderen Seite dehnte eine 
kleine Zahl von Ländern ihre Unterstützung für familienbezogene Lei-
stungen und Bezüge in Reaktion auf die Wirtschaftskrise aus.
Im Bereich der Kinderbetreuung wurden öffentliche Ausgaben für 
monetäre Leistungen stärker reduziert als öffentliche Ausgaben für 
Dienstleistungen. Daher ist das Angebot an Kinderbetreuungsein-
richtungen in mehreren Europäischen Ländern in den letzten Jahren 
trotz der Wirtschaftskrise gewachsen. In einer Reihe von Ländern ist 
die Kürzung der Sozialausgaben jedoch auch im Bereich der Kinderbe-
treuungsdienste spürbar.
Aufgrund der allgemein höheren Armutsrisikoquoten und des ge-
ringeren verfügbaren Einkommens von Frauen im Vergleich zu Män-
nern wird von einer Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuersätze eine negative 
Auswirkung auf die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter erwartet.
Probleme im Zusammenhang mit sozialer Ausgrenzung 
(2005-2010)
Frauen leiden in fast allen Jahren und allen Ländern stärker unter 
schwerer materieller Entbehrung. Der Indikator schwere materielle Ent-
behrung wird definiert als erzwungene Unfähigkeit, eine Anzahl von Din-
gen zu bezahlen, die für ein würdiges und angemessenes Leben für notwen-
dig erachtet werden. Durch die Krise hat sich der Fortschritt in Richtung 
einer Reduzierung materieller Entbehrung verlangsamt, wobei die von der 
SILC-Studie 2010 gelieferten Zahlen höher sind als ein Jahr zuvor, aber 
immer noch niedriger als der Mittelwert vor der Krise und die Zahlen von 
2005. Die Krise hat die Geschlechterkluft etwas reduziert; allerdings pas-
sierte dies durch die Verschlechterung der Situation der Männer und nicht 
durch die Verbesserung der Situation der Frauen. Die Schwankungen in 
den ersten Jahren der Krise sind im Mittel gering, aber in gewissem Maße 
verbergen sie substanzielle Disparitäten zwischen den Ländern.
Bildung
Der Bereich der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung scheint durch 
Sparmaßnahmen weniger beeinträchtigt zu werden.
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Nationale Strategien haben sich während der Krise auf die Verlän-
gerung von Vorschul- und außerschulischen Programmen konzentriert. 
Solche Herangehensweisen sind besonders vorteilhaft für die Kinder 
sowie für betreuende Eltern, bei denen insbesondere die Frauen die Be-
treuungsarbeit leisten. Dennoch wurden anfällige Gruppen beeinträch-
tigt, unter anderem Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund, Obdachlose 
und potenzielle Schulabbrecher (unter denen Männer überrepräsentiert 
sind).
Wohnsituation
Die Wirtschaftskrise hat substanzielle Auswirkungen auf die Immo-
bilien- und Hypothekenmärkte mehrerer europäischer Länder. In einer 
Anzahl von Ländern gibt es bereits Hinweise auf steigende Immobi-
lienschulden, Zahlungsausfallrisiken und Zwangsräumungen. Die Län-
der, in denen es zu einer Immobilienkrise kam (oder die davon bedroht 
sind), bieten hauptsächlich Immobilienschulden-Managementpläne an, 
um Menschen zu helfen, Überschuldung zu bewältigen. Während die 
meisten dieser Maßnahmen eher geschlechtsneutral sind, fördern sie in-
direkt Frauen, die bekanntermaßen in einigen Schlüsselaspekten anfäl-
liger sind. In denjenigen Ländern, für die Daten verfügbar sind, weisen 
Frauen beispielsweise tendenziell höhere Risiken aus Miet- oder Hypo-
thekenzahlungsrückständen auf als Männer. Aus der Geschlechterper-
spektive besonders wichtig sind Wohnunterstützungsmaßnahmen für 
einige Gruppen von Frauen, wie etwa alleinerziehende Mütter, für die 
es aufgrund unzureichender Einkommen oft schwierig ist, eigenwen 
Wohnraum zu kaufen. Das Fehlen erschwinglicher Immobilien ist eine 
der Hauptursachen von Obdachlosigkeit. Trotz der stark begrenzten 
Datenverfügbarkeit gibt es Hinweise darauf, dass  Obdachlosigkeit 
in denjenigen Ländern, die einige Daten liefern, während der Krise 
einen Anstieg verzeichnet hat. In diesen Ländern sehen sich Männer 
und Frauen anscheinend ähnlichen Obdachlosigkeitsrisiken gegenüber, 
obwohl im jüngeren Lebensalter das Risiko der Frauen größer ist als 
das der Männer. Darüber hinaus wird deutlich, dass Frauen öfter als 
Männer „unsichtbar“ obdachlos sind, weil sie vorübergehende Lösun-
gen suchen, wie etwa das Leben mit Familienmitgliedern, mit Freunden, 
in „Zweckpartnerschaften“ oder mit flüchtigen Bekannten. Wenngleich 
sich darin echte Verhaltensunterschiede zwischen Frauen und Männern 
widerspiegeln, könnte in einigen Ländern die Ursache auch im Mangel 
an politischen Maßnahmen, die in diesem Bereich spezifisch auf Frauen 
ausgerichtet sind, liegen.
Gesundheit
Bei den kürzlich in mehreren Ländern durchgeführten Gesundheitsre-
formen stand die Kostenbegrenzung im Mittelpunkt. Daneben wurden 
in mehreren europäischen Ländern neue oder höhere Rezeptgebühren 
eingeführt. Die Kostenbegrenzung wirkt regressiv, da die Kosten der 
Gesundheitsversorgung proportional mehr Menschen mit niedrigeren 
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Einkommen belasten, was wiederum bedeutet, dass Frauen aufgrund 
ihres höheren Armutsrisikos stärker betroffen sind.
Kosteneinschnitte im Gesundheitssektor treffen Frauen auch auf der 
Angebotsseite härter als Männer. Frauen werden hauptsächlich im öf-
fentlichen Sektor und im Gesundheitssektor angestellt. Von Lohnein-
schnitten oder Personalabbau im öffentlichen Sektor sind Frauen über-
proportional häufig betroffen.
Die Senkung der öffentlichen Sozialausgaben erfolgte in der Regel 
nicht durch Kürzungen bei der Bereitstellung von Langzeitpflegedien-
sten. Frauen stellen die Mehrheit der Pflegeempfänger und Pflegedien-
stleister dar. In den Ländern mit den umfangreichsten Haushaltskonso-
lidierungsmaßnahmen wurden die Langzeitpflegebezüge und -zuschüsse 
gesenkt. In einigen Ländern wurden die Langzeitpflegebezüge erhöht.
Empfehlungen
Die folgenden zehn Empfehlungen haben zum Ziel, die Geschlechter-
gleichstellung als ein Mittel zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Erho-
lung nach der Krise voranzubringen.
1.  Die Festlegung der Indikatoren für die Geschlechtergleichstel-
lung muss überprüft werden. Die scheinbaren Verbesserungen bei 
den geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschieden bei gleichzeitiger Ver-
schlechterung der Beschäftigungs-, Lohn-, Arbeits- und Einkom-
mensbedingungen sowohl bei Männer als auch bei Frauen wirft 
Fragen darüber auf, ob „geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede“ die 
Entwicklungen bei der Geschlechtergleichstellung in Zeiten der 
Rezession adäquat erfassen.
2.  Die Mitgliedstaaten müssen angeregt werden, wirksame „Gender 
Budgeting“-Systeme für ihre wichtigsten politischen Initiativen 
einzuführen, auch für die laufenden oder zukünftigen Konjunktur-
programme und Ausgabenüberprüfungen. Gesetzliche Anforde-
rungen, politische Maßnahmen vorab aus einer geschlechtsbe-
zogenen Perspektive zu überprüfen, sind möglicherweise nicht 
ausreichend, wie die Erfahrungen in Österreich und dem Verei-
nigten Königreich zeigen.
3.  Das Risiko der grundlegenden Aushöhlung von Sozialleistungen 
und Infrastrukturen für die Geschlechtergleichstellung durch die 
Haushaltskonsolidierung muss genauestens überwacht werden. 
4.  Initiativen zur Verbesserung der Finanzkenntnisse von Frauen 
(und der Bevölkerung insgesamt) müssen eingeführt und gefördert 
werden, und eine  „kritische Masse“ weiblicher Vertreter in finan-
ziellen Schlüsselinstitutionen der EU muss sichergestellt werden. 
Diese Krise hat gezeigt, wie weit politische Entscheidungen, die 
traditionell mit Frauen in Verbindung gebracht werden, wie etwa 
in den Bereichen Sozialfürsorge, Beschulung oder Vereinbarkeit 
von Familie und Beruf, inzwischen von makroökonomischen und 
finanziellen Entscheidungsprozessen abhängen, von denen Frauen 
traditionell ausgeschlossen waren und über die sie wenig wissen.
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5.  Das Problem der überproportionalen Belastung junger Menschen 
durch die Anforderung der Beschäftigungsflexibilität muss in An-
griff genommen werden. Dies schließt die Neugestaltung gängi-
ger antizyklischer politischer Maßnahmen wie Kurzarbeitsplänen 
und Programmen für Arbeitslosenhilfen mit ein. Während bei-
de Maßnahmen eine wichtige Funktion erfüllten, indem sie die 
schlimmsten Auswirkungen der Krise auf Beschäftigung und 
Löhne abfederten, sind sie oft vorrangig auf reguläre Vollzeitar-
beitnehmer ausgerichtet.
6.  Es müssen Pläne zur Einkommensunterstützung im Sinne des 
Gender Mainstreaming entwickelt werden. Sozialausgaben und 
Steuerausgaben sollten auf die finanzielle Unabhängigkeit von 
Frauen als zentrales Anliegen ausgerichtet sein, insbesondere 
wenn sie zum Ziel haben, Männer und Frauen einen Weg aus der 
Armut zu bahnen.
7.  Sozialausgaben müssen so eingesetzt werden, dass Qualitätsdien-
stleistungen Vorrang erhalten vor Geldleistungen, um eine faire 
Verteilung der Auswirkungen von Sparprogrammen sicherzustel-
len und die Belastung von Frauen durch Betreuungsarbeit abzu-
mildern.  Konjunkturmaßnahmen müssen auf die soziale und 
Pflegeinfrastruktur und nicht nur auf die materielle Infrastruktur 
ausgerichtet werden.
8.  Der Europäische Sozialfonds muss gestärkt und seine Verfahren 
müssen überprüft werden. Mehrere süd- und osteuropäische Län-
der mit geringer Frauenbeschäftigung sind auch diejenigen Län-
der, in denen die Rezession und die Haushaltskonsolidierung zur 
Reduzierung von Sozialleistungen, Vereinbarkeitsprogrammen 
und allgemeinen Maßnahmen zur Förderung der Gleichstellung 
führen. Der Europäische Strukturfonds stellt in diesen Ländern 
ein wichtiges Instrument dar, um Kürzungen lokaler Leistungen 
zu kompensieren und das Beschäftigungsziel für 2020 zu för-
dern. Allerdings müssen die Ausgaben des ESF in einigen Fällen 
möglicherweise überprüft werden, um seine volle Wirksamkeit zu 
garantieren. Diese Überprüfung sollte insbesondere sicherstellen, 
dass: (i) die Verfahren zur Mittelfreigabe und Mittelverwendung 
einfach sind; und (ii) die laufenden umgesetzten Schlüsselpro-
gramme nach Beendigung der Mittelzuteilung des ESF fortgesetzt 
werden.
9.  Die öffentliche Sichtbarkeit von Fällen des Verstoßes gegen 
Mutterschutz- und Mutterschaftsurlaubsrechte muss besser 
überwacht und erhöht werden. Verstöße gegen Mutterschutz 
bzw. Elternrechte kommen in mittleren und kleinen Unternehmen 
wegen höherer organisatorischer Kosten möglicherweise häufiger 
vor. Ihre spezifischen Bedürfnisse bzw. Einschränkungen sollten 
berücksichtigt werden, da dies auch in „normalen“ Zeiten ein 
Problem darstellt.
10.  Das Problem der mangelhaften Integration mobiler Arbeit-
nehmer und Arbeitnehmer mit Migrationshintergrund, insbe-
sondere der männlichen, muss gelöst werden. 
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PrefaCe
The aim of this report is to assess the impact of the ongoing eco-
nomic crisis on the situation of both women and men and on gender 
equality policies in Europe. The study is inspired by concerns about 
current and future prospects for gender equality. 
Why an analysis of the crisis from a gender equality perspective? 
The first reason is that economic crises are profoundly gendered. On 
the demand side, paid work is still considerably gender-typed despite 
more than a century of change: women and men continue to show a 
certain tendency to be concentrated within given sectors, occupations 
and capacities. On the supply side intra-household roles, especially the 
income roles of men and women, are still in transition between a tradi-
tional male breadwinner regime and an adult, dual-earner regime whe-
re responsibilities for income and housework are shared on more or less 
equal terms. There is therefore still room for men and women to behave 
differently in the face of the crisis. 
The second reason is that past recessionary experiences may not of-
fer sufficient guidance, since the labour market for women and their 
household and social positions have changed considerably since the last 
major recession, the so-called oil crisis of the 1970s. 
The third reason is that crises, as the old adage goes, are times of 
challenges and opportunities. This crisis too has been described as 
a “transformative moment”, since it offers opportunities for radical 
change in the organization of the labour market and in the institutions 
that promote equality of outcomes for men and women.7 As the Advi-
sory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men warned 
early on in the recession (Advisory Committee 2009) challenges arise 
because in the face of hardship and drastic policy choices, gender equa-
lity may be seen as a fair weather issue, a luxury to be set aside while 
we wait for better times. Yielding to this attitude while the crisis forces 
long-lasting structural change may roll back progress in gender equality 
permanently. Yet this very structural change might open up new and 
faster avenues in the direction of equality. 
It may be misleading to talk of a ‘single’ crisis, since at least two 
different episodes can be distinguished. The first began in 2008, in 
the wake of the ‘credit crunch’ that spread from the financial servi-
7  See Seguino (2010), “The global economic crisis, its gender and ethnic implications, 
and policy responses”, Gender & Development, vol.18, no. 2, pp. 179 - 199.
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ces sector and resulted in the first dip in 2009. The recovery proved 
fragile and short-lived, however. By 2010, the credit crunch crisis 
had become a sovereign debt crisis that pressed for fiscal consoli-
dation to reduce public deficits and debts. Now, in the autumn of 
2012, the sovereign debt crisis is still unfolding, and a second dip is 
developing.  
At the time of completing this report (in the autumn of 2012), not 
only have the prospects of recovery drifted further away, but also a few 
macroeconomic data series only extend as far as the first quarter of 
2012. This means that the analysis and findings included in this report 
are very much a work in progress. The final impact of the crisis on wo-
men and men will not be discernible for some time to come.8
Structure of the report
This report undertakes extensive analysis of the repercussions of the 
economic and financial crisis on the labour market position and social 
situation of women and men in Europe. It builds on an investigation by 
two experts groups serving the Unit of Gender Equality – respectively 
the EGGE and the EGGSI networks. It covers 33 European countri-
es comprising EU Member States, EEA-EFTA countries and candidate 
countries Turkey, Croatia and FYROM. The core reference period for 
the analysis of labour market and macroeconomic developments is the 
four years between the second quarter of 2008 – when the recession of-
ficially began for the EU as a whole – and the first quarter of 2012 – the 
latest quarter available from Eurostat at the time of writing. However, 
some analyses extend further back in time either because some countri-
es entered recession before the EU as a whole, or because a comparison 
with earlier years and recessionary episodes is warranted. The analysis 
of poverty and social developments spans the five years between 2005 
and 2010.
Chapter I reviews macroeconomic and labour market trends. It 
extensively examines statistical and qualitative evidence on issues ran-
ging from the employment and unemployment responses to the crisis 
to job search discouragement and inactivity, short-time and temporary 
working, and working conditions. 
Chapters II, III and IV address specific questions. Chapter II inve-
stigates change in the gender pay gap during the recession and how 
it might affect longer-term prospects of pay equality. Chapter III in-
vestigates whether the recession favoured an increase in unpaid work 
without significantly re-directing it to men. Chapter IV is primarily de-
voted to assessing policies enacted during the crisis (2008-2012) from a 
gender perspective, including recovery programmes and fiscal consoli-
dation. As these three chapters make large use of data and information 
from the EGGE national reports, the analysis is sometimes focused on 
8  An analysis of the impact on women’s employment of policy changes from the 
recession of the 1990s showed that the repercussions extended almost into the next 
decade. See Smith M. (2009), Analysis Note: Gender Equality and the Recession, 
prepared for the European Commission, Brussels. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2839&langId=en
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a different subset of countries although the wider European context 
remains in the background.9 
Arguably, of the three policy programmes prompted by the crisis – 
financial rescue plans, stimulus packages and fiscal consolidation – it 
is the third of them that is likely to have the longest lasting structural 
impact on European economies and the widest repercussions on gender 
equality. This justifies our devoting the greater part of Chapter IV to as-
sessing the actual or likely repercussions of fiscal consolidation packa-
ges on labour market and social outcomes. The specific repercussions 
on the equality infrastructure of European countries are also reviewed. 
The analysis in Chapter IV sets the stage for Chapters V and VI, 
which delve deeper and more comprehensively into the social impact 
of the crisis. Chapter V looks at income poverty both separately and as 
a constituent part of the wider concept of social exclusion. Attention 
is devoted to policies and measures in this field from 2005 till 2010, 
with a distinction being made between income support schemes and 
consumption support measures (especially with respect to specific cate-
gories of consumption such food and drugs).
Chapter VI looks at multidimensional poverty and social exclusion, 
focusing on those factors that appear to have driven gender imbalances 
during the crisis (2005-2010). These include education, entitlement and 
take-up of welfare state services and benefits, housing, health and - last 
but not least -long-term care provisions. In a life-cycle perspective, all 
of these issues impact on men and women differently - both as reci-
pients and as providers of care.
Chapter VII brings together all the different threads and draws the 
main conclusions. It also provides a short list of recommendations on 
specific actions or policy directions that may be worth pursuing to keep 
gender equality high on policy agendas in coming years. 
9  National experts have been allowed to delve deeper into the specific topic they 
thought was the most relevant for their countries, rather than covering all the topics. 
60
61
imPaCt of the Crisis on Paid worK 
Introduction: concepts and past findings 
This chapter and the one that follows analyze labour market pat-
terns and outcomes for men and women in the first four years of the cri-
sis that struck Europe in 2007/2008. The extensive and detailed review 
offered by these chapters encompasses developments in employment, 
unemployment, activity, discouragement, and pay and working condi-
tions during this period. The primary data sources are Eurostat Labour 
Force detailed survey data, microdata from EU-SILC, and the Structure 
of Earning Survey. Secondary - and especially national - sources are 
also used extensively.
Any analysis of statistical or narrative evidence needs to be guided 
by theoretical concepts and hypotheses in order to clearly examine and 
interpret the information. Socio-economic theorizing has long recogni-
zed that female and male workers may behave differently and be diffe-
rently affected by a recession. Prior to delving into a factual analysis, 
we briefly recall hypotheses and concepts from the earlier literature and 
summarize the findings from studies of previous recessions that these 
hypotheses have inspired. Included in this succinct review are the added 
versus discouraged workers controversy, the buffer versus substitution 
hypothesis, and the segregation and segmentation hypotheses. 
Added and discouraged workers. The added versus discouraged 
controversy dates back to the previous ‘Great Depression’ of 1929, but 
has regained the limelight in the great depression that we are currently 
experiencing. Aldrich Finegan and Margo (1993) have summarized the 
arguments in contention: 
“According to W.S. Woytinsky, the depression created a large popu-
lation of ‘added’ workers, persons who entered the labour force when 
the head of the household was thrown out of work. Woytinsky sugge-
sted, however, that added workers would leave the labour force as reco-
very progressed in the late 1930s so that “the number of jobs necessary 
to reduce unemployment … [was] less than the reported volume of 
unemployment would suggest”. Disagreeing with Woytinsky, Clarence 
Long asserted that the number of added workers was negligible com-
pared with the number of ‘discouraged’ workers – “persons who would 
enter the labour market only when unemployment began to fall […]”. 
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(Aldrich Finegan and Margo 1993, p.1)
If the added worker effect prevails, women’s behaviour is counter-
cyclical and results in increased activity (labour market participation) 
during a recession. If the discouraged worker effect is dominant, inacti-
vity increases. In both cases it is workers’ behaviour – that is, the supply 
side – that drives the outcome. In alternative theorizing, employers’ 
behaviour – the demand side – is deemed more important, and the fo-
cus is on employment and unemployment rather than on flows to and 
from inactivity. 
Buffers and substitutes. The labour reserve or buffer hypothesis is a 
case in point. It is rooted in Marxian theory, and like the added/discou-
raged worker effect it posits a male breadwinner economy. The claim, 
however, is that women constitute a labour reserve that is pushed back 
by employers when demand slows down and called out when demand 
is booming. It has been challenged by the substitution hypothesis, whe-
reby the pressure to lower labour costs during recessions may give an 
incentive to employers to substitute women for men, as the secondary 
income role means they remain cheaper.10 
Segregation and segmentation. According to the proponents of the 
segmentation hypothesis, the important divide is not so much betwe-
en male and female labour but rather between primary and secondary 
jobs. Women are a part of the secondary job segment, alongside ethnic 
minorities and other groups. Depending on the theoretical variant, the 
dividing line between primary and secondary is rooted in employers’ 
reliance on ‘internal market’ rules for the workers they are interested 
in retaining - the skilled, primary segments - while unskilled, secondary 
segments face ruthless competition in an unregulated labour market;11 
or else it may rest on the unions’ fight against de-skilling, or else it may 
rest on employers’ tendency to hire women to do unstable jobs becau-
se they are socially more ‘disposable’ (that is, firing them elicits less 
opposition from the workforce and society at large12. The predictions 
common to all these variants are limited competition between and limi-
ted mobility across the segments, with the secondary segment playing a 
buffer role in a recession. 
On the contrary, says the segregation hypothesis, female employment 
may be sheltered in a crisis.13 The core argument is that sex-typing of 
occupations is both strong and rigid in the short run. Thus, the compa-
rative behaviour of female employment over the cycle is not determi-
ned a priori, but is strongly affected by the sectoral and occupational 
patterns of employment losses in a downturn, but sectoral more than 
10  See Gardiner J. (1976), “Women and Unemployment”, Red Rag, no. 10, pp. 
12-15; Humphries J. (1988), “Women’s employment in restructuring America: the 
changing experience of women in three recessions” in Rubery J. (ed.), Women and 
Recession. London, New York: Routledge and Kegal Paul.
11  See Doeringer P. and Piore M. J. (1971), “Internal Labor Markets and Manpower 
Analysis”, New York: Heath Lexington Books.
12  See Edwards R.C., Reich M. and Gordon D.M. (eds) (1975), Labor Market Seg-
mentation, Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 
13  See Milkman R. (1976), “Women’s Work and Economic Crisis. Some Lessons of 
the Great Depression”, Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 71-
97.
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occupational, given that crises tend to have a distinctive sectoral im-
pact.14 Segregation also affects the gender pay gap in a recession as, for 
example, male wages may be higher (lower) than average in the most 
cyclically sensitive occupations and sectors, and vice versa. 
It is tempting to dismiss all these hypotheses as ‘outdated’. One rea-
son for possible obsolescence is the assumption of the male breadwin-
ner economy that many of them share, especially the added/discoura-
ged worker debate and the buffer role hypothesis.  A male breadwinner 
economy no longer reflects reality. Moreover, unemployment benefits 
and other income cushioning provisions are now far more common 
during a recession than they were in the past, which weakens the ad-
ded worker phenomenon. Also, trade union membership is still male-
dominated but less so than in the past15, and education and skill are no 
longer male prerogatives. Last but not least, occupational and sectoral 
segregation still shape the allocation of jobs to men and women, but 
much less so than in the sixties or seventies. 
Yet the hypotheses retain relevance. Consider gender income roles. 
In 2007, just before the recession set in, an average of 70 out of 100 
couples with at least one working-age partner were dual-earning in the 
25 countries covered by the EU-SILC survey (see Table 1.3 below). 
While this can be read as the demise of the male breadwinner myth, in 
the majority of dual-earner couples, the woman’s contribution was lo-
wer (less than 45% of the combined income of the couple). Perhaps not 
so low as to qualify all these couples as ‘one and a half earners’, but still 
low enough to qualify the female partners as ‘secondary’ earners. Thus, 
there are enough secondary earners and non-earners among women to 
allow for the possibility of an added worker effect. In modern times, 
an added worker effect can materialize at the extensive margin (non-
earners entering the labour force) or at the intensive margin (secondary 
earners increasing their hours of work).
Let us now examine the role of unemployment benefits. While most 
European countries provide unemployment benefits or offer other types 
of income support schemes, coverage may be selective or replacement 
rates low depending on the country.16 This leaves scope for the ad-
ded worker effect (or for discouragement). With regard to the role of 
segregation, a long-term decline has been documented in most of the 
countries for which appropriate evidence is available.17 However, cur-
rent levels are still high across European countries and the declining 
14  See Bettio F. (1988), “Women, the state and the family in Italy: problems of female 
participation in historical perspective” in Rubery J. (ed.), Women and Recession. 
London, New York: Routledge and Kegal Paul.
15  According to the latest (March 8, 2012) annual survey of the European Trade 
Union Confederation (http://www.etuc.org/r/1368), female representation is growing 
among union members, while progress is still rather slow as one looks further up the 
organizational and decision-making ladders. 
16  See, among others, Figari F., Salvatori, A. and Sutherland, H. (2010), “Economic 
downturn and stress testing European welfare systems”, ISER Working Paper, Series 
2010-18, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
17  See Bettio F. (2008), “Occupational segregation and gender wage disparities in 
developed economies: Should we still worry?” in Bettio F. and Verashchagina A. (eds), 
Frontiers in the economics of gender, Routledge, Siena Studies in Political Economy, 
pp. 267–285.
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trend has apparently halted in the European Union as a whole over 
the past decade.18 Thus, there is still scope for segregation to play a 
protective role. 
The idea of segmentation has also come back in fashion as a tool 
for analyzing the repercussions of the present crisis. In current theori-
zing however, segmentation opposes ‘protected’ labour segments with 
‘unprotected’ ones.19 The basic idea is that if differential employment 
protection is granted, particularly against dismissal, the disparity in 
bargaining power between ‘insiders’ in a firm (tenured/adult/skilled 
workers) and ‘outsiders’ (younger/untenured/in need of training) can 
be reinforced by legislation. Women are sometimes included among 
‘outsiders’ because of their more frequent exits and entries into the 
labour market. They may also be included as insiders however, becau-
se they are well represented among (tenured) public employees. In the 
current recession scenario, segmentation sets young workers entering 
(and re-entering) the labour markets on temporary contracts against 
adult workers on standard contracts, and migrant or foreign workers 
on temporary work permits against national workers. When a down-
turn strikes, the groups with less employment protection are the natural 
candidates for a buffer role, men and women alike. 
In the empirical literature, a revisitation of earlier theoretical ideas 
and concepts is not confined to segmentation or the buffer role. The 
added versus discouraged worker controversy is still popular, as is 
the hypothesis of segregation. All of them have been used in research 
analysing the most significant recessionary episodes of the recent past. 
With the downturn dragging on in several countries and many of the 
data that would be valuable for a detailed investigation still in the pi-
peline, what we know about women, men and current crises comes 
largely from past recessionary experiences around the world. Only a 
few concern the current experience. 
Let us now look at some of the salient findings on the added versus 
discouraged controversy in the post-war period. Research focusing on 
the crisis of the early 1980s and late 1990s in Latin American countries 
found that female participation moved counter-cyclically as the added 
worker effect prevailed among middle-to-high income households.20 
On inspecting the data from 1968 to 2005, Juhn and Potter (2007) 
found that the value of marriage as a risk-sharing arrangement - whe-
re she can obtain work if he loses his - has diminished parallel to the 
increase in positive co-movement of employment within couples.  For 
a group of middle-income countries, Cho and Newhouse (2011) also 
found that the added worker effect was weak during the first two years 
of the current crisis. 
With regard to the role of occupational and sectoral segregation, 
18  See Bettio F. and Verashchagina A. (2009), “Gender segregation in the labour mar-
ket: root causes, implications and policy responses in the EU“, EGGE report, Brussels.
19  See Bentolila S. and Bertola G. (1990), “Firing costs and labour demand: How bad 
is the Eurosclerosis?”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 381-402; Boeri 
T. and Garibaldi, P. (2007), “Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection Legisla-
tion: A Honeymoon Effect”, Economic Journal, no. 117, pp. 357–85.
20  Less so among poorer families, see Sabarwal S., Sinha N. and Buvinic M. (2011), “How 
Do Women Weather Economic Shocks? What We Know”, Economic Premise, no. 46. 
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the investigation conducted by various authors into the impact of re-
cessions in Europe and the USA during the early post-war period found 
that women’s employment did not consistently move pro-cyclically in 
Europe or the USA, but attributed the finding to the protective role 
of segregation.21 This role may be waning, according to Mishel et al. 
(2007) as well as Smith (2009), who show that in post-war USA the 
impact of each subsequent recession on women’s employment rate be-
came higher. 
While this raised expectations that the impact might be even higher 
in the present recession, Sierminska and Takhtamanova (2011) created 
the term ‘mancession’ to underwrite the finding that men faced higher 
job-separation probabilities, lower job-finding probabilities, and higher 
unemployment rates than women in the early years of the present crisis 
in the USA. In his study of the early impact of the current crisis in Au-
stralia, Richardson (2009) also finds that recession has affected men’s 
employment and unemployment more seriously, but emphasizes the di-
scouragement and buffer-like effects. In his findings, women account 
disproportionately for hidden unemployment (up to 80 per cent in key 
age groups) and “are more likely to move directly from being defined 
as employed to being defined as out of the labour market entirely and 
then back in again” (Richardson: Table 2, p.8). 
The concepts and hypotheses forged by earlier economic theorizing 
will also inform our analyses in this report. From the standpoint of gen-
der equality that we have adopted here, however, attention cannot be 
focused solely on comparative levels of employment, unemployment, 
inactivity, and wages, as in the literature we have just mentioned. The 
quality of employment such as involuntary part-time, temporary em-
ployment, and the infringement or relaxation of acquired rights (such 
as maternity leave) also matters, as do poorly-visible responses to loss 
of income and heightened uncertainty such as increases in unpaid work 
or decreases in fertility. Last but not least, policy-induced effects are as 
important for gendered outcomes as the responses of employers to de-
mand shocks and those of workers to loss of income. The combination 
of early rescue packages mainly directed towards salvaging financial 
concerns, of stimulus packages mainly directed towards supporting the 
worst-hit industries, and of austerity policy is unique to this crisis, and 
has potentially far-reaching consequences on labour market outcomes 
and gender equality.
Employment, unemployment and sectoral segregation 
Deep recession, some ‘jobless growth’ and the unfolding of a new 
downturn: what happened to the European economy between 2008 
and (early) 2012 is clearly detectable from a simple charting of two ma-
croeconomic series over the last ten years, respectively for GPD and the 
overall employment rate (from 15 to 64) (Figure 1.1). The main stylized 
21  See Rubery J. (ed.) (1988), Women and Recession, London, New York: Routledge 
and Kegal Paul.
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facts are well known. Officially, the crisis dates from the second quar-
ter of 2008 for the whole of the EU (EC 2010e: Table 1, p. 22). The 
response from employment was somewhat delayed, with a fall starting 
in the last quarter of 2008 and reaching a ‘trough’ in the first quarter 
of 2010. Output recovered slowly from the first half of 2009, while 
employment has been oscillating around a flat trend since reaching its 
own ‘trough’ (lowest) point in the first quarter of 2010. By early 2012 
(first quarter), the overall employment rate was again dangerously close 
to the 2012 trough value. This justifies expectations of another major 
employment dip in the months to come, the second of this protracted 
recession.
The patterns are also very different for men and women. If we look 
at the period from the official onset of the recession (second quarter 
2008) until the latest known developments at the time of writing (first 
quarter 2012) the male rate went down by 3.8 percentage points, from 
72.9% to 69.1%, and the female rate by 0.7 points, from 58.9% to 
58.2%. But while these figures have the advantage of simplicity and 
tell the headline story for this Section – that gender gaps have narro-
wed – in no uncertain terms, they can be misleading on various counts. 
First, the timing and the severity of the crisis differ between output 
and employment, as we have noted.  Pronounced differences also exist 
among different countries: some countries experienced the onset of the 
downturn earlier than others, and a few have entered sustained recove-
ry, while others have never really exited the first recessionary episode. 
Timing and severity also differ between men and women, with aggre-
gate figures thereby hiding a complex interweaving of gender, country, 
and timing effects.  
Figure 1.1. Employment and GDP 2003Q1-2012Q1. EU27
Source: Eurostat, online database
In order to be able to single out the specific labour market effects of 
the crisis on men and women in each of the 33 countries included in this 
report, we therefore need to deploy more specialized indicators. One 
conventional indicator is the peak-to-trough variation in employment 
in a downturn: that is, the difference between the highest employment 
value around the onset of the recession and the lowest value (‘trough’ 
value or ‘trough’ for short) reached since. Subsequent developments 
can be measured by trough-to-latest variations, which are the differen-
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ce between the latest figure available for the employment rate and the 
trough value. An alternative method is to look at employment devia-
tions from pre-recession trend values - the difference between the actual 
level of employment in a given year and the level that would have been 
reached had the pre-recession trend continued unabated. We shall use 
both indicators: peak-to-trough and deviations from trend. 
Tracking peak and trough points (quarters) is equivalent to charting 
the different phases of the crisis, and we have done this in Table 1.1 on 
a country-by country basis, using the criteria spelt out in Box 1.1. Our 
reference indicator for this mapping exercise is the overall employment 
rate (15-64).
Box 1.1 - The timing of the crisis in European countries 
Using an analogy with conventional definitions for cyclical ou-
tput movements, we term the maximum level of employment rates 
reached between 2007Q4 and 2008Q4 a ‘peak’ value. Recession 
is entered if a fall in the employment rate(s) is recorded for two 
consecutive semesters after the peak has occurred, while a ‘trough’ 
occurs when the employment rate reaches its lowest level since the 
recession began and is followed by at least two consecutive quarters 
of increase. For countries with no sign of recovery, we have made 
the trough point coincide with the lowest value reached since the 
recession first struck.
With these definitions in mind, the following taxonomy of 
countries can be identified:
One dip countries (AT, BE, CZ, EE, LT, LU, LV, HU, MT, NL, 
PL, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK, IS, NO, FYROM, TK): these countri-
es have witnessed a recession and some subsequent recovery. By 
this we mean either a consistent increase in the employment rate or 
oscillating movements. The corresponding row in the table includes 
P and T symbols. The vast majority of countries fall into this group, 
as does the EU27. 
Protracted recession countries (EL, IE, IT, HR and PT): here the 
recession was not followed by a recovery. In the corresponding row, 
a P and an L are marked, where L denotes the fact that the lowest 
value of employment rate was observed in the latest available quar-
ter. In these computations, we have treated L values as ‘troughs’. 
Countries heading for a double dip (BG, ES, DK, FR, CY): here, 
the first dip is clearly identified, and the second is unfolding at the 
time of writing, since the latest employment rate value is also the 
lowest since the recession struck. The corresponding row includes 
P, T, and L symbols.
No recession countries (DE): countries that, technically, have not 
experienced a recession in the overall employment rate but where a 
trough can be detected for the male employment rate, denoted by a T*.  
In the vast majority of countries, therefore, the ‘peak-to-trou-
gh’ indicator spans the period between well-identified peak trou-
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gh quarters. In protracted recession countries however it spans the 
whole period since the onset of the recession. In countries heading 
for a second, major dip, peak-to-trough variations are computed 
for the first dip as the second is still unfolding.  
Table 1.1. Peaks and troughs in the employment rate (all, aged 15-64)
Country 
(total) 200
7Q
4
200
8Q
1
200
8Q
2
200
8Q
3
200
8Q
4
200
9Q
1
200
9Q
2
200
9Q
3
200
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1
201
0Q
2
201
0Q
3
201
0Q
4
201
1Q
1
201
1Q
2
201
1Q
3
201
1Q
4
201
2Q
1
EU 27 P T
BE P T
BG P T L
CZ P T
DK P T L
DE P T*
EE P T
IE P L
EL P L
ES P T L
FR P T L
IT P L
CY P T L
LV P T
LT P T
LU P T
HU P T
MT P T
NL P T
AT P T
PL P T
PT P L
RO P T
SI P T
SK P T
FI P T
SE P T
UK P T
IS P T
NO P T
HR P L
FYROM P T
TK P T
Note: P: ‘peak’; T: ‘trough’ (also shaded in grey); L: ‘lowest’ value since the peak, 
observed during the latest quarter.
* ‘imputed’ trough, coincides with the quarter when the trough was observed for 
men, as in Appendix 1.
Source: own elaboration using Eurostat online database.
With the help of these specialized indicators we can deepen our 
analysis of gendered labour market patterns during the past ten years 
and in particular since the crisis began. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 give the 
‘big picture’ of how employment, unemployment and inactivity beha-
ved for men and women in the Union as a whole. Quarterly values for 
employment and inactivity rates are displayed in Figure 1.2 alongside 
computed trend values, where the trend has been estimated over pre-
recession years.22 Using the peak-to-trough indicator, the employment 
fallout was 4 percentage points for men (69.3% in 2010, 1st quarter, 
compared with 73.3% in 2008, 3rd quarter). The corresponding figure 
for female employment was 1.4 percentage points (57.8% compared 
with 59.2%). The most recent developments have brought the male 
22  The trend was computed between first quarter 2003 (the first available values) 
and second quarter 2008. Missing quarter values for the first two years of the series 
were replaced using standard procedures in STATA. Of course, trend values vary 
depending on the period over which the trend is computed, but the choice in this case 
was straightforward, namely to use all available data, since they cover a period of 
uninterrupted growth. 
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employment rate down further, to 69.1% in the first quarter of 2012, 
while the female employment rate gained 0.4 percentage points on its 
trough value, reaching 58.2%.  
 
Figure 1.2. Employment and inactivity rates in EU27, quarterly val-
ues and trends 2003Q1 – 2012Q1
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While resorting to the conventional peak-to-trough measure in or-
der to quantify losses and gains has the advantage of being transparent 
and simple, it can also bring about a backward-looking perspective. 
When female employment is experiencing a strong rising trend before a 
recession and the trend in male employment is weaker, peak-to-trough 
variations de facto underestimate the fall in potential employment for 
women. An alternative indicator that avoids this difficulty is deviation 
Lower panel of figure 1.2 
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from trend values. Villa and Smith (2011) view this deviation as captu-
ring the ‘opportunity cost’ of the recession for women or men.23 If we 
take this view, the deviation computed at the trough point (2010Q1) 
may be interpreted as the highest employment opportunity cost incur-
red during the recession. Deviations from trend in the depths of the 
recession amounted to 2.6 percentage points for women and 4.6 for 
men.24  
To sum up, whichever way we measure loss of employment, men 
did bear the brunt of the fallout in employment during the recession 
more than women. How much more, however, depends on the measure 
that is chosen: nearly three times more according to conventional, but 
‘backward-looking’, indicators, and nearly twice as much if the indi-
cator takes into account pre-recession trends. This latter option makes 
more sense from a gender equality perspective, because a given loss of 
employment is more costly for the group that is still in the process of 
catching up (women). It also makes sense from the perspective of the 
European Employment strategy because the success of this strategy also 
hinges on women’s ability to catch up. 
Figure 1.3. Quarterly unemployment rates, 2003Q2-2012Q1, by sex
Source: Eurostat, own elaborations. 
The choice of indicators is also important for examining deve-
lopments in unemployment. If we look at changes in unemployment, 
a mirror image of that found for employment emerges. By the first 
quarter of 2012, the male rate had risen 4.4 percentage points since 
the onset of the recession, with men entering unemployment faster and 
experiencing wider fluctuations than women. The corresponding rise 
23  Perhaps the main disadvantage of ‘opportunity cost’ statistics is that they are sensi-
tive to the period over which the trend is taken.
24  Bottom values of the employment rate for both men and women in Europe as a 
whole (EU27) were reached in 2010Q1. 
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was 3.2 points for the female rate, with unemployed women behaving 
as ‘slower movers’. The advantage of this was a less sharp increase 
when unemployment was on the rise, while the disadvantage was slo-
wer re-absorption when unemployment declined. However, if we look 
at levels rather than changes, female unemployment was higher to start 
with, and may not be as easily absorbed once a lasting recovery sets 
in precisely because unemployed women are ‘slower movers’. On two 
occasions, the male rate rose above that for women – in early 2010 and 
again in early 2012 – but only just. 
The top ten countries for percentage point increases in unem-
ployment from the onset of the recession are the same for men and wo-
men, although the order may differ (see Figure 1.4). The list comprises 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, 
Portugal, and Estonia. In many of these countries output contractions 
were also among the largest. This aggregate pattern of a greater incre-
ase for men is repeated across the vast majority of countries but the 
exceptions are worth noting. In Greece, Malta, Romania and Turkey, 
unemployment among women grew more in percentage terms. While 
the impact of the recession was rather uneven in these countries, all of 
them score below the EU27 average for level of female employment. 
This sends out a warning that the crisis may have curtailed women’s job 
opportunities more where they are scarcer to start with. At the same 
time, it also indicates that even in low-opportunity countries, women 
held on to the labour market rather than acting as buffers.
Figure 1.4. Unemployment rates 2008Q2-2012Q1, by country and sex
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A comparison with the USA brings out the importance of area-
specific versus gender effects. Figure 1.5 plots employment and unem-
ployment up to 2011 for EU27 and the USA (yearly figures). As can 
be gauged from the chart, female employment has been comparatively 
sheltered in both the USA and Europe, and in both areas female unem-
ployment was stickier. The main purpose of the comparison, however, 
is to show that overall employment vulnerability in this crisis has been 
influenced by area-specific factors at least as much as gender. To say it 
with numbers, in 2009 – the worst year for employment losses on both 
sides of the Atlantic – the men’s rate in Europe fell as much as the wo-
men’s rate in the USA (-2.1 points with respect to 2008), and about half 
as much as the men’s rate in the USA. Yet GDP recorded a larger drop 
on this side of the Atlantic.
Figure 1.5. Employment and unemployment in the USA and in Europe 
2000-2011, by sex
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Country differences in the employment response to the cycle are 
considerable also within Europe. Figure 1.6 displays peak-to-trough 
declines and trough-to-latest variations in the employment rate for men 
and women in each Member State. Consider, for example, employment 
contraction in relation to output in the first two years of the reces-
sion. The Baltic States, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
witnessed the highest contractions relative to output (Employment in 
Europe 2010), and all of them also exhibited some of the highest peak-
to-trough declines, for both men and for women. In fact, employment 
responsiveness for men correlates strongly with that for women across 
countries (Box 1.2). Conversely the countries with the strongest male 
employment recovery to date, including the Baltic States and Turkey, 
again tend to coincide with those where female employment is picking 
up faster. Both findings underscore the importance of country effects.
The quite influential literature on Employment Protection Regimes 
(Bentolilla et al. 2008; Boeri and Garibaldi 2007) underpins a wide-
spread perception that country effects in employment responsiveness 
reflect the ‘flexibility’ regime present in each country, where ‘regime’ is 
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understood to be the set of regulations, collective agreement practices 
and income support policies that makes hiring and firing easier and less 
costly for firms. In particular, recourse to reductions in hours worked 
and selective retention of personnel (the so-called ‘internal flexibility’) 
as an alternative to mass firing – ‘external flexibility’ - has apparently 
coincided with the far greater employment resilience in the EU versus 
the USA (EiE 2010: Box 2, p. 27 and Section 3.1.3). To some extent, 
these country effects were shared by female and male employment, not 
least because women and men are fairly equally represented in the lar-
gest ‘flexible’ labour segment, that of employees on temporary con-
tracts (Section 1.4 below). 
In all countries however the vulnerability of female and male wor-
kers differed, primarily because of the sheltering role played by oc-
cupational and sectoral segregation. When the recession first struck, 
output and employment contractions were larger where manufactu-
ring, construction, and selected financial branches were hit the most. 
Since women are consistently under-represented in these sectors, their 
comparative vulnerability was lower. In the joblessness and uncertain 
recovery that followed, female employment was relatively sheltered by 
comparatively rigid demand in sectors like social and health care, or 
even education. To date, the negative effects of fiscal consolidation on 
employment in these sectors have shown up in just a few countries and 
only partially (Chapters IV and V), but they cannot be ruled out for the 
future.  
Figure 1.6 Peak-to-trough and trough-to-2012Q1 variations in em-
ployment, by country and sex
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C. Employment rates: peak level and fall to the 1st trough. Women 
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Note: sorted by peak value.
Source: Eurostat, own elaborations
In Box 1.2, we explore the role of segregation in protecting female 
employment. A simple measure of association – the Pearson correla-
tion – between the strength of segregation on the one hand and gender 
differences on the other in peak-to-trough variations turns out to be 
statistically significant and positive. This indicates that countries with 
more sex-typed employment branches recorded comparatively larger 
employment losses for men, as expected. The value of the Pearson cor-
relation is slightly higher for sectoral than it is for occupational segre-
gation, indicating that employment losses had a more marked sectoral 
than occupational profile.
To broadly summarize developments in employment and unem-
ployment during the last four years, the evidence is of a downward 
leveling of the gender gaps through greater employment losses and hi-
gher unemployment expansions among men. This holds for the whole 
of the EU and for most European countries, though not for all. Sectoral 
segregation has apparently protected women, as it has been found for 
previous recessions. 
The exceptions are worth noting. Unemployment rose more among 
women in some of the countries where they are poorly integrated in the 
labour market – in Greece, Malta, Romania, and Turkey in particular, 
but also in the Czech Republic. Although this may be taken as a sign of 
women’s determination to stay in the labour market, it also indicates 
that the crisis may have disproportionately curtailed employment op-
portunities for women in these countries. 
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While there is a clear finding of a considerable downward leveling of 
gender gaps in employment and unemployment, a few qualifications are 
warranted. The first is that the extent of the ‘disadvantage’ suffered by 
men during downturns may be exaggerated by the use of conventional 
indicators of employment variations during a recession. Specifically, peak-
to-trough variations do not account for potential losses stemming from 
the fact that the crisis interrupted a rising employment trend.  European 
women were experiencing a stronger positive employment trend before 
the recession begun, and thus potential losses are higher for them. In order 
to capture potential losses, we measured employment variations by taking 
deviations from pre-recession trends and found that they too are higher 
for men in the downturn, but not to the same extent as actual losses.
 
Box 1.2 - Employment vulnerability in the downturn. 
Segregation and country-level factors
A simple way of examining the role sectoral gender segregation 
has played in the current recession is to ascertain whether within-
country gender differences in employment in the downturn correla-
te with the level of segregation. The higher the degree of protection 
that segregation affords female employment in a country, the larger 
the expected difference from male employment. Of course, the cor-
relation is meaningful as long as patterns of sectoral segregation 
are similar across countries, which is broadly confirmed by recent 
research (Bettio and Verashchagina 2009). Peak-to-trough declines 
in employment measure within-country employment vulnerability 
in the downturn, while segregation is measured by the 2009 IP se-
gregation index computed by Eurostat. For the 27 Member States, 
the value of the correlation between gender differences in peak-to-
trough values and the index of sectoral segregation is 0.50 and falls 
to to 0.40 for occupational segregation. Both values are statistically 
significant (Table 1.2). Although caution is needed in assessing cor-
relations, as they need not indicate causality, the results conform 
to the experience of past recessions, when over-representation in 
certain service occupations and the public sector worked in favour 
of women.
Segregation may thus have made some difference for female (or 
male) employment within each country. Across countries, howe-
ver, national rather than gender differences appear to matter: that 
is, where the responsiveness of male employment to a given con-
traction in output was higher, so was that of female employment. 
Employment responsiveness to output variations is measured by 
elasticities25, and Table 1.2 sets out peak-to-trough employment 
elasticities separately for men and women. The cross-country cor-
relation between the two sets of elasticities is very strong (0.91), 
indicating close similarity of behaviour.    
25  Employment elasticity with respect to output takes the percentage variation in 
employment in ratio to the percentage variation in GDP. 
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Table 1.2. Employment vulnerability in the downturn 
 
Table 1.2. Employment vulnerability in the downturn
 Country 
Employment/ 
output elasticity 
peak-to-trough,  
WOMEN        
(1) 
Employment/ 
output elasticity 
peak-to-trough, 
MEN           
(2) 
Absolute gender 
difference in 
employment 
peak-to-trough 
variations     
 (3) 
IP index of 
occupational 
segregation,  
2009          
(4) 
IP index of 
sectoral 
segregation,  
2009  
(5) 
BE 0.258 0.469 0.9 25.5 19.58 
BG 0.575 0.823 2.2 29.4 21.84 
AT 0.056 0.828 4.1 26.1 19.53 
CY 0.402 1.707 3.9 29 19.72 
CZ 0.356 0.594 1.4 28 20.69 
DE 0.118 0.250 0.9 26.2 19.46 
DK 0.445 0.964 4.2 25.5 19.71 
EE 0.398 0.942 10.4 31.8 25.36 
EL 0.648 1.345 7 22 16.02 
ES 0.560 2.147 8.5 27 20.84 
FI 0.426 0.726 3.1 29.3 24.15 
FR 0.279 0.582 1.3 26 19.02 
HU 0.132 0.564 3.6 28.4 20.84 
IE 0.418 1.365 10.2 27 22.13 
IT 0.256 0.654 2.8 24.4 19.76 
LT 0.302 0.849 8.7 29.2 22.67 
LU 0.333 0.384 0.4 23.7 16.48 
LV 0.314 0.787 11.3 28.5 23.58 
MT 0.503 0.437 0.3 23.4 16.35 
NL 0.595 0.793 1 24.9 18.73 
PL 2.149 6.924 2 26.2 20.62 
PT 0.311 1.368 6.8 27.1 21.61 
RO 0.498 0.243 2.2 23.1 17.26 
SE 0.594 0.689 0.7 26.1 21.86 
SI 0.566 0.503 0.6 26.1 18.53 
SK 0.452 0.773 2.7 30.4 24.63 
UK 0.239 0.717 3 24.7 19.47 
EU 27 0.247 0.706 2.6 25.8 19.83 
Correlation 
 19.0 2,1
 04.0 4,3
 05.0 5,3
  
 
Source: own elaboration using Eurostat online database.
One additional qualification concerns timing. As noted, employment 
stickiness is an advantage during the downturn, but the downside is 
that unemployment absorption may be slower when a generalized reco-
very finally sets in. This concern adds to the risk that ongoing financial 
consolidation in feminized areas such as public administration, social 
services, or education will hinder future prospects of swift employment 
gains for women in several countries. We shall come back to the issue 
of fiscal consolidation in Chapter IV.  
As we have argued throughout this Section, gender differences are of 
central importance for an understanding of the way the labour market 
has behaved during the crisis, but they should not be over-emphasized. 
We would argue, in fact, that one of the novelties of this crisis is a 
growing similarity in behaviour on the part of men and women. A close 
investigation of patterns of inactivity, involuntary short-time working, 
discouragement from job-seeking, and income roles will bear this out 
in the discussion to follow. 
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Inactivity and discouragement 
Did the fall in household income push women out in search of em-
ployment, or did lower job opportunities discourage many of them 
from searching? The stylized fact at the macro level and for the whole 
of Europe is that (i) unlike men, women increased their labour market 
participation; (ii) male breadwinner households lost ground in favour 
of female breadwinner households; (iii) discouraged workers are (and 
remain) higher among women, but the rise in the aftermath of the re-
cession was greater for men, if anything. 
All this is consistent with the possibility that both added and discou-
raged worker effects were at play. However, while the typical worker 
pushed into the labour market by the recession may still be female, the 
‘typical’ worker discouraged by the recession is no longer a woman.  
Here are the details. Some support for the added worker effect is found 
in gender patterns of labour market participation. In the first quarter of 
2012, twenty-two and a half out of a hundred men of working age were 
not in the labour market in Europe, slightly more than four years earlier 
when the recession officially began (22.1% in 2008, second quarter for 
EU27). Many more women were inactive - 34.9 out of a hundred in 
2012 - but less so than four years earlier (-1.5%). In other words, labour 
market participation has risen among women and fallen among men26. 
This difference in activity patterns may partly reflect structural tren-
ds: women’s activity was following a stronger rising trend in the pre-
recession years. However, there is also evidence that the crisis may have 
turned some women into added workers. According to the latest 2011-
2 Labour Market Developments in Europe, (EC 2011: Box 1.1.1, Table 
2) this has happened among married women with children, as the the-
ory predicts. It is recognized, however, that analysis  would be needed 
at a country level for conclusive proof. Ghignoni and Verashchagina 
(2012) provide qualified evidence for Italy. They find that the added 
worker hypothesis holds for the Central and Southern regions of the 
country. In these regions female labour force participation is lower than 
in Northern Italy where women’s participation patterns are closer to 
those observed in Europe as a whole. It is therefore conceivable that an 
added worker effect has emerged in the EU as a whole primarily thanks 
to developments in low female employment regions.  
EU-SILC data on income roles within households are also not incon-
sistent with the possibility that the crisis may have triggered an added 
worker effect. Table 1.3 sets out the typology of couples by the partner’s 
contribution to earnings from employment. In 2007, just before the cri-
sis struck, dual-earner couples accounted for 74.1%27 of the all couples 
with at least one working age partner in the 25 European countries in-
cluded in the SILC survey (simple average). The pure ‘male’ breadwin-
ner typology, where only ‘he’ earns, made up little over one-fifth of the 
26  It should be recalled, however, that women’s activity was rising faster before the 
recession. The same structural factor pushing for an increase in pre-recession years 
may thus explain part of what happened during the recession.  
27  Note, the EU-SILC figures refer to income earned in the year preceding the survey. 
Thus 2009 figures are drawn from the 2010 survey. The values are weighted average. 
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total (21%), while female breadwinner couples accounted for a 4.9% 
share. By 2009, dual-earner couples had lost ground (-5.1%), mainly 
to the benefit of female breadwinner couples (+4.7%), while male bre-
adwinner couples more or less retained their share (+0.4%). 
The shift from dual to female breadwinner couples was more pro-
nounced in some of the countries worst and first hit by the crisis – mainly 
the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Without further 
investigation of flows between household types, however, we cannot 
know to what extent these changes reflect loss of jobs for the male part-
ner in dual-income households versus some added worker effect.  
Table 1.3. Couples by partner’s income role, 2007-2009
Country
 2009 2009-2007 (%)
 Male 
bread-
winner 
couples
Dual-
earner 
couples
Female 
bread-win-
ner couples
Male 
bread-
winner 
couples
 Dual-ear-
ner couples 
Female 
bread-
winner 
couples
AT 22.14 68.29 9.57 -5.95 -1.44 7.39
BE 19.49 75.54 4.98 -3.36 2.72 0.65
CZ 27.16 64.43 8.41 4.24 -7.67 3.43
DE 22.36 65.62 12.02 -1.87 -4.60 6.47
DK 11.25 81.37 7.31 3.77 -7.34 3.50
EE 20.95 66.10 12.94 3.43 -10.64 7.21
ES 30.40 63.28 6.33 -4.60 1.40 3.22
FI 12.67 76.79 10.53 3.36 -6.92 3.55
FR 16.34 74.21 9.45 -1.51 -3.09 4.60
GR 37.04 54.23 8.73 -5.36 -1.46 6.83
HU 27.06 60.20 12.74 1.40 -4.47 3.07
IS 8.96 86.30 4.74 1.05 -3.92 2.87
IT 35.86 53.76 10.38 -1.67 -4.97 6.64
LT 18.75 66.82 14.43 2.65 -10.23 7.58
LU 29.26 61.45 9.29 -1.89 -3.45 5.33
LV 20.69 65.73 13.58 6.61 -15.63 9.02
NL 18.15 75.21 6.64 -1.78 -1.61 3.49
NO 10.58 82.58 6.84 0.34 -2.30 1.96
PL 30.97 58.16 10.87 -0.51 -0.18 0.69
PT 25.14 63.17 11.69 0.16 -6.89 6.72
SE 10.67 80.05 9.28 1.97 -6.22 4.24
SI 16.41 72.15 11.42 3.36 -7.13 3.75
SK 19.53 72.59 7.87 3.69 -8.24 4.54
UK 20.75 67.98 11.27 2.34 -8.73 6.39
Simple 
average 21.4 69 9.6  0.4 -5.1 4.7
Note: Couples with at least one of the partners working. 
Source: EU-SILC surveys for 2008 and 2010; own elaborations.
79
Impact of the crisis on paid work
At the same time as it pushed additional women into the labour 
market, the crisis also pushed out of it almost a million and a half 
discouraged workers – persons who were not seeking work because 
they believed that none was available. Between 2008 and 2011, slightly 
more men than women (respectively 762 and 632 thousand) exited on 
the grounds of discouragement. As a result, the EU27 share of discou-
raged workers in the non-active population rose by two percentage 
points for men, and by slightly more than one point for women, al-
though the starting value was (and remains) higher for the latter (Figure 
1.7). Once again the gender gap closed, but not in all countries. In a 
sizeable minority of Member States – Cyprus, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Spain – the increase in the share of 
female discouraged workers was actually more pronounced. 
These developments tell a story in no uncertain terms: that the beha-
viour of women in the recession reflects the fact that their income role 
is in transition between traditional conditions as marginal and secon-
dary earners and modern conditions as co-primary earners. Thus, a few 
may still fit within the added worker concept, but the majority behaves 
much like men. 
The increasing representation of men among the so-called NEETs 
underscores this conclusion. As is well known, the term applies to young 
people aged 15-24 who are not in education, employment, or training. 
Discouraged workers have contributed to swelling the ranks of the NE-
ETs during this recession. In 2010, this share amounted to 12.8% of the 
population of those aged 15 to 24 in the EU27, which corresponds to 
approximately 7.5 million young people. The size of the problem varies 
across the EU Member States, with values ranging from 4.4% in the 
Netherlands to 21.8% in Bulgaria (European Foundation for the Impro-
vement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012: Figure 3). 
In 17 out of the 27 EU Member States, the share of NEETs is higher 
for women, resulting in approximately a 1 percentage point gender gap 
for the EU27. The gap is particularly marked in Greece and Romania. 
In Bulgaria, the country with the highest incidence of NEETs, almost 
every fourth woman aged 15-24 belongs to this category. The Baltic 
States, Ireland, Spain, the three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Fin-
land and Sweden), as well as Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
Slovak Republic exhibit the opposite pattern. Here, the men’s share of 
NEETs is higher, though in some Member States (such as the Scandina-
vian countries), gender differences are fairly limited. 
As the recent Eurofound investigation on the NEETs states: “With 
the exception of Luxembourg, all the Member States have seen a con-
siderable rise in the number of NEETs since the onset of the crisis; in 
2010 in Italy and the UK, the size of the NEET population has reached 
approximately 1.1 million of those aged 15–24 years. Factors which 
primarily affect the probability to be in the group include: some kind of 
disability, immigration background, a low education level, living in re-
mote areas, low household income, unemployed and divorced parents, 
as well as low educational background.” (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012: p.3).
80
Impact of the crisis on paid work
Figure 1.7. Discouraged workers, 2008-11, by country and sex
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Employment conditions: involuntary part-time and tempo-
rary contracts
Economic crises heighten the risk that the ‘quality’ of employment 
will decline because employers impose inferior conditions in an effort 
to curtail costs, or because employees are more willing to accept some 
worsening if it helps them stay in employment. Quality of employment 
has several dimensions, first and foremost pay. Chapter II will investi-
gate the pay issue. In this and the following sections, we focus on the 
deterioration of employment conditions other than pay in particular 
the rise in involuntary part-time, the use of temporary employees as 
buffers and the weakening of workers’ rights. The overall indication is 
that the worsening of working conditions has spared neither men nor 
women, but has affected them differently. It is also perceived differen-
tly, making issues of ‘more’ or ‘less’ rather questionable.    
Part-time working has risen during the recession, and in early 2012 
it was slightly higher than at the onset of the crisis. Much more so than 
in the USA, part-time has been used in Europe to avoid the harder op-
tion of firing (European Commission, 2010e; Hijzen and Venn 2011). 
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According to the results of the European Social Survey conducted in 17 
Member States to investigate working conditions during the recession 
(Box 1.4), more than 10% of female respondents reported having to 
work shorter hours in 14 of these countries - 13 in the case of men. 
Given the use of shorter hours as an alternative to lay-offs, any in-
crease in part-time during this recession may be considered a mixed 
blessing. However, when workers self-identify as ‘involuntary part-
timers’ it is the sense of loss that prevails. In 2010, when the first em-
ployment dip occurred, the share of involuntary over total part-time 
had risen to 38.1%, up 5.8 points from its 2007 level (Figure 1.8). 
Among women, the corresponding value was 24%, up 3.8 points. One 
year later - the latest on record - the share decreased for both sexes, but 
remains considerably higher than pre-recession levels. Again, however, 
percentage variations may be misleading because many more women 
are part-timers. Absolute figures tell a different story. In 2010, female 
involuntary part-timers numbered 7.3 million against 3.2 million for 
men. The respective upsurge from 2007 totalled 1.3 million, against 
773 thousand. This is a clear case where the choice of indicators co-
lours the perception of outcomes.
Figure 1.8. Involuntary part-time, 2007-2011
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Of course country-specific patterns vary, but those worst hit by the 
upsurge in involuntary part-time also tend to be those where there was 
more of it already. Specifically, Mediterranean countries such as Gree-
ce, Italy, Spain and Cyprus are at the high end of the range with the 
largest share of involuntary part-time, as well as some of the strongest 
rises for both women and men. In percentage terms however, it is Ire-
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land that leads the league for increases, although its starting value was 
comparatively low among women. Nordic countries are more frequen-
tly found at the opposite end to Mediterranean countries, while Eastern 
countries are found at both ends. 
Unlike part-time, temporary employment is distributed fairly equal-
ly between men and women, with a slight prevalence of the latter. In 
EU27, men on temporary contracts reached 12.6% of total male em-
ployment in the first quarter of 2012, while the figure for women was 
1.1 percentage points higher (13.7%). A modest gender gap also cha-
racterizes most Member States, the exceptions being Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Romania.  
In the downturn, a last-in-first-out principle prevailed, as firms 
found it more difficult to fire tenured employees than to stop renew-
ing temporary contracts. The peak-to-trough share of male tempora-
ry employment declined from 13.7% to 12.5% in EU27, and a very 
similar contraction was recorded for the share of female temporary 
employment (from 15.2% to 14.1%). Uncertainty about recovery in 
some countries and protracted recession in other countries account for 
a mixed pattern after the first dip. At the EU level, there was a slight 
decrease in the share of temporary female employment, while substan-
tial stability prevailed for men. By early 2012, the (small) gender gap 
had grown smaller than it had been in 2008, but the change is marginal 
(Figure 1.9).  
It is well known that temporary employees are disproportionately 
concentrated among younger workers. Given their low employment 
protection, young workers have been used to cushion the employment 
fallout among adult and older workers, as highlighted by the segmen-
tation debate. Temporary employment may bring some advantages to 
young workers, including more opportunities to shop around for better 
jobs; however, this crisis added higher cyclical sensitivity to the list of 
disadvantages for this type of labour relations. The average young wor-
ker on temporary employment in the EU experienced a wage penalty 
of 14.4% in 2010 in comparison to a worker on a standard contract 
with similar characteristics. Moreover his/her chances of transiting to a 
standard, open-ended work contract were barely over one-third in the 
same year (34.6: European Commission 2012b: Table 2, p. 146). 
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Figure 1.9. Temporary employment. Peak-to-trough change and cur-
rent values
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This has an important gender twist. Temporary contracts may pre-
clude access to full maternity benefits, for example if the woman beco-
mes pregnant during a spell of unemployment. Moreover, uncertainty 
about the timing and conditions of the next (sequence of temporary) 
jobs creates a specific disadvantage for young women, as it has been 
found that fertility is delayed when labour market prospects are uncle-
ar (see, for example, Adsera 2004, Modena and Sabatini 2010). While 
this holds true in good and bad economic times, for the young female 
cohorts affected by the crisis uncertainty may lower fertility altogether 
(Sobotka et al. 2010), since a postponement of a few years will signifi-
cantly shrink a woman’s reproductive period. 
In-work poverty: differences among women matter
Part-time and temporary work are among the employment charac-
teristics that contribute to in-work poverty, especially when it is in-
voluntary. So is low pay too. But despite women’s over-representation 
among part-timers, the low-paid, and temporary employees, in-work 
poverty besets selected segments of women rather than all working 
women, and remains higher among working men. This is because job 
and contractual characteristics matter for working people’s exposure 
to the risk of poverty, but so do the characteristics of the family they 
belong to. For example, a single mother with one child increases her 
odds of in-work poverty by roughly 2.4 times when she has a second 
child (European Commission 2012b: Chapter 4, p. 153). Young, single 
working women are also at greater risk of in-work poverty on account 
of low starting salaries and temporary contracts, but they largely share 
this risk with young men. For partnered women, however, notably 
many of those that could be classified as ‘secondary earners’, the part-
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ner’s income often counters the risk of in-work poverty. Commission 
Services estimated for the interval 2007-2009 that, all other things be-
ing equal, being a man increased the odds of being in-work and poor by 
some 4 percentage points compared to being a woman (Figure 1.10 ).28
Between 2008 and 2010, in-work poors rose very slightly and only 
among women within the EU, although the incidence remains higher 
among men (8.9% compared to 7.8% among women)29.  A plausible 
explanation is that job losses were stronger among the low paid, and 
given the sectoral profile of the recession, among men.    
 
Figure 1.10. Determinants of in-work poverty, EU level, survey years 
2007-2009
Source: European Commission (2012b): Chart 17, p. 153.
Working conditions: infringement and restrictions of 
rights and entitlements
Restrictions of rights that protect pregnant women or mothers of young 
children are not confined to employees on temporary contracts. In at le-
ast three countries Greece, Ireland30 and Portugal Labour Inspectorates 
recorded a multiplication of the instances of infringement of such rights 
during the crisis, while in Italy and the Czech Republic infringement is re-
ported to have occurred frequently in ‘normal times’ as well. The Nether-
lands is a welcome exception: take-up of parental leave actually increased 
in recessionary years and among both men and women (Box 1.3). 
Besides pregnancy and maternity, restrictions of rights contributed 
to deteriorating working conditions in other respects. Delayed wage 
28  Technically, the odds ratio (the ratio of the likelihood of being in-work poor versus 
that of not being in this condition). 
29   Eurostat, online database 
30  For further details on Ireland see Russell H and F McGinnity (2011), ‘Workplace 
Equality in the Recession? The Incidence and Impact of Equality Policies and Flexible 
Working’. Dublin: Equality Authority & ESRI.
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payments are frequently alleged for Eastern European countries (Bulga-
ria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and also for Greece, whilst 
in other countries allegations range from specific instances of discrimi-
nation against women (Portugal) to occupational downgrading (UK), 
the conversion of standard into ‘atypical’ contracts and increases in 
irregular work (Greece), increased work pressure and harassment at 
work (Finland and France), and more frequent violations of health and 
safety regulations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia), of working schedu-
les (Poland) or of the right to unionize and strike (Turkey). As might be 
expected, there is no clear sign that male or female workers were more 
frequent targets, although this may be the case for individual countries 
or for specific allegations.
Box 1.3 - Infringement of rights of pregnant and would-
be pregnant women during the recession
Greece. Infringements of the right of pregnant women to a full 
period of maternity leave and of the right of mothers to childcare 
leave or a reduced working day immediately after maternity leave 
were frequent in the private sector before the crisis. Highly sensi-
tive issues are also increased instances of discrimination in hiring, 
lay-offs in the case of pregnancy etc. Between 2007 and 2009, the 
number of disputes on gender equality at work in which the Labour 
Inspectorate was called to intervene increased from 11 in 2007 to 
79 in 2010. The primary reason for intervention is illegal dismissals 
of pregnant and breast-feeding women. The second most important 
reason is the detrimental change in the employment conditions of 
mothers returning after completion of maternity leave. 
The Czech Republic. Discrimination against mothers with small 
children is an “institutionalized feature” of the Czech labour mar-
ket. The three-year parental leave, together with low availability of 
childcare services for children under six years of age, gives emplo-
yers grounds to discriminate against all women, with or without 
children. These tendencies already existed before the crisis, and the-
se groups of women are more likely to be affected by a worsening 
in working conditions and cuts in social benefits during the crisis. 
Italy. According to the surveys carried out in 2008-2009 by the 
National Statistical Institute, there is a tendency for the working 
conditions of young mothers to become more stringent. In 2008-
2009, about 800,000 mothers who were working or had worked 
in the past declared that they had been dismissed or forced into 
a position where they resigned because of pregnancy during their 
working life course. This amounts to about 8.7% of the total in the 
15-64 age group, but the percentage peaks at 14.1% for mothers 
born after 1973: that is, those who entered the labour market du-
ring this decade.  
The Netherlands. From a gender perspective, it is interesting to 
see if access to leave schemes has become more restricted during the 
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crisis. Data from 2002 to 2010 show that while the take-up rate de-
creased between 2006 and 2008, it has increased even further since 
then. Among men, take-up was almost 23% in 2010, and among 
women almost 43%. This seems to suggest that the crisis did not 
prevent parents from taking up parental leave. 
Portugal. According to the last official Report of the Commis-
sion for Equality in Labour and Employment (CELE), one of the 
most frequent reasons for CELE’s intervention is giving legal opi-
nions in cases of the dismissal of pregnant, puerperal and breastfee-
ding women. Requests for legal opinions increased from 87 in 2008 
to 94 in 2009.  
Source: EGGE national reports
Men voiced complaints more frequently (Box 1.4). The above-men-
tioned 2010 ESS survey gathered subjective evaluations of changes in 
working conditions that had taken place in the preceding three years. 
The questions administered to the respondents focused on four aspects: 
(i) experiencing a reduction in pay; (ii) having to work shorter hours; 
(iii) having less security in the job; and (iv) doing less interesting work. 
Men reported cuts in pay, heightened job insecurity, and worsening 
quality of the work content more frequently than women. Women re-
ported having to reduce work hours more frequently than men. While 
more frequent complaints of job insecurity and pay cuts among men 
reflect higher jobs losses on their part, more frequent grievances about 
the quality of work content may also reflect the fact that in ‘normal’ 
times, men are less likely to be induced to accept compromises relating 
to the quality of their work content on account of family commitments. 
Box 1.4 - The effect of the crisis on working condi-
tions, a subjective evaluation
The European Social Survey conducted in 2010 investigated the 
impact of the crisis on working conditions. The survey was con-
ducted in 20 countries - 17 from the EU, plus Israel, the Russian 
Federation and Switzerland. The main results for the EU countries 
are as follows (Figure 1.11):
- in 10 European countries out of the 17 covered by the sur-
vey, at least 20% of male respondents reported having to take a 
reduction in pay, while for women the corresponding number of 
countries is 7.
- at least 20% of men reported having less job security in 10 
countries, compared to 9 for women.
- at least 10% of men reported having to work shorter hours in 
13 countries, compared to 14 for women.
- at least 30% of male respondents reported to be doing less in-
teresting work in 9 countries, compared to 6 for women.
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Figure 1.11. Sub�ective evaluation of change in working condi-
tions during last three years, 2008-2010
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Note: blue bars represent men, and red bars women. Design weights have been 
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Source: own elaboration on ESS data, round 5, year 2010 (first release: 
26.10.2011)
In some contrast to the picture emerging from the ESS investigation, 
the survey conducted in 2011 by the European Trade Union Confe-
deration (ETUC 2011) among its members documents a widespread 
perception that women suffered losses across the board,  indicating that 
that the lack of gender disaggregated statistics may have contributed to 
underestimate the scope of such losses.    
Buffer and sheltered groups: the age, nationality and edu-
cational divides 
Temporary employees are among those bearing the repercussions of 
the crisis to a disproportionate extent. The segmentation debate sug-
gests that there are other candidates – the unskilled and migrants in 
particular – and it is of interest to investigate gender patterns for these 
groups. For this purpose, we have chosen to focus on three possible 
dimensions of segmentation in this Section: age, education, and natio-
nality. 
Age. Peak-to-trough losses in employment for young workers (15-
24), adult workers (25-49) and older workers (50-64) bear out the fin-
ding that in Europe as a whole (i) the younger the worker the higher the 
employment losses during recession, and (ii) this age pattern is common 
to men and women, though less pronounced for the latter (Figure 1.12).
Prima facie differences among countries in the employment vulne-
rability profile by age group are consistent with the hypothesis that 
vulnerability also depends on the type and strength of employment pro-
tection in the country (or on the type or strength of flexibility). Com-
pare the pattern for Spain and Estonia in Figure 1.12. Spain, where the 
incidence of temporary employment is one of the highest in Europe 
(25.4% for women and 22.3% for men in 2012Q1), well illustrates 
the buffer role of young workers, men and women. In Estonia however 
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the labour market is fully flexible for both young and older workers. 
This caused extremely high losses in the recession, but not primarily 
to the detriment of younger men . In fact, the worst hit groups were 
adult male workers. The pattern for this country is repeated in other 
Baltic and Eastern European countries (Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Poland). No clear picture emerges for countries with contained losses, 
including Germany, Belgium, and France.
On average for Europe, however, job losses for workers older than 
55 were more contained than for younger workers. Among older wo-
men employment has never stopped growing, though it slowed down as 
the crisis unfolded (see also EC, 2012: Chart 4, p. 206). Unlike in ear-
lier recessions, therefore, the employment of older workers was appa-
rently spared from the worst effects of the downturn. However, this is 
likely to reflect the fact that a number of European countries postponed 
the pensionable age in the attempt to curb public deficits (see Chapter 
5)    rather than the willingness on the part of employers to hoard their 
more experienced manpower. 
For buffer-role-groups like young workers (men and women) the 
expectation is that employment recovery should be more pronounced. 
In the vast majority of countries that are experiencing some level of re-
covery, however, employment gains up to the first quarter of 2012 are 
too uncertain and slim to yield any firm indication.   
Education. A common finding for previous recessions was that the 
less educated a worker was, the higher her/his risk of losing the job, and 
vice versa. In the current recession, this holds for the ‘average’ EU male 
and female worker, but not for all workers or in all countries (Figure 
1.13). 
For example, the average European worker with tertiary education 
was still comparatively shielded from dismissals, but this did not ap-
ply to women in some Baltic and Mediterranean countries. In Esto-
nia, Latvia, Italy and France, it was low-educated women who suffered 
lower employment losses. Moreover, in countries where some recove-
ry is underway, employment growth is often stronger among middle-
educated women and men than it is at the top end of the educational 
range, although there are exceptions to this pattern (Latvia and Malta), 
and the order of magnitude is still too small for any safe conclusion 
to be reached. This waning degree of protection afforded by educa-
tion has presumably contributed to the emergence of NEETs as a large, 
worrying phenomenon among men as well as women (see above). 
Nationality. There is little doubt that the most vulnerable group in 
this crisis is male migrants, and in a fairly consistent geopolitical order. 
Male workers from outside the Union were the worst hit by job los-
ses, followed by mobile male workers from within the Union: that is, 
male citizens of the Union working in a European country other than 
their own. In EU27, the peak-to-trough drop in the employment rate 
reached 5.2% among male mobile EU workers, and 8.6% among third 
countries male migrants. By comparison, the figure for local (national) 
male workers is 3.8% (Figure 1.14). In 14 out of the 22 countries for 
which relevant data exist, the highest employment fallout was, in fact, 
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for outside migrants. However, in Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Poland 
and Luxembourg mobile workers from within the Union fared slightly 
worse than migrants from outside. 
The pattern is rather different for female workers. Mobile women 
workers from within the EU were by and large spared, except in Ire-
land, Finland, the Netherlands, and Portugal. In fact, they proved less 
vulnerable to the recession than national female workers in EU27 as 
a whole. The converse holds for third countries female migrants, but 
even for this group the fall in employment was at 3.7 percentage points. 
One plausible reason is, again, occupational and sectoral segregation. 
So called ‘independent’ female migration from Eastern Europe and 
from outside Europe has grown considerably over the past decades, 
filling shortages of local workers in service and care jobs, and in elderly 
care in particular (Morokvasic 2003; Bettio et al. 2006; Kofman and 
Raghuram 2007). The recession has not halted the ageing process, and 
demand for elderly care has continued to grow. In fact, shortages of 
skilled and semi-skilled care workers were reported in several European 
countries just before the recession (Bettio and Verashchagina 2009). 
Since then, the growth in demand for elderly care may have decelerated 
due to falling private and public funds, but this is unlikely to have can-
celled out the shortages altogether.
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Figure 1.12. Age profile of employment change. Peak-to-trough and 
trough-to-2012Q1 variations in the employment rate.
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Source: own elaboration using Eurostat data
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Figure 1.13. Education profile of employment change. Peak-to-
trough and trough-to-2012Q1 variations in the employment rate.
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Source: own elaboration using Eurostat data
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Figure 1.14. Nationality profile of employment change. Peak-to-
trough and trough-to-2012Q1 variations in the employment rate.
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Concluding remarks 
In this summary, we will primarily draw attention to outcomes at 
an EU level, despite the fact that aggregate trends invariably conceal 
different – and sometimes opposite – patterns across countries, as we 
have frequently pointed out in this chapter.  
In fact, the variety of country experiences makes it difficult to chart the 
timing of the crisis. At the time of writing, a second major employment 
dip is expected in the EU as a whole, which has technically re-entered 
recession in GDP terms. But this imminent second dip hides the fact that 
some countries have never actually exited the first recessionary episode 
(Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Croatia), other countries have 
been on a consistent pathway to employment recovery for some time (the 
clearest examples is that of the Baltic States), and perhaps the majority of 
countries experienced a fragile and uncertain recovery.      
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The overriding connotation of the present crisis is the downward 
leveling of gender gaps in activity, employment, unemployment, and 
wages. Male employment dropped earlier in the recession and faster, 
spurred by a severe contraction in output in manufacturing, construc-
tion, and some branches of the financial sector. In the few cases where 
recovery is taking place, male employment has also picked up faster, 
but the lost ground has not yet been fully regained. As a result, the 
EU-wide gender gap in the employment rate has gone down some 3.2 
percentage points: from the 14.1 points pre-recession peak to 10.9 
points in the first quarter of 2012. As short-time working was used 
across countries to cushion the fall in employment, the gender gap in 
the full-time-equivalent employment rate also shrank, although eviden-
ce is only available for early in the recession (from 20 percentage points 
in 2008 to 18.4 in 2009).
Female unemployment displayed a stickier pattern, with the advan-
tage of a less sharp increase in the downturn compared to male unem-
ployment, and the disadvantage of slightly slower re-absorption where 
and when recovery set in. With the second major employment dip in 
this recession approaching, the gender unemployment gap turned re-
versed again in the first quarter of 2012, standing at -0.2 percentage 
points. The first reversal of the gap had occurred in 2009.
This does not imply progress in gender equality or success towards 
reaching the employment target that has been set in the Europe 2020 
Employment strategy. At peak values, just before the recession began, 
10 Member States were above the 65% employment rate mark for wo-
men aged 15 to 64, but the number was down to 6 in the most recent 
quarter, as Estonia, Latvia, the UK and Slovenia slipped below this 
mark. In the vast majority of Member States, the new target set for 
2020 looks further away now than it did four years ago. As for unem-
ployment, it is a cause for universal concern that both men and women 
are now very close to the 10 percent mark.
Like in previous recessions, occupational and sectoral segregation 
has protected female employment (and unemployment). We found that 
the differences in peak-to-trough employment losses between men and 
women correlate positively with the level of sectoral segregation across 
countries, the correlation with occupational segregation also being si-
gnificant, but slightly lower. In simpler terms, the higher concentra-
tion of men in traditionally male sectors (occupations) made male em-
ployment more vulnerable to the recession. 
However, the extent to which female employment was shielded 
should be de-emphasized on three counts. Firstly, the vulnerability of 
male employment (or the resilience of female employment) is sometime 
exaggerated by the indicator that has been chosen. Women were slowly 
catching up in employment with men before the recession set in, and 
still need to do so. Thus, potential losses rather than actual losses are 
relevant. If we take deviations from trends to measure potential losses, 
men appeared to have suffered losses nearly twice as high as women at 
the bottom of the first dip, and about one and a half times higher at the 
beginning of 2012 (first quarter). The comparison is bleaker in terms of 
actual losses, which are nearly three times as high among men between 
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the peak and the bottom quarter of the first recessionary episode, and 
even higher over the entire four years of the recession.  
Moreover, employment segregation has made a difference for men 
and women within individual countries. Across countries, however, 
employment responsiveness to the cycle (vulnerability for short) was 
largely influenced by country-specific factors, including labour market 
(de)regulation or flexibility. Using employment elasticities to measu-
re vulnerability, we found that the vulnerability of female and male 
employment associates very strongly across European countries, de-
spite differences in segregation. As a result, female vulnerability in 
one country was sometimes higher than male vulnerability in another 
country, despite similar contractions in output. The comparison betwe-
en the USA and Europe well illustrates this case.
Finally, Europe is not yet ‘home and dry’. At the time of writing, 
the sovereign debt crisis is still menacing the future of the common 
currency, the euro, although the outlook is brighter than it was a few 
months ago. Renewed efforts to consolidate debts in the countries at 
risk or to prevent debt deterioration may avert the menace, but fiscal 
consolidation brings with it cuts in welfare services and public em-
ployment, where jobs tend to be feminized. Owing to fiscal consolida-
tion, the tail of this recession may affect jobs and employment condi-
tions for women unfavourably, with the added complication that the 
countries with the greatest need for consolidation tend to score rather 
low in female employment. We will explore this issue in Chapter IV.
In early theorizing, employment segregation was seen to restrict the 
tendency for female employment to act as a cyclical buffer. The idea of 
a buffer role for women still lingers in some literature and in the me-
dia. This recession conclusively refutes this idea as regards Europe. The 
buffer role can no longer be tracked along sex lines. The modern ‘buf-
fers’ are male migrants, especially from outside the EU, together with 
young men and women in temporary employment. In the downturn, 
firms found it easier to cut employment by slowing down the renewal 
of temporary contracts and a result, total temporary contracts declined 
in proportion to total employment from 12.2% to 11.1% at the trough 
point, with few differences between men and women. In the jobless re-
covery that has prevailed since, temporary employment, too, oscillated 
around the trough value for both men and women. 
As emphasized by the literature on segmentation and Employment 
Protection Regimes, the dividing line for temporary contracts (and hen-
ce for exposure to the cycle) is not sex, but age. In the large majority 
of the countries reviewed here, the age profile of peak-to-trough em-
ployment variations followed a clear age ordering, with the youngest 
being the most exposed by far. However, in several Eastern and Baltic 
countries, where the labour market is less segmented along age lines, 
it was primarily middle-aged workers who were hurt by the recession, 
both men and women. The comparative employment resilience among 
older workers may, however, reflect postponement of the pensionable 
age rather than indicating lower, individual risk of job loss. 
In comparison to migrant workers, male local supplies have been 
relatively shielded from loss of employment. Male migrants from out-
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side the EU recorded the highest employment fallout in the Union as a 
whole. In contrast, outcomes for mobile workers from within the EU 
appear to differ across countries. 
Like their male counterpart (but to a lesser extent) female migrants 
from outside the EU were hit by the recession more than local, female 
employment was. One notable difference concerns female migrants ori-
ginating from within the EU. This group was largely shielded from the 
downturn in employment. Many of them had migrated from Eastern 
to Western Europe to find work in the care sector, which is a highly-
feminized labour market segment where demographic aging continues 
to sustain demand for personal services. With the welfare cuts imposed 
by fiscal consolidation, however, the resilience of demand for care ser-
vices may be jeopardized.
Flexibility, the sectoral profile of output contraction and employment 
segregation are all factors operating primarily on the demand side. On 
the supply side, what makes this crisis different from previous ones is 
the greater labour market entrenchment on the part of women. Income 
roles for women are still in transition between a secondary role and a 
co-primary role, but the crisis may have accelerated the transition.
In 2007, dual-earner couples formed the absolute majority (almost 
three-fourths) of all working-age couples in which at least one of the 
partners worked. Male breadwinner and female breadwinner couples 
shared the remained fourth unequally (respectively 21% and 8% of 
all couples). This could be read as the demise of the male breadwin-
ner myth, but this would not tell the whole story. Within dual-earner 
couples, the women’s contribution to household (labour) income was 
significantly lower than their partners’, perhaps not so low as to qualify 
all these couples as ‘one and a half earner’ couples, but low enough to 
still qualify the female partners as ‘secondary’ earners. 
This transitional state showed up in women’s behaviour during the 
crisis. On the one hand, they showed no greater signs of discouragment 
than men did. If anything, the opposite occurred, as more men than 
women exited the labour market out of discouragement. On the other 
hand, there is evidence in favour of the added worker effect among 
women, both at the EU level  and in some regions (the Centre- South of 
Italy in particular). The combined result is a rise in labour market parti-
cipation among women, and a fall among men. Also, the share of dual-
earner couples dropped by 3.7 percentage points, largely in favour of 
an increase in couples where the woman is the sole earner (+3.4%). It 
remains to be seen whether the additional women the crisis has drawn 
into the labour market will remain there if and when a robust recovery 
finally materializes. 
The behaviour of involuntary part-time is another sign of higher 
employment entrenchment among women. In 2010, the worst year of 
the recession, involuntary part-time rose sharply for men, as short-time 
working was often a way to avoid dismissals. The percentage rise in 
the share of involutary part-time was in fact about two points higher 
for men (+5.8 against +3.8). However, because of the large gender di-
spartity in the prevalence of part-time, the increase in the numbers of 
involuntary part-timers was actually much larger among women: al-
96
Impact of the crisis on paid work
most double.
Comparison in terms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ are far less meaningful 
with regard to developments in working considitions. The worsening of 
working conditions may have affected women and men differently, ra-
ther than simply in terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’. Curtailments of rights have 
apparently intensified during the crisis across the spectrum of working 
conditions. Some instances have concerned pregnant women and mo-
thers of young children. Specifically, the right of pregnant women to 
maternity leave or benefits or to resume their job after maternity is do-
cumented (or believed) to have risen in the wake of the crisis in at least 
four countries (Greece, Portugual, Italy and the Czech Republic). These 
instances are worrying not only per se, but also for their repercussions 
on fertility (Sobotka et al. 2010).  
Working conditions have reportedly deteriorated in many other 
respects for men and women alike. The list includes delays in wage 
payments, occupational downgrading, violations of health and safety 
regulations or (normal) working schedules and trade union rights, pres-
sure and harassment at work and downright discrimination. 
Overall, there is no conclusive, objective evidence showing which 
of male or female workers were the most frequent targets of such in-
fringements, although this may be the case for individual countries or 
for specific allegations. According to the results of the recent European 
Social Survey on working conditions, however, men voiced complaints 
more frequently in at least three respects: increased job insecurity, cuts 
in pay and having to accept less interesting work. While greater job in-
security and more frequent pay cuts may well have accompanied higher 
jobs losses among men, more frequent grievances about the quality of 
work content may also reflect the fact that in ‘normal’ times, men may 
be forced to compromise on work content less often in order to meet 
family commitments.
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The risk of worsening employment conditions during a crisis is first and 
foremost the threat of wage reduction. There are, however, no a priori re-
asons why a downward trend in pay should affect male and female wages 
differently. Economic theorizing does not offer strong a priori guidance in 
this respect.31 However, if male employment is disproportionately affected, 
as in the current recession, theoretical expectations are clearer. When this 
occurs, simple supply and demand analysis or more sophisticated job search 
theories (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) generate the expectation that the 
downward pressure will be higher for men’s wages. The same outcome may 
be brought about by compositional effects if occupational segregation is wi-
despread. A typical instance is when wage losses accrue disproportionately 
to industries and occupations with higher than average male pay.
This chapter reviews evidence on wages and the gender wage gap 
since the beginning of the recession. EU-level data are combined with 
local information for nine countries: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, Croatia, Lithuania, Norway, the Slovak Republic and Cyprus. 
Section 2.2 focuses on the decline of the gender wage gap. Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 investigate the main factors behind this decline including 
segregation, the composition of the pay packet and national policy pro-
grammes designed to curb wage disparities between men and women. 
Section 2.5 concludes. 
31  For example, in the added worker situation, some women are willing to revise 
their minimum pay aspirations downwards in order to gain entry into employment. 
This does not, however, mean that average female wages will fall, as the story is about 
those women who might have been out of employment precisely because their wage 
aspirations were higher than the wages they could be paid. Thus, the entry of these 
women need not lower the average wage for those already in employment. Under the 
substitution hypothesis, heightened competition during the recession induces emplo-
yers to hire women, who are cheaper than men to start with. But even here it is hard 
to see why stronger demand for women during a recession should lower their wages 
more than men’s. One alternative possibility is that because of gender segregation in 
employment, a lowering of wages in, say, feminized branches do not spread to male-
dominated branches. However, segregation is a two-way process, and the converse is 
equally possible. In principle, the segregation hypothesis is compatible with gender 
wage differentials moving in any direction during a crisis. What matters in practice is 
whether feminized or male-dominated sectors are affected the most.
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Decades of research on gender pay disparities have argued in fa-
vour of analyzing the ‘adjusted’ wage gap alongside the ‘unadjusted’ 
gap. However, ascertaining the magnitude of the adjusted gap is costly, 
procedures are not standardized, and results are not rapidly available. 
Inevitably, information on the behaviour of the adjusted wage gap is 
scant, and this chapter is no exception.
Box 2.1 - Adjusted and unadjusted wage gap. Eurostat 
definitions
The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents the difference 
between average gross hourly earnings of male and female emplo-
yees expressed as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of 
male employees. The GPG recorded by Eurostat covers all econo-
mic activities except agriculture, fishing and public administration 
(NACE Rev. 2, Sections B to S, excluding O) and businesses with 
at least 10 employees. Gross hourly earnings include paid overti-
me and exclude non-regular payments (such as bonuses); part-time 
workers are included. Average earnings used for the GPG are cal-
culated as arithmetic means. This indicator is ‘unadjusted’ because 
it does not account for individual characteristics that may explain 
part of the earnings difference, such as differences in education, age 
or labour market experience between men and women. 
The adjusted gap measures the disparity in hourly wages that 
would exist if employed women and men were similar as regards 
certain key personal characteristics, such as education or age. This 
gap is of special interest for policy action, since the wage disparity 
that is measured cannot be justified on grounds of productivity. 
The decline in the Gender Pay Gap
The latest ESS survey on working conditions indicates that at least 
10 per cent of male workers and 6 per cent of female workers had 
their hourly earnings reduced in the first three years of the recession.32 
Against this backdrop of falling earnings, the story for women is of 
strength in weakness. The gender wage gap decreased in the EU as a 
whole, as well as in the majority of member countries for which data 
are available (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The basic facts are as follows: 
•  According to Eurostat data, the unadjusted GPG declined between 
32  According to the findings of the European Social Survey 2010 (ESS), one-fifth of 
female workers (20.0%) and slightly under one-quarter of all male workers inter-
viewed in 17 European Member States (23.8%) report having accepted a reduction 
in pay in the last 3 years (2008-2010). In both cases, the proportion of interviewees 
reporting a reduction in hours is lower, around 13% for men and 14% for women. 
Since ‘a reduction in pay’ is generally understood to be a reduction in earnings over 
a period (weekly, monthly, yearly), at least some 10% of working men and at least 
some 6% of working women appear to have accepted a reduction in hourly earnings 
(data in Figure 1.9 above). 
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2007 and 2010 in 16 out of 25 member countries for which data 
are available, with the greatest reductions (between 3 and 5%) 
being in Lithuania, the Netherlands and Slovenia, moderate re-
ductions in Denmark, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Sweden, the Slovak 
Republic and the UK, and a less than 1% decline in Belgium, Fran-
ce, Finland, Luxembourg, Romania and Spain. However in four of 
these countries – the UK, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Spain 
– a pre-recession declining trend is observable since 2002. 
•  According to national level data, the list of countries witnessing a 
decline in the unadjusted GPG is longer. National sources indica-
te a decrease for Norway (Table 2.2)33 and for two countries for 
which Eurostat data are not available, Croatia and Estonia.
•  There is also evidence that the adjusted wage gap declined alongsi-
de the unadjusted gap, but only for one country: the Slovak Repu-
blic. The Trexima research institute conducted a survey on behalf 
of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. Values for the 
adjusted wage gap were estimated to range between 8% and 12% 
in 2007, depending on the level of occupational disaggregation, 
down to 7.8-11.3% in 2011. The 2011 value of the unadjusted 
gap varied from 16.6 in the non-business sector to 20.8 in the 
business sector. 
Overall, a downward leveling of pay disparities between men and 
women was the most common outcome, although there are several 
instances to the contrary. As with developments in employment, the 
recession is making everybody worse off, men a little more so than 
women. 
The following example of Denmark will put some flesh on the bare 
numbers of deteriorating wage (and career) prospects for men and wo-
men, and may echo the experiences of other countries. With the advent 
of the crisis, Danish male early school leavers and drop-outs who had 
been lured out of school into fast-expanding industries like construction 
during the boom years faced few prospects of formal apprenticeship, 
but high prospects of unskilled jobs for life, or worse. Among Danish 
women, the threats to their wages and careers originated primarily from 
within the public sector. Allegedly, “…[the] restructuring of the public 
sector [has meant] that direct ‘hands-on’ services have been rationalized, 
but more personnel is engaged in the development, rationalization and 
control of the public sector. Overall, this has favoured younger, well-
educated women and men, and made the working conditions of social 
and health personnel more stressful”. This personnel comprises “older 
or middle aged women, who typically work in the public sector and are 
receiving lower salaries in real terms than before the crisis”.
33  The discordance between Eurostat and national data for Norway stems primarily 
from the different sectoral coverage. The GPG reported in Table 2.1 does not cover 
all sectors, as it excludes the public administration, defence, and compulsory social se-
curity. Alternative GPG figures are available from Eurostat which cover these sectors, 
but they exist for fewer countries and not at all for EU27. With few exceptions, these 
alternative GPG figures depict similar trends to those reported here for the recessio-
nary years. Two notable exceptions are Norway and Denmark: in the former, the 
alternative GPG shows a downward trend between 2008 and 2010, and in the latter 
the trend is upwards.
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Table 2.1. Gender pay gap in hourly earnings, unad�usted 2002-2010
Country 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Δ2007-2010
AT : 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.4 25.5 0.0
BE : 9.5 9.1 9 8.8 8.6 -0.5
BG 18.9 12.4 12.4 13.6 15.3 15.7 3.3
CY 22.5 21.8 23.1 21.6 21 21 -2.1
CZ 22.1 23.4 23.6 26.2 25.9 25.5 1.9
DE : 22.7 23 23.2 23.2 23.1 0.1
DK : 17.6 17.7 17.1 16.8 16.0 -1.7
EE : 29.8 30.9 27.6 : :
EL 25.5 20.7 21.5 22 : :
ES 20.2 17.9 17.1 16.1 16.7 16.7 -0.4
FI : 21.3 20 20 20.1 19.4 -0.6
FR : 15.4 16.9 17.1 15.5 16 -0.9
HU 19.1 14.4 16.3 17.5 17.1 17.6 1.3
IE 12.6 12.6 12.6
IT : 4.4 5.1 4.9 5.5 5.5 0.4
LT 13.2 17.1 20 21.6 15.3 14.6 -5.4
LU : 10.7 12.5 12.4 12.5 12.0 -0.5
LV : 15.1 15.4 13.4 14.9 17.6 2.2
MT : 5.2 7.6 8.6 6.9 6.1 -1.5
NL 18.7 23.6 23.6 19.6 19.2 18.5 -5.1
NO : 16 15.7 17.2 16.7 16.1 0.4
PL 7.5 7.5 7.5 9.8 9.8 5.3 -2.2
PT : 8.4 8.3 9.2 10 12.8 4.5
RO 16 7.8 12.7 9 8.1 12.5 -0.2
SE : 16.5 17.9 17.1 16 15.8 -2.1
SI 6.1 8 8.3 8.5 3.2 4.4 -3.9
SK 27.7 25.8 23.6 20.9 21.9 20.7 -2.9
TK : -2.2 : : : :
UK 27.3 24.3 21.1 21.4 20.6 19.5 -1.6
EU27 : 17.7 17.6 17.4 16.9 16.4 -1.2
Source: own elaboration using Eurostat data.
Factors driving the GPG decline 
Three main factors have contributed to the decline in the gender 
pay gap: cuts in the overtime and other non basic components of pay 
packets, sectoral segregation and in some countries, equal pay policy. 
The first two may not outlast the crisis, while the third may maintain 
longer-lasting progress. 
Wage reductions typically develop from cuts to the more volatile 
component of pay packets, those ‘extra’ payments that include bonuses, 
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premiums for overtime and the like, and that move pro-cyclically (Box 
2.2). Experts from countries with labour market structures as varied as 
those of Belgium, Finland, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic main-
tain that a major driver of the GPG decline has been the downsizing 
of overtime and other non basic pay components, since the latter are 
typically more important for men’s pay. The Belgian experts provide 
hard evidence on this point, showing that the basic components of the 
pay packet contributed to the decline in the GPG much less than did the 
other components (Box 2.2). However,  the importance of cuts in non 
basic pay components for the decline of the official GPG (Table 2.1) 
should not be overemphasized, since calculations of the gap include 
overtime but exclude non regular wage payments (this may be different 
at national level where local data sources and methodologies are used).
Box 2.2 - Non wage components drive the decrease of 
wage disparities between men and women
Evidence from Belgium clearly illustrates that the dampening of 
the GPG was driven primarily by the reduction of disparities in the 
extra-wage components of pay rather than the wage itself. Overall, 
the gender gap in wages/salaries has witnessed a small reduction 
of 0.7% between 2007 and 2009. The reduction in the basic wage 
component of the gap was even lower (-0.3%) but was compensa-
ted by a much larger reduction of the bonuses components (-1.9%). 
This pattern tends to hold across sectors but is more typical of ma-
nufacturing where the gap in bonuses decreased more than two per-
centage points. An evident exception occurred among white collars 
in the public sector where bonuses are a fairly small component of 
pay: the disparity in favour of men increased notably.
Figure 2.1. Change in the composition of the gender pay gap. Bel-
gium, 2007-2009
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Source: Belgian national report based on data from the Belgian social security 
records.
www.onssrszlss.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/publications/emploi-salarie 
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A larger cut in the extra components of men’s pay has apparently 
contributed to dampening gender disparities in wages and earnings 
in other countries beside Belgium.
In Finland, the reduction in gender pay disparities has accelera-
ted during the crisis. According to the Finnish expert “…part of the 
very recent development may relate to the fact that less payments 
by productivity have been made during the crisis; since men tend to 
receive such bonuses more frequently than women, this has resul-
ted in lower income especially among men, compared to previous 
years”. 
In Lithuania, the comparatively larger reduction in average 
monthly earnings for men ‘...was influenced by a decrease in irregu-
lar bonuses, premiums and one-off monetary allowances as well as 
by a reduction in overall employment in agricultural, construction 
and other enterprises, accompanied by lower hours worked. 
In the Slovak Republic the GPG is comparatively high and has 
fallen primarily in the business sector between 2007 and 2011. The 
Slovakian expert “… speculate[s] that the existing development in 
the gender wage gap is influenced by the structural elements of male 
and female salaries. Usually, the salary consists of a fixed, basic wage 
and a variable component - i.e. overtime pay, bonus, premium, etc. 
The former weighs more in women’s pay packet: in the first quarter 
of 2011 the basic wage accounted for more than 80% of the female 
average salary compared with 61% of the male salary. During the 
economic crisis the variable part of salaries fell significantly. This 
may have contributed to a slight reduction of the gender wage gap”. 
Source: EGGE national reports
An additional factor driving the GPG decline is employment segre-
gation. The uneven distribution of male and female workers among 
different sectors, as well as between private and public concerns is an 
important dimension of gender pay differentials. This is because the 
gender pay gap tends to be wider in private concerns, which lost weight 
during the recession in favour of public concerns, where the gap is more 
contained, and women are over-represented. Within the private sec-
tor, moreover, men tend to earn well in the industries that suffered the 
highest employment losses, such as manufacturing, construction and 
branches of the financial sector. 
Evidence that the private/public employment divide may have over-
exposed male wages to decline is available for four countries: Belgium, 
Finland, Norway, and the Slovak Republic, where the GPG decline was 
consistently larger in the private sector (Table 2.2A).
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Table 2.2. Gender pay gap, unad�usted, hourly earnings 2007-2011
 
By public/private sector 
Country               
Sector 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belgium    
All sectors  13.2 12.6 12.5
Private sector 16.5 15.8 15.9
Public sector 4.9 4.7 4.6
Estonia 
All sectors   31.4 27     
Finland (Indexes )  
All sectors Men: 100 Men: 105.4 Men:  109.4 Men: 111.7 
Women: 100 Women: 105.5 Women: 109.8 Women: 113.2 
Private sector Men: 100 Men: 105.3 Men: 109.1 Men: 111.4 
Women: 100 Women: 105.2 Women: 109.7 Women: 112.6 
Croatia   
All sectors    11.1 10.6     
Norway* 
Private sector 14.7 14.5 14 
State sector 7.1 6.8 6.8 
Municipal sector 8.7 9.1 8.7 
the Slovak Republic§  
Business sector 24.11 20.8
Non-business sector 16 16.6
Source: EGGE national reports. 
Evidence on the importance of the sectoral dimension comes from 
Croatia. Here, the GPG would have declined by 0.2 points in the first 
year of the recession had the sectoral distribution of employment remai-
ned unchanged, whereas the actual decline totalled 0.6 points. The or-
der of magnitude is inevitably small, as the decline spans one year only, 
but the implication is that segregation accounted for the lion’s share.34 
On balance, this evidence is consistent with the presumption that 
segregation has protected women’s wages rather than men’s. However, 
the strength of this protection is uncertain and may have varied con-
siderably from country to country.35 The slashing of bonus payments 
and, more generally, the uneven decline of wages across sectors could 
be redressed if and when a solid recovery sets in. If this happens, we 
may expect the GPG decline to be reversed. Early signs of this can be 
seen in Latvia and the Slovak Republic, where the GPG rose in 2010 
after a very marked fall in the two preceding years. 
34  This finding was obtained by means of a counterfactual: that is, the value of the 
gap that would have been observed in 2009 had wages been allowed to change in 
each sector while the sectoral composition of (male and female) employment remai-
ned the same as in 2008. An equivalent counterfactual exercise conducted on Belgian 
data between 2007 and 2009 yields a different result. In Belgium, the wage gap would 
have declined by 0.7 percentage points had the sectoral composition of employment 
remained unchanged from 2007; this is practically the same decline that actually took 
place. In other words, sectoral segregation played no role. One possible explanation 
is that the influence of segregation may have been nullified by an ongoing high-profile 
policy programme to reduce the GPG (discussed in the text).
35  See previous footnote.
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The role of Equal Pay policy 
Equal pay policy is another factor behind the GPG decline. Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Finland and Cyprus had been running policy program-
mes specifically designed to lessen the gender pay gap before or during 
the crisis. In all these countries, the GPG declined or did not increa-
se, indicating that equal pay policy may have contributed to the decli-
ne. However, the available information offers no clear indication that 
would allow us to separate out the actual part that policy played.  
A review of these countries’ experience (Box 2.3) suggests that while 
equal pay policy may have 
Box 2.3 - Equal pay policies and the decline in the GPG
Good practices have been implemented in Belgium starting from 
2008, and the government remains committed to bringing down the 
GPG to 5% by 2020; the same is true in Luxembourg, where the 
government has pledged to take concrete action between 2010 and 
2014. During the recession, the modest decline that took place in Bel-
gium is not explained by segregation; thus we cannot rule out that 
policy mattered. 
In Finland, the GPG has remained pegged at about 20% per cent 
during the past decades, and the issue has recently become a policy 
priority: in 2006, a national Equal Pay Programme was launched in 
the country to reduce the gender pay gap to 15 per cent by 2015, 
and a full mainstreaming approach has been set up for this purpose. 
According to the Finnish expert, assessments must be sober. Pre-crisis 
progress was below expectations, with the gap only falling from 20% 
in 2000 to 19% in 2008, according to national statistics. The crisis 
accelerated a fall to 17.5% in 2010, but this, too, may not be enough 
to ensure compliance with the targets set for 2015 .
In response to the EU2020 Strategy, the Cyprus National Reform 
Programme 2012 has announced Cyprus’ commitment to reducing 
the 23% gender pay gap in 2009 to 18% by 2015. To date, however, 
progress has been slow. According to the Cypriot expert, reasons for 
the sluggish improvement are: lengthy procedures for ESF co-funding, 
inadequate budget to address comprehensive measures, lack of coor-
dination and synergy with education and training system policies, and 
absence of associated targets to address vertical and horizontal gender 
segregation in the labour market. Reliance on ESF may generate the 
perception that this approach does not amount to a long-term equal 
pay strategy, as it will only last for the duration of the programme.
Source: EGGE national reports
contributed to reducing the GPG, the order of magnitude of the de-
cline was modest. Rapid effectiveness may be hindered by the fact that 
the main policy tools for fighting the gender pay gap rely on moral 
suasion or on increasing the transparency of wage-setting mechani-
sms, both of which need time to prove effective. Alternatively, it may 
be due to the way the European Structural Funds are perceived and 
used in some countries, as the Cypriot expert indicates.
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Concluding remarks 
‘Strength in weakness’ is the term that best summarizes the beha-
viour of women’s wages relative to men’s during the first years of the 
current recession. Weakness because the setting is one of loss of ear-
nings affecting some twenty per cent of all workers, men and women, 
in the Union as a whole, with limited variations across countries, and 
including the countries where the recession has bitten less. Strength 
because women’s earnings have been comparatively sheltered, overall 
and on a per-hour basis. 
This chapter has reviewed developments in the gender pay gap in 
European countries during the recession, using EU level data in combi-
nation with country-level information from the national reports from 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Croatia, Lithuania, Norway, the 
Slovak Republic and Cyprus. The gender wage gap declined in the ma-
jority of countries in the Union during the first year of the recession. At 
the aggregate level (EU27), the decline has prevailed, although the re-
duction has been modest. Trend factors played some role in this decline, 
as a pre-recession downward trend is clearly visible for four countries 
since the early 2000s. But in the assessment of the national experts, the 
recession may have accelerated the decline in these countries as well. 
Sectoral and occupational segregations have offered a protective 
shield. Protection worked through the over-representation of female 
employment in the public sector and its under-representation in those 
sectors that shed more labour: manufacturing, construction or finan-
ce. It also worked indirectly through widespread cuts in the non basic 
components of the pay packet: overtime and productivity related pay 
and bonuses which tend to be more common in male occupations, but 
which are the first to be foregone in a recession. Experts from Belgium, 
Finland, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic all report hard evidence 
or widespread perceptions that one of the drivers of the decline in the 
GPG has been cuts in the non basic components of pay. 
However, the extent to which segregation has mattered is uncertain. 
One reason for uncertainty has to do with statistics, since the infor-
mation needed for a more in-depth analysis is still inadequate. Not 
surprisingly, the findings from the scant evidence available are mixed. 
In one instance - Croatia - segregation accounted for the larger part of 
the decline, while in another - Belgium - it played practically no role. 
A more substantive reason for uncertainty is that factors other than 
segregation may have protected women’s relative pay, including equal 
pay policy programmes. In four countries that were running policy pro-
grammes specifically designed to lessen the gender pay gap before or 
during the crisis (Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, and Cyprus) the GPG 
declined or did not increase in the first three years of the recession. Ho-
wever, available information offers limited indications that would allow 
one to extricate the part that policy played in this decline. In Belgium, 
the (modest) decline that has taken place since 2007 apparently cannot 
be attributed to sectoral segregation, which means that equal pay po-
licy might have mattered. In Finland, the crisis accelerated an otherwise 
slow downward trend, which again does not rule out the possibility 
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that equal pay policy was uninfluential. From all available indications, 
while equal pay policy may have contributed to reducing the GPG, the 
order of magnitude of the decline was modest. This may be due to the 
fact that the main tools for fighting the gender pay gap rely on moral 
suasion, or on increasing the transparency of wage-setting mechanisms, 
both of which need time to prove effective. Alternatively, it may be due 
to reliance on external funds, including the European Structural Funds, 
which may detract from a strong commitment on the part of the local 
government. 
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reCession 
What do people do after they lose their jobs, other than look for a 
new one? Widespread perceptions that ‘The Great Depression was a 
Great Vacation’ still linger in the economic profession, supported by 
evidence from previous studies of the impact of unemployment on time 
allocation that showed little effect (Folbre 2011). 
This is an outdated story, however. Traditionally, the research focus 
has been on men becoming unemployed and deciding what to do with 
their time. Earlier evidence that they simply enjoyed more ‘leisure’ on 
becoming unemployed was consistent with the ‘added worker’ story. 
This conjured up the idea of a traditional family in a recession where the 
man frittered away his time waiting for the labour market to improve, 
while the woman might have gone out to work to make up for loss of 
income. Alternative scenarios where ‘she’ or ‘he’ makes up for loss of 
income by increasing their unpaid work received less research attention.
A fresh, authoritative study for the USA by Aguiar et al. (2011) 
challenges traditional ideas. Through an analysis of several recessiona-
ry episodes, the authors find that about 30 per cent of foregone market 
working hours during a recession were reallocated to housework, and 
about 5 per cent to child care. Education, health care, and civic activi-
ties took up an additional 10 per cent. Sleep and leisure time increased 
alongside time devoted to job searches, but the latter remained low. 
The study finds that gender differences are not statistically significant, 
with two important exceptions: women were more likely than men to 
increase the time they devoted to housework and sleeping. This more 
than proportional increase in housework among women and men who 
lost their job does not, however, necessarily mean that the share of un-
paid housework done by women went up in the aggregate, but it might. 
Gender disparities in participation in unpaid work are larger in Eu-
rope (Burda et al. 2008), and so if the findings for the USA of a si-
gnificant rise in unpaid work in recessions and a greater increase in 
housework for women were to apply to Europe, there would be reason 
to expect a worsening of gender disparities on this side of the Atlantic. 
However, time-use data are not collected annually in Europe, and no 
direct evidence on reallocation of working hours during recessions is 
available.  
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This represents a serious limitation for this chapter, in which we ask 
whether the crisis forestalled progress towards more equal participation 
by men and women in unpaid work. Indirect evidence at a European and 
country level can nevertheless offer relevant indications. Specifically, we 
use Eurostat data on household expenditure to gauge trends in unpaid 
work. Data are currently available up to 2010 for a subset of European 
countries, but we focus on change between 2008 and 2009 when output 
and employment fell the most on a yearly basis. We also use periodic 
country-level data on time use to investigate intra-household re-alloca-
tion between paid and unpaid activities. Four countries are part of this 
investigation: Italy, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey. Given the limitations 
in the data the findings are indicative, but they are consistent with the 
possibility that unpaid work increased and slowed down pre-recession 
trends in the direction of redistribution towards men. 
Section 3.2 reviews macro developments in unpaid work during the 
recession. Section 3.3 discusses country-specific evidence on the impact 
of the recession on the allocation of unpaid work between men and 
women, and Section 3.4 offers some conclusions.
Changes in household expenditure in the recession 
Between 2008 and 2009, European households felt the pinch of the re-
cession and cut their expenditure. A decrease in expenditure is observable 
for 19 out of the 22 countries for which the 2009 value can be compared 
to that for 2008. The exceptions are France, Austria, Sweden and Poland, 
where the recession was delayed, short-lived, or mild (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1. Household expenditure by consumption purpose (selected 
COICOP items), % change 2008-2009 (volume)
Source: Eurostat online data base; our elaboration
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As expected, the reduction is not evenly distributed across con-
sumption items. In an attempt to smooth out a decline in basic stan-
dards of living, households restricted consumption of luxury items or 
items that can be more easily substituted with unpaid work. Figure 
3.1 charts changes in total household expenditure against changes in 
each of the following sub-categories: eating and drinking out, or having 
foods and drinks brought to one’s premises and ‘catering’; goods and 
services for household maintenance; hospital services; pre-primary and 
primary education; out-patient services and social protection. 
The fall in consumption was greater for catering, social protection, 
goods and services for routine maintenance, outpatient services, and 
maintenance and repair of dwellings, in decreasing order. Education, 
hospital services and medical products recorded an increase.36 To a gre-
at extent catering, outpatient services and routine maintenance can be 
substituted by unpaid housework and care work. It would therefore be 
surprising if unpaid work did not rise during the recession. The que-
stion is ‘more unpaid work for whom?’, and the next Section looks at 
the experience of Italy, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey in an attempt to 
obtain some answers. 
Unpaid work in Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey 
In comparison to other European countries, the 2009 fall in hou-
sehold expenditure was high in Spain (-4.5%), but modest in Italy, Slo-
venia and Turkey (respectively -1.9, -1.6, and -2.3%), partly reflecting 
the different timing of the recession. In both Spain and Italy, expendi-
ture dropped for catering, routine maintenance services, and outpatient 
services, though to different degrees. Slovenia and Turkey exhibit a dif-
ferent pattern. In Slovenia, only catering recorded a significant contrac-
tion, while in Turkey it was pre-primary and primary education as well 
as outpatients services – in short, care services – that were cut (Ozar 
2011: Fig.4).                        
The extent of gender disparities in unpaid work in the four countries 
under examination is worth emphasizing. Figure 3.2 shows the diffe-
rence in total working time between men and women for the countri-
es covered by the Harmonized European Time Use Survey (HETUS), 
which include Italy, Slovenia and Spain. Total working time is the sum 
of paid and unpaid working time, with unpaid activities covering both 
care and housework. Measured in minutes per day, total working time 
is higher for women in all the HETUS countries except Sweden, with 
the difference being entirely accounted for by unpaid work. Italy, Slove-
nia, and Spain are among the five countries (out of 14) with the widest 
gender gap, and with a positive difference of men in total working time 
of at least 60 minutes per day. 
36  This ranking order is based on the simple average percentage variation for all 
the countries included in the figure, except Estonia, which was excluded because of 
abnormally high percentage variations compared to the other countries (when the 
simple average is computed, ‘outlier’ values can be distortive). 
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Figure 3.2. Difference between total work of women and men (20-74 
years) in the EU (Mean minutes per day)
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Source: reproduced from Francavilla et al. (2009: Fig.1); based on HETUS data, 
various years between 1998 and 2005.
Turkey is an extreme case within Europe, with a gap of about two 
hours. According to the results of the first time use survey conducted in 
2006, the average employed woman in Turkey worked approximately 
9 hours per day, almost half of which (47%) were allocated to unpaid 
work. The average employed man worked a total of 7 hours per day, 
only 10% of which was devoted to unpaid work (Ozar 2011: Fig. 2 
and commentary). 
To see how the recession may be having an impact on these high-
disparity countries, we need to take a country-by-country approach 
and exploit local information fully. Italy offers (some) evidence that 
the recession may have slowed down the tendency for unpaid work to 
re-balance between men and women. Something similar may also have 
occurred in Slovenia and Spain, but the evidence is inconclusive in both 
cases. Turkey offers more conclusive evidence of a significant increase 
in unpaid work among women in the wake of the recession.
Italy37. In Italy, the behaviour of female and male employment during 
the recession largely mirrors the aggregate pattern for Europe, except 
for a later, milder surge in unemployment due to the Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni, a selective but comparatively generous income support sche-
me that retains employment status for people temporarily out of work. 
Three time use surveys have been carried out since 1988. The latest 
was conducted between 2008 and 2009, when the recession had just 
started delivering its blow on household income. Analysis of the results 
from these three surveys suggests that the recession may have slowed 
down a clear trend in the direction of a re-balancing of unpaid work 
towards men. The evidence is set out in Table 3.1. 
37  See Bettio F. and Verashchagina A. (2011), Fiscal system and female employment 
in Europe, Brussels: European Commission, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justi-
ce/gender-equality/document/index_en.htm#h2-2
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Table 3.1. Yearly change in paid work, unpaid work, and housework: 
Italy, 1988-2009
Share of participants in activity Minutes per day in activity
yearly 
change 
1988/9-
2002/3
yearly 
change 
2002/3-
2008/9
yearly 
change 
1988/9-
2002/3
yearly 
change 
2002/3-
2008/9
yearly 
change 
1988/9-
2002/3
yearly 
change 
2002/3-
2008/9
yearly 
change 
1988/9-
2002/3
yearly 
change 
2002/3-
2008/9
25-44 years of age
Men Women Men Women 
unpaid work 0.24 0.40 -0.02 -0.13 1.21 1.50 -1.64 -2.33
of which: 
housework 0.41 0.78 -0.03 -0.28 0.29 0.67 -3.36 -2.83
paid work -0.20 0.07 -0.13 0.23 2.00 -0.17 -0.50 2.33
45-64 years of age
Men Women Men Women 
unpaid work 0.77 0.20 -0.09 0.12 1.14 1.67 -1.71 -3.00
of which 
housework 0.96 0.62 -0.14 0.08 1.00 0.50 -2.50 -2.83
paid work -0.49 0.02 -0.43 0.58 -0.79 2.00 -0.57 3.17
Source: ISTAT (2011: Tabs 3.21 and 3.22), own elaboration
The columns to the left set out the yearly changes in participation in 
paid work, unpaid work and housework for men and women in young 
and central age groups, respectively. The columns to the right set out 
the changes in daily minutes spent on each activity. Participation is de-
fined as the share of respondents reporting to take part in the activity. 
Housework is a sub-category of unpaid work, and has been singled out 
because it often shows the trends at work more clearly. 
The share of household members participating in unpaid work - 
housework in particular - has been increasing among men and decli-
ning among women since the late 1980s. Among older men, however, 
this increase has slowed notably in the last five-year period compared 
to the previous 12 year period, while the decline among older women 
actually reversed. Time (minutes) spent on housework also increased at 
a slower pace in recent years among older men as well as among young 
women. 
Given that the latest time use survey was conducted in the first two 
years of the recession, the slower progress in the re-balancing of hou-
sework (and unpaid work) between 2002/3 and 2008/9 might be attri-
butable to the fact that the recession induced an increase, particularly 
among women. While this does not represent strong evidence, it is con-
sistent with the findings on housework for the U.S.A. (Aguiar et al. 
2011), as well as with those from Turkey (see below).
Spain.38 In 2009, the recession in Spain was already severe, and 
this showed up in a fairly pronounced drop in household expenditure, 
38  Based on González Gago E. (2011) ‘Crisis and Recovery in Spain. Labour market 
impact on men and women’, EGGE National Report, European Commission. 
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as noted. Perhaps the strongest evidence for Spain that unpaid work 
went up in the recession is the fall in expenditure on items like ca-
tering (-10%), goods and services for routine household maintenance 
(-2.5%), and outpatient services (-3.1%). However, the presumption 
that household members partly offset lower purchases of market ser-
vices with own, unpaid time cannot be proved right or wrong on the 
basis of available statistics.
The first Spanish time use survey was conducted in 2003, and the 
second in 2010. As in Italy, the data show that the recent tendency is 
for men to increase their participation in unpaid work and for women 
gradually to reduce theirs, though at a much slower pace (Table 3.2). 
Unlike in Italy, however, there are no data on earlier trends to be used 
for comparison. Overall, the Spanish evidence from time use surveys is 
silent on the possible impact of the recession. 
Table 3.2. Change in paid and unpaid work by sex (2003-2010): Spain
 Year Men Women 
Total unpaid work time 2003 4:02 6:31 
 2010 4:42 6:20 
Total paid work time 2003 8:22 6:51 
 2010 7:55 6:43 
Total work time 2003 12:24 13:22 
 2010 12:37 13:03 
Source: Reproduced from González Gago (2011: Tab. 3)
Slovenia.39 Like Italy, Slovenia had not yet felt the full impact of the 
crisis in 2009. The drop in household expenditure was moderate and 
entirely attributable to catering. While unpaid working time on coo-
king and food preparation may have gone up as a result, it is unclear 
how unpaid care work behaved during the crisis. On the one hand, 
demand for elderly care continued to increase and was not met by 
adequate public provisions. On the other, the crisis has not weakened 
the government’s commitment to maintaining and further developing 
childcare infrastructure. The number of children enrolled in kinder-
gartens increased by 7.5% in 2008/9 compared to the previous school 
year, which brings Slovenia very close to meeting the 2002 Barcelona 
target of 33% coverage for children under 3 years of age, while the 
target for older children has already been met. However, child-care po-
licies and practices influence developments in the medium and long run. 
As to the impact of the recession, there are no data or research from 
Slovenia that provide clear indications. 
39  Based on Kanjuo-Mrřela (2011) ‘Crisis and Recovery in Slovenia. Labour market 
impact on men and women’, EGGE National Report, European Commission. 
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Turkey.40 Female labour market participation in Turkey is very low, 
and the welfare and care infrastructure very poor. With the male bre-
adwinner family still largely prevailing, an added worker effect contri-
buted to limiting the decrease in working time among women in the 
downturn. At the same time, unpaid work is estimated to have incre-
ased, probably to compensate for lower expenditure on formal care 
services. The combined result is a likely and sizeable worsening of the 
gender gap in total working time.
Supporting evidence comes from two sources. The first is the quo-
ted household expenditure pattern. Whereas expenditure on catering, 
maintenance and repair services, as well as hospital services and social 
protection, increased in the course of 2009, the fall in pre-primary and 
primary education expenditure as well as in outpatient services was the 
main contributor to the overall decline in expenditure. Lower purcha-
ses of pre-primary and primary education mean that children spend 
more time at home, and lower purchases of outpatient services mean 
that the sick and the disabled need more family care. In a traditional 
society, the demand is for additional female, unpaid time in both cases. 
The second source of evidence is econometric forecasting. Bahçe and 
Memis¸ (2010) investigated the relation between women’s care work 
and economic crises, using the 2006 time use survey to forecast the 
effects of the 2008 economic crisis on unpaid work in Turkey. In their 
forecast, the average paid working time per day decreased by 4% (2 
minutes) for women and by 3% (8 minutes) for men. Also, the total 
workload (unpaid + paid) increased by 12.5% (45 minutes) for women, 
but by only 5 minutes (1.7%) for men. As a result, the difference betwe-
en the average total working time for women and men increased by 108 
minutes, to the detriment of the former, with the gap in care work went 
up by 51 minutes (from 47 to 98).
Concluding remarks 
Recent analysis of 30 recessionary episodes in the USA has revealed 
that both men and women made redundant during these episodes enga-
ged more in unpaid work, but the study found no significant gender dif-
ference, except for housework and sleeping time: women devoted pro-
portionately more time to additional housework and additional sleep.
This chapter has addressed a similar question for Europe in the pre-
sent recessionary episode, namely whether unpaid work has gone up, 
and whether the increase has been unevenly distributed among men 
and women. Greater gender imbalance in housework and care work 
in Europe compared with the USA makes uneven distribution of a pos-
sible increase in unpaid work much more likely on this side of the At-
lantic. Since time use surveys are not available for European countries 
on an annual basis, we have relied on indirect evidence, respectively 
patterns of household expenditure within the EU, and periodic time use 
40  Based on Ozar (2011) ‘Crisis and Recovery in Turkey. Labour market impact on 
men and women’, EGGE National Report, European Commission.
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surveys or other research information in four countries: Italy, Slovenia, 
Spain and Turkey. 
Within the EU, household expenditure dropped between 2008 and 
2009 in three categories of goods and services for which unpaid work 
may provide a good substitute: catering, goods and services for routine 
household maintenance, and outpatient services. Although the order 
of magnitude differs, the majority of countries that were experiencing 
recession in 2009 recorded lower purchases in these items, thereby esta-
blishing the premise for an increase in unpaid work.
In Italy, redistribution of unpaid work towards men and away from 
women was greater in the 1990s and early 2000s than it was between 
2002/3 and 2008/9, which may reflect the fact that housework incre-
ased even at the beginning of the recession, and more so for women. 
Spain is also witnessing a tendency for unpaid work to be redistribu-
ted among the sexes: care work more than housework. The specific 
impact of the recession cannot be gleaned from time use data, but the 
fall in expenditure for routine maintenance goods and services, care 
services, and meals and beverages was sufficiently pronounced to sup-
port the conjecture that unpaid women’s work primarily contributed 
to offset lower purchases. In Slovenia, an unfaltering commitment on 
the part of the government to develop childcare infrastructure has pro-
bably continued to relieve women from unpaid childcare work, but 
the demand for elderly care continued to increase during the recession 
without being met by an adequate expansion of subsidized formal ser-
vices. In view of these contrasting developments, what has happened to 
unpaid care work during the recession and to unpaid work in general 
is a matter for speculation. The evidence for Turkey is more conclusive. 
Based on the latest time use survey, unpaid work was forecast to rise 
during the recession, with the increase accruing disproportionally to 
women. These forecasts are reinforced by country-level evidence that 
expenditure actually dropped for care services (pre-primary education 
and outpatient services).
Overall, these findings offer some evidence that the gender gap in 
the allocation of unpaid work may have widened during the recession 
in countries where disparities in housework and care between men 
and women are especially pronounced, as in the countries investiga-
ted in this chapter. The case of Slovenia, where childcare coverage in-
creased by 7.5% during the recession, shows however that policy can 
successfully counter the tendency for deep-seated gender disparities in 
unpaid work to re-surface in times of crisis.
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PoliCies and gender equality
Crisis, Governance and gender
This crisis is different from previous ones. Fears of a desperate 
1929-style scenario did not materialize at first, as the initial liquidity and 
financial crisis in 2008 was quickly averted by massive aid to the finan-
cial sector and subsequent stimulus packages. Paradoxically,however, 
the very scale and, in many respects, the success of these early policy 
interventions established the premise for a sovereign debt crisis. In an 
attempt to appease financial speculation on sovereign debt and in the 
hope of improving long-term growth prospects, the EU countries united 
on the implementation of austerity measures and fiscal consolidation 
programmes. The ensuing deflationary effects have been stronger than 
anticipated when policy was being formulated. The recovery of 2010 
proved selective, fragile and short-lived: four years after the recession 
officially began, the EU is witnessing a second dip in 2012, with this cri-
sis becoming one of the longest as well as one of the deepest on record. 
The gender impact of the crisis is transmitted and mediated through 
a number of general governance issues. These have to do not only with 
the impact of the crisis itself, but chiefly with the reactions of policy-
makers and policies as the crisis unfolds.
 Direct effects. The most visible effects are brought on by the crisis 
itself. Women may be profoundly affected by crisis developments. 
The reaction to the sovereign debt crisis is budgets cuts that thre-
aten important elements of the welfare state, including the gender 
equality machinery. The second phase of the crisis signalled chan-
ging effects on economic activity, causing increasing challenges to 
women rather than men. The direction of economic activity in the 
context of the crisis is changing in the direction of posing increasing 
challenges to women rather than men: whereas in the first stage of 
the crisis construction was hit hardest which translated into greater 
increases to unemployment for men, in subsequent phases the crisis 
has spread to services and even the public sector, implying a greater 
impact on women. 
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 Crisis, governamce and the EU level. The unfolding of the crisis and 
the policy response to it has resulted in a number of fundamental 
changes in governance at the EU level. As a consequence of these 
changes, the EU will henceforth play a more active role in macroeco-
nomic and fiscal management. This is potentially important for gen-
der. Transferring decisions from the national context to the EU level, 
where gender has a firmly embedded place in policy-making, could 
imply that gender can receive greater relevance in the formation of 
macroeconomic policy. However, this is only a potential gain. In or-
der to be effective in this changed policy scenario, therefore, gender 
equality machineries may require revision, both at the EU and the 
national levels. More generally, the need to mainstream gender into 
macroeconomics has gained urgency.
 Threshold effects and gender vigilance: Protracted or recurrent re-
cessions are likely to trigger threshold effects as they progressively 
eat away at the accumulated savings and resources possessed by 
households and firms. In many real-life situations, a negative im-
pact may seemingly be absorbed easily, until a particular value (a 
threshold) is reached; beyond that level, the same cause can appear 
to have a greater impact. The most well known example of this is 
bankruptcy: a company continues in business until it becomes insol-
vent, but a small deterioration is enough to push it over the edge. 
This is important for gender effects, as a number of gender-sensitive 
outcomes depend on cumulative effects and would begin to appear 
after a certain length of time; many of the gender gains have been se-
cured recently and progress could be rolled back. This consideration 
implies that generalising from the past may be misleading and that 
there should be vigilance against complacency in the field of gender.
 Gender as collateral damage of filling budgetary gaps: A similarly 
important (if indirect) phenomenon concerns gender vulnerabilities 
related to policy formation during the crisis. These arise as policy 
adjusts to take in factors not fully foreseen in its initial formulation. 
These types of reactions are especially common in issues regarding 
structural reforms. These reforms have acquired an urgency they did 
not possess before the crisis; similarly, implementing reforms is har-
der during a recession. Thus, while more and more national budgets 
rely on structural reforms in order to attain fiscal targets, shortfalls 
in attaining these targets are becoming more common. The question 
then arises, “How is the shortfall to be made up?” 
Box 4.1 The point of comparison – What is the gender 
impact of excessive debt?
In assessing policy responses a crucial point to grasp has to do 
with the point of comparison. The actual policy response has to be 
compared with what would have happened, had the policy not ta-
ken place. This must be contrasted with an approach assessing the 
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situation with what existed before (the status quo ante), without 
projecting trends with what would have taken place if matters were 
left on their own. Examining policy responses on their own, must 
presume that the world could have stood still and that the situa-
tion prevailing before the fiscal interventions could have continued 
unhindered. Neither of these conditions hold.
This general observation is particularly relevant for the case of 
fiscal consolidation, as the alternative at least for those countries in 
the bailout procedure, has been conclusively shown to be unsustai-
nable. The undoubted gender implications of fiscal consolidation 
programmes have to be seen against a gender analysis of the effects 
of fiscal and macroeconomic destabilisation. As any counterfactual 
analysis, such an analysis cannot be definitive. As a general point, 
it is as well to remember that the rapid progress towards gender 
balance of the last two decades were associated with conditions of 
macroeconomic stability. In contrast, the period of stagflation of the 
1970s was associated with threats to gender balance (which galva-
nised the women’s rights movement).  More worrying still, the pe-
riod of the Depression in the 1930s led to significant backtracking 
on many gains made in the twenty preceding years.
Making up these shortfalls may have gender implications which 
will appear as ‘unintended consequences’ of the shortfall and are an 
important part of crisis dynamics: decisions have to be taken on how 
to fill budget gaps that become evident, frequently halfway through 
the budget cycle. These decisions must be taken under pressure of 
time and in an atmosphere of crisis. The kinds of measures considered 
have to be easy to design must yield budget results quickly and must 
not clash with domestic veto points. Pensions are an obvious candida-
te, as are across-the-board (‘horizontal’) cuts in earnings. Expenditure 
of relative low visibility, such as social services supplied by local au-
thorities, can also be a frequent target. In those countries where there 
is a lack of gendered data, or where gender sensitivity is at a relatively 
low level, gender-sensitive expenditure may be at greater risk.  Equal-
ly, in cases where the ‘male breadwinner model’ is (implicitly) seen as 
the norm, then kinds of expenditure prioritising ‘heads of household’ 
may be seen as more important than social services supporting wo-
men’s entry in the labour market, which could implicitly be treated 
as luxuries. 
The operation of ‘unintended consequences’ of this kind implies 
that gender may well be something like ‘collateral damage’ of gender 
blindness in governance. These gender costs will by hypothesis, only 
become apparent once gendered data become available,  i.e. sometime 
in the future and only ex post. This means that they cannot be measu-
red at this stage of the crisis and will only be apparent later – when it 
may well be too late. 
It is precisely because policy and governance issues and developments 
are so important to gain understanding of the course of this crisis that 
we have devoted this chapter to a detailed analysis of the main policy 
responses to the recession. Not only is this analysis relevant per se, but 
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it also sets the stage for the next chapters, which will address issues of 
poverty and social exclusion. 
The first question that we address in this chapter is whether and to 
what extent the coordinated EU response to the crisis reflects the princi-
ple of gender mainstreaming. We then use recent research findings and 
the subjective evaluations of experts to assess the main types of policies 
that were enacted during this crisis from a gender perspective: early-
recovery measures, counter-cyclical employment policies, fiscal conso-
lidation packages, and policies affecting the gender equality machinery. 
Our main focus will be on fiscal consolidation policies.
The EU response to the crisis and gender mainstreaming
The integrated nature of European economies supports the logic of a 
coordinated response from the European Union to the crisis. However, 
the competencies of the European Union in this area are relatively limi-
ted. The European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) is a clear example 
of an attempt to coordinate a macroeconomic response to the crisis 
while relying heavily on Member States for funding, development, and 
implementation (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions 2009b).
The European Economic Recovery Plan aimed at restoring consu-
mer and business confidence, boosting lending and investment, crea-
ting jobs, and helping the unemployed back into work. Action was 
envisaged in four areas – monetary and credit policies, fiscal policy, 
Lisbon-type structural reform, and external co-operation. The resulting 
document was more of a framework to encourage Member States to 
reach a rapid agreement when they met in December 2008. The 200 
billion euro agreement was an unprecedented response in terms of the 
coordination it required among Member States as well as the financial 
commitment it involved (85% of which comes from Member States). 
The labour market measures in the Recovery Plan included reducing 
social security contributions on lower incomes, reducing indirect taxa-
tion on labour-intensive services, accelerating investments in infrastruc-
ture, and investments in R&D, innovation, and education. The most 
common policies currently enacted by Member States include public 
works programmes, reduced VAT in some countries, and reductions in 
social benefits in many Member States.41 
Although existing guidelines require policies coordinated at the EU 
level to be gender mainstreamed, the European Economic Recovery 
Plan makes no mention of “gender”, “women”, or “equality”.42 The 
41  See European Commission (2010e), The Commission’s assessment of the Eu-
ropean Economic Recovery Plan, European Commission Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Unit G.1., DOI 10.2767/6547 
Brussels.
42  See Villa P. and Smith M. (2010), Gender Equality, Employment Policies and 
the Crisis in EU Member States, EGGE Report for the European Commission, DG 
Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, Brussels. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5630&langId=en
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Commission’ s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Wo-
men and Men clearly exposed the low visibility of gender in these Eu-
ropean-level responses, as well as the need to take the gender dimension 
into account in current and future initiatives to tackle the crisis. Some 
of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee are especially rele-
vant to the management of the crisis, for example:
•  to emphasize the importance of maintaining the current commit-
ment to gender equality;
•   to take into account the gender dimension in future initiatives to 
counteract the crisis or limit its impact;
•  to ensure that a gender perspective is built into the future revision 
of the Lisbon Strategy after 2010;
•  to shape the post-2010 framework for gender equality with a 
clear priority on measures to promote gender equality in the economic 
and financial crisis (including a commitment to equal pay);
•  to ensure that all proposed policies are routinely subject to gen-
der impact assessment, as a matter of good policy-making;
•  to build a gender budget mechanism into the Commission’s 
work;
•  to improve women’s participation at all levels of decision-ma-
king (including the European Central Bank);
•  to adapt the European Structural Funds to focus on additional 
support for the areas of women’s employment likely to be affected by 
the crisis.
Despite these and other recommendations of the Advisory Commit-
tee, the “urgency” of a response to the crisis seems to have pushed 
gender mainstreaming further down the priority list. For example, one 
of the simplest gender mainstreaming tools is to present gender-disag-
gregated statistics, yet many analyses and documents have failed to do 
so.43 
The missing gender dimension is not simply a presentational con-
cern, but rather symbolic testimony to a low sensibility towards this 
issue in the documentation relating to the crisis over the past months. 
Yet the draft Joint Employment Report adopted by the Council at the 
beginning of 2010 had embraced a stronger position on gender, with 
women being identified among the groups at risk in a period of rising 
unemployment, and with a clear preoccupation to avoid permanent 
inactivity and losses of human capital.44 Similarly, the Commission re-
cognized the impact of the crisis on gender equality policies, stating that 
“some measures for gender equality have been delayed or cancelled and 
no new measure have [sic] been taken except support to new jobs in the 
care sector”. The need for gender mainstreaming to be “more actively 
applied in employment policies, notably when defining and implemen-
ting recovery policies” is also explicitly recognized. 
43  See, for example, Bradshaw J. and Mayhew E. (2011), The Measurement of 
Extreme Poverty in the European Union, report for the European Commission, DG 
Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, Brussels. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6462&langId=en
44  See European Commission (2010f), Joint Employment Report 2009/10, Council 
(Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs) Brussels.
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Employment policies
This crisis staged three main types of labour market policies: short-
time working, public sector downsizing and income support for the 
unemployed. The timing varies: short-time working epitomizes wide-
spread efforts to prop up employment in the early recessionary phase 
(the first dip), while public sector downsizing is part of the austerity 
measures leading to the second dip, and support for the unemployed 
spans the entire length of the recession. Public works programmes and 
other stimulus measures enacted as part of the European Economic Re-
covery Plan were generally temporary and targeted at those very male 
branches of industry that were first hit (for example, car scrapping sche-
mes targeted at the automotive industry). Despite a high public profile, 
however, these were not the most important employment measures. 
Short-Time Working (STW). Support for Short-Time Working in an 
attempt to avoid dismissals was widespread, as witnessed by the surge 
in short working hours (see above). Training and income replacement 
for lost hours of work are typical ingredients of SWT schemes. In Italy, 
for example, the main STW scheme is the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
a wage supplementation fund that is activated when a firm resorts to 
mass dismissals. The fund largely compensates for lost hours of work, 
avoids termination of the employment contract (that is, it formally ke-
eps workers in employment even when they work zero hours), and can 
last for more than a year, depending on the agreement struck by the 
social partners. It may be flanked by re-training or mobility schemes. 
According to a recent OECD study on STW schemes enacted during 
the recession in 19 member countries, “take-up was highest in Belgium, 
Turkey, Italy, Germany and Japan, accounting for over 3% to almost 
6% of all employees in 2009” (Hijzen and Venn 2011, p. 6). Although 
the OECD study lacks a gender perspective, the conclusions it reaches 
have gender implications: “The largest impacts of STW on employment 
among the 16 countries considered45 were in Germany and Japan. Ho-
wever, the positive impact of STW was limited to workers with perma-
nent contracts, further increasing labour market segmentation between 
workers in regular jobs and workers in temporary and part-time jobs.” 
Since women are significantly under-represented among regular full-
timers, STW programmes benefitted men in the first place. Having said 
this, it was among men that employment losses were higher. 
Downsizing of the public sector. A notable development in the se-
cond phase of the crisis (2010-12) is that moves to downsize the public 
sector, and with it public employment, have been gaining momentum. 
Employment in central government and public corporations is of a ma-
gnitude that is crucial for public expenditure plans in the current crisis. 
Across the OECD, compensation of government employees represen-
ted about 24% of general government expenditure in 2009 (OECD 
2012). Reducing the overall size of the public payroll is thus one of the 
most lasting and effective ways of controlling the fiscal pressure the 
45  A subset of those included in the study.
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government places on the economy. Given that public workers cover a 
very wide variety of skills and supply a multitude of services, the public 
sector has to prepare for new demands and roles as old roles and fun-
ctions either become obsolete or are devolved out of the public sector. 
Why is women’s employment in the public sector important for ove-
rall gender balance?
• Women tend to be over-represented in public sector employment. 
•  Gender equality policies often start in the public sector and are 
always implemented much more strictly in the public sphere due 
to visibility, employment stability, the strength of the unions and 
-very often in the past - soft budget constraints. 
•  In principle, high employment in the public sector is associated 
with the supply of abundant social services. 
In a recent OECD study on future employment plans, over three-
quarters of OECD countries indicate that they are planning reforms 
that will decrease it, while none are planning an increase (Figure 4.1). 
It is interesting to note that among EU countries, only Germany is not 
planning to shrink employment. Further details on the downsizing of 
the public sector and how this may affect women’s labour market posi-
tion are given below in the six countries’ accounts of the impact of later 
consolidation (Section 4.3).
Figure 4.1. Anticipated changes in employment levels in more than 
50% of governmental agencies and ministries (2010)
Source: 2010 OECD Survey on Strategic Human Resources 
Management in Central/Federal Governments.
Income support for the unemployed. Due to a more discontinuous 
and lower labour market commitment, female workers also tend to be 
comparatively penalized by unemployment benefit schemes where entit-
lement is conditional on contributions and replacement is proportional 
to earnings rather than at a flat rate. However, flat-rate schemes tend to 
offer comparatively low replacement rates to all (Bettio and Verashcha-
gina 2009: Chapter 1). How, then, did the various European unem-
ployment benefit programmes fare in this recession from the standpoint 
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of gender equality? To our knowledge, no comparative study has yet ad-
dressed this question head on, and the fragmentation of unemployment 
protection programmes in the different countries makes it difficult to 
find a clear answer on the basis of country-specific evidence. 
Figari et al (2010) throw some light on the issue. Their study analyses 
the implications for the living standards of those most likely to lose 
their jobs over the first two years of the economic downturn (the ‘new 
unemployed’). Five countries are considered - Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, 
Spain, and the UK – with Lithuania and the UK being closer to a flat-
rate system than the remaining countries. Two main findings are worth 
noting from a gender perspective. First, in none of the five countries 
were all the ‘new unemployed’ protected against loss of income. Ho-
wever, the risk of falling below the poverty threshold was found to be 
much lower in Belgium and Spain, where income replacement rates are 
generous, and higher in Lithuania and the UK, where they are flatter. 
Although the study does not make this explicit, men are likely to be 
over-represented among the ‘new unemployed’ for two concurrent rea-
sons, namely the (fairly consistent) tendency for women to be prevalent 
among the long-term unemployed, and the more severe employment 
losses for men in the first years of the recession. 
The findings from the study, therefore, tell an old story in a new gui-
se: the higher the replacement rate, the less female workers benefit from 
the system, whereas the flatter the benefits, the more the system tends 
to be ‘fair’ to women, especially if benefits are flatter but last longer, as 
tends to be the case in the U.K. This may in turn imply an unpleasant 
trade-off between poorer income protection for all and greater gender 
balance. The study also confirms that the best insurance against falling 
into poverty is being a part of households where someone else works. 
This is one of the strongest reasons for supporting greater integration 
of women into the labour market from an income equality as well as 
a growth perspective. Chapter V below will delve more deeply into an 
analysis of poverty.
Fiscal consolidation and its likely impact on gender 
equality
Fiscal consolidation: macroeconomic background and basic facts
The European Economic Recovery Plan was initially estimated to 
amount to some 2% of GDP on average in the EU for the period 2009–
2010, but more recent estimates suggest a higher figure. The differences 
in the size of the stimulus packages across countries are considerable, 
with Spain, Austria, the UK, Germany, and Poland having adopted the 
largest packages in 2009 or 2010.46 However impressive this may seem, 
the EERP has drawn on fewer public resources than was the case for 
the Financial Rescue Packages that were hastily approved after the de-
46  Van den Noord P. (2011), quoting data from European Commission services.
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mise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 in an attempt to prevent 
chain bankruptcies. Between 2008 and 2011(September), the European 
Commission approved financial aid amounting to little more than one-
third of the Union GDP. Not all of this aid was used. Between 2007 
and 2010, the financial aid actually used amounted to 13.1% of 2010 
GDP, and for the most part was accounted for by financial guarantees. 
But even if we confine our attention solely to capital injections, relief 
of impaired assets, liquidity and bank funding, the actual aid reached 
about 4% of GDP.47
The combination of financial rescue and stimulus plans, rising ex-
penditure on unemployment (and other welfare benefits), dwindling 
revenue due to the fall in output and jobs as well as the fall in house 
prices, all concurred to boost public deficits and debts across countries, 
setting the stage for the sovereign debt crisis. 
In some countries, such as Iceland, Ireland, the UK or Spain, it 
was the sheer size of the rescue or stimulus packages that unbalan-
ced public finances, whereas in countries with more long-standing 
debts, such as Italy or Greece, the deterioration was largely an indi-
rect effect of the recession and unresolved issues in the architecture 
of the monetary union. Under pressure from financial markets and 
the EU monetary authorities, since 2009 the vast majority of Europe-
an countries have undertaken or announced consolidation plans as a 
pre-emptive action to rebalance public finances or avoid the risk of a 
sovereign debt crisis.48 
OECD (2011) defines fiscal consolidation as “concrete policies 
aimed at reducing government deficits and debt accumulation”. It is 
achieved by cutting public expenditure or raising fiscal revenue throu-
gh increased taxation, social security contributions, and the like. The 
repercussions of fiscal consolidation on economic growth and labour 
market outcomes are hotly debated in economic research and policy 
circles,49 but there is hardly any in-depth research or even awareness of 
gender repercussions. 
Of special interest for this report is the composition of consolida-
tion packages. In 2010, the OECD carried out a Fiscal Consolidation 
Survey on thirty countries (OECD 2011). While the survey ended in 
November/December 2010 and was not updated with the events of 
2011, it collected prospective information about consolidation plans 
until 2015 (Figure 4.2). 
The survey found that: 
- in the vast majority of countries, consolidation is achieved pri-
marily through expenditure cuts (rather than increases in fiscal reve-
nue): cuts account for half or more of cumulative consolidation in 
47  EC data available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/ex-
penditure.html#II (accessed September 2012)
48  See OECD (2011), Restoring Public Finances, OECD Working Party of Senior 
Budget Officials, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, Paris.
49  For a concise and recent overview see Kerdrain C. and Lapègue, V. (2011), “Re-
strictive fiscal policies in Europe: what are the likely effects?”, INSEE, Paris; see also 
Barrios S., Langedijk S. and Pench L. (2010), “EU fiscal consolidation after the finan-
cial crisis. Lessons from past experiences”, European Economy - Economic Papers, 
no. 418. Brussels.
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all the European countries in the survey, with the exceptions of Bel-
gium and Sweden. Within Europe in particular, governments appear 
to share in the analysis (as in Commission 2012) that expenditure 
reduction, rather than revenue increase, is the most efficacious way 
to proceed.50 
- cuts affecting health, welfare, pensions, and infrastructure provi-
sions take the lion’s share of the planned expenditure reduction, whe-
ther they are measured by the share of GDP accounted for or by the 
number of countries implementing the cuts. Taking the latter indicator, 
18 countries in the survey planned cuts in welfare provisions, 15 in he-
alth, 14 in pension benefits and 13 in capital infrastructures. Education, 
culture, and the environment were comparatively spared, but so was 
defence spending.51
- cuts in government running costs are the second largest item in 
expenditure reduction, and comprise reductions or freezes in wages and 
staffing. Twenty countries announced wage cuts for public sector per-
sonnel, while 15 announced staff reductions. 
Figure 4.2. Announced Consolidation plans as % of GDP 
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Commission services document that there has been considerable fi-
scal progress in the EU, however we might define that progress (Euro-
pean Commission 2012c). The overall budget deficit for the Eurozone 
has been almost halved, from 6.2% of GDP in 2010 to an expected 
3.2% in 2012. This development is echoed for EU27 – from 6.5% to 
3.8%. Even adjusting for the stage in the economic cycle (the struc-
50  Moreover, in Denmark, Portugal, and Spain, the consolidation package is fairly 
evenly split between expenditure cuts and increases in revenue. 
51  See OECD (2011), Restoring Public Finances, OECD Working Party of Senior 
Budget Officials, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, Paris.
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tural balance), there is still improvement, and the structural primary 
balance – that is, subtracting interest payments – is actually expected 
to shift into a surplus for the Eurozone as a whole (1.1% of GDP), a 
development which also carries over into EU2752. 
Figure 4.3. Short-term fiscal impact of the crisis. General government 
debt in ratio to GDP
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However and despite progress in fiscal consolidation, (expected) 
debts to GDP ratios are considerably higher in 2013 than in 2007 
throughout the EU, with the single exception of Sweden  (Figure 4.3). 
The increase is especially great in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, 
where large falls in GDP are an important part of the story behind soa-
ring debt ratios. A key question that cannot yet be answered is whether 
this deflationary effect of consolidation in the short run will pay off 
with higher growth in the medium and longer run. 
Ex ante impact assessment of Fiscal Consolidation 
Like the Recovery and Financial Rescue Plans, consolidation pro-
grammes have scarcely benefitted from preliminary gender impact as-
sessment, as clearly stated by Villa and Smith (2011) in their analysis of 
National Response Plans during crisis years.53 This is also the allegation 
that most experts from the EGGE and the EGGSI networks raise with 
respect to their own countries (Box 4.2). 
52  See European Commission (2012), ‘Report on Public finances in EMU’, European 
Economy, 4/2012, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels: 
p. 16 in particular.
53  See Villa P. and Smith M. (2010), Gender Equality, Employment Policies and 
the Crisis in EU Member States, EGGE Report for the European Commission, DG 
Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, Brussels. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5630&langId=en 
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Box 4.2 – Gender-blindness of public cuts in EU Mem-
ber States
Austria. All ministries have been asked to contribute to the bud-
get consolidation by cutting their own. Additional taxes (taxes on 
capital and environmental taxes in a wider sense) will be levied, 
and the government plans ‘offensive measures’ for the period 2011-
2014 targeting science, energy-saving construction, and the expan-
sion of all-day schools. With the reforms to the Austrian Federal 
Constitution and federal budget law adopted in 2007, factual gen-
der equality has been anchored in public budgets. Thus, as of 1st 
January 2009, the Austrian federal state and its provinces and mu-
nicipalities are committed to mainstreaming their budgets towards 
gender equality. However, an institutional implementation inclu-
ding a transparent and consistent description of the gender effects 
of revenues and expenditures is lacking. 
Bulgaria. Measures to stabilize public finances and rescue the 
financial system have included a 15% reduction in expenditure in 
the 2009 budget and again in 2010, a 15% to 20% reduction in 
administrative staff in the various ministries, and more stringent 
controls of the financial system. None of these policies has been 
gender mainstreamed.
Cyprus. A new package of measures prepared by the Government 
in the context of the Stability and Growth Plan (March 2010) aims 
to stabilize the deficit for 2010 and bring it down by 2013. Measu-
res include a hiring freeze in the public sector and a progressive re-
duction in the number of government employees, to be achieved by 
leaving vacated positions unfilled.54 However, it is important to note 
that the sectors of education, health care, and social welfare have 
been exempted from the hiring freeze. No documented information 
is available on the gender repercussions. 
Czech Republic. Crisis-specific employment and social policies 
focus primarily on cuts in public spending, including support for 
families with small children. Policy plans announced by the new 
government go further in tightening support for the most vulnera-
ble groups of the population. New policies are not gender main-
streamed, nor are they implemented with a clear conception or 
strategy. 
Denmark. In 2010, a 24 billion DKK (3.2 billion euros) austerity 
plan was accepted in Parliament (Genopretningspakken). Leschke 
and Jepsen (2011) comment that that there is an apparent lack of 
gender assessment of the impact of both the stimulus and austeri-
ty packages in Denmark, which is surprising, given that Denmark 
otherwise has a good reputation for ensuring gender equality. The 
authors attribute this state of affairs to the general policy of gender 
mainstreaming, but also to the fact that the Department of Equa-
54  In 1990, the total number of civil servants was 33,978, and the state payroll 
amounted to 374.5 million Euros, while in 2009 the total number increased to 
51,787 civil servants, and the state payroll reached 2 billion Euros.
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lity was downgraded in 2008 to an office of the Ministry of Em-
ployment.55 
Estonia. The state budget was heavily cut in order to cope with 
the crisis. There was no gender impact analysis of the cuts made, 
and gender budgeting is unknown in Estonia. The largest cuts af-
fected the Ministry of Social Affairs, whose actions have especially 
significant consequences for women.
France. Public cuts risk being the primary targets of public sector 
reductions, which contradicts the spirit of the Europe 2020 stra-
tegy. Alongside a reduction of 64,000 civil servants by 2013, the 
government plan is to freeze their pay. Moreover, the number of 
subsidized jobs will be halved from 400,000 to 200,000 by 2013.
Germany. The fiscal stabilization programme includes massive 
reductions in social policies as financial support of recipients of 
unemployment assistance will decrease (by means of cuts affecting 
parental leave allowances, transitional payments, and the heating 
allowance). This group does no longer receive any parental leave 
allowance. The parental leave allowance replacement ratio has been 
lowered from 67% to 65% for all new parents, which will primarily 
hit medium term families and might therefore reduce the propensity 
of fathers in this group to take leave. The maximum amount of euro 
1,800 which in fact only families with higher income receive, stays 
the same.  
Greece. The measures adopted or announced in Greece to 
counteract the effects of the economic crisis have been selected wi-
thout a gender perspective in mind. They have been chosen with a 
view to ensuring fiscal consolidation in the first place, while the les-
sening of the impact of the crisis on specific groups was a secondary 
consideration. 
Hungary. Although state budgetary problems commenced in 
2006 in Hungary - i.e. well before the present economic crisis - the-
re have been no reports or investigations from a gender perspective. 
Ireland. Macroeconomic policy as part of the ‘Building Ireland’s 
Smart Economy’ strategy over the last year has been dominated 
by just one Europe 2020 objective: stabilising public finances. For 
example, investment in public capital programmes has been redu-
ced, and while educational expenditure has not been reduced to the 
same extent as other areas (such as social welfare), it has nonethe-
less been subject to serious restrictions. The 2010 budget brought 
in severe pay and pension cuts, even for those in low-paid public-
sector jobs. 
Latvia. The reforms implemented include cuts in teachers’ wa-
ges, the closure of a number of schools, and a number of (unpre-
dictable) changes in taxation policy. Since the education and health 
sectors are female-dominated, the reforms have affected women in 
the first place.
55  Leschke J. and Jepsen M. (2011), “The economic crisis – challenge or oppor-
tunity for gender equality in social policy outcomes? A comparison of Denmark, 
Germany and the U.K.”, ETUI Working Paper no. 2011.04. Available at: http://
s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.etui.org/ContentPages/2508944073.pdf
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Malta. There is little evidence of gender mainstreaming policies 
to improve the quality and efficiency of measures to counter the ef-
fects of the economic crisis. In fact, Malta lacks a set-up for gender 
auditing and gender budgeting. 
Poland. Facing the threat of the crisis, the Polish government 
reacted quite quickly, focusing mainly on the financial solvency of 
the banking and housing sectors and employment support to the 
enterprise sector, as well as on fiscal stability and public finance 
consolidation. The relevant instruments were often implemented 
after discussion with social partners, but gender aspects have not 
been considered at all. 
Spain. The main policy initiatives for tackling the crisis are ex-
pected to affect women adversely. Most of these initiatives were 
implemented in 2010 in an attempt to further fiscal consolidation. 
Moreover, they have been accompanied by cutbacks in social spen-
ding at a local and regional level. The gender impact has not been 
measured yet, but it is expected to be enormous, especially in he-
alth, social policy, and education. 
United Kingdom. Since its formation in May 2010, the Coali-
tion Government has chosen to reduce public debt predominantly 
by cutting government spending. The Emergency Budget of June 
2010 and the Spending Review of October 2010 both announced 
significant cuts in welfare expenditure and public services. The Go-
vernment has a legal obligation to pay ‘due regard’ to the impact of 
its decisions on different equality strands, including gender. Despite 
this legal duty, an equality impact assessment of the 2010 Emer-
gency Budget was not conducted, a fact that led the Fawcett Society 
to seek a judicial review of the budget in the High Court. 
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
In the absence of suitable impact assessment studies on which to rely 
for an informed appraisal, we have resorted here to the judgement of 
experts from 19 European countries.56 Specifically, these experts have 
been asked to single out from their respective country packages the 
consolidation measures that are most likely to have consequences for 
gender equality, and to assess their expected repercussions.  The clas-
sification of consolidation measured used by the OECD in its 2010 
survey was used as a template in order to ensure some reporting homo-
geneity.57 
The experts focused on an altogether contained list of measures, and 
provided fairly concordant assessments, but the nuances and discordan-
ces are interesting. In order of frequency, the most cited measures are: 
56  The EGGE national experts were asked to devote a Section of their report to one 
of three issues: the gender pay gap, unpaid work, and fiscal consolidation. Nineteen 
experts chose fiscal consolidation; the relevant countries are Austria, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, FYROM, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Li-
chtenstein, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and 
the UK.
57  We refer here to the classification adopted for Table 1 of the country notes in 
OECD (2011).
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On the expenditure side:
•  Wage freezes or wage cuts in the public sector (10 countries: AT, 
DE, EL, HU, IE, LV, PL, PT, RO, UK);
•  Staffing freezes or personnel cuts in the public sector (9 countries: 
BG, DE, EL, FR, IS, LV, NL, PT, UK);
•  Pension reforms, postponing retirement and/or bringing the age of 
retirement for 
women in line with that for men (8 countries: CZ, EL, FR, HU, IE, 
MT, NL, PL);
•  Cuts and restrictions in care-related benefits/allowances/facilities 
(8 countries: AT, EL, IE, IS, LV, NL, PT, UK);
•  Reductions in housing benefits or family benefits (6 countries: AT, 
HU, IE, LV, PT, UK);
•  Tightening of eligibility criteria for unemployment and assistance 
benefits, or reductions in replacement rates (5 countries: DE, EL, 
HU, IE, UK);
On the revenue side:
• Tax measures (6 countries: AT, EL, FR, IE, IS, PL); 
• VAT increase (6 countries: CZ, EL, IE, PL, PT, UK);
•  Increases in fees for publicly-subsidized services (healthcare fees, 
transport fees, others) (3 countries: EL, IE, PT).
Of course, more European countries have announced or implemen-
ted each of the above measures than the 19 included in the above list. 
In particular 12 more countries have enforced or announced freezes 
or cuts in public employment or wages: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, and Lithuania. In addition, the age of retirement has been postpo-
ned in four more countries: Belgium, Croatia, Spain and Italy. 
In the (relative) majority of cases, the expectation on the part of the 
experts that took part in the evaluation exercise is that consolidation 
measures will have a significant direct impact on women, implying ne-
gative repercussions on gender equality. This is typically the case with 
freezes or cuts in public employment, where women are frequently 
over-represented. As the Greek expert suggests in her national report, 
however, over-representation of women in public sector jobs usually 
means that women are more commonly found in public rather than 
private sector jobs, not that they actually outnumber men in public 
employment. Thus, depending on the size of the male and female public 
employment segments, both sexes stand to lose from job cuts or free-
zes, and the number of men at risk may be even larger. Additionally, 
the example of Germany is a warning that greater job loss for women 
is not a foregone conclusion, because employment in the care and he-
alth branches may not be easily slashed in ageing economies. National 
evidence for the initial years of the crisis indicates that Member States 
have been reluctant to cut health or even long-term care provisions. 
Widespread expectations that cuts or freezes in public sector wages 
may be disproportionately borne by women also warrant some qualifi-
cation. In fact, the gender pay gap may even improve if the cuts dispro-
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portionately affect the variable components of the pay packet, as seen 
in Chapter II.  
With regard to the ‘rationalization’ of unemployment benefits and 
welfare assistance, the repercussions tend to be more severe for the 
long-term unemployed, who are often mothers of children, as the case 
of Germany indicates. 
Restrictions in housing benefits impact gender equality in more indi-
rect ways, by affecting the poorest households. Where the feminization 
of poverty means that female-headed households are especially ‘at risk’, 
lower housing benefits increase gender inequality. As the Portuguese 
and UK experts point out, higher service fees and VAT increases may 
also exacerbate gender inequalities in income for much the same rea-
son: that is because they have the most adverse impact on the poorest 
households. 
The postponement of the age of retirement for all and/or bringing 
the age for women in line with that for men is seen differently by the 
various experts, which reflects the wider social debate on this issue. The 
Czech expert stresses the equalizing value of evening out the retirement 
age. The Greek expert warns however that women stand to lose more, 
because the legal retirement age was lower for them and they more 
frequently took advantage of early retirement. The Polish expert argues 
that delaying retirement for women may mitigate the income gap in 
old age, as it would allow them to (partially) compensate for lower 
earnings and more frequently interrupted careers. In most countries, 
reforms affecting the retirement age also feature increased pension con-
tributions or lower benefits, or both. Not surprisingly, there is much 
greater convergence of expectations with regard to reduced benefits or 
more restrictive claims for the same level of contributions, since the 
pension income gap in old age is likely to increase in response.
Tax reforms need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A bank 
levy in Austria and the removal of a taxation shield for high incomes in 
France are deemed to enhance equality in general. In Austria, it is thou-
ght that the bank levy will specifically enhance gender equality, because 
more men than women own financial assets. 
 Overall, however, the bulk of the measures selected by the experts on 
the grounds of their potential relevance for gender equality are seen to 
carry the risk of stalled progress in closing gender gaps in employment, 
pay, income, and poverty. There are some welcome exceptions, such as 
the bank levy in Austria, and, according to some, postponement in the 
retirement age and the resulting evening out of the gender gap. 
 We also addressed the question of the practical importance of the 
provisions that might, in the opinion of the experts, backfire on equali-
ty (methodology in Box 4.3), and found that in half of the countries we 
examined, these provisions account for at least 1% of national product 
in one or more years within the announced consolidation period. This 
is by no means a negligible amount, although this finding must be taken 
with more than the customary pinch of salt.
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Box 4.3 - Quantifying controversial consolidation mea-
sures
What is the order of magnitude of the consolidation measures 
that might directly backfire on gender equality? 
In order to address this question, the measures for which the 
national experts offered comments, positive or negative, have been 
matched with the corresponding measure in the list of fiscal provi-
sions that the OECD has drawn up for each of the 30 countries sur-
veyed by means of an ad hoc questionnaire on fiscal consolidation 
(OECD 2011: country notes). These measures have been quantified 
by the OECD in terms of the GDP share they account for. 
The detailed results of this matching have been set out in a pre-
vious version of this report, and can be obtained from the authors 
on request. They have been left out of this version for reasons of 
space,. The matching concerned the 12 countries at the intersection 
between the 19 countries whose experts had been selected to contri-
bute to analysis in this chapter and the group of countries surveyed 
by the OECD. The reference period spans from 2009 to 2015, but 
differs from country to country. 
The provisions judged by the national experts to carry at least 
some risks for gender equality driectly amount to less than 1% 
of GDP in all consolidation years in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In Germany and the UK, the 
share of GDP accounted for by such measures is little more than 
1% in at least one consolidation year. In Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
and Portugal, the same share is between 2% and 5%. 
Taking the analysis forward: selected issues encountered 
in a panel of six Member States
Are the expectations of the experts borne out by facts? It is, of course, 
too early for an ex-post assessment. Not only is fiscal consolidation still 
ongoing at the time of the last update to this report (August-September 
2012), but there are hardly any comparative ex-post evaluation exer-
cises that can be used from a gender perspective. There are, however, 
countries where the process of fiscal consolidation started sufficiently 
early or is sufficiently pronounced to have already shown up in some 
statistics, or where the process is being better monitored. Once more, 
therefore, we have turned to a selected group of country experts to 
uncover evidence of the ongoing impact of fiscal consolidation at a 
national level. This panel of countries includes Greece, Ireland, Latvia, 
the Netherlands, Finland and Spain.
The analysis above has shown that the crisis has proceeded at diffe-
rent speeds, and in certain cases, in different directions across the EU. 
Similarly, the challenges posed by the crisis encounter different gender 
vulnerabilities in different Member States. It is important, thus, to cap-
ture the extent of differentiations across the EU, especially given that 
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the differences in gender implications of the recessions will not appear 
in ex post gender-sensitive data for some time to come. Indeed, waiting 
for definitive information before taking a stance runs the risk of ‘shut-
ting the stable door after the horse has bolted’. 
All six countries are affected by the crisis and have fiscal retrench-
ments plans in operation. Yet they span a very wide spectrum. Figu-
re 4.4, derived from a Eurobarometer survey conducted in December 
2011 shows that citizens in all countries feel threatened and vulnerable 
(in this case by poverty58)– but not the same extent. Thus GR, ES and 
IE are worse affected, while FI and NL are less so. Latvia entered the 
crisis earlier and is now well on the way to recovery.
Figure 4.4. (%) of persons reporting that poverty has strongly in-
creased  in the last 12 months in their country
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In all the countries examined little is known about the medium and 
long-term implications of fiscal consolidation. There is more evidence 
on implications in the short run, but it is still very scant. What is known 
yields some closely related indications. A divide is emerging between 
countries where fiscal consolidation has been severe and protracted – 
Greece, Ireland and Spain - and those where the scope for consolidation 
was comparatively smaller – the Netherlands and Finland – or the pro-
blem was radically addressed early on in the crisis – Latvia. In the se-
cond group of countries the actual or expected impact of consolidation 
programmes is contained, or it does not appear to systematically work 
against women. In the first group of countries the impact is severe for 
both men and women and may well be rolling back progress in gender 
equality. Trends in the overall employment rate in these two groups of 
countries underscore this divide. In Greece, Ireland and Spain female 
employment has fallen more or less consistently from the onset of the 
recession whereas in Finland, the Netherlands and Latvia it has shown 
58  Poverty data covering the crisis will not be published until May 2013. Eurobarom-
eter data correct this by showing perceptions of poverty increase, which may be seen 
as a leading indicator.
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some signs of recovery, however uneven and fragile.  
Table 4.1 codifies experience in the six-country panel with reference 
to six observations regarding their fiscal consolidation experience and 
which have implications for gender.
1. Gender awareness. In the six countries gender was only taken into 
account in the design of fiscal consolidation policy and in assessing its 
impact in Finland, and partly in the Netherlands. Finland indexed ma-
ternity, home care and childcare benefits and has increased social bene-
fits. The Netherlands government assessed the impact of budget cuts on 
different kinds of households and activity statuses – which goes some 
way towards enabling a gender analysis. In the other four countries 
(among them those worse affected by the crisis and facing greater gen-
der vulnerability) gender was not approached or mentioned. 
2. Expenditure curtailment, focused primarily on cuts in salaries of 
public sector workers and social insurance pensions, as their size im-
plied that they could yield larger sums for the budget.. On the other 
hand, at least up to mid-2012, social protection benefits and social ser-
vices in kind have yielded –as a percentage of GDP – lesser amounts Of 
course, given the lower base, a given reduction of expenditure could 
imply greater percentage reductions in the case of benefits, as well as 
a greater distributional effect. Another explanation for the observed 
balance is that social services in kind are supplied by lower levels of 
government. Retrenchment decisions (or cash restrictions) taken at the 
central level may take time to work through; if so, we might see the 
effects of retrenchments appearing later on in the crisis.
3. Taxation. In the countries worse affected (Greece, Ireland, Spain, 
Latvia )  both direct and indirect taxation increased. NL focused on in-
direct taxes while FI also increased indirect taxes with an emphasis on 
green taxation. All governments attempted to retain a progressive ove-
rall impact of the tax changes by focusing taxes and expenditure cuts 
on higher incomes. In direct taxation the tendency is for tax exemptions 
to be reduced, bringing into the tax net low income people and social 
protection beneficiaries, categories where women are over-represented 
(e.g. in Ireland the Universal Social charge is levied on gross income, 
with an exemption level below the poverty threshold. In Greece VAT 
was increased from 19% to 23% while many items were switched to 
higher rated categories)
4. Are the overall programmes fair and gender balanced? The claim 
thus exists that what is implemented is ‘progressive austerity’ or ‘fair 
austerity’. However, certain qualifications of relevance to gender must 
be noted: (a) in all cases indirect taxes (VAT, excises) were also rai-
sed with regressive implications on family budgets; (b) the shadow 
economy is encouraged, where women are more likely to be working 
(Greece, Latvia), or irregular work (Greece, Spain);  (c) cuts take place 
in sectors of considerable importance for women as they are both pro-
ducers and users, such as health care, long term care, education (Spain, 
Ireland); (d) while the public sector is downsizing, new hires are in all 
cases severely reduced. This has adverse effects on women labour force 
entrants, who relied on public employment to a larger extent; (e) it is 
fully possible that the relative risk of  poverty may fall – if individuals at 
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the middle of the distributions (workers) are affected proportionately 
more than those at the bottom (pensioners, benefit recipients). Howe-
ver, this could happen while the more vulnerable are becoming worse 
off in absolute terms. 
5. Retirement trends. The tendency for retirement ages to increase 
gives incentive for people (frequently women) with vested rights to exit 
the labour market. The prospect of future pay retrenchment gives a 
further incentive to exit in those systems where pension entitlements 
are defined in terms of final salary (or where they are weighted in fa-
vour of more recent earnings). In Greece these mechanisms combined 
with transitional arrangements of the 2010 pension law to lead to exit 
into retirement of women over 50. This alters the gender balance in the 
labour market and creates the conditions for future pension adequacy 
problems by widening pension gender gaps.
6. The spread of effects through layers of government. The crisis was 
evident first at the central level , where austerity responses were initially 
focused. The crisis spreads to lower levels of government with a lag 
and usually through the financing relations between the central Go-
vernment and regional and local governments. In this way, the kind of 
austerity effects that depend on local or regional government decisions 
are yet to be felt fully and are likely to appear from 2012 onwards. 
(Spain is a case in point; in Greece social services such as the Help at 
Home programme are financed by municipalities and are being drasti-
cally curtailed in most localities from 2012 onwards.) 
7. Greater burden on women of unpaid work as a result of retrench-
ment. Women as the managers of family budgets have to contend with 
a rise in prices (due to indirect taxes), a fall in disposable income (due 
to direct taxes and direct earnings cuts,), a fall in the supply of social 
services and joblessness of themselves and other family members. Sol-
ving this difficult equation is frequently done through the expedient of 
women supplying more unpaid labour in the home. This unpaid labour 
might be directed towards economizing on purchases or supplying gre-
ater care and will have an important if unmeasured effect on women’s 
welfare. This effect was mentioned by the Greek and the Spanish ex-
perts but is likely to exist elsewhere as well.
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bl
e 
to
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(w
om
en
 a
re
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
es
en
te
d)
.
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n 
V
A
T
 a
nd
 i
nc
om
e 
ta
x;
 r
ed
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
no
n-
ta
xa
bl
e 
m
in
. 
 a
nd
 t
ax
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s;
  
ta
x 
on
 
di
vi
de
nd
s,
 a
nd
 e
xt
en
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
op
er
ty
 t
ax
. 
So
m
e 
of
 t
ax
 m
ea
su
re
s 
re
ve
rs
ed
 in
 2
01
1/
20
12
.
B
ot
h 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
va
lu
e-
ad
de
d 
ta
x 
w
er
e 
in
cr
ea
-
se
d 
in
 2
01
1 
an
d 
20
12
. 
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 V
A
T
 w
ill
 b
ec
om
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
as
 o
f 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
2
A
 s
hi
ft
 o
f 
em
ph
as
is
 t
ow
ar
ds
 g
re
-
en
 
an
d 
in
di
re
ct
 
ta
xe
s,
 
lo
w
er
in
g 
co
rp
or
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
xe
s,
 
m
or
e 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
ta
xa
ti
on
, 
w
id
en
in
g 
ta
x 
ba
se
,  
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 c
om
ba
t s
ha
do
w
 
ec
on
om
y 
2.
 R
es
ul
ts
Fi
rs
t 
in
di
ca
-
ti
on
s 
of
  
im
-
pa
ct
 a
nd
 s
id
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
R
ec
es
si
on
 d
ee
pe
ne
d,
 l
ar
ge
 r
ed
uc
-
ti
on
 i
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 d
efi
ci
t:
 U
ne
m
-
pl
oy
m
en
t 
do
ub
le
d,
 
m
ai
nl
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
un
de
r 
25
, 
w
om
en
 s
ti
ll 
ah
ea
d 
in
  
  
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
(2
6.
5%
) 
 a
t 
al
l a
ge
s.
 A
ls
o 
ba
nk
ru
pt
ci
es
 d
ue
 t
o 
liq
ui
di
ty
 s
qu
ee
ze
 (j
ob
s 
ar
e 
lo
st
 a
nd
 
se
lf
-e
m
pl
oy
ed
 in
 t
ro
ub
le
).
R
ec
es
si
on
 d
ee
pe
ne
d;
 s
ev
er
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n 
in
 d
em
an
d;
 c
on
-
ti
nu
ed
 h
ig
h 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
an
d 
em
ig
ra
ti
on
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
rl
y 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
.
E
co
no
m
y 
is
 r
ec
ov
er
in
g 
an
d 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 
dr
op
pe
d.
 H
ow
ev
er
, m
ea
n 
an
d 
m
ed
ia
n 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
di
sp
os
ab
le
 
in
co
m
e 
de
cl
in
ed
. 
 
 
G
D
P 
st
ill
 
la
gs
 
be
hi
nd
 t
he
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
20
06
, 
&
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
re
-
m
ai
ns
 h
ig
h.
R
ec
es
si
on
 
de
ep
en
ed
, 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 
de
fic
it
, 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
is
ed
 
fr
om
 2
0.
5%
 t
o 
24
.8
%
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
10
Q
3 
an
d 
20
12
Q
2 
(y
ou
th
 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
fr
om
 4
0.
7%
 t
o 
53
.3
%
 in
 t
he
 s
am
e 
pe
ri
od
).
 
Im
pa
ct
 
on
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
s 
lim
i-
te
d,
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
rl
y 
fo
r 
w
om
en
 (
un
em
-
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
s 
of
 m
en
 h
av
e 
al
m
os
t 
do
ub
le
d,
 b
ut
 r
at
e 
is
 s
ti
ll 
lo
w
 c
om
pa
-
re
d 
to
 E
U
 a
ve
ra
ge
) 
N
o 
in
di
ca
ti
on
s 
to
 d
at
e.
 C
on
fid
en
-
ce
 i
n 
th
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 o
f 
pu
bl
ic
 fi
na
n-
ce
s 
to
 m
ee
t 
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
s 
re
m
ai
ne
d 
hi
gh
. 
C
re
di
t 
ra
ti
ng
 A
A
A
 a
pp
ea
rs
 
to
 b
e 
st
ab
le
. 
Si
ng
le
 p
ar
en
ts
 a
nd
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
th
e 
m
os
t a
dv
er
se
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
(-
5%
 in
 in
co
m
e)
.
3.
 
G
en
de
r 
di
m
en
si
on
 
of
 
im
pa
ct
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
oc
um
en
te
d
N
o 
ge
nd
er
 
st
at
is
ti
cs
 
on
 
im
pa
ct
, 
no
 g
en
de
r-
se
ns
it
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 a
ss
es
-
sm
en
t.
 L
ar
ge
 n
um
be
rs
 o
f 
w
om
en
 
in
 p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
jo
bs
 a
nd
 u
ti
lit
ie
s 
ar
e 
pu
sh
ed
 o
ut
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
to
 
ea
rl
y 
re
ti
re
m
en
t.
 
G
en
de
r 
eq
ua
lit
y 
in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
/ 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
se
ve
re
ly
 c
ut
-
ba
ck
.
G
en
de
r 
im
pa
ct
 is
 n
ot
 a
ss
es
se
d.
G
en
de
r 
po
ve
rt
y 
ha
s 
ri
se
n 
si
nc
e 
20
10
 (
cu
rr
en
-
tl
y 
at
 2
7.
2%
).
  
Fe
m
al
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
is
 s
ti
ll 
hi
gh
er
 t
ha
n 
m
al
e´
s.
 L
T
U
 i
s 
ra
pi
dl
y 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
am
on
g 
jo
bl
es
s 
w
om
en
. W
om
en
 a
re
 o
ve
r-
re
pr
e-
se
nt
ed
 i
n 
se
ct
or
s 
m
os
t 
se
ve
re
ly
 h
it
 (
ed
uc
at
io
n 
an
d 
he
al
th
).
 
N
o 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
ge
nd
er
 a
ss
es
sm
en
ts
; 
ge
-
ne
ra
l l
ab
ou
r 
st
at
is
ti
cs
 s
ho
w
 m
or
e 
im
-
pa
ct
 o
n 
m
en
, 
re
su
lt
in
g 
in
 d
ec
re
as
in
g 
(u
n)
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ga
ps
.
N
o 
do
cu
m
en
te
d 
ge
nd
er
 
di
m
en
-
si
on
.
R
is
k 
of
 
po
ve
rt
y 
su
pe
r 
hi
gh
 
fo
r 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 
w
om
en
 
(4
0%
) 
an
d 
si
ng
le
 h
ea
de
d 
h/
h 
w
it
h 
ch
ild
re
n 
(m
aj
or
it
y 
w
om
en
) 
(3
3,
4%
) 
–
SI
L
C
20
10
.
N
o 
of
fic
ia
l 
ge
nd
er
 d
is
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 d
at
a.
 L
ik
el
y 
gr
ea
te
r 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
au
st
er
it
y 
on
 l
ow
 i
nc
om
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
, 
m
aj
or
it
y 
w
om
en
. 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 f
ro
m
 m
ic
ro
-s
im
ul
at
io
n 
(2
01
2)
 s
ug
ge
st
 
th
at
 a
us
te
ri
ty
 h
ad
 p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
 i
m
pa
ct
 (
w
it
h 
to
p 
in
co
m
es
 b
ei
ng
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
m
os
t)
. 
H
ig
he
r 
pr
og
re
s-
si
vi
ty
 f
or
 f
am
ili
es
 w
it
h 
ch
ild
re
n,
 n
eu
tr
al
it
y 
fo
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 w
it
h 
el
de
rl
y 
m
em
be
rs
. N
o 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 
fo
r 
th
e 
(r
eg
re
ss
iv
e)
 e
ff
ec
t 
of
 in
di
re
ct
  t
ax
at
io
n.
D
ow
ng
ra
di
ng
 o
f e
qu
al
it
y 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
E
qu
al
it
y 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 (
E
qu
al
it
y 
M
in
is
tr
y)
. 
In
 
20
12
, t
he
 E
qu
al
it
y 
B
ud
ge
t  
re
du
ce
d 
by
 1
9.
9%
.
B
ec
au
se
 o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 c
ut
s,
 t
he
 l
ab
ou
r 
fo
rc
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 l
on
e 
m
ot
he
rs
 
ha
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
sl
ig
ht
ly
 
(Q
1,
 
20
12
).
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
la
bo
ur
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 
m
ot
he
rs
 w
it
h 
yo
un
g 
ch
ild
re
n 
re
m
ai
-
ne
d 
st
ab
le
.  
In
de
xa
ti
on
 o
f 
ba
si
c 
so
ci
al
 p
ro
te
c-
ti
on
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s 
(m
at
er
ni
ty
, h
om
e-
ca
re
 a
nd
 c
hi
ld
-c
ar
e)
 i
s 
se
en
 a
s 
a 
sh
ie
ld
 p
ro
te
ct
in
g 
w
om
en
 in
 n
ee
d.
 
A
ls
o,
 d
ra
st
ic
 c
ur
ta
ilm
en
t 
an
d/
or
 c
lo
si
ng
 d
ow
n 
of
 in
st
it
u-
ti
on
al
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 f
or
 m
on
it
or
in
g 
eq
ua
lit
y.
 
 
 
 
L
ik
el
y 
fu
tu
re
 
im
pa
ct
Se
le
ct
iv
e 
cu
ts
 o
n 
so
ci
al
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
by
 
lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
ri
ti
es
 (
 s
uc
h 
as
 c
hi
ld
ca
-
re
 a
nd
 h
om
e 
he
lp
 f
or
 t
he
 e
ld
er
ly
).
In
cr
ea
se
d 
ta
x-
ta
ke
 t
hr
ou
gh
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
ta
x.
 F
ur
th
er
 c
ut
s 
to
 c
om
m
un
it
y 
ba
se
d 
he
al
th
 a
nd
 s
oc
ia
l 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
Fu
rt
he
r 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 i
n 
ch
ild
 s
up
po
rt
 p
ay
m
en
ts
: 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
po
ve
rt
y 
le
ve
ls
 a
nd
 g
ro
w
in
g 
in
eq
ua
lit
y.
Pe
ns
io
n 
fr
ee
ze
, 
cu
ts
 i
n 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 w
ag
es
, 
cu
ts
 i
n 
ch
ild
-r
el
at
ed
 b
en
efi
ts
, r
ed
uc
ti
on
 in
 t
ax
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 
fo
r 
de
pe
nd
an
ts
: 
al
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 a
ff
ec
t 
w
om
en
 m
or
e 
th
an
 m
en
.
E
du
ca
ti
on
, 
he
al
th
 a
nd
 s
oc
ia
l 
se
rv
ic
e 
bu
dg
et
 
cu
ts
, 
ad
de
d 
to
 p
ay
 c
ut
s 
in
 p
ub
lic
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s´
 
sa
la
ri
es
 a
nd
 m
aj
or
 l
ab
ou
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
re
fo
rm
  
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 w
or
se
n 
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
le
ve
ls
 f
or
 w
o-
m
en
 a
nd
 d
ow
ng
ra
de
 e
qu
al
it
y 
ag
en
da
. 
 F
ur
-
th
er
m
or
e,
 a
s 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 p
ub
lic
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
is
 c
ur
ta
ile
d,
 w
om
en
 w
ill
 f
ac
e 
ex
tr
a 
de
m
an
ds
 
on
 t
he
ir
 t
im
e.
   
U
nc
le
ar
 
im
pa
ct
 
on
 
ge
nd
er
 
eq
ua
li-
ty
. 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
m
ig
ht
 
st
im
ul
at
e 
(p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
w
or
ki
ng
) 
w
om
en
 t
o 
in
cr
e-
as
e 
th
ei
r 
w
or
ki
ng
 h
ou
rs
. 
C
hi
ld
-c
ar
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
cu
ts
 m
ay
 r
ed
uc
e 
m
ot
he
rs
’ 
w
or
ki
ng
 h
ou
rs
.
W
om
en
 b
en
efi
t 
fr
om
 e
as
in
g 
ta
xe
s 
on
 lo
w
es
t 
in
co
m
es
, f
ro
m
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
ba
si
c 
so
ci
al
 
se
cu
ri
ty
 
be
ne
fit
s,
 
an
d 
th
e 
ab
ol
it
io
n 
of
 m
ea
ns
-t
es
ti
ng
 
of
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
su
bs
id
y.
E
xt
re
m
e 
st
ra
in
 o
n 
fa
m
ily
 b
ud
ge
ts
 
du
e 
to
 h
ig
he
r 
ta
xa
ti
on
 a
nd
 w
ag
e 
cu
ts
 (
pl
us
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t)
 in
cr
ea
se
 
th
e 
bu
rd
en
 o
n 
w
om
en
 f
or
 m
an
a-
gi
ng
 s
ca
rc
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
  S
ub
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 
pu
bl
ic
 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
w
it
h 
un
pa
id
 
w
om
en
’s 
w
or
k 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
fa
m
ily
.
In
 t
ot
al
, t
he
 m
ea
su
re
s 
ad
op
te
d 
ha
ve
 a
n 
un
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
ed
 
th
ou
gh
 p
ot
en
ti
al
ly
 v
er
y 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
w
om
en
.
A
ls
o,
 th
e 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
of
 th
e 
sh
ad
ow
 e
co
no
m
y 
m
ay
 
in
cr
ea
se
 w
om
en
’s
 v
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y.
Pl
an
s 
to
 c
ut
 t
ra
ns
fe
rs
 t
o 
L
oc
al
 G
o-
ve
rn
m
en
t 
m
ay
 
w
or
se
n 
w
om
en
’s
 
ac
ce
ss
 
 
to
 
so
ci
al
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
(f
ro
m
 
20
13
).
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Table 4.1. Codifying some stylized facts -fi scal consolidation experi-
ence in the six country studies
1.
 I
m
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
fis
ca
l c
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
 m
ea
su
re
s 
 (
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
an
d 
re
ve
nu
e)
 
G
re
ec
e 
 
Ir
el
an
d
L
at
vi
a
Sp
ai
n
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Fi
nl
an
d
I
n
c
o
m
e
s 
&
 
w
ag
es
A
cr
os
s 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
li-
se
d 
cu
ts
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d,
 
se
ct
or
al
 
an
d 
 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t 
de
-
la
ye
d.
 M
ai
n 
em
ph
as
is
 o
n 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
or
 (
w
ag
e 
cu
ts
 a
nd
 n
o 
hi
re
s)
 
bu
t 
no
 r
ed
un
da
nc
ie
s.
 I
ns
ec
ur
it
y.
U
ni
ve
rs
al
 
So
ci
al
 
C
ha
rg
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
Ja
n.
 
20
11
.
A
cr
os
s 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
cu
ts
 o
f 
pu
bl
ic
 w
ag
es
 (
by
 1
5-
20
%
),
 s
tr
uc
tu
ra
l 
re
fo
rm
s 
in
 t
he
 p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r. 
Pu
bl
ic
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
pa
y 
cu
ts
 
w
er
e 
im
pl
e-
m
en
te
d 
in
 
20
10
 
(5
%
) 
an
d 
20
12
 
(7
%
).
 
Fr
ee
zi
ng
 
of
 
w
ag
es
 
of
 
ci
vi
l 
se
r-
va
nt
s 
an
no
un
ce
d 
in
 
Sp
ri
ng
 
20
12
.
T
ri
pa
rt
it
e 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
ag
re
e-
m
en
t 
on
 w
ag
es
 a
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
of
 
w
or
ki
ng
 
lif
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ye
ar
s 
20
11
—
20
13
. 
C
on
tr
ac
tu
al
 
in
-
cr
ea
se
s 
2.
4—
1.
9 
pe
r 
ce
nt
.
Tw
o-
ti
er
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
in
 p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
fo
r 
po
st
 
20
10
 h
ir
es
 (
lo
w
er
 p
ay
 a
nd
 p
en
si
on
s 
en
ti
tl
em
en
ts
).
  
E
m
-
ph
as
is
 o
n 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
in
 1
st
 p
ha
se
.
Pe
ns
io
ns
 f
re
ez
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 2
01
3.
 
W
om
en
 f
or
m
 t
he
 m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
em
pl
oy
-y
ee
s 
(o
ve
r 
50
%
).
 P
ri
va
te
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
w
ag
es
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 2
01
2.
 
So
ci
al
 
be
ne
-
fit
s,
 
tr
an
sf
er
s 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
-
in
-k
in
d
Pe
ns
io
ns
 i
n 
pa
ym
en
t 
cu
t,
 s
oc
ia
l 
be
ne
fit
s 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 m
ea
ns
-t
es
ti
ng
 
ye
t 
to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
  
Se
rv
ic
es
 
in
 k
in
d 
fo
r 
el
de
rl
y 
an
d 
ch
ild
-c
ar
e 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
su
ff
er
 s
ev
er
e 
bu
dg
et
 c
ut
s.
 
A
ls
o 
su
ff
er
 f
ro
m
 z
er
o-
hi
re
 c
la
us
e.
Fi
rs
t 
ph
as
e 
of
 in
tr
od
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
s 
to
 O
PF
P 
ha
s 
be
en
 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 –
 f
ul
l i
m
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 b
y 
20
15
.
Pe
ns
io
n 
fr
ee
ze
, 
cu
ts
 i
n 
co
nt
ri
bu
to
ry
 a
nd
 s
om
e 
no
n-
co
nt
ri
bu
to
ry
 b
en
efi
ts
 a
re
 im
pl
em
en
te
d.
Pe
ns
io
ns
 
re
fo
rm
 
an
d 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
be
ne
fit
 
cu
ts
 w
er
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 2
01
1 
an
d 
20
12
 r
e-
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
. D
im
in
is
hi
ng
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 p
ub
lic
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
cr
uc
ia
l 
fo
r 
w
om
en
 (
ed
uc
at
io
n,
 h
ea
lt
h,
 l
on
g-
te
rm
 c
ar
e)
 is
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 t
he
ir
 v
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y.
Pe
ns
io
n 
ag
e 
to
 b
e 
ra
is
ed
. 
In
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 s
oc
ia
l 
be
ne
fit
s 
(i
nt
ro
-
du
ct
io
n 
of
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
d 
pe
ns
io
n 
-€
 
68
8,
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
an
d 
si
ck
ne
ss
 
in
su
ra
nc
e,
 c
hi
ld
 b
en
efi
ts
 a
nd
 c
hi
ld
 
ca
re
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Equal opportunities policy frameworks
The evidence just reviewed revealed a generalized absence of gender-sen-
sitive data and gender-informed analysis. The reason why this is worrying 
is that if decisions have to be taken under pressure of time, not being able 
to present a gender balance perspective succinctly and persuasively may 
result in permanent effects far into the medium term. In this respect, a 
pre-existing, effective and functioning gender balance infrastructure and 
ongoing gender balance debate can yield very important dividends: being 
able to argue the ‘gender balance corner’ in proactive terms, commensu-
rate with fiscal retrenchment, is the best guarantee of continued progress 
in that field. Conversely, if the existing gender balance infrastructure were 
to be assigned a more defensive role - for example, merely to preserve the 
status quo - its effectiveness may be severely curtailed. 
The Spanish case rings alarm bells as to the repercussions of this cri-
sis on gender equality machinery, but Spain is not an isolated example, 
as the equality infrastructure has revised in several Member States in 
past years. Somewhat reassuringly, these revisions did not consistently 
mean downgrading or downsizing, although this has been the outcome 
in several countries. Developments in institutions and procedures to 
foster gender equality have occurred for different reasons, sometimes 
quite independently of the economic crisis. 
Villa and Smith (2011) gathered extensive evidence from the Natio-
nal Action Plans of the changes that the first years of the crisis brought to 
the national gender equality machinery. In a few cases, the main reason 
behind recent changes was the political will to improve the efficiency 
and efficacy of gender equality bodies. This appears to have been the 
case with the institutional changes introduced in Poland, where there 
has been a reallocation of gender equality tasks between the two main 
gender equality institutions. The establishment of the Governmental 
Board for Gender Equality in the Slovak Republic is another example. 
In some Members States, the institutional frameworks for gender 
equality policy have been reinforced by acts, action plans, and strate-
gies. In Denmark, the new action plan for gender equality has seen the 
launch of a men’ s equality panel, with the aim of changing workplace 
cultures to make it more acceptable for men to take parental leave. 
In Portugal, the Secretary for Equality, created after the 2009 general 
elections, has allowed increased visibility of gender equality issues and 
a more central role in public policy. 
However, the budget cuts induced by fiscal consolidation measures 
entail the concrete risk of downgrading the status of equality policies or 
reducing the budgets allocated to them. Our review in Box 4.4 shows 
that in several Member States, cuts in public budgets are seriously af-
fecting the functioning of gender equality infrastructures (in Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, the Slovak Re-
public, Spain and the United Kingdom). However, other Member States 
offer examples of good practice, as they have deliberately decided not 
to reduce the resources devoted to gender equality institutions and/or 
projects, and even to increase them. This has been the case in Portugal, 
Slovenia and Sweden.
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Box 4.4 - The economic crisis, budget cuts and gender 
equality infrastructure
Austria. Owing to the financial and economic crisis, it seems ra-
ther unlikely that sufficient funding will be available to implement 
substantial and sustainable gender equality measures within the 
next few years.
Belgium. The recent economic crisis has had a negative impact 
on the budget of the Institute for the equality of women and men 
(the main infrastructure in the field of gender equality), as it has on 
all other federal public services. The impact of the recent crisis on 
the Institute is all the more difficult to deal with because its missions 
and competences have constantly been broadened over time, but 
the previous cuts in its budget have already reduced the share of 
funds available for research to an absolute minimum.
Czech Republic. The new government (which took office in Au-
gust 2010) has implemented severe budget cuts for gender equality 
infrastructures.
Ireland. In practice, the resources allocated to gender equality 
generally, and to gender mainstreaming in particular, have been re-
duced substantially in the current economic crisis, and it is evident 
that even at a time of reduced public expenditure, the scale of cut-
backs experienced by key elements of the equality infrastructure has 
been disproportionate.
Latvia. Given the severity of the economic and financial crisis, 
the majority of the activities and measures included in the Program-
me for the Implementation of Gender Equality 2007-2010 have 
been suspended.
Portugal. The gender equality infrastructure has not been se-
riously affected by cuts in the public budget. The crisis did not indu-
ce cuts in the budget for gender equality policies, but has inhibited 
the launching of new measures.
Romania. Gender equality bodies have been directly affected by 
the economic recession: the financial resources made available for 
their functioning as well as for their activities have been drastically 
reduced.
The Slovak Republic. The only permanent Department responsi-
ble for gender equality – the Department of Gender Equality and 
Equal Opportunities at the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and 
Family – has faced personnel changes and cuts. In particular, the 
Support Centre for the Implementation of Horizontal Priority for 
Equal Opportunities in structural and cohesion funds has recen-
tly been abolished. The national “Institute of Gender Equality” 
project, which had already been in existence for more than a year, 
has been temporarily frozen on account of poor expertise in project 
management and discrepancies in public procurement.. Additional 
projects have been delayed.
Slovenia. The budget of the Office for Equal Opportunities 
(OEO) has been slightly increased in the last years, and there are no 
signs that it will be reduced because of the crisis.
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Spain. The Ministry of Equality was withdrawn in October 2010 
and absorbed into the Ministry of Health and Social Policy. The 
reason put forward for this change was savings in administrative 
costs within the context of the fiscal austerity demanded by the cur-
rent economic crisis.
Sweden. The government has increased the resources for gen-
der equality policy. During the period 2007-2010, SEK 400 mil-
lion (around 40 million Euros) per year have been deposited. No 
cuts have been made to these resources because of the crisis, but it 
took some time before the resources could be allocated to suitable 
projects.
United Kingdom. The budget cuts announced in the coalition 
government’s June emergency budget will have an impact on most 
government Departments, including the Government Equalities 
Office (GEO) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(ECHR). The EHRC has been ordered to cut 15% from its budget. 
This means it will have to review its staffing and marketing and the 
grants programme that is currently in place to combat discrimina-
tion. The scale of cuts to the GEO has not been announced yet.
Source:  EGGE and EGGSI national reports  
The case of Iceland is worth recalling as a best practice example 
of using the economic crisis as an opportunity for radical change in 
the organization of the gender equality machinery. In the government, 
which took office in Iceland in May 2007, gender equality policies ac-
quired priority as a policy issue in the hands of a female Minister of 
Social Affairs. When this Minister later became Prime Minister in Fe-
bruary 2009, a gender equality policy was further prioritized in central 
government. Gender mainstreaming became the mode of policy imple-
mentation, and coordination of gender equality policies was moved 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Prime Minister´ s office. One 
out of four ministerial committees is now a ministerial committee on 
gender equality, a further indication of the political willingness to give 
gender equality a prominent place in the policy agenda. The manife-
sto of the coalition government of the Social Democratic Alliance and 
the Left-Greens has put gender budgeting on the agenda, and in late 
2009 the Ministry of Finance took the first steps towards implementing 
gender budgeting59. The publication of a handbook on gender main-
streaming by the Centre for Gender Equality in Iceland was a flanking 
initiative.60 The gender equality agenda is independent of government 
responses to the economic crisis, but the fact that gender equality po-
licy had been prominent on the agenda prior to the financial collapse 
59  Gender budgeting (Kynjuð fjárlagagerð) available at
http://www.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/media/adrarskyrslur/Kynjud_fjarlagagerd_radstefna_
dagskra.pdf; see also Gender budgeting: practical implementation. Handbook. April 
2009 available at:
http://www.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/media/Utgefin_rit/Kynjud_fjarlagagerd_handbok_
um_framkvaemd.pdf.
60  Equal Playing field. A handbook on Gender Mainstreaming (Jöfnum lei-
kinn. Handbók), available at: http://www.jafnretti.is/D10/_Files/Jofnum_leikinn-
handb%C3%B3kin.pdf.
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did indeed affect the response, in the sense that decision-makers gave 
gender issues more prominence and attention than before. Academic 
experts on gender equality were, for instance, asked to contribute to the 
Special Investigation Committee’s report to Parliament on the causes of 
the 2008-banking crisis. In the follow up, the Minister of Social Affairs 
and Social Security appointed a specific task force on gender equality, 
the Gender Equality Watch, to monitor the impact of the crisis on the 
situation of men and women. This task force delivered its first report 
in March 2009.61 When the Welfare Watch task force was established, 
the two task forces were merged so as to systematically mainstream the 
approach to gender equality into policy formulation and policy imple-
mentation. The Welfare Watch has commissioned surveys and reports 
on the development of child care protection in the period 2005-2009,62 
on local government services for children and families with children,63 
on children’s experience and ideas about the crisis, on food donations 
by charity organisations64, and on issues concerning women and the 
crisis.65 
Concluding remarks
Phase one of the crisis, which broadly coincided with the first two 
years, saw interventions by European governments on an unpreceden-
ted scale. Stimulus packages under the European Economic Recovery 
Plan are estimated to have mobilized at least 2% of GDP. Actual (that 
is, used) financial aid amounted to about 4% of GDP in the EU if finan-
cial guarantees are excluded, and 13% if they are included. The flip side 
of this massive injection of public resources into European economies 
is austerity measures of equally unprecedented proportions in order to 
reduce government debts and deficits. Fiscal consolidation is the policy 
hallmark of phase two of the crisis, which is still with us. The 2010 
61   Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Security (2009b), The Gender Equality 
Watch - An Interim Report, March, available at http://www.velferdarraduneyti.is/
media/09FrettatengtFEL09/Afangaskyrsla_jafnrettisvaktarinnar.pdf
62  Guðmundsson H.S. (2009), Fjölgun barnaverndartilkynninga 2005-2009. (The 
development of the number of recorded Child Protection Cases), Centre for Research 
on Child and Family Protection, University of Iceland. Reykjavík, available at: http://
www.velferdarraduneyti.is/media/acrobat-skjol/Fjolgun_barnaverndartilkynnin-
ga_2005-2009081209.pdf
63  Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Security (2009a), Könnun velferðarvakta-
rinnar: Afleiðingar efnahagskreppunnar á félagsþjónustu sveitarfélaga. Samantekt úr 
svörum sveitarfélaganna (Welfare Watch Survey: The impact of the crisis on social 
services within local governments. Summary of responses), Reykjavík, May, available 
at http://www.velferdarraduneyti.is/media/velferdarvakt09/11082009KonnunVelferda
rvaktar.pdf
64  Social Science Research Institute, (2010), Food donations by aid and charity 
organisations: A Survey into the group of recipients of food donations, University of 
Iceland, Reykjavik. 
65  Bjarnadóttir E. and Árnadóttir E. (2011), Konur í Kreppu? Samantekt á opin-
berum tölulegum gögnum á áhrifum efnahagshrunsins á velferð kvenna (Women in 
Crisis? Summary of official statistical data on the impact of the economic collapse on 
the welfare of women). February, available at:
 http://www.velferdarraduneyti.is/media/ritogskyrslur2011/Konur_i_krep-
pu_22032011.pdf 
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OECD survey has estimated that the consolidation plans announced 
as of December 2010 to be implemented until 2013-15 would amount 
to between 2% of GDP in Italy and 22% in Greece. In the meantime, 
some consolidation measures have been repealed in certain countries, 
such as the Netherlands, but additional major measures have also been 
announced or implemented, including in Spain, Italy and Greece.66 
Recovery, financial rescue packages and fiscal consolidation have 
very different implications for men and women, and the same holds for 
more ‘traditional’ counter-cyclical employment and fiscal measures. Fi-
nancial rescue and initial recovery measures went primarily to the sec-
tors and concerns that were first hit by the crisis, which were male-do-
minated in terms of employment. Counter-cyclical employment policies 
other than these one-off recovery measures pivoted around short-time 
working programmes and the management of unemployment benefit 
programmes. The evidence available to date suggests that men have 
been the main beneficiaries of both types of programmes, not only be-
cause they suffered job losses on a much larger scale, but also because 
of the typical design of these programmes. The positive impact of short-
time working was, in fact, largely limited to full-timers on permanent 
contracts. In addition, unemployment benefit schemes delivered better 
protection against poverty in systems with high replacement rates: that 
is, where the gender gap in benefit income also tends to be higher. The 
‘male bias’ in these programmes may have worked well in this crisis be-
cause of the corresponding ‘bias’ in employment losses, but this acts as 
a warning that the design of counter-cyclical employment and income 
policies may need to be made more ‘universal’ in the future. 
Fiscal consolidation measures have primarily targeted expenditure 
on public employment (number of employees and wages), pensions and 
welfare benefits and services. All these are areas of employment where 
women tend to be in the majority. But even though female-dominated 
activities and concerns may be the primary targets, the deflationary 
effects of fiscal consolidation have spread widely, with the European 
economy spiralling downwards towards a second dip in the second half 
of 2012. Using a gender lens to assess the likely repercussions of fiscal 
consolidation is thus important, but it is both too difficult and too early 
to disentangle the direct effects of consolidation from those of the de-
flation that it has triggered. 
Despite the caution that this warrants, we have attempted in this 
chapter to garner evidence for a very initial assessment. Having ascer-
tained that very few ex-ante impact assessment exercises have been 
conducted at a national or European level – with Austria, the UK and 
Finland featuring  among the few (and partial) exceptions– the EGGE 
and EGGSI experts contributing to these reports have been asked to 
give their own subjective expectations of the likely impact of consoli-
dation. Specifically, a self-selected group of national experts has been 
requested to single out from their own country packages the consoli-
66  For Italy, see, for example, ‘Italy’s Fiscal Consolidation and Structural Reforms 
(November 2011-August 2012)’, http://www.dt.tesoro.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/
documenti_en/analisi_progammazione/analisi_programmazione_economico/Note_on_
the_reform_measures1.pdf. For other countries see Section 4.5 
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dation measures that have the highest direct consequences for gender 
equality, and to assess their expected repercussions. Their choices all 
converged into an altogether limited list of measures which includes, in 
order of frequency, wage freezes or wage cuts in the public sector, staf-
fing freezes or personnel cuts in the public sector, pension reforms, cuts 
and restrictions in care-related benefits, reduction in housing or family 
benefits, tax measures, the tightening of eligibility criteria for unem-
ployment and assistance benefits or reductions in the replacement rates, 
VAT increases, and increases in fees for publicly-subsidized services. 
This is indicative of the degree of policy convergence that fiscal con-
solidation is successfully imposing on Member States. But this degree 
of convergence may be a matter for concern rather than complacency, 
since in the majority of cases the expectation on the part of the experts 
is that the consolidation measures they have chosen to assess will have 
a disproportionate impact on women, which implies a potentially ad-
verse impact on labour market gaps and on gender equality in general. 
In some important cases, such as postponement of the retirement age, 
there is a discordance of expectations among the experts, reflecting the 
wider social debate on the issue. Some experts point to the equalizing 
potential of pension reforms that reduce or eliminate disparity with 
men regarding the legal age of retirement, or that may enable women 
to partly reverse at an older age losses of earnings due to career inter-
ruption in child-bearing age. Other experts stress that women stand 
to lose more if the current legal age is lower for them. An additional 
consideration is that the ‘unpaid care potential’ that is lost by having 
older women and men in employment needs to be compensated for, but 
it can hardly be expected that fiscal consolidation packages will offer 
this compensation. 
In a few cases, consolidation measures have received a favourable 
assessment from a gender equality perspective or from an equality per-
spective tout court. One example is the tax levy on banks introduced in 
Austria. Overall, however, measures assessed to bear with them the risk 
of rolling back progress in the full integration of women into the labour 
market are in the majority. We have carried out a quantification exerci-
se, exploiting the fact that the OECD has expressed the most important 
consolidation provisions as a share of GDP in the respective countries. 
In half the countries that we were able to include in our quantification 
exercise, we found that the provisions deemed to entail ‘risks’ that gen-
der equality will be rolled back represent no less than one percentage 
point of GDP in one or more years within the announced consolidation 
period. This is not a negligible amount. 
These rather alarming expectations on the part of the experts are 
partly qualified by a more in-depth analysis of the ongoing effects (to 
the time of writing) of fiscal consolidation in six countries: Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Finland, Latvia and the Netherlands. Evidence from the 
countries with relatively limited fiscal consolidation programmes (the 
Netherlands and Finland) or those where the most severe contraction of 
public finances occurred early on (Latvia) assuages some of our worst 
fears. In Finland, the austerity policy did not foreclose the introduction 
of a guaranteed pension threshold to safeguard the livelihood of those 
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living on the smallest pension incomes, and there has been a consistent 
effort not to widen income inequality. The long-term impact remains 
uncertain, however, and also hides specific risks for (older) women due, 
for example, to higher prices for medicines and health insurance. In 
Latvia, the scale of the consolidation packages is impressive, and despi-
te a continuing recovery since late 2009, pre-recession levels have not 
been regained yet. According to a recent simulation exercise, however, 
the distributional effects of the rise in direct taxation and cuts in social 
transfers were quite progressive, which bodes well for gender fairness. 
However, rises in indirect taxation (VAT) are not included in the si-
mulation exercise, nor are many other consolidation measures. One 
clear outcome in Latvia has been a new wave of migration out of the 
country, which might be affecting women as much as men, if the recent 
experience of Ireland is not an isolated example.  In the Netherlands, 
some of the planned measured have been repealed, and the government 
estimates a modest fall in the use of child-care facilities despite rising 
fees, while female participation has continued to grow. Also, the short-
run loss of purchasing power is expected to be modest, with likely mi-
xed gender effects, for example with double-income households being 
relatively spared but sole breadwinners (mostly male) being among the 
worst hit. Nothing is known, however, about the medium and long-
term consequences, which may be more severe. 
The developments in Ireland, Spain, and Greece stand in contrast 
to this picture. In Ireland, for example, where the rise in poverty is 
arguably the most dramatic social concern, a survey carried out by the 
TASC Think Tank for Action on Social Change has revealed that single 
parents and children have experienced the most adverse effects in term 
of loss of gross income. In both these cases women may be especially 
affected, though for different reasons. In Greece, austerity carried with 
it an allegedly limited direct effect on poverty and income distribution, 
reflecting the progressive design of the first wave of measures. However, 
poverty statistics reportedly under-estimate gender differences and the 
crisis may be widening pay and pension gaps. In a country where the 
average pension income for elderly women (in receipt of a pension) 
exceeded the poverty line by a mere 20% in 200967, pensions were 
subjected to cuts on nine separate occasions, while a tenth was discus-
sed in the Summer of 2012. In Spain, female employment fell both in 
terms of quantity and quality, the equality machinery was downsized 
and downgraded, and family carers (a highly feminized group) as well 
as the elderly as a whole (again quite feminized) are likely to be the 
major losers from the overhaul of the long-term care system. However, 
there are no clear statistics or studies that can disentangle the specific 
part that fiscal consolidation has had in all this. 
The divide that we found in our subgroup of countries between, on 
the one hand, Finland, the Netherlands and Latvia and, on the other 
hand, Ireland, Spain and Greece may well reflect a larger divide in the 
Eurozone with, for example, Italy or Portugal belonging in the second 
67  Ongoing research by the European Network of Experts on Gender Equality on 
behalf of the Gender Equality Unit, EC Justice Division.
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group and Austria, Germany and other countries belonging in the first 
group. The problem with such divide is that the countries where the 
prospects for gender equality are less favourable are also those where 
gender gaps are larger. This in turn calls attention to an unintended, 
but worrying consequence of fiscal consolidation, namely that existing 
disparities among European countries in terms of gender equality may 
be widening back again.   
Despite expectations of a differential gender impact of the fiscal and 
other policies, in actual fact, despite the 2009 Recommendations of the 
European Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities and the strong 
gender position of the 2010 Employment Report (and of some other 
Commission documents), gender mainstreaming has been largely disre-
garded at the policy design and implementation stages.  This concerned 
all European countries, with only Austria, Finland and (possibly) the 
UK as partial exceptions. In Austria, gender budgeting is now enshri-
ned in the Constitution, and yet the fiscal consolidation measures an-
nounced for 2011-2014 have not benefited fully from an institutional 
implementation of gender budgeting, including a transparent and con-
sistent description of their likely gender effects. The U.K. government 
has a legal obligation to give ‘due regard’ to the gender (and other) 
impact of its main policies, but no gender equality impact assessment 
of the 2010 Emergency Budget was conducted. 
Gender equality policy has perhaps been more prominent with re-
gard to the re-design of the gender equality infrastructure. However, 
both the underlying motivations and the outcome vary greatly among 
countries. Fiscal consolidation packages threaten to impair the activi-
ties of the gender equality machinery in several Member States (Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, the Slovak Re-
public, Spain and the United Kingdom), and some have even down-
graded their pre-crisis institutions. By contrast, a few Eastern Euro-
pean countries have introduced institutional innovations into the field 
of gender equality (Poland and the Slovak Republic), while Denmark, 
Sweden and Portugal have attempted to make their existing machinery 
more effective. Perhaps the most inspiring example is Iceland, where 
the crisis has been turned into an opportunity to make gender mainstre-
aming an integral part of ‘normal’ policy -making process.  
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gender differenCes 
in inCome Poverty 
The next two chapters aim at reviewing the most recent trends in 
schemes and policies targeting poverty and social exclusion in the light 
of the current economic crisis68. 
The Conclusions of the June 2011 European Council set out lift-
ing out of poverty or social exclusion at least 20 million Europeans by 
2020 as a headline target for the Union.69 The concept of “poverty” or 
“social exclusion” refer both to relative income poverty (i.e., the pov-
erty line is set at a value relative to the median population income in 
order to better capture poverty as a social and historically contingent 
phenomenon) and to a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing 
other domains of social inclusion - namely labour market attachment 
and access to a number of good of services. Thus, a person is at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion if he or she is at risk of poverty (i.e., 
they earn an equivalent disposable income lower than 60% of median 
equivalent income), he or she is severely materially deprived (i.e., he or 
she suffers a forced unavailability of certain items among a pre-defined 
list), and/or lives in a household with no or very low work intensity.
As shown by the Social Protection Committee (2011, Table 1),70 Eu-
ropean countries adopt different indicators to benchmark their prog-
ress towards the Europe 2020 target. A convenient standardised indi-
cator is the percentage of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in each country. As shown in Table 5.1, the crisis has slowed down 
the process towards the reduction in the share of population at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion: at the EU-27 level, a slight increase of 
such share took place between 2009 and 2010 (from 21.8% to 22.3% 
for men and from 24.3% to 24.5% for women). In spite of the general 
68  One of the principal statistical sources for both chapters is the SILC survey which 
collects each year income figures for  one year earlier (see also footnote 24). In both 
chapters the figures set out in the text and in the tables refer to survey years, unless 
the text clearly states otherwise.        
69  http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion_17_june_en.pdf 
70  Social Protection Committee (SPC) (2011), The Social Dimension of the Europe 
2020 Strategy. A Report of the Social Protection Committee, European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union.
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trend, some European countries experienced continuing decline in the 
share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion even in 2010 (Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Sweden, 
for men; Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, Germany, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania and Norway, for women).
Overall, the values from the 2010 survey (the latest available)  are 
lower than the historical average for both men and women at the EU-
27 level, denoting an overall decreasing trend that the crisis has not 
completely reversed. Exceptions to this finding, i.e. countries in which 
more people were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2010 than in 
2005, are Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovenia and Spain for men, and Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Iceland, Spain, and Sweden for women.71
Given the abovementioned two-fold nature of the concept, poverty 
will be considered from two interrelated perspectives. In this chapter, 
the concept of insufficient monetary income will be considered from a 
gender perspective. In the next chapter, a specific focus will be devoted 
to the analysis of gender differences in multidimensional poverty (also 
referred to as “social exclusion”). This is a holistic approach to poverty 
that takes into account several dimensions along with monetary income 
such as access to services, education, health, and so forth. 
71  Following SPC (2011), the choice of 2005 as reference year was driven by data 
availability.   
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Table 5.1. Evolution of the percentage of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion, by sex
  Men Women 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium 21.5 20.0 19.9 19.1 18.5 20.0 23.9 23.1 23.1 22.4 21.8 21.7
Bulgaria : 61.4 59.4 43.0 44.1 39.8 : 62.9 61.9 46.4  48.1 43.3
Czech Republic 17.8 16.6 14.2 13.3 12.3 12.7 21.4 19.4 17.4 17.2 15.7 16.0
Denmark 16.2 15.5 15.9 15.7 17.0 17.7 18.3 17.9 17.7 17.0 18.2 19.0
Germany 17.0 19.1 18.9 18.5 18.8 18.6 19.7 21.4 22.4 21.6 21.2 20.9
Estonia 24.9 20.4 19.4 18.9 21.1 21.5 27.6 23.7 24.2 24.3 25.5 22.0
Ireland 24.1 22.0 21.6 22.7 25.0 29.3 25.9 24.6 24.6 24.7 26.4 30.5
Greece 27.0 27.7 26.0 26.3 26.1 26.0 31.5 31.2 29.3 29.8 29.0 29.3
Spain 23.0 22.6 21.7 21.6 22.3 24.9 25.3 25.1 24.5 24.2 24.4 26.1
France 17.8 17.3 18.0 17.5 17.2 18.5 20.1 20.3 20.0 19.7  19.5 20.0
Italy 22.8 23.9 23.8 23.2 22.8 22.6 27.2 27.9 28.2 27.2 26.4 26.3
Cyprus 23.9 23.3 22.7 19.7 20.2 22.6 26.8 27.4 27.6 24.6  24.2 25.4
Latvia 43.4 38.8 33.8 31.0 35.9 37.6 48.7 43.6 37.4 36.2  38.7 38.5
Lithuania 39.0 33.9 26.3 25.3 27.3 32.9 43.0 37.7 30.9 29.7 31.4 33.8
Luxembourg 16.2 15.8 15.0 14.2 16.0 16.5 18.3 17.1 16.9 16.7 19.6 17.7
Hungary 31.3 31.1 28.6 27.3 29.1 29.4 32.8 31.8 30.1 29.0 30.0 30.3
Malta 18.6 17.6 18.3 18.2 19.0 19.7 21.7 20.6 20.6 21.0 21.4 21.5
Netherlands 15.6 14.6 14.6 14.3 14.3 14.1 17.7 17.4 16.9 15.5 15.9 16.0
Austria 15.0 15.7 14.5 16.8 15.0 14.7 18.5 19.7 18.9 20.3 18.9 18.4
Poland 44.7 39.0 33.5 29.9 27.0 27.0 45.8 40.0 35.1 31.2  28.6 28.5
Portugal 25.2 24.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 24.8 26.9 26.1 26.0 26.8 25.8 25.8
Romania : : 45.1 43.0 41.9 40.8 : : 46.7 45.3 44.2 42.1
Slovenia 16.4 15.3 15.0 16.6 15.1 16.5 20.5 18.8 19.2 20.3 19.1 20.1
Slovakia 30.9 26.1 19.7 18.9 18.0 19.6 33.4 28.0 23.1 22.0 21.1 21.6
Finland 16.2 16.3 15.8 15.9 15.8 16.0 18.1 17.9 19.0 18.9 17.9 17.7
Sweden 13.4 15.9 13.6 13.7 14.4 13.4 15.4 16.7 14.2 16.1 17.5 16.6
United Kingdom 23.6 22.1 21.1 21.7 21.1 22.1 25.9 25.4 24.1 24.7 22.8 24.2
EU-27 24.4  23.9  22.9 22.1 21.8 22.3 27.0 26.6 25.9 25.0 24.3 24.5
Iceland 13.1 11.6 11.5 11.0 10.7 13.5 13.5 13.4 14.5 12.6 12.6 14.0
Norway 14.9 15.2 14.7 13.1 13.7 13.8 17.4 18.4 18.3 16.8 16.8 15.9
Note: people at risk of poverty or social exclusion are defined as being at risk of 
poverty and/or suffering from severe material deprivation and/or live in a household 
with no or very low work intensity.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
In the first part of this chapter specific available data are summari-
zed and analysed. In the second part, policies and measures to tackle 
poverty and social exclusion are described by national EGGSI experts 
according to three categories: Member State strands: guaranteed mi-
nimum income schemes, categorical measures with regard to specific 
target groups, and consumption support measures (especially with re-
spect to specific categories of consumption such as food, housing, and 
transports).
Income poverty and the crisis 
At the EU-27 level income poverty, as measured by the share of po-
pulation earning a yearly income below 60% of median income, seems 
not to have been dramatically affected by the crisis. When conside-
ring the variation between 2009 and 2010, the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
(ARPR) remained constant for women and only increased by 0.5% for 
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men. Similarly, the ARPR for both men and women appears as virtually 
constant in comparison with the years prior to the crisis (i.e. the ARPR 
is slightly lower in 2010 than the 2005-2007 average, both for men and 
women). 
This is due to a number of reasons. The crisis hit Europe relatively 
later than the USA (2007) and it first struck countries such as Iceland, 
while data on income and living conditions is released at considerably 
longer intervals than for example data on employment or productive 
activities. The second reason is that the social impact of an adverse 
economic environment often manifests itself with a certain delay due to 
socio-economic dynamics but also to statistical issues connected to the 
later collection of data. For example, in population surveys such as the 
EU-SILC households or individuals are asked about their yearly income 
in the previous year72 and consequently it is necessary to wait one year 
before being able to ascertain the impact of a certain phenomenon. 
Third, in the specific case of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, the apparent 
steadiness over time of the EU-27 aggregate is indeed the result of mi-
xed dynamics across EU Member States (see Table 5.2). 
While most countries indeed experienced a small deterioration of 
the ARPR (generally lower than 1%) for men and women, few countri-
es showed a neat improvement, rebalancing the overall result. Three 
countries exhibited a reduction in male income poverty by 1% or more 
(Estonia, Latvia and the Netherlands), whereas three countries show-
ed a reduction in female income poverty higher than 2% (Estonia, Li-
thuania and Romania) and four higher than 1% (Bulgaria, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, and Norway). The countries in which the most dramatic 
increases (more than 1%) of income poverty took place between 2009 
and 2010 are Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic and Spain for men; and Croatia, Ireland and Slovenia for wo-
men. 
In almost all countries and years, women exhibited a higher at-risk-
of-poverty rate than men. At the EU-27 level, the gender gap showed 
an increasing trend up to 2007 and has been decreasing thenceforth. 
Between 2009 and 2010, a reversal of the gender gap took place in 
three countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg). In Latvia this was 
party due to the fact that female poverty is concentrated   among older 
pensioners whose income fell less than the median.  73
Finally, a fourth explanation for the relatively small impact of the 
crisis on income poverty may arise from the very method of calculation 
of the ARPR index. The at-risk-of-poverty rate, as mentioned above, 
provides a definition of relative poverty (i.e., an individual is conside-
red as poor if his or her income falls below a threshold which varies 
across areas and countries).  The reason for this method is to take into 
72  In the EU-SILC, in some countries this is meant to imply the previous calendar 
year, in others it is the exact twelve months that precede the interview. For a discus-
sion of the international comparability of such data see Brandolini A., Rosolia A. and 
Torrini R. (2011)  “The distribution of employees’ labour earnings in the European 
Union: Data, concepts and first results”, ECINEQ WP 2011 – 198, available at: 
http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2011-198.pdf
73  By contrast, in Hungary the gender gap is negative throughout the whole period 
considered.
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consideration not only the minimum income necessary for survival, but 
also what is considered adequate for a decent life in a certain society. 
As a consequence, every year the poverty line is computed as 60% of 
that year’s median income. This method implies that when the average 
and the median income decrease - as it is a case during a recession - the 
poverty line decreases as well, possibly causing a number of people to 
“emerge” out of poverty due to a purely computational effect. In order 
to account for this perverse effect when comparing historical trends, 
ARPRs may be computed with a fixed poverty line, i.e. an individual 
is considered as poor if his or her income falls below the poverty line 
applied to a specific year in the past. Currently, Eurostat sets 2005 as 
the reference year. 
Table 5.2. Evolution of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, by sex
  Men Women 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belgium 14.1 13.7 14.4 13.6 13.4 13.9 15.5 15.6 15.9 15.9 15.7 15.2 
Bulgaria 13 17.3 20.9 19.8 19.8 19.0 15 19.3 23.0 22.9 23.7 22.3 
Czech Republic 9.7 8.9 8.7 8.0 7.5 8.0 11.0 10.8 10.5 10.1 9.5 10.0 
Denmark 11.6 11.4 11.3 11.7 12.8 13.1 12.1 12.0 12.0 12.0 13.4 13.4 
Germany 11.4 12.1 14.1 14.2 14.7 14.9 12.9 13.0 16.3 16.2 16.3 16.4 
Estonia 17.4 16.3 16.7 16.5 17.5 15.4 19.1 19.9 21.7 22.0 21.6 16.2 
Ireland 18.9 17.5 16.0 14.5 14.9 15.9 20.6 19.5 18.5 16.4 15.1 16.2 
Greece 18.3 19.5 19.6 19.6 19.1 19.3 20.9 21.4 20.9 20.7 20.2 20.9 
Spain 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.3 18.3 20.1 20.8 21.3 20.9 21.0 20.6 21.3 
France 12.3 12.3 12.8 11.9 12.0 12.8 13.7 14.0 13.4 13.4 13.7 14.1 
Italy 17.0 18.0 18.4 17.1 17.0 16.8 20.6 21.1 21.3 20.1 19.8 19.5 
Cyprus 14.5 13.5 13.5 14.0 14.4 15.5 17.6 17.7 17.4 18.3 17.9 18.5 
Latvia 18.3 21.1 19.3 23.1 24.2 21.7 20.0 24.8 22.7 27.7 27.0 21.0 
Lithuania 19.7 19.1 16.7 17.6 19.1 20.7 21.3 20.8 21.2 22.0 21.9 19.8 
Luxembourg 13.2 13.8 12.9 12.5 13.8 14.6 14.2 14.3 14.1 14.3 16.0 14.4 
Hungary 13.9 16.3 12.3 12.4 12.8 12.6 13.2 15.5 12.3 12.4 12.1 12.0 
Malta 13.4 13.3 14.4 13.6 14.7 15.0 14.4 14.7 15.3 16.4 15.9 16.0 
Netherlands 10.6 9.5 9.6 10.5 10.8 9.7 10.8 9.9 10.7 10.4 11.3 10.8 
Austria 11.5 11.0 10.6 11.2 10.7 10.7 13.1 14.0 13.3 13.5 13.2 13.5 
Poland 21.3 19.7 17.6 17.0 16.9 17.4 19.9 18.5 17.1 16.7 17.4 17.7 
Portugal 18.7 17.7 17.2 17.9 17.3 17.3 20.1 19.1 19.0 19.1 18.4 18.4 
Romania : : 24.3 22.4 21.4 20.7 : : 25.3 24.3 23.4 21.4 
Slovenia 10.6 10.3 10.0 11.0 9.8 11.3 13.7 12.9 12.9 13.6 12.8 14.1 
Slovakia 13.2 11.8 10.2 10.1 10.1 11.7 13.5 11.5 11.0 11.5 11.8 12.2 
Finland 10.6 12.0 12.1 12.7 12.9 12.4 12.8 13.1 13.8 14.5 14.7 13.8 
Sweden 9.0 12.3 10.5 11.3 12.0 11.4 10.0 12.3 10.6 13.0 14.5 14.3 
United Kingdom 18.6 18.0 17.6 17.4 16.7 16.4 19.4 19.9 19.6 20.0 17.8 17.8 
EU-27 15.6  15.7  15.7 15.5 15.4 15.7 17.0 17.2 17.3  17.4 17.1 17.1 
Iceland 9.8 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.3 9.8 9.6 10.2 11.0 10.7 11.1 9.8 
Norway 10.2 11.5 10.3 9.9 10.1 10.1 12.5 13.2 13.4 12.9 13.2 12.2 
Croatia 16 16 16 15.4 16.0 19.7 20 18 19 19.0 19.7 21.3 
Note: the at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the share of people with an equalised 
disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which 
is set at 60% of t national median equalised disposable income after social transfers. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
When considering the ARPR anchored at a fixed point in time, 
between 2009 and 2010 a considerable increase of the risk of poverty 
emerged in a number of countries (cf. Table 5.3). At the EU-27 level, 
female ARPR grew by 0.6% and male by 0.7%. However, it grew by 
more than 2% in Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Spain 
for men and in Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta and Spain for women.
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Table 5.3. Evolution of the at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a fixed 
moment in time (2005), by sex
  Men Women 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belgium 15.2 14.1 12.6 12.5 13.2 17.1 15.7 14.2 13.8 14.4 
Czech Republic 12.5 12.7 12.6 9.9 10.7 13.9 14.0 14.7 11.3 11.6 
Denmark 8.1 6.8 5.8 4.4 5.0 9.3 7.7 6.2 4.7 5.2 
Germany 11.0 10.4 11.0 11.0 11.9 11.6 11.2 11.4 11.2 11.3 
Estonia 14.9 13.2 12.6 12.9 12.7 16.5 15.0 14.2 14.1 13.9 
Ireland 11.6 7.7 5.6 4.5 5.9 12.2 7.9 5.0 2.9 4.6 
Greece 16.0 11.3 9.7 9.7 15.6 18.1 12.7 10.1 10.0 16.0 
Spain 19.1 18.2 18.2 15.9 15.5 20.9 19.8 19.0 16.8 16.5 
France 17.6 15.0 13.9 13.4 17.2 19.5 16.9 15.0 14.2 18.0 
Italy 12.3 13.0 : : : 14.1 13.6 : : : 
Cyprus 18.3 18.2 16.8 16.9 16.7 21.5 21.1 19.7 19.7 19.3 
Latvia 10.3 8.6 7.6 7.1 7.9 14.5 11.7 10.6 10.0 10.7 
Lithuania 17.4 10.1 6.5 6.5 9.4 19.0 10.1 6.9 5.4 7.0 
Luxembourg 13.4 7.4 5.2 5.3 10.8 13.5 7.7 5.2 4.0 8.3 
Hungary 13.4 13.2 13.0 12.8 14.4 14.1 14.3 14.6 14.8 14.1 
Malta 13.9 10.5 9.6 9.0 10.6 13.2 10.2 9.4 8.4 9.8 
Netherlands 10.2 9.5 9.2 7.0 11.1 10.9 10.0 10.1 7.9 11.7 
Austria 9.6 8.5 7.6 7.9 6.5 10.0 9.5 7.7 8.1 7.3 
Poland 11.8 11.8 11.6 9.8 9.7 14.8 14.8 14.0 12.1 12.2 
Portugal 16.7 12.9 8.6 7.2 6.7 15.3 12.2 8.0 6.7 6.0 
Slovenia 18.6 17.5 16.5 14.4 13.8 20.2 19.3 17.6 15.5 14.3 
Slovakia 9.2 8.4 8.1 5.7 7.4 11.9 10.9 10.0 7.6 9.3 
Finland 10.3 6.4 4.9 2.6 2.8 9.9 5.9 4.7 2.3 2.5 
Sweden 10.6 10.4 10.5 8.8 8.2 11.5 11.6 11.3 10.0 8.8 
United Kingdom 11.6 9.2 8.2 8.0 7.1 11.2 8.6 8.2 8.1 7.5 
EU-27 17.1 14.4 13.8 15.2 16.1 18.8 15.9 15.7 16.4 17.4 
Iceland 8.4 5.8 6.4 6.7 9.8 9.4 6.3 5.8 7.2 9.6 
Norway 10.5 9.1 7.3 6.7 6.7 13.0 11.8 9.4 7.4 6.3 
Note: the at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a fixed moment in time 
is defined as the share of people with an equalized disposable income 
(after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 
set at 60% of median equalized disposable income of the same popula-
tion in year 2005. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
Besides the statistical complexity of the issue, it may be noted that a 
crucial contribution to the relatively good performance of the Europe-
an countries in terms of income poverty in the wake of the crisis came 
from the European social model.74 As shown in Table 5.4, without so-
cial transfers (i.e., social contributions or benefits and redistributive 
taxation), the at-risk-of-poverty rates would have increased between 
2009 and 2010 for both men and women to levels higher than befo-
re the crisis. Namely, ARPR would have increased for men by more 
than 2% in 12 countries (Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Iceland, Norway and 
Croatia), for women by more than 2% in 10 countries (Bulgaria, Esto-
74  See European Commission (2012a), EU Employment and Social Situation, Quar-
terly Review, March 2012, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion, Brussels; and European Commission (2012b), Employment and Social De-
velopments in Europe 2011, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
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nia, Ireland, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Croatia); by 5% or more in Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Iceland for 
men, and in Latvia, Lithuania and Iceland for women. Sole exceptions 
to this are Austria, Denmark and Romania, where ARPR before social 
transfers would have slightly decreased.
Table 5.4. Evolution of the at-risk-of-poverty rate before social trans-
fers, by sex
Note: the at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the share of people with an equalized 
disposable income (after social transfer) 
below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of national median 
equalized disposable income. This indicator examines the hypothetical absence of so-
cial transfers (including pensions).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
In all European countries and throughout the period taken into con-
sideration, women suffered from a considerably higher ARPR before 
social transfers that after social transfers, which led to a higher gender 
gap (i.e. roughly 5% as opposed to 2%). Such evidence shows that 
taxation and welfare systems across the EU are fundamental in redu-
cing the risk of poverty women face. After the crisis, however, a mar-
ginal worsening of men’s position before social transfers has slightly 
reduced the gap in ARPRs before social transfers: from 5.1% in 2005 
to 4.8% in 2010.
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Box 5.1 – Poverty measurement with individual inco-
mes
A problem with statistical measures of poverty and social exclu-
sion is that income and all other financial resources are assumed 
to be equally shared by the members of a same household. The as-
sumption is reflected in the practice of summing up all the incomes 
of the members of a household and then dividing the corresponding 
sum by the number of individuals (or by an equivalence scale). As a 
consequence, “poor” or “at-risk-of-poverty” households composed 
by only two adults of opposite sex equally contribute to the corre-
sponding statistical indexes of poverty of both men and women, 
without being taken into account in the determination of the gender 
poverty gap. Evidently, this produces an underestimation of gender 
imbalances that is greater in the countries in which this typology 
of household (two opposite-sex adults, with or without children) is 
more diffused. 
For households composed of adult opposite-sex couples, an ave-
rage household income computed by summing up all the household 
members’ resources needs not reflect the actual access to good and 
services of any member of the household. Especially when conside-
ring gender differences, it is crucial to take into account that control 
over the family’s resources is a traditional and deeply rooted source 
of unequal power sharing between men and women. For this re-
ason, we have computed the risk of poverty for men and women 
by considering not households resources, but rather individual re-
sources. Specifically, we computed the relevant poverty indexes by 
considering the incomes for each individual that can be attributed 
with certainty to him or her (e.g. labour income, certain kinds of 
social transfers, etc.) while we assumed that the other household 
incomes, such as those from propriety, are equally shared.75 By con-
sidering individual resources, we separately computed the share of 
men and women whose individual income is below 60% of median 
individual income, denoting a risk of monetary poverty. 
Such an index, however, requires a redefinition of the concept of 
income poverty. Indeed, the consideration for an individual’s own 
income must not lead to the presumption that lack of income is 
equal to income poverty. Individual members of a household may 
temporarily or permanently lack an autonomous income or have 
a very low one, and yet they may have access to a wide range of 
goods and services (or even of financial resources) due to transfers 
within the household (notice that regular transfers such as alimo-
ny payments are already computed within the individual’s income). 
Thus, the individual lacking of own income is at risk of income 
poverty only if these transfers are insufficient or if they do not take 
place (for example, because the individual has no partners or re-
75  This last assumption, following Meulders and O’Dorchai (2010) corresponds to a 
prudent stance in constructing the index, in the absence of any information on intra-
household bargaining and the sharing of common resources.
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latives, because they are not willing to provide him or her with 
sufficient resources, or because all members of the household lack 
an adequate income). As a consequence, lack or insufficiency of 
individual income should rather be interpreted as lack of financial 
autonomy, which is likely to lead to low empowerment and lack of 
autonomy and agency in society and at home. For this reason, we 
name the index measuring the lack or insufficiency of income not as 
an individual poverty rate but as a financial dependency rate. 
According to these definitions, the financial dependency rate is 
then computed as the ratio between the population whose indivi-
dual income falls below the poverty line divided by the dimension 
of the relevant total population. In analogy to the traditional inco-
me poverty measures, the poverty line is defined as 60% of median 
individual income in the population. This procedure cannot be ap-
plied in Chapter VI concerning material deprivation rates because 
in the case of assets, durable goods and other resources that are 
jointly consumed or enjoyed of in the household, the existing Eu-
ropean surveys do not report any information on intra-household 
bargaining and the sharing of common resources. Thus, for these 
items it is impossible to obtain individual-level data.
As shown in Figure 5.1, both before (year 2007 as reference 
point) and after the onset of the financial crisis in Europe (year 
2009), women suffered from a dependency rate that in almost all 
European countries was nearly twice that of men’s. As a consequen-
ce of their higher involvement in the production of household goods 
and services and of their lower attachment to the labour market, 
women’s dependency rate in most European countries exceeded 
30%  and in several it exceeded 40%, while men’s was generally 
comprised between 10% and 20% both before and after the crisis. 
By comparing the year 2007 with the year 2009 it emerges that the 
crisis has had on average a stronger impact on women’s dependency 
than on men’s. For men, a significant increase in the dependency 
rate (greater than 2%) took place in France, while it did so for 
women in Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, France and Greece. 
In the period considered, a significant decrease of the dependency 
rate took place in Latvia for men and women, and in Sweden for 
women only.
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Figure 5.1. Dependency rate by sex, before and after the crisis began
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Note: the dependency rate is defined as the share of people with an individual di-
sposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 
set at 60% of national median individual disposable income after social transfers. Indi-
vidual incomes computed according to the methodology described in the present Box.
Source: EU-SILC data, own elaboration.
Income support schemes and consumption support mea-
sures
Prior to the emergence of the current crisis, European countries de-
veloped with different configurations and timings universal and catego-
rical non-contributory schemes in order to ensure a minimum standard 
of living for individuals and households. Such schemes are designed to 
guarantee sufficient resources to live with dignity or meet basic needs 
to all and are aimed at preventing poverty and at promoting social 
inclusion.
As a response to the financial crisis, various schemes have also been 
introduced while already existing measures face pressure to meet an 
increasing demand and experience structural transformations due to 
the effect of the recession and resulting austerity policies. According to 
the Social Protection Committee (2009), European countries reinforced 
their income support measures in the initial phase of the crisis by incre-
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asing the level of minimum income and by strengthening safety nets76. 
Different forms taken by social assistance are here analyzed in a gender 
perspective, according to three broad categories:
 Guaranteed minimum income schemes: universal and comprehensi-
ve means-tested schemes providing cash benefits for all individuals 
and/or households below a specified minimum income standard.
 Categorical measures targeting specific groups: integrated network 
of categorical non-contributory cash and in-kind assistance for spe-
cified target groups, namely families (lone parents, children), disa-
bled, old-age, and unemployed77.
 Consumption support measures (VAT differentiation, Food con-
sumption support, compensation for heating, and transports).
Most measures are geared towards households rather than indivi-
duals under the assumption that incomes and other resources are equal-
ly shared within the household. Such predominant measure design may 
impact differently on men and women, depending on the income and 
structure of the household. Given the inequality of gendered social ro-
les and differences in the labour market (gender pay gap, activity and 
employment rate gaps), women as second earners risk not to be entitled 
to independent support. Furthermore, support measures design takes 
into account  different types of women’s social citizenship: caregiver for 
children and adult dependants when lone parents are exempted from 
work obligations and active agent in the labour market for job search. 
Such a measure design makes the assessment of gendered impact of 
supporting measures more ambiguous.
Guaranteed minimum income schemes
Guaranteed minimum income schemes are granted on a universal 
basis and do not depend on previous contributions to social protection 
insurance systems by beneficiaries. Despite different denominations 
across countries, they are conceived as an all-encompassing benefit or 
as an ultimate socioeconomic safety net providing means-tested cash 
payments conditioned to individuals or households resources. In most 
countries examined, some form of minimum income is provided as a 
measure of last resort ensuring a minimum standard of living for indivi-
duals and families. Only in Greece and Italy such universal guaranteed 
minimum income schemes do not exist.
The minimum income scheme is in a few cases the sole existing inco-
76  Social Protection Committee (2009), “Second Joint Assessment by the SPC and 
the European Commission of the Social Impact of the Economic Crisis and of Policy 
Responses”, SPC/2009/11/13 final, available at: http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/
docs/fr/publicaties/socinc_rap/spc-2009-11-13.pdf 
77  Data on disability benefits reported in the “2010 Update of the Joint Assessment 
by the SPC and the European Commission of the social impact of the economic crisis 
and of policy responses” are not disaggregated by gender and thus they will not be 
included in the current analysis.
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me support measure, but can also be part of a more complex safety net 
supplemented by other allowances. According to the country of imple-
mentation it can have various forms but all minimum income schemes 
are the “expression of a universal, non-contributory, subjective, and 
non-discretionary right to social assistance, granted generally under the 
form of a means-tested differential income”78. According to their natu-
re, guaranteed minimum income schemes are not gender mainstreamed.
New minimum income schemes have been recently introduced in Au-
stria, France, and Hungary. While the latter was amongst the countri-
es that lacked a minimum income scheme, Austria’s and France’s new 
schemes rationalize already existing measures.
As a response to the crisis, several countries experienced a remar-
kable increase in the number of beneficiaries (Belgium, Estonia, Latvia 
and Luxembourg), with a predominant share of women, and raised 
guaranteed minimum income payments through growing public expen-
diture (Bulgaria, Spain, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland and Romania)79. 
In these countries, where women’s poverty rates before social transfers 
are higher than men’s, minimum income schemes positively affect gen-
der equality by reducing both men’s and women’s poverty and bringing 
women’s poverty rates closer to men’s.
A recent trend defines a stronger link between minimum income 
schemes and activation requirements to promote the inclusion in the 
labour market (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Luxembou-
rg and Spain).
Box 5.2 - Guaranteed Minimum income schemes: ma-
jor developments during the crisis
In Austria, a means-tested minimum income scheme was introdu-
ced in 2010 as the successor of the system of social assistance. It 
is paid by the provinces and foresees a minimum security payment 
oriented at the equalization supplement reference rate of € 747 
(2009). The granting of minimum security payments is coupled 
with the willingness to work if the beneficiary is able to. Positively, 
lone parents are granted a higher benefit than under past regula-
tions to ward off the above-average risk of poverty of this group. 
By covering previously not health insured recipients of social tran-
sfers with statutory health insurance, unrestricted access to medi-
cal services is to be guaranteed. Means-tested minimum income 
payments were coupled in 2010 with the willingness to work in 
case the beneficiary is able to work.
In Belgium, social assistance takes the form of a guaranteed 
minimum income called the Social Integration Income (Revenu 
d’intégration social, RIS). The RIS is linked to a “right and duty” 
78  Casas R. P. (2005), “Minimum Income Standards in Enlarged EU: Guaranteed 
minimum income schemes”, Working Paper II, Setting Minimum Social Standards 
Across Europe Transnational Exchange Project.
79  See also Social Protection Committee (2009).
156
Gender Differences in Income Poverty
activation scheme that is obligatory for beneficiaries aged 18-25 
and optional for other applicants. The RIS is means tested, is pro-
vided for as long as necessary and varies according to household 
composition. The number of beneficiaries of the RIS is increased 
during the 2005-2009 time interval and women are the majority 
of beneficiaries. The RIS is felt to be insufficient to allow people 
(whether at the single or family rate) to live in dignity, essentially 
because of the cost of housing. A specific, means-tested minimum 
guaranteed income scheme is provided to older persons (GRAPA), 
and women are the majority among the beneficiaries. 
In Bulgaria, guaranteed minimum income payments increased by 
18.2% as of the beginning of 2009 as a response to the economic 
crisis among other key social assistance programmes.
The basic income scheme for ensuring minimum income among 
vulnerable groups in Cyprus is the Public Assistance Scheme, 
provided to individuals whose income is inadequate to cover their 
basic and special needs. In 2006, the Law on Public Assistance was 
amended to financially reinforce public assistance recipients but 
also to encourage their integration in the labour market. The ma-
ximum amount provided for the coverage of basic needs vary with 
each applicant: currently, the monthly cash allowance for basic 
needs is € 452 for the head of household, € 226 for every depen-
dent over 14 years of age and € 135.60 for every dependent under 
the age of 14 years.1 It should be noted that these amounts reflect a 
12% increase in public assistance that was introduced in 2008. 
The main income support measure in Estonia is means-tested sub-
sistence benefit. The number of beneficiaries of subsistence benefit 
decreased approximately 4 times from January 2005 to August 
2008, but increased again by nearly 2.5 times from September 
2008 to February 2010. The subsistence benefit is a sufficient 
measure to avoid poverty only in case of single parents and single 
elderly persons, and thus may have gendered impact, especially for  
single mothers2.
In France, during the recession, a new income-support scheme, the 
Active solidarity income (RSA), has been implemented in France. 
It can be seen as a welfare-to-work reform, encouraging income 
support recipients to participate in the labour market. 
In Hungary, a minimum income scheme called “Benefits for per-
sons in active age” has been recently introduced with two main 
target groups: individuals capable of performing work, who can 
be involved in public work and those unable to work3.
One of key instruments in Latvia to address the issue of poverty 
especially during the period of economic crisis is the Guaranteed 
Minimum Income (GMI). The GMI monthly payment is set at the 
level of 40 lats (€57) for adults and 45 lats (€64) for children (but 
used to be lower in the years before the crisis). The municipali-
ties may determine higher GMI levels, but not lower than those 
mentioned above. The maximum level of GMI for pensioners and 
disabled is 90 lats (€128) a month. The benefit is granted for a 
period not exceeding 9 months). In 2007 only 26% of poor people 
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received the GMI benefit, while this share in 2010 increased to 
39.9%.
In Luxembourg, a basic guaranteed income (revenu minimum 
garanti or RMG) is provided either via an integration benefit4 or 
a supplementary allowance5 to individuals who do not have any 
income or whose income is below the minimum level set by law, 
either in an individual capacity or jointly with other members 
of their household. As of 1 January 2011, the basic guaranteed 
income amounted to €1,251.97 per month for a single person, 
€1,877.93 for a couple, €358.20 per additional adult and a fur-
ther €113.81 s for each child under the age of 18 who qualifies 
for family allowance. Between 2008 and 2009, the annual incre-
ase was particularly large without substantial gender differences 
(16% compared to 3% the previous year): the number of persons 
in receipt of basic guaranteed income increased by 2,261, 53% 
of whom are women6. On 1 January 2009, the basic guaranteed 
income was raised by 2% (the cost for the State’s budget amounts 
to 1,977,000 euros).
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Categorical measures for specific target groups 
Guaranteed minimum income schemes are often accompanied by an 
integrated network of different categorical and non-contributory sche-
mes supporting specific target group such as families, single parents, 
children, elderly and the disabled. 
Family-related benefits and allowances supplement minimum inco-
me schemes by providing universal or contributory, means-tested or 
irrespective of income cash payments and in-kind provision in case of 
maternity, paternity, parental leave, lone parents and widowhood.
Family-related benefits are formally gender-neutral measures with a 
significant gendered impact, as women dominate household payments 
due to gender-specific division of care activities. At the same time, wo-
men’s employment patterns affect their entitlements (in Ireland, the Fa-
mily Income Supplement requires women to be employed for at least 19 
hours in order to receive the benefit).
Furthermore, the assessment of family- and children-related benefits 
and corresponding entitlement is ambiguous from a gender perspecti-
ve: while providing support, they also strengthen the women’s role as 
a main child and family caregiver, thus reducing their prospects for the 
full inclusion into the labour market, as well as the participation in 
political and social life.  
Cuts in public expenditure due to the economic crisis affected exi-
sting family-related benefits in most countries with substantial gender 
effects. Austerity policies unaccompanied by proper gender impact as-
sessments had an influence on family support schemes traditionally di-
rected to women or resulted in the entrenchment of traditional gender 
roles. On the other hand, only few countries expanded their support to 
family-related benefits and allowances as a response to the economic 
crisis.
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Family and child-related benefits and services since the inception of 
the economic crisis 
As it is the case with long-term care (see par. 6.4.2 below), public 
expenditure for monetary allowances has been reduced more than the 
expenditure for the provision of services in an attempt of fiscal conso-
lidation in the field of childcare. In some European countries monetary 
benefits have been reduced and/or their eligibility requirements tighte-
ned (for example in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, or the Uni-
ted Kingdom), while others - less strongly impacted by the economic 
crisis - exhibit a reverse policy trend, i.e. an increase in public expendi-
ture (Finland, Netherlands, Slovak Republic and Hungary). 
Fiscal consolidation measures have targeted paternity leave schemes 
in Estonia, Iceland, Spain and the Czech Republic, a policy measure 
traditionally considered as fundamental for a more equilibrated sharing 
of unpaid work burdens between the genders as well as for the modi-
fication of traditional gender roles. Since men usually have a higher 
salary than women, the loss of income for the household is likely to 
be higher if the father takes on parental leave than if the mother does. 
Thus, it is a priority issue to ensure fathers and mothers an equal right 
to parental leave by providing benefits generous enough to enable fa-
thers to take part in the upbringing of their young children.
As mentioned, in the European countries public or publicly subsi-
dized private provision of childcare services has undergone less drastic 
cuts than monetary allowances. One reason may be that kindergartens, 
crèches and all-day schools are effective instruments for parents to con-
ciliate working and family time, while offering children an opportunity 
to enhance their learning skills. In some countries, such policy in time 
of crisis aims at shifting the focus on family support from an untargeted 
and expensive early childcare policy to a more specific set of measures 
directly providing childcare, enabling women to work and maintaining 
childcare-related employment (again, mainly benefiting women also on 
the supply side of care). Thus, in several European countries the supply 
of childcare facilities has grown in the last few years even in spite of 
the economic crisis and the associated austerity programmes, although 
in several European countries it has not reached the Lisbon target of 
having at least 33% of children below 3 years old attending pre-school 
institutions. 
In a number of European countries (Poland, Czech Republic), an en-
hanced provision of childcare is mainly or exclusively sought through 
direct or indirect public financing of private facilities. Such measures 
have the strong advantage of reducing public expenditure, since part of 
the financing falls upon the private sector (either the families benefiting 
from the service or the third-sector entities supplying it). However, in 
certain cases (such as corporate crèches) plans supporting only priva-
te preschool institutions may have a lower potential for social inclu-
sion since their target are neither exclusively nor mainly the vulnera-
ble groups of the population. For example, the most socially excluded 
groups of the population are not likely to be employed in large firms 
that offer corporate crèches; similarly, they probably cannot afford the-
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se services if they are provided for a significant fee. Therefore, an inte-
grated approach may be more effective with the aim of targeting those 
furthest from the labour market. 
However, in the mixed policy environment characterized by uneven 
public austerity measures that followed the crisis, some countries expe-
rienced social expenditure retrenchments in the field of childcare servi-
ces (Estonia and the Netherlands). Finally, even when facing budgetary 
constraints, some European countries still tried to improve childcare 
and the conditions of working parents through regulatory reforms at 
no or very little cost (Slovak Republic). 
Box 5.3 – The provision of childcare in times of crisis: 
monetary allowances and services
In Austria, the federal government introduced in 2009 free access 
to kindergarten for half-day in the last year before school as well as 
an obligation for all children to attend one year of kindergarten be-
fore entering compulsory education. Since childcare services are the 
responsibility of the provinces and municipalities, the implementa-
tion of this measure depends on the individual provinces. 
In Cyprus, in 2009 the scheme of state subsidies to community 
organizations and NGOs was extended for the first time to local 
authorities in order to finance childcare programmes. 
In Finland in 2009 the flat-rate child homecare allowance paid 
to families with children under three years as an alternative to pu-
blic day care was raised by ř20 per month (the new amount being 
ř314,28). The support for private daycare was also increased from 
ř140 to ř160 per month. The minimum maternity, paternity and pa-
rental benefits, paid to those parents taking leave who do not have 
a previous income (and thus not receiving income-related benefits) 
were increased in 2009 to the level of the minimum unemployment 
benefit (i.e. from ř15.2 per day to ř22.04 per day).
In Germany, payments for parental leave have been reduced in 
two ways. First, unemployed persons receiving welfare benefits no 
longer receive the minimum parental leave payment of ř300, a re-
form carried on with the argument that the difference between the 
income from work and the income from welfare would become too 
small if parental leave was paid for this group. Second, persons 
with a net income of more than ř1,240 per month are now entitled 
to a wage compensation of 65% during their parental leave, down 
from the previous 67%. The infrastructure for childcare improved 
significantly in 2010, with 23.1% of all children between 0 and 3 
years having a position in day care, up from 13.6% in 2006 (though 
with relevant regional differences).7 The Promotion of Children Act 
sets the target that in 2013 there should be a place in day care for 
at least every third child up to three years, and from the year 2013 
every child older than one year should be legally entitled to a place 
in public day care or with a private child-minder.
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In Hungary, the new system of family daycare widens the op-
portunities for parents who have only poor access to childcare in-
stitutions (although the programme started in 1997, it met several 
administrative difficulties that have been mitigated only recently). 
The main objective of the programme is to reduce the tension due to 
the lack of places in crèches, or due to the lack of crèches.
In Malta, three new community centres were set up between 
2009 and 2010, following an integrated approach including but 
not limited to care services.
In the Netherlands, since 2008 self-employed women are entit-
led to maternity leave and fiscal advantages for pension accrual are 
planned to be introduced in the near future.
In the Slovak Republic, maternity benefits were increased from 
55% to 60% of mother’s previous income, though with a stringent 
ceiling (the average maternity benefit was €317 per month in 2010, 
very close to the minimum income of €307).8 From January 2012, 
a further increase of up to 65% of the mother’s income and an 
extension of the drawing period up to 40 weeks is planned, and 
by 2014 the benefit should reach 75% of the mother’s income and 
52 weeks of drawing period. Moreover, the parental allowance – a 
state cash payment – was adjusted to the level of €195 per month 
and per child (the level of the subsistence minimum), and a change 
in legislation has removed legislative barriers that prevented parents 
from working while receiving parental allowances.
In Slovenia, since 2008 childcare for the second and subsequent 
children is provided free of charge and is considered as a universal 
right. The state also subsidizes food and transport of pupils and 
students at the primary and secondary school levels.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Consumption support measures and their consequences on gender 
equality
Consumption support measures have been adopted during the re-
cession period in most European countries even if they seem to repre-
sent a marginal part of economic stimulus plans. Due to the focus on 
austerity there have been few new measures to support consumption, 
and an increasing pressure on existing programmes. They are mostly 
gender blind as do not include any special gender-related measure but 
rather concern the whole population (VAT differentiation), low-income 
households (programmes of food donation), local populations (price 
subsidy in public transports), sometimes the elderly (compensation for 
heating) or children (meals at school for the poorest children).
Existing measures to support consumption are scaling down in some 
countries, as in Poland where the reduction was visible in 2008-2010 
and in some cases it seems more pronounced in 2011. In Belgium, a 
number of policies in support of consumption at federal and regional 
level tend to refer to the entire population and not to the most vulne-
rable.
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As part of fiscal consolidation plans, increases of the Value Added 
Tax (VAT) rates have been mainly used to improve the state budget 
balance rather than for promoting consumption of certain goods or 
services. This is expected to carry a negative impact on gender equality 
given the generally higher at-risk-of-poverty rate and the lower dispo-
sable income of women compared to men. 
Food support measures are amongst the few consumption measures 
explicitly targeted to alleviate the impact of the crises for the poorest 
and developed across selected countries through in-kind distribution 
programmes and subsidized access to food. Compensations for heating 
and other payments related to utility bills of pensioners and other di-
sadvantaged target groups are also ensured in several countries through 
cash payments. Public transport is heavily subsidized in many countri-
es. A part of transportation costs is usually borne by local government 
budgets (local buses, subways), and sometimes by the central budget as 
well (railroads). Ticket price reductions are usually offered for different 
types of transport services to selected groups of passengers, none of 
which is gender related.
Lack of data on the gender impact of consumption support mea-
sures is a widespread issue. However, for the same reasons mentioned 
above (i.e., women’s average higher at-risk-of-poverty rates and lower 
disposable income), it may be expected that downscaling and budgeta-
ry cuts of consumption support measures may negatively affect gender 
equality by withdrawing state support from the poorest households, 
among which women are overrepresented.  
Box 5.4 - Consumption support measures since the 
beginning of the crisis 
In Estonia, one of the most innovative measures carried out by 
NGOs is the Food Bank. Since October 2010 the Veterinary and 
Food Board allowed distribution of food that has already passed the 
best before date conditional on the recipient’s awareness. NGOs in 
cooperation of local governments, volunteers, Swedbank and Open 
Estonia Foundation are now providing food packages to people with 
disposable income below the subsistence level. The food is donated 
by retail shops and producers, but also by private individuals.  
In Iceland, food donation is supported by a charity organization, 
the Family Aid Agency, to help disabled people, unemployed, single 
mothers and fathers, the elderly, poor households and individuals 
who suffer from poverty with food, grants to subsidize medical 
drugs and cheap clothing. On November 2010, 975 received dona-
tions involved 553 (57%) women and 422 (43%) men. Available fi-
gures seem to indicate that the majority of recipients are single mo-
thers with low income. These practices may be seen as destabilizing 
the principle of the Nordic welfare system, in which individuals 
and households should be ensured minimum income to maintain a 
certain standard of dignity and independent living. 
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One of the first measures introduced in Italy at the beginning 
of the crisis was the so-called Social Card, an electronic payment 
card used in support of food expenditure (and later of health and 
energy needs). The Card has a monthly value of 40 Euros and it is 
recharged with ř80 every two months. The recipients of the Social 
Card are Italian citizens residing in Italy over 65 years of age and 
children under 3 (in this case the beneficiary is the parent), with an 
income and ISEE (equivalent economic situation indicator) of less 
than ř6,322.64. In 2009, an additional sum of ř25 per month for 
the purchase of milk and nappies was introduced for children under 
3 months,. The Social Card covers also the payment of electricity 
and gas bills, and in 2009 was increased with an additional sum 
of 10 Euros for the use of natural gas or LPG for heating and hot 
water production. Another anti-crisis measure adopted in Italy is a 
reduction in the electricity rates (The Electric Bonus) and gas bills 
(The Gas Bonus).
In Poland, the National Food Programme was established in 
2005 for the years 2006-20099 with the main intention to finance 
meals at schools for the poorest children (with household income 
not exceeding 1.5 times the social assistance threshold). Occasio-
nally, support could also be granted to other poor persons in need, 
and income threshold could be set at a higher level pursuing the 
decision of the local government. The Programme was extended 
until 2013, and, at the same time, the increase of co-financing by 
self-governments (if the beneficiary income exceeds 150% of the 
regular income thresholds) has been introduced.  For some go-
vernments this new rule became an obstacle.  As a result, National 
Food Programme as a whole faced some problems during the years 
of the financial crisis. In 2009, the number of children covered by 
the Programme slightly decreased (from 2,006K down to 1,998)10. 
A higher decrease regarded the share administered by the social as-
sistance (mostly due to the changes of financing rules with respect 
to local governments). Unfortunately, the number of children provi-
ded with food under social assistance decreased both in 2009 (by as 
much as 7.5%, from 856 down to 793K ), and in 2010 (by 4.3%, 
down to 759K)11.  
One of the rare measures explicitly targeted at reducing the im-
pact of the crisis upon the poorest in the Slovak Republic is food 
support. In 2011, the Slovak Republic participated for the first time 
to the EU´s “Food Distribution programme for the Most Deprived 
Persons of the Community” (MDP).  Free access to 20 kg of flour 
and 20 kg of pasta is provided to individuals with monthly pensions 
lower than ř 305, or to those at the threshold of the subsistence 
minimum (ř 195).12
In the Slovak Republic, the most frequently claimed allowance 
is that for commuting to work, which increased to ř 135 during the 
crisis, and take up of the total allocation was 12%.13  
In the United Kingdom, annual payments are made to indivi-
duals above the state pension age to support the high cost of fuel 
through the winter fuel allowance and cold weather. The winter 
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fuel allowance is an annual tax-free payment to help people pay for 
their heating costs in the winter. It was worth £250 for the over 60s, 
and £400 for the over 80s in 2010/11 but was set to revert to £200 
and £300 respectively for the winter of 2011-12.
In FYROM, consumption support schemes promoted by the Mi-
nistry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP) in 2008 provided poor 
population unable to meet minimum nutritious standards with SOS 
cards for discounts at specific supermarkets. The programme failed 
to achieve the goal  due to partial or not significant use of the card. 
Food consumption for poor persons was also a part of the National 
Cuisine project14 started in March 2007, which as a target group 
has beneficiaries of social assistance, family members.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Concluding remarks
European women suffer from a higher risk of poverty or social 
exclusion than European men, as well as from a higher at-risk-of-po-
verty rate (that is, they specifically suffer from higher income poverty). 
The current economic crisis has marginally reduced the gender gap in 
poverty though in  perverse way, i.e. it increased men’s risks of poverty 
more than women’s, rather than reducing the latter. As a consequence, 
the crisis has slowed down the process of poverty reduction in several 
European countries as well as the process of rebalancing gender ine-
quality. 
When considering income poverty, the impact of the crisis at the 
European level appears on the whole as limited. In part, there are spe-
cific problems with the ability to infer relevant trends from the data 
(for example, a greater time lag between the event under study and the 
data analysis is necessary, and therefore it is to be expected that clearer 
signs of the social impact of the crisis will emerge in future studies). 
To a considerable extent, however, the small impact at EU-27 level is 
a consequence of high heterogeneity across European countries. While 
some countries were severely hit and men were slightly more hit than 
women in these countries, others even showed signs of improvement 
between 2009 and 2010. Increases in poverty rates between 2009 and 
2010 were especially worrying in Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta and Spain, for both men and women. 
A comparison of the at-risk-of-poverty rates before and after social 
transfers shows that a crucial contribution in mitigating the impact of 
the crisis has come from redistributive taxation and the welfare sta-
te. Without social transfers, the crisis would have produced relevant 
increases in poverty rates in a large number of countries, for both 
men and women. Redistribution also appears as relevant in reducing 
the gender gap in poverty rates. Since the crisis this effect has only 
marginally been mitigated by the fact that slightly more men fell in 
poverty before social transfers and were thus more frequently lifted 
out of poverty by social transfers (the contribution of the European 
164
Gender Differences in Income Poverty
social model to reducing poverty remains however greater for women 
even after the crisis).
In most European countries with few exceptions (Italy and Greece), 
different configurations of minimum income schemes are aimed at pre-
venting poverty and promoting social inclusion through the provision 
of means-tested non-contributory measures, mostly directed to hou-
seholds rather than to individuals under the assumption that incomes 
and other resources are equally shared within the household. Various 
schemes have been introduced as a response to the crisis, while alrea-
dy existing measures face pressure to meet an increasing demand and 
experience structural transformations due to the effect of the recession 
and resulting austerity policies. The scaling back of existing measures 
may negatively contribute to gender equality, given women’s higher po-
verty rates, while for the same reasons the introduction of new schemes 
in some countries is expected to exert a positive effect in terms of gen-
der equality. 
Guaranteed minimum income schemes are often accompanied by 
an integrated network of different categorical measures. Categorical 
measures consist of non-contributory cash and in-kind assistance for 
specified target group such as families, single parent, children, elderly 
and the disable. Family-related benefits and allowances supplement mi-
nimum income schemes by providing universal or contributory, means-
tested or irrespective of income cash payments and in-kind provision in 
case of maternity, paternity, parental leave, lone parents and widowho-
od. They are formally gender-neutral but in several cases they induce 
significant gendered effects, given the gender-specific division of care 
activities and gender differences in patterns of employment. Thus, the 
provision of childcare and other services, as highlighted above, seem to 
be preserved or even enlarged in several countries at the time of crisis, 
in view of the aim to boost the labour supply of mothers in particular. 
On the contrary, monetary transfers seem less efficient in reducing gen-
der inequality.
Few new consumption support measures were introduced during the 
recession, while an increasing pressure on existing programmes emer-
ged in several European countries. Specific gender-related interventions 
are not promoted, as consumption support measures rather concern 
the whole population (VAT differentiation), low-income households 
(programmes of food donation), local populations (price subsidy in pu-
blic transports), sometimes the elderly (compensation for heating) or 
children (meals at school for the poorest children).
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exClusion
Accumulated wealth or monetary income - that is, access to money 
to perform exchanges and transactions in the market- have an irre-
placeable role in determining men’s and women’s social inclusion in a 
capitalist society. However, many of the goods and services shaping the 
material needs of Europe’s citizens are not usually (or not exclusively) 
provided by the market. 
The public sector and household production constitute the two other 
pillars of Europe’s economy. In neither spheres of society money is the 
necessary or the sufficient enabler of consumption. Economic research 
has not yet found a solution to the issue of quantifying home produc-
tion and its value80 or the value of the production of public goods.81 
Most of these goods and services are not exchanged in the market, thus 
prices cannot be issued. Without prices, such activities are regarded as if 
they had no value – that is, they are either not accounted for (domestic 
productive activities) or their value is largely underestimated (in case of 
public production of goods and services). The issue is particularly rele-
vant in Europe due to the large roles domestic and public sectors have 
in the economy: in the EU-27, public sector expenditure alone (which 
as mentioned underestimates the overall public production) in 2010 
was comparable in size to the value of all goods and services exchanged 
in the market, amounting as a share of GDP to 50.3%. Thus, monetary 
income at the micro-level and the GDP itself at the macro-level are not 
sufficient to ponder all forms of production. On the supply side, there 
is a strong argument to move beyond men’s and women’s monetary in-
come to consider their overall capacity to obtain the goods and services 
necessary to their full social inclusion.
 Regarding the demand of the material needs required in our mo-
dern societies, it is not sufficient to take into consideration only the 
80  Cfr. Picchio A. (2003), Unpaid Work and the Economy, London: Routledge.
81  With respect to the public sector, estimates are available but they are known to 
underestimate the actual values since they are largely based on the value of the means 
of production (such as wages, etc.) and not on the value of the actual output, which is 
often impossible to estimate. See National Statistical Office (NSO) (2005), “Measure-
ment of Government Output and Productivity for the National Accounts”, Atkinson 
Review: Final Report.
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monetary income. Living arrangements, health conditions, educatio-
nal attainments, access to transportation, being or not the object of 
discrimination or social stigma, entitlement to certain claims or rights 
among other factors fundamentally shape men’s and women’s ability to 
enjoy a certain standard of life and a certain inclusion and participation 
in society’s activities. In this respect, the economist and philosophers 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum coined the term “capability” to 
express a person’s actual ability to do something they value and they 
have reason to value within their society.82 Income is a fundamental 
enabler of men’s and women’s capabilities, but it is not the only one.
Thus, due to both supply and demand reasons, a holistic approach 
beyond the sole consideration of income is necessary to provide a reali-
stic assessment of the standard of living of European men and women. 
In this chapter an attempt is made at analyzing the most critical factors 
to the fulfillment of men and women’s basic needs, their evolution since 
the onset of the economic crisis and the policies European countries are 
implementing to sustain social inclusion and fight poverty. 
In the academic literature, “deprivation” is the term used to denote 
the lack of certain minimum requirements in a given field such as hou-
sing, health, etc. “Multidimensional poverty” is the term usually used 
to denote a situation of deprivation in several fields or dimensions, the 
number of dimensions a person is deprived in playing a similar role to 
that played by poverty thresholds in traditional poverty measures (i.e. 
they denote different degrees of poverty).83 However, within the Europe 
2020 strategy “material deprivation” is a synonymous term for multi-
dimensional poverty  denoting a condition of lacking three or more de-
privation items among a predefined list of 9 items.84 Such definition of 
material deprivation – yet taking into consideration divergences across 
European countries - is likely to imply a hampered ability to fully con-
tribute to and to participate in society’s life and thus may imply social 
exclusion.  It is thus useful to retain such an integrated and holistic view 
when comparing gender differences in poverty, and so it will be done 
in the next section. 
Most European countries adopt focussed strategies to deal with spe-
cific dimensions of deprivation using a piecemeal approach. Therefore, 
when reviewing the policies adopted to cope with the social impact of 
the economic crisis from a gender perspective specific attention will 
be paid to those drivers of inclusion showing the highest gender im-
82  See for example Sen A.K. (1985), Commodities and Capabilities, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Nussbaum M. C. and Sen A.K. (eds.) (1993), The Quality of Life, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
83  For a review of poverty measures and the process of selection of the indicators 
considered within the Open Method of Coordination, see Bradshaw J. and Mayhew 
E. (2011), The measurement of extreme poverty in the European Union, Report for 
the European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion, January 2011.
84  These are: 1. inability to face unexpected expenses; 2. inability to pay for one 
week of holiday away from home per year; 3. being late or having arrears in debts 
repayments (including mortgage or rent, utility bills or to hire purchase instalments); 
4. inability to pay for a full meal with meat, chicken or fish every other day; 5. inabili-
ty to pay to keep the home adequately warm; 6. not having a washing machine; 7. not 
having a colour TV; 8. not having a telephone; 9. not having a car.
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balances85: educational and life-long learning, housing conditions and 
policies and healthcare and care activities (considering men and women 
both as recipients and as providers of such activities).  
Material deprivation and the crisis
The Laeken European Council of December 2001 endorsed a set 
of statistical indicators on social exclusion that are subject to a conti-
nuing process of refinement by the Indicators Sub-Group of the Social 
Protection Committee. As noted in Chapter 5, the overarching goal of 
reducing the number of Europeans at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
may conveniently be monitored through three such indicators: the at-
risk-of-poverty rate, the material deprivation rate and the share of peo-
ple living in a household with zero or low work intensity. After having 
analyzed income poverty in Chapter 5 and households’ labour market 
attachment in Chapters 3 and 4, the index of material deprivation will 
be considered here. 
The index of severe material deprivation within the Open Method of 
Coordination - defined as the enforced inability to pay for a number of 
items considered necessary to a decent and adequate life - is particularly 
useful for monitoring the progress of Member States in the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion. It consents retaining an overall view of 
the satisfaction of the material needs of European men and women, 
that is their overall access to the goods and services necessary to lead 
a decent life. On the one hand, moving beyond the sole consideration 
for monetary income is necessary to obtain a better grasp of the actual 
living situation of European men and women. On the other hand, the 
problem with the material deprivation rate is that there currently exists 
no shared theory or agreed upon methodology to consider household 
assets at the individual level. In other words, it is not yet possible to 
trace the enjoyment of the goods and services in possession of the hou-
sehold to the single members composing it. 
A crucial hindrance is that in the case of assets, durable goods and 
other resources that are jointly consumed or enjoyed of in the hou-
sehold, the existing sample surveys do not ask or report any informa-
tion on intra-household bargaining and/or on the sharing of common 
resources. Thus, in the impossibility to obtain individual-level data for 
these variables, a gender analysis of the current patterns incurs into the 
problems mentioned in Box 5.1:  it is bound to assume that individuals 
share equally the household’s resources  without being able to assess 
how far from reality this assumption is, especially when considering the 
traditional gender relations within the household.
85  See Corsi M. et al. (2010), Gender Mainstreaming Social Inclusion Policies, 
EGGSI report for the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs, and 
Equal Opportunities, Brussels.
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Figure 6.1. Intersections between the Europe 2020 indicators, by sex
Note: ARPR stands for at-risk-of-poverty rate; DEP stands for severe material de-
privation rate; LW stands for the share of people living in a household with zero or very 
low work intensity. Data on incomes (used to calculate the ARPR) refer to the previous 
year, data on employment and household assets (used to calculate the LW and DEP, 
respectively) refers to the same year of the survey.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
Before considering the index of material deprivation in detail, it is 
worthwhile to trace the development of its interrelations with the other 
two indexes composing the risk of poverty or social exclusion. As no-
ted in Chapter 5, the crisis slowed down the pace of reduction in the 
number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, both men and 
women. Indeed, between 2009 and 2010, the impact of the crisis on 
the share of population severely materially deprived and/or living in a 
household with zero or very low work intensity was relatively small at 
the EU-27 level. As it was the case for the income poverty measures, 
this finding may in part result from inadequacy of data and in part from 
a heterogeneous impact across European countries. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the share of population considered as at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion according to any of the three criteria 
grew from 21.9% to 22.3% for men, and from 24.3% to 24.5% for 
women. The population at risk of poverty or social exclusion according 
to the three criteria simultaneously grew from 1.4% to 1.6% for men, 
and from 1.3% to 1.5% for women. For women the 
Figure 6.1. Intersections between the Europe 2020 indicators, by sex
Women, 2009
Men Men Women Women
2009 2010 2009 2010
ARPR 9,3 9,2 10,5 10,2
ARPR & LW 2,5 2,7 2,7 3
ARPR & DEP 2,3 2,2 2,6 2,4
ARPR & DEP & LW 1,4 1,6 1,3 1,5
LW 2,3 2,5 2,8 3
DEP 3,7 3,6 3,9 3,9
DEP & LW 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5
Men, 2009
�
�
Women, 2010
Men, 2010
�
�
Men, 2009 Men, 2010
Women, 2009 Women, 2010
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Table 6.1. Evolution of the severe material deprivation rate, by sex
  Men Women 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium 6.5 6.2 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.7 6.5 6.7 6.2 6.0 5.5 6.0 
Bulgaria : 57.1 56.6 39.6 40.1 33.8 : 58.2 58.6 42.8  43.5 36.0
Czech Republic 10.8 9.4 7.0 6.3 5.8 5.8 12.7 9.9 7.7 7.3 6.5 6.5 
Denmark 3.1 2.8 2.9 1.5 2.2 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Germany 4.3 5.0 4.3 5.3 5.3 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.6 5.4 4.7 
Estonia 12.1 6.8 5.4 4.8 6.2 9.3 12.6 7.2 5.8 4.9  6.3 8.7 
Ireland 4.7 4.6 4.0 5.3 5.5 7.1 5.5 5.0 4.9 5.8 6.8 8.0 
Greece 11.8 11.0 10.6 10.1 10.2 10.9 13.8 11.9 12.3 12.2 11.7 12.2
Spain 3.3 3.4 2.9 2.6 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.5 3.4 4.1 
France 5.0 4.6 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.7 5.9 5.8 
Italy 6.3 5.9 6.4 7.2 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.6 7.2 7.8 7.3 7.1 
Cyprus 12.4 12.5 12.5 8.0 7.8 9.1 11.9 12.7 14.0 8.4  7.9 9.1 
Latvia 35.9 28.5 23.5 17.3 21.3 26.8 41.4 32.3 26.1 20.4  22.5 27.9
Lithuania 31.1 23.6 15.8 11.7 14.3 19.5 33.8 26.7 17.3 12.9  15.7 19.5
Luxembourg 2.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.7 
Hungary 22.6 20.8 19.6 17.3 20.2 21.5 23.1 21.0 20.1 18.4 20.4 21.6
Malta 5.1 3.5 3.8 3.8 4.5 5.6 5.8 3.9 4.5 4.2 4.9 5.8 
Netherlands 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.7 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 2.2 
Austria 2.8 3.8 3.1 6.0 4.4 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.5 6.7 5.1 4.6 
Poland 33.4 27.4 21.9 17.6 14.6 14.1 34.2 27.8 22.7 17.9  15.3 14.4
Portugal 8.9 8.7 9.2 9.5 8.9 9.2 9.7 9.4 9.9 9.9 9.2 8.8 
Romania : : 36.1 32.4 31.8 30.7 : : 36.9 33.4 32.6 31.2
Slovenia 4.9 5.1 4.9 6.4 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.1 5.3 6.9 6.3 6.3 
Slovakia 21.6 17.8 12.8 11.1 10.5 11.1 22.5 18.6 14.5 12.3 11.6 11.8
Finland 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.6 3.8 3.6 4.1 3.8 2.7 3.1 
Sweden 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 3.0 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.4 
United Kingdom 4.9 4.4 3.9 4.3 3.4 4.8 5.6 4.7 4.4 4.8 3.2 4.9 
EU-27 10.3  9.6  8.7 8.1 7.8 7.9 11.0 10.1 9.5 8.8 8.3  8.3 
Iceland 2.5 1.7 1.7 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.8 2.4 2.5 0.9  0.6 2.0 
Norway 3.5 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.2 3.5 3.1 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.9 
Note: the severe material deprivation rate is defined as the percentage of popula-
tion that cannot afford at least four of the following nine items: i) to pay their rent, 
mortgage or utility bills; ii) to keep their home adequately warm; iii) to face unexpected 
expenses; iv) to eat meat or proteins regularly; v) to go on holiday; vi) a television set; 
vii) a refrigerator; viii) a car; ix) a telephone. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
increase is exclusively due to the rise in the share of people living in 
a household with zero or low work intensity, while for men all indica-
tors grew - the latter exhibiting highest. Thus, the crisis contributed to 
a reduction in the gender gap in the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
again through a perverse effect, i.e. by worsening men’s position rather 
than improving women’s. In 2010, women remained at higher risk ac-
cording to any of the three criteria, while men remained at a slightly 
higher risk when the three criteria are considered conjointly.  
Considering the severe material deprivation rate, considerations si-
milar to the at-risk-of-poverty emerge (compare Table 6.1). First, wo-
men suffer from greater severe material deprivation in almost all years 
and all countries considered. Second, the crisis has slowed down the 
progress towards the reduction of material deprivation, with 2010 le-
vels higher than 2009 but still lower than the pre-crisis average and 
than 2005 levels. Third, the crisis has slightly reduced the gender gap, 
though by worsening men’s position rather than by improving women’s. 
Fourth, variations between 2009 and 2010 are on average small, but to 
some extent they hide substantial heterogeneity between countries. Ac-
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cordingly, while for both men and women a considerable worsening of 
the situation, with increases in the severe deprivation rate higher than 
2% took place in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and in Bulgaria the 
improvement was even higher than 5% for men and women.
These international differences overlap with a differentiated social 
impact of the crisis within individual countries. A differentiated impact 
in terms of poverty and deprivation may for example be seen by consi-
dering men and women of different educational attainment. 
As shown in Table 6.2, deprivation rates increased less or even de-
creased among people with higher educational attainments, the more so 
in new Member States. In the EU-15, severe material deprivation rates 
for both men and women were higher since the crisis than they were in 
the pre-crisis period (indeed, for women with pre-primary, primary or 
lower secondary education, this process of impoverishment had started 
already before the crisis hit Europe). On the contrary, in new member 
states the crisis has not stopped the overall process of improvement of 
both men’s and women’s situation.
Table 6.2. Evolution of the severe material deprivation rate, by educa-
tional attainment and sex
    Men Women 
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Pre-primary, primary 
and lower secondary 
ed. (levels 0-2) 
EU-27 13.4  12.7 12.5 11.5 11.3 11.7 13.7 13.1 13.0 12.1 11.7  11.8
EU-15 7.2 6.9 7.1 7.1 7.3 7.8 6.9 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.4  7.7 
NMS-12 48.7 46.8 43.7 37.9 36.1 36.1 45.8 43.3 40.7 35.1 33.8 32.4
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-
tertiary ed. (lev. 3-4)   
EU-27 10.5  9.4 8.3 7.6 7.2 7.2 10.7 9.4 8.8 7.9 7.3  7.5 
EU-15 3.5 3.4 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.0  4.3 
NMS-12 27.5 24.0 20.5 16.6 16.0 15.8 27.8 24.0 20.8 16.9 16.3 16.0
First and second 
stage of tertiary ed. 
(levels 5-6)  
EU-27 2.8  2.5 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.3 3.7 3.1 2.5 2.7  2.6 
EU-15 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.8  1.7 
NMS-12 8.9 7.7 6.3 4.7 4.8 4.2 12.6 10.3 9.2 6.6 6.7 6.6 
Note: the severe material deprivation rate is defined as the percentage of population 
that cannot afford at least four of the following nine items: i) to pay their rent, mortga-
ge or utility bills; ii) to keep their home adequately warm; iii) to face unexpected ex-
penses; iv) to eat meat or proteins regularly; v) to go on holiday; vi) a television set; vii) 
a refrigerator; viii) a car; ix) a telephone. NMS-12 denotes the 12 new Member States.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
As explained in Chapter V, a specific problem when considering 
household resources is that gender differences are only evident from 
the statistics for those households in which there is an odd number of 
men and women. As a consequence, population averages partly undere-
stimate the gender gap in poverty and deprivation. While for monetary 
income an attempt at individualization of resources is reported in Box 
5.1, this is hardly possible when considering household assets. Thus, 
there is a case for focusing on certain sub-populations in which single-
headed households are more common, such as in the case of migrants 
or the elderly. Moreover, some such sub-populations may exhibit speci-
fic vulnerability. As shown in Table 6.3 among single persons, the cate-
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gory of households in which gender differences are more easily captu-
red by the statistics, the crisis seem to have produced more pronounced 
gender-specific effects. 
Table 6.3. Evolution of the severe material deprivation rate among 
single persons, by sex
  Men Women 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium 12.8 11.2 12.0 9.3 10.5 12.6 11.1 10.5 11.1 10.1 9.2 9.5 
Bulgaria : 66.0 61.9 61.6 51.1 45.3 : 83.7 78.0 82.9 76.0 57.5
Czech Republic 18.1 14.5 12.3 11.4 9.6 9.3 18.2 13.6 11.1 11.2 11.1 9.0 
Denmark 6.8 5.5 5.6 3.7 4.1 5.7 4.4 5.6 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.9 
Germany 11.9 9.0 9.3 11.2 12.0 10.3 8.7 8.2 9.7 10.0 9.0 8.2 
Estonia 27.8 16.7 15.8 12.0 12.8 17.1 21.2 12.6 10.4 6.4  9.7 10.1
Ireland 7.9 10.6 8.6 13.0 12.9 14.9 4.6 4.0 2.8 6.0 5.9 6.0 
Greece 14.8 17.2 18.8 15.9 16.0 18.1 26.0 24.0 28.7 24.1 18.8 21.5
Spain 5.7 8.2 5.1 3.5 3.7 4.5 5.5 5.4 3.2 3.3 3.2 4.6 
France 11.4 9.0 8.9 6.6 9.1 10.9 8.0 7.8 8.3 7.8 8.5 8.4 
Italy 10.1 9.3 7.9 8.1 6.7 8.4 8.8 9.2 9.4 9.5 8.3 8.4 
Cyprus 15.1 15.1 18.3 16.8 9.8 11.9 17.9 18.7 25.8 13.8  12.7 11.9
Latvia 48.7 43.2 44.3 28.7 33.9 37.5 61.0 51.4 48.5 40.0  32.0 35.0
Lithuania 46.8 40.3 27.2 22.1 32.9 32.1 51.2 43.7 29.9 22.7  24.2 27.7
Luxembourg 5.9 4.4 2.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.5 2.0 1.5 2.6 3.2 
Hungary 24.9 30.2 24.8 25.8 24.4 25.5 26.5 25.8 23.6 22.3 22.6 22.8
Malta 9.6 6.1 5.5 8.3 8.7 8.8 9.0 6.8 5.8 8.2 8.8 7.9 
Netherlands 4.1 3.0 5.5 3.9 4.7 6.9 4.0 6.5 3.7 2.5 3.2 4.0 
Austria 5.6 7.4 6.3 9.8 8.1 5.6 5.1 4.3 5.4 9.9 7.1 7.6 
Poland 44.7 37.3 35.1 31.7 26.8 24.1 44.6 37.5 31.8 27.7  22.8 21.6
Portugal 14.8 19.1 18.3 18.6 14.7 21.5 22.3 22.0 18.6 15.6 15.5 16.2
Romania : : 47.9 42.3 39.3 39.4 : : 57.6 44.0 39.7 41.0
Slovenia 14.4 15.1 13.6 15.2 14.4 11.7 13.2 12.7 13.6 11.2 12.9 13.8
Slovakia 24.7 27.1 20.8 20.0 21.0 23.6 23.2 22.8 22.1 20.2 18.2 15.2
Finland 10.8 9.3 7.6 8.6 8.2 8.2 7.3 9.0 9.1 8.8 7.3 7.6 
Sweden 2.0 3.7 4.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.2 3.5 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.5 
United Kingdom 8.7 8.1 6.9 5.7 7.6 9.7 6.1 4.6 4.7 5.1 4.2  5.3 
EU-27 13.4  11.8  11.0 10.4 10.7 11.2 13.5  12.6 12.3 11.6 10.6  10.4
Iceland 6.5 3.4 1.9 2.9 4.3 3.6 4.2 3.8 5.3 2.1 1.7 3.5 
Norway 8.2 6.4 5.2 5.9 6.6 5.1 4.4 7.4 4.9 3.5 3.3 3.4 
Note: the severe material deprivation rate is defined as the percentage of popula-
tion that cannot afford at least four of the following nine items: i) to pay their rent, 
mortgage or utility bills; ii) to keep their home adequately warm; iii) to face unexpected 
expenses; iv) to eat meat or proteins regularly; v) to go on holiday; vi) a television set; 
vii) a refrigerator; viii) a car; ix) a telephone. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data.
At the EU-27 level, in the pre-crisis period single women suffered a 
higher severe material deprivation than single men. However, in 2009 
and 2010 the gender gap turned negative, i.e. men’s position was worse 
than women’s, due to the sensible increase in single men’s severe ma-
terial deprivation in a number of countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and the 
United Kingdom). As already noted, the reduction of the EU-27 avera-
ge gender gap is a phenomenon partly driven by the specific dynamics 
in the new Member States: for example in Bulgaria between 2009 and 
2010 men’s severe material deprivation rate decreased by 5.8%, while 
women’s by 18.5%.       
In light of such pronounced heterogeneity in the social impact of the 
crisis among and within countries, it appears that the strategy followed 
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by the majority of the European countries to cope with the most severe 
forms of deprivation through target categorical schemes may be the 
most appropriate in a time of very strong budgetary pressures on public 
expenditure. This point will be further discussed and analysed in the 
next sections.
Education, life-long learning and training 
The Europe 2020 strategy indicates three key priorities for sustaina-
ble growth and job creation: knowledge and innovation, green growth 
and an inclusive high-employment society. These pillars aim at building 
a competitive and sustainable economy through raising employment ra-
tes, combating the risk of poverty, promoting active ageing and raising 
skills. Concerning the latter point, a previous report from the EGGSI 
network86 already highlighted that on average women are catching 
up with men’s higher educational attainments due to young women’s 
high enrolment rates at higher education institutions. However, there 
is still a gender disparity in terms of what kind of education men and 
women receive. Vocational enrolment is also largely gender segrega-
ted, and women are less likely than men to participate in vocational 
training, especially when it includes technical, mechanical or scientific 
disciplines.87 Moreover, even when choosing vocational training young 
women are concentrated in specific apprentices in the service sector: a 
study focussing on Austria, for example, found that 50% of all female 
apprentices chose retail saleswoman, hairdresser or office clerk as a 
profession to learn, while eight out of ten young men decided to learn 
a profession in the production sector having a very small percentage of 
female apprentices.88
In the face of this imbalance, some Member States have begun to 
take action in encouraging the take up of unconventional jobs and the 
rejection of traditional gender roles. 
Most Member States opted for a policy strategy to cope with the 
crisis and for social inclusion with a strong labour market link. In this 
context training and education are fundamental in order to increase 
men’s and women’s chances to find employment. For example, increa-
sing the number of educational places is one of the ways that selected 
countries (Sweden and Norway) have chosen to tackle the economic 
downturn. Many of the measures scheduled to develop these goals are 
86  Corsi M. et al. (2009), Gender Mainstreaming Active Inclusion Policy, EGGSI 
report for the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal 
Opportunities, Brussels. Available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docI
d=6335&langId=en
87  See Corsi M. et al. (2010), Gender Mainstreaming Social Inclusion Policies, 
EGGSI report for the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs, and 
Equal Opportunities, Brussels.
88  Mairhuber I. and Papouschek U. (2010a), “Frauenerwerbsarbeit in Österreich. 
Brüche und Kontinuitäten einer begrenzten Integration seit Mitte der 90er Jahre”, 
Frauenbericht 2010, Wien. Available at: http://www.bka.gv.at/studien/frauenberi-
cht2010/Frauenbericht_Teil2_2Forba.pdf
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targeted to women (Portugal and Cyprus). 
However, other European countries have reduced the number or va-
lue of monetary allowances related to education in the wake of general 
public balance retrenchments (United Kingdom).
Box 6.1 - Adult vocational training and education in 
the face of the crisis
In Cyprus, women were a majority of the participants in several 
ESF co-funded Lifelong Learning (LLL) projects, reaching 86.3% of 
the participants in the “scheme for the promotion of training and 
employability of the unemployed” and 82.7% of the participants 
in the “scheme for the enhancement of computer literacy of the 
unemployed”.
In Liechtenstein, a set of measures has targeted career guidance 
and vocational orientation of girls and young women and of boys 
and young men. The aim was to inform girls and young women of 
the importance of a sound foundation of training and professional 
development, to broaden the scope of their career choices, to en-
courage both girls and boys to question traditional gender roles and 
to raise parents’ and teachers’ awareness of the concept of equal 
opportunity in career choices.
In Portugal, the Social Insertion Income scheme aimed at the 
involvement of 80,000 beneficiaries in programmes of training or 
qualification until 2010.
In Sweden, between 2009 and 2011 the Government carried 
out temporary measures to finance more places in adult education, 
adult vocational training, vocational colleges and universities and 
colleges. Since 1 January 2010, temporary additional resources have 
been allocated to municipal adult education (Komvux) with the aim 
to create 1,750 new places between 2011 and 2013 for unemployed 
young people aged 20-24 who lack a complete compulsory or up-
per secondary school-leaving certificate. Moreover, since 2009 it is 
possible for the municipalities, to increase the number of students 
in Yrkesvux (adult upper secondary education with a vocational 
orientation) through a targeted grant from the central government,. 
Its primary aim is to provide the unemployed with an opportuni-
ty to receive training, but also to prevent shortages of skilled la-
bour. According to national evaluations, a majority of participants 
(70%) had already found employment when the training ended or 
within a month, but there are indicators that a smaller share of men 
found employment when the programme ended and however that 
it took a longer time for men to start working. An explanation for 
this difference might be that men and women usually study diffe-
rent subjects, and that in a period of crisis there is a lower labour 
demand for workers who have studied such topics as technology, 
manufacturing and ICT, i.e. areas where the share of men is much 
higher than that of women.
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In the United Kingdom for students of school age the Education 
Maintenance Allowance was a benefit intended to support children 
in low-income families to stay on in education aged 16-18. This was 
scrapped in 2010 to be replaced by a less generous annual bursary 
for people in care, care leavers, people claiming income support and 
disabled young people who receive Employment Support Allowan-
ce and Disability Living Allowance.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Focus on children and young people
Early education and childcare are important for two reasons: for the 
parents to reconcile work and family life, and for the children to foster 
their educational opportunities. Indeed, childcare and access to quality 
education improve children’s chances of participation in society, espe-
cially for children from educationally or resource-poor families, and for 
children from foreign families education enables them to learn the na-
tional language. Thus, in a time of crisis it is fundamental that sudden 
and temporary financial difficulties do not produce long-term harm: if 
costs savings were to imply a reduction in the provision of education 
and training, there would be a risk of producing a structurally lower 
level of human capital accumulation. 
In a number of European countries (Finland, Malta, and FYROM) 
specific measures are targeted to the most disadvantaged groups of po-
pulation, such as migrants, women, young people who have not com-
pleted upper secondary school, and those at highest risk of poverty. 
These policy measures will to some extent target men more than 
women: as mentioned, social exclusion in the education field  (such 
as dropping out of school) is more common among young men than 
women. However, activation of unemployed young people may also 
become a tool for decreasing gender segregation in the labour market, 
as unemployed young women may be encouraged to find employment 
also in traditionally male areas of the private sector due to budget cuts 
in the female-dominated public sector. 
Box 6.2 – Early education and childcare: children’s 
development and parents’ inclusion 
In Belgium, the National Office for Childhood (ONE) in colla-
boration with GABS (“Groupe d’animation de la Basse-Sambre”, 
animation group of the Basse-Sambre Region), recently organised 
“Baby bus”, a service of travelling nursery targeted to parents in 
precarious situations, with priority to non-working mothers in par-
ticular. 
The service is organised as follows: two certified educators head 
every day to a different village each. They carry in the van baby 
equipment and animation and transport it to a room made availa-
ble by the municipality and approved by the ONE. These venues are 
175
Gender Differences in Social Exclusion
fixed so that parents know when they can get that support nearby 
their place of living.
 Every day, various activities are proposed for socialisation, psy-
chomotor skills and creativity d. The temporary crèche is also ac-
cessible to disabled children. Other social activities are also offered 
by the GABS to support the development of children and socio-
cultural activities for parents. The aim of the service is to support 
parenthood and offer to children from 0 to 3 years of age oppor-
tunities to get activities with professional educators and play with 
other kids in a safe and socially mixed environment. The price for 
the service is ř4.5 for half a day and ř7.5 for the whole day, inclu-
ding lunch. The baby bus is open to all parents who wish to have a 
few hours to complete administrative procedures, go to the doctor, 
responding to a job or just take a break. 
In Finland, according to a new government programme called 
“Youth Guarantee 2013”, everyone under 25 and every graduate 
under 30 will be either offered a job, a trainee position, a place in 
education, or a place in a youth workshop or rehabilitation within 
three months from the beginning of unemployment. 
In Germany the government launched an “education package 
for children and young people from low-income families” starting 
1 January 2011 with a projected investment of ř1.6 billion betwe-
en 2011 and 2013. The overall aim of the education package is to 
support education and social participation of children and young 
people by providing them monetary subsidies for school materials, 
for sport, cultural or leisure activities, subsidies for a hot meal in 
the school canteen, the nursery or other childcare institutions, re-
funding to families the costs for day school or nursery excursions as 
well as of learning support for pupils in accordance with the local 
rates, and the costs for school transport. While being gender-neu-
tral, the package raised public attention to poverty among children 
and aims at breaking the vicious circle of child poverty, educational 
poverty and social exclusion, which very often leads to further di-
sadvantages in the life course.
In Ireland the Free pre-school year in Early Childhood Care and 
Education Programme  (ECCE) was introduced from 1 January 
2010 to replace an Early Childcare Supplement. Approximately 95 
% of childcare and pre-school services participate in the program-
me, bringing participation rate in State funded pre-school in the 
year before Junior Infants to  97 %. There is strong demand that 
this be extended to a second year.
In FYROM, in the framework of the National Strategy for Deve-
lopment of Education 2005-2015, compulsory secondary education 
has been introduced, along with cash transfers conditional on se-
condary school attendance and fines for the parents who would not 
enrol their children to secondary school. Moreover, the Government 
provides free textbooks to the pupils in primary and secondary edu-
cation, as well as free bus tickets to high-school students.
Source: EGGSI national reports.
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Education and training for migrants
In the face of the economic crisis, those exhibiting a looser attach-
ment to the labour market may incur higher risks of poverty and social 
exclusion. Among them, migrants are a group at particularly high risk 
of social exclusion. To sustain migrants’ integration even in a time of 
crisis, European countries often focus on inclusion in the labour mar-
ket, frequently including counselling and orientation services especially 
for newly arrived migrants. 
Education and training are two fields of particular relevance to lift 
up migrants from the risk of social exclusion often due to a lack of wor-
king knowledge of the national language in the host country. However, 
migrants may suffer from lower inclusion also in these activities and 
are accordingly target beneficiaries of integrated services devoted to 
individuals with no permanent ties to the labour market and dependent 
upon the provision of social benefits. As shown in Box 6.3, Europe-
an countries launched several gender-specific education and training 
programmes, showing a substantial awareness of the role of gender 
inequality in the process of migrants’ integration.
Box 6.3 – Migrants integration in the face of the crisis: 
the role of education and training
In Austria the programme Perspektive, organised by the Counsel-
ling Centre for migrants and supported by the City of Vienna, offers 
vocational counselling and counselling for further education and 
training for newly arrived migrants and asylum seekers living in 
Vienna. The counselling includes the assessment of academic and 
professional qualifications, the comparison of learned profession 
with the requirements in Austria, elaboration of similar occupatio-
nal areas, clarification of professional opportunities, information 
on the recognition of your qualifications in Austria as well as search 
for career-oriented courses or training and clarification of possibili-
ties of support for planned further education and training.
In Cyprus, labour market related training for migrants often in-
clude teaching of the national language(s).
In Denmark, the project “Mit liv – mit valg” (My life – my choi-
ce), carried out by an NGO and the local municipality of Roskilde, 
targets migrant and refuge women. The project aims at focusing 
on the resources of these women in order for them to gain a higher 
quality of life and the courage to take up work or enter into edu-
cation. The project involves: group and individual consultations; 
teaching and discussion sessions; excursions in order to gain an un-
derstanding of the Danish society, including the labour market and 
civil society; physical activities; activities focusing on family roles; 
concluding event organized by the participants. Activities are vari-
ed and include teaching, physical training and excursions since it 
is aimed to first establish trust and confidence in the group before 
more personal issues such as illness or family life can be discussed. 
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The project appears to having been popular among women in the 
target group, as they have since then participated in other municipal 
projects and events and have established their own multicultural 
association.
In Liechtenstein it was recently found that young foreigners 
have more difficulties in finding apprenticeships than young Lie-
chtenstein citizens, especially if they lack German language skills, 
exhibit insufficient scholastic performance, or lack a social net-
work, among other factors. To solve this issue, a scheme targeted 
to young persons with a foreign mother tongue was created, called 
“Vorlehrjahr” (pre-apprenticeship), whereby learning of the Ger-
man language within vocational training is especially emphasised. 
The goals of the course are a rapid acquisition of the German lan-
guage, the closure of gaps in general education, and assistance in 
integrating into society and the workforce. Furthermore, to speed 
up integration of adults into their communities, cooperation with 
the business community, associations for foreign nationals and local 
institutions are being studied to promote linguistic competences at 
work and to further social contacts.
In Norway a specific initiative called “Second Chance” targets 
individuals who have resided in Norway for several years with no 
permanent inclusion in the labour market and dependent on social 
benefits. The main focus of the programme is to emphasise language 
skills for immigrants in order to increase their labour market parti-
cipation. However, the “Plan of action” also focuses on increasing 
the number of immigrant children in child-care and pre-school pro-
grammes, so that these children learn to speak Norwegian before 
starting school. Thus, although the measures in the Plan are gender 
blind, some of the measures, such as free childcare, will indirectly 
enhance the position of non-Western immigrant women. Many of 
the programmes within the Second Chance initiative focus entirely 
on women. According to the Directorate of Integration and Diver-
sity, the main reason to continue the Second Chance programme in 
2009 was to decrease the negative impact of the economic crisis on 
immigrants. Results from the programme in 2009 show that 42% 
of those who participated in the programme went to education or 
work, while only 32% did not finish the programme.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Housing conditions and living arrangements since the 
beginning of the crisis
 The economic crisis is exerting a substantial impact on the housing 
and mortgage markets of several European countries.89 
89  Cfr. Montanaro E. and Tonveronachi M. (2011), “A critical assessment of the 
European approach to financial reforms”, PSL Quarterly Review, vol. 64 n. 258, 
pp. 193-226; D’Ippoliti C. and Roncaglia A. (2011), “L’Italia: una crisi nella crisi”, 
Moneta e Credito, vol. 64 n. 255, pp. 189-227.
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In a number of countries there is already evidence of increases in 
housing debts, payment default risks and forced evictions. In some 
European countries access to housing has become a difficult obstacle 
to overcome for several groups of the population (Belgium, Iceland, 
Ireland or Spain). For example, in Iceland it is found that since the 
crisis the cost of housing is most badly absorbed by the lowest income 
group, and single parents stand out as the group hardest hit by the 
impact of the financial crisis. In 2010 91.4% of all single parents were 
women. Similarly, a gender-differentiated analysis of the distribution of 
mortgage or rent arrears in Ireland shows female-headed households as 
2.6 times more likely to be in housing-related arrears.90 A recent study 
analysed over-indebtedness in Irish households showing a strong con-
nection between low income, poverty and over-indebtedness: the result 
suggests that income inadequacy, rather than high levels of personal 
consumption or over-borrowing, is a key factor in over-indebtedness. 
In 2009 over one quarter of the population was in arrears with at least 
one bill or loan (significantly up from 10.8% in 2008) and over one 
third of households at-risk of poverty were in arrears (compared to 
20% in 2008). 
The countries that face a high risk of a housing crisis are implemen-
ting crisis response measures mostly based on housing debt manage-
ment schemes in order to help people to cope with over-indebtedness 
(Belgium, Iceland, and Spain)91. While most of the measures are gene-
rally gender blind, though they indirectly favour women due to their 
higher vulnerability, eviction rules explicitly consider some gender 
aspects in Poland.
In general, in the other European countries, where a housing crisis 
is not a concrete and immediate risk, still the process of banking sector 
deleveraging (i.e. the reduction of banks’ assets, including credit to firms 
and households) implies evermore tightening conditions and increased 
costs for families to obtain a mortgage. This process in turns implies 
a tightening of the overall housing market conditions, narrowing the 
rental market as well, and constraining the access to decent housing 
for the most vulnerable and those most at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion. Thus, housing is one of the dimensions in which the crisis 
may be expected to produce the highest social costs also in the Europe-
an countries in which no housing-related financial turmoil is in place. 
Housing loans default and persistent arrears have been a major con-
cern during the recession. Subsidized housing loan in the form of lowe-
red interest rates, partial or total payment of monthly instalments, and 
relaxed term have been adopted, though without a gender perspective 
(FYROM, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, and the Slovak Re-
public).
In these countries, other housing policies to cope with the conse-
quences of the crisis may be divided into two strands:  monetary sub-
sidies to families (dealt with in the next section) and direct provision 
90  Russell H and McGinnity F. (2011), The Impact of Recession on Work Pressure: 
The Case of Ireland, Paper prepared for the 2011 Spring Meeting of the ISA RC28 
University of Essex, UK 13th-16th April 2011.
91  See also Social Protection Commitee (2009).
179
Gender Differences in Social Exclusion
of facilities (analysed in section 6.3.2). These measures are in general 
gender blind, as shown below, though they may be expected to bene-
fit proportionally more those most vulnerable and at risk of poverty, 
among which women are over-represented. For women the effects of 
the crisis overlap with a pre-existing situation in which they are often 
the victims of stereotypes and discrimination in both house purcha-
sing and renting, due to their limited financial resources and because 
single women and single-adult headed families with children (mostly 
women) are regarded as riskier renters or unreliable subjects in terms 
of repayment and breaking off the lease due to family resettling.92 Thus, 
housing policies may be expected to provide a crucial contribution to 
gender equality in the future. This is the case for example of the home-
less, to which a specific focus is devoted in section 6.3.2.
Box 6.4 – Housing crisis response measures in a gen-
der perspective
In Belgium, a law organises a system of collective debts settle-
ment (judiciary proceedings comparable to bankruptcy but for in-
dividuals) and there was also mediation debts supporting structures 
including services within CPAS/OCMW. In late 2009, the Central 
Credit Register data recorded 78,145 people involved in a procedu-
re of collective debt settlement (0.91% of the Belgian adult popula-
tion). The law reserves this procedure for people who are no longer 
able to cope with their debts in a sustainable manner. In addition, in 
the Regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, debt mediation ser-
vices offer non-judiciary mediation for people who are not eligible 
for collective debt settlement or not willing to use it. Files of debt 
mediation still concern mostly single adults living alone (41%) or 
with one or more children (24%), men dominate the group of iso-
lated (61%) and women are the large majority in the single-parent 
household category (79%). 
In Iceland, the government set up a new agency in August 2010 
built on a public agency that previously provided advice on hou-
sehold finances. The new public agency was the Debtors’ Om-
budsman.15 The Debtors’ Ombudsman represents the interests of 
debtors and offers them support if applicable. The Debtors’ Om-
budsman offers free assistance to individuals who have serious dif-
ficulties meeting their financial obligations in order to find a balance 
between financial capacities and financial obligations. The agency 
provides and covers the costs of an interpreter for non-Icelandic 
speaking debtors. On delivery of all documents to the Debtors’ Om-
budsman, the client’s financial situation is reviewed. Counseling in-
cludes matching financial capabilities and financial obligations and 
92  See Wuiame N. (2011), The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of 
Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies, National Report Belgium, Exter-
nal report commissioned by and presented to the European Commission Directorate-
General Justice, unit D1 “Equality between men and women”.
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looking for ways to balance the two. Solutions can imply further 
counseling, mediation in negotiation with creditors, assistance in 
applying for grace periods for loans or payment mitigation. From 
August 2010 to end of May 2011 the agency received 2582 appli-
cations on payments mitigations of which 764 applications have 
been accepted, 72 rejected and 80 applications were withdrawn. 
Still some 200 applications are being sent in to the Debtors’ Om-
budsman every month.16 
In Ireland, housing supports in the form of a mortgage interest 
subsidy are available to low-income and unemployed households, 
and it is found that the numbers in receipt of such housing supple-
ments have grown significantly during the recession.
In Italy, in 2010 a solidarity fund was established, aimed at re-
lieving the poorest families who own a house from housing costs 
overburden. The fund was created to support families who due to 
the economic crisis find themselves unable to pay back one or more 
instalments of their first home mortgage. To be eligible, families 
must have a low monetary income and must have recently incurred 
negative events such as: job loss followed by at least three months 
without finding a new job; death or loss of income of one of the 
household members who contributed for at least 30% to the to-
tal income of the family; payment of relevant certified medical ex-
penses or home long-term care; extraordinary house maintenance 
costs; large and unexpected increases in the mortgage instalments 
due to changes in the interest rate. The fund allows applicant fami-
lies to suspend the repayment of their mortgage for a maximum of 
two times and during an overall period not exceeding 18 months. 
In Poland, pregnant women (and some other categories, such as 
children or the seriously ill) if evicted have to be supplied with so-
cial housing.17 This possibly makes fewer women than men evicted 
but exact figures by gender are not available. Recently, the situation 
has worsened. In 2007 17,000 eviction cases were debated in the 
courtroom (4.7 thousand evictions were executed), 90% of them 
as a result of the non-payment of housing bills. In 2009, the num-
ber of eviction cases reached 24,000 and their execution reached 
5.4 thousand.18 Low-Cost Housing Companies (TBS) provide some 
advantageous credit rules for purchasing flats. During the crisis, 
home loan subsidies for laid-off individuals were additionally im-
plemented as an emergency measure. A measure that proved to be 
effective is the “Family on its own” scheme. Launched in 2006, it 
targets households of a given status (no own house, families with 
children are preferred), providing state support for interest re-
payments, under strict limits of price and floor area.19 In 2009, the 
number of subsidized loans reached 30.8 thousand or one fifth of 
the total. Moreover, while the overall number of housing loans de-
clined abruptly (by over 30%), “Family on its own” expanded by 
more than four times in terms of individuals supported and more 
than six times in times in terms of money value of loans. In 2010, 
this expansion continued.
In the Slovak Republic, a programme of assistance for people 
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unable to repay housing loans following job loss during the crisis 
came into force in October 2009. According to strict criteria (e.g., 
the amount of the loan, sources of finance and property evalua-
tion, and adjustment of interest payments according to the bank), 
repayment can be delayed or taken over by the state, which later 
enforces it to the beneficiary. Although the number of loan defaults 
and households unable to repay loans increased during 2009, Slo-
vak banks addressed clients’ insolvency in a standard way, without 
any bailouts from the state.20 However, six thousand people could 
have taken advantage of the programme.21 Young people can also 
access state supported mortgages or loans of ř 10,000 if they are 35 
years old and below, and with an average monthly income lower 
than ř970 (ř 1,900 if living with a partner). The loan is supported by 
an interest rate reduction of three percentage points, while the bank 
is obliged to subsidise half of the reduction. This reduction is valid 
only for the first five years of the loan cycle.22
In Spain, the National Housing and Rehabilitation Plan (2009-
2012) provides a wide range of monetary support to buy and rent. 
Specific support on renting is remarkable, especially for young pe-
ople (40% of the annual rent with a maximum of ř3,200). Moreo-
ver, a benefit emancipation income (rent benefits for young people) 
has been established for young people between 22 and 30 (ř210 
monthly during four years). Recently, the Spanish government an-
nounced that the non-attachable income has increased from ř641 
to ř950 in case of mortgage debts (30% more when the adult has 
a dependent child). However, the acceptance in lieu system (which 
establishes that the mortgage debt can be remitted by the delivery of 
the house to the financial institution) has not even been contempla-
ted and an agreement to change the Mortgages Act by public policy 
makers is far from being achieved.
In FYROM, the project “Half-instalment for the first five years” 
is the project subsidizing half of the monthly instalment for the hou-
sing loan for persons without homes and place for living.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Cash benefits to support decent housing
Housing benefits are intended to support low-income individuals or 
public assistance recipients with the costs of construction and improve-
ment of housing conditions, rental payments, loan instalments through 
the provision of rental benefits, subsidized loan terms, or lump sum 
contributions. Most of these support measures are means-tested and 
none of them considers gender. They are either designed for households 
or they are completely gender blind. 
In few countries, a contraction in housing benefits emerged due to 
the financial crisis and the resulting fiscal consolidation measures (Por-
tugal, Hungary, and Czech Republic).
Housing support measures seem to play a more important role for 
the most vulnerable individuals in countries where the housing mar-
ket is ownership-oriented and accordingly social housing may not be 
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well developed. In Norway, 90% of the population owns its house. 
The same trend also applies to Slovenia and Hungary. From a gender 
perspective housing support measures are particularly important for 
groups of women such as single mothers, who due to a lower income in 
many cases have difficulties to buy a home of their own.
Box 6.5 – Housing benefits for the improvement of hou-
sing conditions
In Austria, rent assistance is provided to social assistant reci-
pients as well as a person-related subsidy for housing, which is only 
paid to persons with Austrian nationality, EU-members and to fo-
reigners with a legal stay in Austria for more than five years. The 
amount of this subsidy (“Wohnbeihilfe”) depends on the rent per 
month, the income per month, the number of the people living in 
the household and the size of the flat. All provinces provide finan-
cial resources under the housing subsidy scheme in order to give 
households access to high-quality and affordable housing, to pre-
vent homelessness and to achieve a social mix in residential areas.
In Italy, several special allowances related to housing costs (e.g. 
electricity and gas, water rates, municipal taxes for the collection of 
solid waste, etc.) were increased or newly introduced as a response 
to the crisis. These allowances are managed by municipalities, in 
charge of social services in the country, and they are targeted to the 
most vulnerable groups of the population.
The rental housing market in the Netherlands is highly subsidi-
zed. People with low incomes are entitled to a housing allowance 
for renting a house. The amount of this allowance depends on the 
personal situation. However, the maximum rent for entitlement to 
housing allowances at this moment is approximately ř650. 
In Norway, additional support for the construction of rent hou-
ses to marginalized groups (e.g. homeless or drug addicts) is provi-
ded to house-builders. The new housing support system launched in 
July 2009 covered 40-50,000 new recipient households.
In Slovenia, the Housing Fund of the Republic of Slovenia pro-
vides means-tested subsidies for renting in the profit housing sector 
since 2008 in order to expand the right to subsidies for renting 
apartments previously restricted to non-profit dwellings. 
In Liechtenstein, payments for subsistence rental costs are pro-
vided. The amount of the rental subsidy varied in 2011 from a ma-
ximum of CHF 1,279 (€ 1,048) monthly in the case of a household 
income of CHF 30,000 (€ 24,233) per year and 6 persons living in 
the household to CHF 213 (€ 172) monthly in the case of a hou-
sehold income of CHF 75,000 (€ 60,582) per year and 6 persons 
living in the household.  In Liechtenstein, 14% of all households 
with children paying rent receive rental subsidies.
The aim of the Rent Benefit Act in Iceland is to bring down the 
cost of accommodation for lower-income tenants and reduce ine-
183
Gender Differences in Social Exclusion
quality on the rented property market. The local authorities admi-
nister the rent benefit system, which is financed by them and the 
Local Authorities’ Equalisation Fund. Rent benefit entitlements are 
calculated on the basis of rent, income, net assets and the number 
of dependent children. All those who rent residential premises and 
live in them are entitled to rent benefit. Foreign nationals who are 
resident in Iceland have the same entitlement to rent benefit as Ice-
landic citizens. Tenants living in premises that they rent from the 
local authorities themselves also have the right to receive rent bene-
fit. The total amount disbursed in the form of ordinary rent bene-
fit remained fairly stable in the period 2005–2007; total payments 
then rose by 37% and by 47%, respectively, in 2008 and 2009. 
There was a 30% increase in the number of recipients between the 
first nine months of 2008 and the same period for 2009. So in this 
case existing policy programmes respond to an escalating need for 
income support to cover cost of rented housing by an increase in 
the take up rate.
Low-income and unemployed household can access rental sup-
plements in Ireland. The supplements were administered to 97,260 
recipients in 2010, up from 59,726 in 2007. Rent supplement has 
been subject to cuts in two budgets and is considered under threat 
of further cuts. Even with cuts the expenditure continues to grow 
with rent allowance for example increasing by 10.9% from € 725 
to € 804 mio. over 2009 to 2010.
In Portugal, deduction of housing loans, rents and interest paid 
were cut in the context of the implementation of the economic po-
licy conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Central Bank and the European Commission, and 
the municipal tax on house owner’s exemption will be progressi-
vely removed. Moreover, the exemption from the payment of IMI 
(municipal tax on house owners) will be shortened and removed 
progressively.
In the United Kingdom, people on low incomes may be entitled 
to housing benefit and council tax benefit to help with the costs of 
housing. The majority of housing benefit claimants is composed of 
women.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Social housing and the fight to homelessness
An inadequate or lacking social housing stock creates the conditions 
to hinder the access to decent housing for the poorest people and to 
boost evictions of those who have lost their jobs.
Social housing demand grew faster than the increasing availability 
of housing places during the economic crisis according to recent eviden-
ce (EGGSI National reports on Belgium, Ireland and Poland). 
The lack of affordable housing is one of the main causes of ho-
melessness. Most recent data show how this phenomenon has worse-
ned during the recession. Recent surveys in Belgium reveal that home-
lessness involves to an increasing extent young people, families with 
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children as well as women. In Ireland, homeless people increased from 
2,700 to 5,000 nationwide. According to the statistics of the Housing 
Finance and Development Centre, there were 8,150 homeless persons 
in Finland in 2009. Approximately one-third of all homeless people 
in are estimated to be long-term homeless. In Austria, according to 
the estimates of the umbrella organisation of housing organisations in 
2006 around 15,000 people have been supported by institutions pre-
venting eviction, around 13,500 persons have been searching for am-
bulatory support and around 8.500 persons have been living in shelters 
for the homeless. 
A gender perspective on homeless estimates is available for Austria 
and Ireland. In Austria, it is estimated that women are in the same 
extent affected by homelessness or endangered of becoming homeless; 
however the percentage of women in institutions for the homeless is 
just between 20 and 30% of all clients. Women are often “invisibly” 
homeless, i.e. they react by seeking temporary solutions by living with 
family, friends, “convenience partners” or casual acquaintances. This 
is in part influenced by specific female behaviour patterns, but could 
also be due to a lack of women-specific offers in this area. In Ireland, 
the Homeless Agency Dublin reported that in 2008 men in homeless 
services outnumbered women by a ratio of over 2 to 1. However, in the 
youngest age cohorts (18-25), women in homeless services outnumbe-
red men in absolute terms. In addition, the proportion of women aged 
18-34 who are in homeless services is higher than the proportion of 
men.
The effects of restrictive budgetary policies on support measures 
against homeless clearly emerged in France where budgetary cuts on 
emergency housing for the homeless decided by the French Government 
in May 2009 lead to drastic consequences. On June 2011, the Social 
emergency association (Samu social) has decided to close its unique 
emergency housing centre for women in Paris for lack of resources. 
 
Box 6.6 - Social housing and support to the homeless
The housing policy in Austria is essentially characterized by 
the tradition of social housing construction. The system of social 
housing funds is however very complex and not transparent. Each 
province has different frameworks of subsidies depending on the 
state of the accommodation. In some provinces public housing is 
provided to low-income households at relatively low costs. Vienna 
hosts about 220,000 communal flats (one fifth of all flats), and is 
the European largest public housing owner. The social eligibility 
criteria of access to communal flats are low household incomes as 
well as an officially acknowledged need for housing. Since 2006 
third-country nationals holding “long-term residence permits” or 
with “consolidated residence status” may also apply for communal 
flats. Only in Vienna and Linz a quota of social housing is reserved 
to homeless and socially disadvantaged persons.
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In 2008, the Government of Finland approved a programme to 
reduce long-term homelessness during the period 2008–2011. The 
objective of the programme is to halve long-term homelessness by 
2011 and to intensify measures to prevent homelessness through 
the support for the construction, acquisition and basic renovation 
of housing. For housing projects intended for the long-term home-
less, the subsidy may cover up to 50 per cent of the project’s appro-
ved costs. The programme has created 1,250 new homes or support 
apartments for long-term homeless people, and 205 new employees 
have been hired to support services for the homeless.
In Malta, in order to promote quality of life and affordability 
of housing has been promoted a gender-neutral project for urban 
regeneration. The objective of urban regeneration project is to buy 
existing and older housing, preferably in urban core areas, which 
can be redeveloped and eventually allocated under shared owner-
ship, sheltered housing or social housing for rent. 
In the Slovak Republic, the Social Theatre project intends to in-
form citizens in regions with high unemployment about the cau-
ses of homelessness and its risks in the form of social theatre. The 
project created an attractive platform (theatre) to meet homeless 
people and people who are under the threat of becoming homeless. 
It informed the public about the life of homeless people and peo-
ple with physical disabilities, actively integrated the homeless and 
physically disabled into life, served as a means of prevention and 
increased the social status of the homeless and physically disabled 
that took part in the project.
In Slovenia, subsidised renting is provided through non-profit 
dwellings to identified priority groups and particularly to vulnera-
ble groups of women. 
In FYROM, the construction of 37 social buildings for social-
ly vulnerable groups23 and apartments for young people are plan-
ned by 2012 according to the National Strategy on alleviating po-
verty and social exclusion 2010-2020. Women single mothers are 
amongst the categories of individuals eligible for social apartments 
provided by the Ministry of Transport and Communication in seve-
ral municipalities throughout country. The distribution procedure is 
done through electronic lot drawing and it has been criticized.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Health and long-term care activities: evolution during the 
crisis
As shown in a previous report by the EGGSI network,93 while most 
European countries have organised their health systems on the prin-
93  Crepaldi C., Samek Lodovici M. and Corsi M. (2010), Access to Healthcare and 
Longterm Care. Equal for Women and Men?, Final Synthesis Report, European 
Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union.
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ciple of universal or near-universal rights to care, actual access to he-
althcare or long-term care may encounter structural barriers. Thus, 
depending on country-specific regulations, groups of persons falling 
(permanently or temporarily) out of the coverage in insurance-based 
systems may be undocumented migrants, asylum seekers without co-
verage, non-economically-active women after divorce, students after 
they have been covered by parents’ insurance, unemployed persons af-
ter their unemployment benefits have been cancelled, persons released 
from prison without employment or entitlement to unemployment be-
nefits, etc. Barriers to access to healthcare may be financial, cultural or 
geographical, for example, and they are frequently deeply gendered in 
nature. As poverty increases during recessions we can expect gendered 
impacts on health status. 
Concerning gender roles and the overall men’s and women’s con-
ditions, on the one hand the economic crisis may facilitate a partial 
change of traditional gender roles. For example, by reducing the gen-
der employment gap and increasing men’s unemployment, more men 
may be found at home and more might be involved in housework and 
unpaid care work. Conversely, more women may be faced with an in-
surmountable need to work in order to lessen their families’ economic 
difficulties. On the other hand, however, the abrupt and involuntary na-
ture of these changes is likely to bring about increasing discomfort and 
stress among Europe’s men and women, with a worsening of psycholo-
gical and emotional health. Portugal and Ireland, two of the European 
countries most hit by the crisis, provide a particularly relevant example 
of the gendered health impact of the crisis on European citizens’ welfa-
re (see box 6.7). Besides the direct impact on mental health, the crisis 
is also producing serious social consequences at the community level, 
with associated modifications in health behaviour such as rising levels 
of drug addiction, and alcohol and tobacco use.
Box 6.7 – Impact of the crisis on health status and 
behaviour
In Finland, unhealthy use of alcohol continues to be common 
especially among unemployed men, though the drinking habits of 
upper-white-collar men also appear as problematic. According to 
an annual postal survey,94 in 2010 the proportion of those who do 
not use any alcohol was 10 per cent of men and 14 per cent of 
women while 49 per cent of men and 38 per cent of women used 
alcohol at least once a week. Students and retired people who have 
lower income levels use less alcohol than employed people. Alcohol 
consumption is most frequent among upper-white-collar workers, 
94  Helakorpi S., Pajunen T., Jallinoja P., Virtanen S. and Uutela A. (2011), “Suoma-
laisen aikuisväestön terveyskäyttäytyminen ja terveys, kevät 2010” [Health Behaviour 
and Health among the Finnish Adult Population, spring 2010], Terveyden ja hyvin-
voinnin laitos (THL), Raportti 15/2011. Helsinki. Available at: http://www.thl.fi/
thl-client/pdfs/4582dc7b-0e9c-43db-b5eb-68589239b9a3 
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especially men, of whom 63 per cent drink alcohol at least once a 
week. Unemployed men use bigger amounts of alcohol than any 
other men or women: 38 per cent consumed six or more portions 
of alcohol on one occasion at least once a week.95 Alcohol con-
sumption is linked to the number of alcohol-related diseases and 
alcohol-related deaths and indeed men suffer from more alcohol-
related diseases than women: 79 per cent of the patients in alcohol-
related periods of care and 74 per cent of clients in institutions that 
provide care for substance abusers were men. In 2009 there were 
2,954 alcohol-related deaths in Finland, which is about 5 per cent 
less than in 2008. 1,656 men and 414 women died because of al-
cohol-related diseases, which were still the most common cause of 
death among women and men of working age.96 To cope with this 
situation, alcohol taxes have been raised several times during the 
recent years. In 2008 alcohol taxes were raised by 15 per cent for 
strong alcoholic beverages and by 10 per cent for other alcoho-
lic beverages. In 2009, excise taxes on alcoholic beverages were 
raised twice by 10 per cent. From the beginning of 2008, it has 
been prohibited to use so-called quantity discounts, that is, to offer 
several packages of beer or other alcoholic beverages at a redu-
ced total price. It is also prohibited to advertise happy-hour prices 
outside restaurants and bars and alcoholic beverages on the televi-
sion and in cinemas before 9 p.m. According to a new government 
programme,97 taxes on alcohol and tobacco as well as sweets and 
soft drinks will be further raised. 
In Ireland, women report higher levels of mental health pro-
blems. Since the beginning of the crisis, women have been more 
likely to be admitted to hospital with depression while men with 
schizophrenia or alcoholic disorders. For both men and women the 
highest cause of admission was depressive disorders, often consi-
dered to be related to recession.98 The experience of recession is 
borne with most stress within the household. This is correlated with 
significant increases in suicide numbers over the course of the reces-
sion, rising from 424 in 2009 to 527 in 2010, though apparently 
reducing in the first part of 2011.99 While suicide has spread across 
all age groups and genders, it is still most pronounced in young 
men and closely associated with the despair and fatalism of those 
faced with stressful economic experiences such as unemployment. 
A recent study100 reviewed the impact of the crisis on drugs and the 
95  Helakorpi S., Pajunen T., Jallinoja P., Virtanen S. and Uutela A. (2011), ”Suoma-
laisen aikuisväestön terveyskäyttäytyminen ja terveys, kevät 2010” [Health Behaviour 
and Health among the Finnish Adult Population, spring 2010], Terveyden ja hyvin-
voinnin laitos (THL), Raportti 15/2011. Helsinki. Available at: http://www.thl.fi/
thl-client/pdfs/4582dc7b-0e9c-43db-b5eb-68589239b9a3 
96  THL, Yearbook of Alcohol and Drug Statistics 2010, available online at http://
www.thl.fi/thl-client/pdfs/85338d3b-c126-4914-9384-d5847d59d598 
97  Government Programme 22.6.2011 http://www.vn.fi/hallitus/hallitusohjelma/en.jsp 
98  Kinsella R. and Kinsella M. (2011), “Unemployment: Scarring a generation”, 
Studies, vol. 100.
99  Central Statistics Office (2010), Survey on income and living conditions (SILC) 
2009, April, Dublin. 
100  Harvey B. (2010), Community drugs problem: defining the problem - defending 
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link between increased poverty and rising levels of drug addiction.
In Portugal, one of the areas where the number of sick people 
has considerably grown since the inception of the crisis is psychia-
try, as a result both of the actual worsening of living conditions 
and of the increasing fears for the future. In a recent study it was 
revealed that 22.9 per cent of the Portuguese population manifests 
symptoms that place them in the category of mental disorder. This 
figure is well above the countries of southern Europe - Spain only 
exhibits a 9.2 per cent prevalence, for example, and Italy 8.2 per-
cent - and it is far even from the two European countries with the 
highest prevalence, i.e. France (18.4 percent) and the Netherlands 
(14.8 percent). At the top of the problems are anxiety disorders 
(16.5 percent), depressive disorders (7.9 percent), impulse control 
disorders (3.5 percent) and alcohol-related disorders (1.6 percent). 
The study finds that the most affected are women, young people 
between 18 and 24 years old, people living alone (separated, wido-
wed and divorced) and people with low or medium levels of litera-
cy. During the 6th Edition of Mental Health Conference (Lisbon, 
April 2011), it was confirmed that people in Portugal are more fre-
quently hit by depression than in the rest of Europe, and that the 
on-going worsening of their living conditions increases the chances 
of mental disorders, with a growth of anxiety disorders, which in 
turn are the basis of the development of skin diseases, heart stroke 
or cancer, among others.
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Impact of the recent reforms on health care
In the face of the crisis, European countries followed a bipartite 
strategy. On the one hand, the need to reduce public budget deficits 
induced a reduction of health expenditure in several countries. On the 
other hand, the aim to sustain those who bear an unsustainable weight 
induced several countries to expand the range of public services or in-
troduce new or higher subsidies to households.
With respect to the first policy mentioned, in several European 
countries recent health reforms have primarily dealt with cost con-
tainment leading to an increasing individualisation of health costs (for 
example in Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal 
and Slovak Republic). New or higher prescription fees have been also 
introduced in several European countries, such as Cyprus, Czech Repu-
blic, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Slovak Republic. 
It should be noted that women are more likely to make use of general 
practitioners, dentists, and alternative medicine practitioner services.101 
the responses, report from citywide conference on Oct 15th 2010, Dublin. Available 
at: http://www.citywide.ie/download/pdf/citywide_conference_2010_report_hardcopy.
pdf
101  Crepaldi C., Samek Lodovici M. and Corsi M. (2010), Access to Healthcare 
and Longterm Care. Equal for Women and Men?, Final Synthesis Report, European 
Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union.
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Hence, cuts in the public provision of such services will disproportiona-
tely impact on women. Moreover, cost containments have a regressive 
effect since the cost of healthcare proportionally impinges more upon 
lower incomes. Thus, due to the gender pay gap and women’s higher 
risks of poverty, such policies weigh an extra burden on women. 
Elderly persons, in particular women and chronically ill people as 
well as generally persons with a lower income are financially burdened 
by cost containment for health services. While elderly people require 
more frequent access to healthcare services, they both incur a propor-
tionally higher income loss and they often face reduced services. 
Where the cost of access to healthcare has not been raised, policies 
of containment in public spending may have resulted in growing diffi-
culties to provide basic health care services for the population especial-
ly in terms of longer waiting times to get a doctor’s appointment, with 
negative effects on timely access to medical care (Finland, Belgium, and 
Estonia).
Budget cuts in the health sector hit women harder than men also on 
the supply side. Gender segregation in the labour market traditionally 
exhibits women as primarily employed in the public sector and in the 
services sector, especially the education, health and the care industries. 
Savings achieved or planned mainly through cuts to public sector pay 
or staff reductions involved such a female-dominated sector in Ireland, 
Finland and Slovenia. Thus, overall these policies risk to seriously con-
flict with efforts towards greater gender equality in other fields.
Box 6.8 – The effects of cost containment policies on 
gender access to health care
In the Czech Republic it has been estimated that women from 
very low-income families (single mothers especially) might hesitate 
to use healthcare for themselves, as they would have to pay the fees, 
which might be a problem for their household budget.102 
In Ireland, the TASC report Eliminating Health Inequalities 
(2011) argues that the health gains of the last few years will be 
reversed under the IMF/EU programme and cite increased fees for 
accessing emergency departments and public hospital beds as well 
as new prescription fee charges as examples of the new obstacles to 
health. The National Drugs Strategy (2009-2016) is considered to 
be at risk due to the cuts to drug services that have been imposed in 
the two years that followed the adoption of the strategy itself. The 
budget for voluntary and community drugs services has been redu-
ced by 20% over the past two years. In 2010 alone, while the overall 
government spending was reduced by 1.8%, spending on voluntary 
102  The information is based on qualitative research carried out under the project 
“Processes and Sources of Gender Inequalities in Women’s Careers in Connection 
with the Transformation of Czech Society After 1989 and After the Accession of the 
Czech Republic to the EU”, Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech 
Republic No. IA700280804.
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and community drugs services dropped by 11%. Worryingly, there 
were significant reductions in budgets for flanking organizations de-
aling with the supply of drugs and the prevention of crime (e.g. the 
policing budget anticipates a 10% drop in policing numbers). The 
national drugs strategy now embraces alcohol but such expansion 
is to be serviced by a reduced budget.
In Italy, fees and cost increases for healthcare services (“ticket” 
payments) in several regions are made proportional to the beneficia-
ry’s income and sometimes they are reduced in case of long-term ill-
nesses, thus contributing to a fairer distribution of healthcare costs.
Several forms of cost containment are being implemented in Por-
tugal. Due to the geographical concentration of health services ai-
med at cost containment, largest strata of the population, especially 
those living in the interior parts of the country, are faced with the 
requirement to use transports for consultations and other health 
support. Moreover, in addition to the reduction of ambulatory tran-
sport services, with ambulances used almost exclusively for emer-
gency situations, an increase of 15% in the fees of public transport 
has already been announced, which may further condition and limit 
the possibility of the population to access health services. In Portu-
gal, the 2008-2010 NSR foresaw a number of the measures targeted 
more or less directly to women: in the health sector, the financial 
support to 310,000 pregnant women who reach their 13th week of 
gestation; a support for the purchase of medicines for low income 
elderly people; a support for the acquisition of dental prostheses, 
of glasses and lenses. However, in late 2010 and during the current 
year some of these measures, especially those relating to the assi-
gnment of pecuniary aid such as the support for pregnant women 
and the social support allowances, were reduced in terms of the 
number of beneficiaries and of the ways of determining the values 
to be assigned. 
In the United Kingdom, since June 2010 a number of monetary 
allowances and subsidies in kind have been abolished, including the 
free admission for older people to swimming facilities, originally 
meant to support healthy living in old age.
Sources: EGGSI national reports
However, as mentioned above the crisis did not affect single Euro-
pean public health systems  in the same way. Indeed, some European 
countries were less affected by the global crisis; some were not affected 
at all; and in some the economic recovery manifested itself early. These 
countries had to undergo less severe policies of public spending reduc-
tion, or could even increase expenditure (Norway, Sweden, Estonia and 
Poland). Other countries improved accessibility to healthcare through 
an expansion of public healthcare specifically aimed at coping with the 
social impact of the crisis (Austria, Slovenia and FYROM).
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Box 6.9 – Policy efforts to mitigate the effects of the 
economic crisis on the health sector
In Austria (in Innsbruck) recent reorganisations brought about 
more flexible opening hours and the possibility of childcare pro-
vision during the utilisation of health services, in order to reduce 
the barriers to access to healthcare for single mothers, who pre-
dominantly bear the problem of available time to consult a health 
service.103 
In Estonia, an expansion of health services is expected to be su-
stained by the private sector, since Open Estonia Foundation laun-
ched a Crisis Fund for NGOs supporting projects to help civil socie-
ty organizations survive in difficult economic conditions.104
In Norway additional public investments were used, among 
other forms, within the social and health sector, and 1,500 new 
beds on nursing homes were introduced.105 
In Poland, after a slight decline in the number of physicians – 
both men and women – in 2008, the situation has changed in 2009 
with an overall increase by 1% and an increase of women emplo-
yees by 2.5%. Yet, overall expenditure on healthcare remains very 
low in Poland and the recent evolution is mixed.106
In Slovenia, since 2009 the recipients of financial social assistan-
ce (or those eligible for receiving financial social assistance but not 
receiving it) are also entitled to receive coverage of health costs up 
to their full amount. Since 2008, a number of carers are recognised 
full inclusion in the compulsory health insurance scheme: parents 
that are on paternity leave whose employment contract has expired, 
parent who through her/his activity pays social security contribu-
tions for at least 20 hours per week and cares for a child under 3 
years of age, parent who leaves employment for caring for four or 
more children. These are in majority women, even though the mea-
sures are intended for both men and women.
103  Baldaszti E. and Urbas E. (2006), Wiener Frauengesundheitsbericht 2006, Wien, 
pp. 382-384.
104  The Open Society Emergency Fund will finance social projects aimed at sup-
porting the most vulnerable groups of society affected by the global economic crisis, 
as well as innovative initiatives promoting the values of open society (the fund was 
opened thanks to a $100 million donation of the Open Society Institute to 20 coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus in order to alleviate the 
impact of the global economic crisis).
105  Berge Ø. (2009) De nordiske modellerna etter 2000 –tilak for å dempe finanskrisa 
i Norden, Fafo-notat 2009 :12.
 
106  In 2008, public expenditure (current expenses only) amounted to 4.73% of GDP 
and private to 1.94%. In 2007-2009, outpatient care expanded and the share of 
consultations granted to women increased. In 2008, the gender structure of outpa-
tient consultations of specialists exhibited a higher share of women (57.4%) than 
men as beneficiaries. In 2009, the share of women grew to 60.2%. At the same time, 
however, the number of patients in public general hospitals decreased from a total 
6.7 million in 2008 to 6.5 million in 2009, while waiting lists grew together with 
public hospital debts. See GUS (2010), Podstawowe dane z zakresu ochrony zdrowia 
w 2009 r; GUS (2008), Podstawowe dane z zakresu ochrony zdrowia i pomocy 
spoіecznej w 2007; GUS (2009), Podstawowe dane z zakresu ochrony zdrowia i 
pomocy spoіecznej w 2008.
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In Sweden, the levels of net income in the county councils and 
municipalities (responsible of welfare services) in both 2009 and 
2010 were the highest in many years.107 Value added for education, 
health and social work increased between 2008 and 2009 as well 
as final expenditure by central and local government.108 As a con-
sequence, 78 per cent of people nation-wide in 2009 agreed fully 
or partly to the statement “I have access to the health care I need”, 
which represented an improvement from 69 per cent in 2004 (the 
results did not show any significant discrepancy between women 
and men).109
In FYROM, women are targeted by the “Programme for he-
alth protection for mothers and children”. The programme targets 
mothers and women at reproductive age (15-49 years); infant and 
toddlers (2-4 years). It mostly encompasses preventive educational 
activities, patronage visits of Roma, health mediators and etc. The 
programme targets Roma women (500.000 women) in particular.110 
Recent changes to the Law on Health Insurance increase access to 
health by providing universal coverage. The Government introdu-
ced 16 vertical programmes that are free of charge and thus accessi-
ble to the most vulnerable and poor.111 Victims of domestic violence 
are targeted as a separate group in governmental programmes for 
provision of health care. 
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
The provision of long-term care
Long-term care is overwhelmingly a women’s issue, since women 
constitute the majority of care recipients and caregivers. Since the in-
ception of the crisis, in the European countries that underwent the 
largest efforts of public budget consolidation (such as Ireland, Spain) 
long-term care allowances and monetary benefits have been reduced. 
By contrast, in an attempt to face the higher risks of poverty and social 
exclusion due to the crisis, in some countries long-term care allowances 
were raised instead (for example in Austria and Liechtenstein). 
Women assume the majority of responsibility for care, so that they 
are especially concerned with the reconciliation of work and caring 
responsibilities and insufficient social security. Thus, variations in the 
care allowances and the rules governing them affect more women than 
107  SALAR (2011), The Economy Report. On Swedish Municipal and County 
Council Finances – December 2010, available at http://brs.skl.se/publikationer/index.
jsp?http://brs.skl.se/publikationer/publdoc.jsp?searchpage=/dummy&search_titn=%2
239885%22&db=KATA&from=1&toc_length=20&currdoc=1 
108  SCB (2011), Statistisk årsbok, Tables 15.8 and 15.9. 
109  SALAR & Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (2010), Quality and 
Efficiency in Swedish Health Care. Regional Comparisons 2010, p. 49. Available at: 
http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Lists/Artikelkatalog/Attachments/18336/2011-5-18.pdf
110  Programme for health protection for mothers and children (Official gazzete of the 
RM, no. 20). http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/63B49DC48D21E647BF4E485C90
DEA8D1.pdf.
111  Tozija F. and Apostolska Z. (2010), Annual National Report 2010:  Pension, 
Health and Long-term care in Republic of Macedonia, p.17, http://www.socialprotec-
tion.eu/files_db/903/asisp_ANR10_FYR_Macedonia.pdf 
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men in a twofold manner. On the one hand, the majority of care bene-
ficiaries are women, and their income is therefore most affected by mo-
difications in the value or the eligibility criteria of care allowances.112 
A particularly vulnerable group is single parents, because this group 
(mostly composed of women) often lacks the necessary resources for 
in-patient care and will depend on means-tested social assistance in the 
future. In general, it can be said that the distributional effects of the 
long-term care allowances between higher and lower income brackets 
are positive: care allowances reduce the at-risk-of-poverty rates within 
particularly vulnerable groups, improve the position of long-term care 
receivers in the income hierarchy and have a proportionally higher im-
pact on the income of persons from the lower income brackets, where 
elderly women can be particularly found.113 Thus, since women are 
overrepresented in these groups, reductions in the public financing of 
long-term care due to public consolidation measures have a strong gen-
der impact.
On the other hand, women might be indirectly negatively affected 
by a reduction of allowances as carers who, informally remunerated, 
perform the bulk of the informal care for persons in need of long-term-
care. This is particularly true in those countries, the vast majority of 
European countries, in which the cash transfer is untied, that is reci-
pients have full autonomy over how to use it, including passing it on 
fully or partly to other persons (e.g. family caregivers). Indeed, there is 
a tension within monetary care support schemes (including support of 
childcare) between the aim of sustaining the income and social inclu-
sion of those who care, i.e. mostly women, and that of not providing 
financial incentives to women to take on unpaid work thus reinforcing 
traditional gender roles. 
In any case, while it is important not to provide monetary incentives 
to women’s informal work, it is even more fundamental that housework 
and care work do not remain unpaid and invisible, especially in a time 
of economic crisis when the reduction of public social expenditure may 
weigh an extra burden on it. 
These aspects become more relevant in those countries where, inde-
pendently of the economic crisis, de-institutionalisation of care is more 
consistently being sought (for example Cyprus or Slovenia). Again, the 
focus on home/family care may have a negative impact on women as 
prime carers, also reinforcing the gendered division of labour at home 
and possibly conflicting with the Europe-wide efforts to ease the bur-
den of care work on women and promote their integration in the la-
bour market.
Indeed, the extent to which an increased provision of care at home 
weighs a higher burden on women depends on social arrangements in 
terms of the public and the market provision of care at home. In some 
112  Crepaldi C., Samek Lodovici M. and Corsi M. (2010), Access to Healthcare 
and Longterm Care. Equal for Women and Men?, Final Synthesis Report, European 
Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union.
113  Mühlberger U., Knittler K. and Guger A. (2008), Mittel- und langfristige Finan-
zierung der flegevorsorge, WIFO, Wien, p.12. 
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European countries (such as Germany or Italy), migrant women have a 
particularly strong role in this respect. In these countries many nurses 
– often migrants, primarily from Eastern Europe – who are employed 
in private households provide care as personal services. They often live 
in the household and have to be available for the person requiring care 
around the clock, while their pay is far below the remuneration that 
would have to be paid for legal 24-hour care, and work conditions are 
often lower and more precarious. The true extent of illegal employment 
in nursing is unidentified because of its private structure. However, for 
example for Germany estimates by the Federation of Private Providers 
of Social Services (Bundesverband privater Anbieter sozialer Dienste) 
in 2009 suggested that about 150,000 Middle and Eastern Europeans 
work undocumented in elderly and long-term care. 
While since the beginning of the crisis the trend in regards to moneta-
ry benefits is mixed, with several countries trying to reduce expenditure, 
European countries have generally abstained from reducing public social 
expenditure by cutting on the provision of long-term care services.  The 
provision of support services for long-term care was even expanded in 
some countries (such as Austria, Liechtenstein, or Ireland) even in a con-
text of vast programmes of reduction of public expenditure.
From a gender perspective the investment into the expansion of 
long-term care services is to be seen as a positive initiative. Not only it 
shall ensure a qualitatively high and at the same time affordable ran-
ge of care services, whose main beneficiaries are, as noted, women, 
but it may also release women from unpaid long-term care services for 
their relatives. The latter benefit is relevant also from the perspective of 
macroeconomic policy to cope with the crisis. While, as noted above, 
several European countries adopted a strategy focussing on job crea-
tion and reduction of unemployment, there may be a tension in such 
policy where the aim to increase participation rates for women may 
conflict with a health and welfare policy predicating or however impli-
citly relying on there being one unpaid, usually female, adult at home 
who does the caring work.114 It is in any case important that several 
measure aimed at sustaining the income and social inclusion of those 
(mostly women) performing house and care work, especially in a time 
of economic crisis.
Box 6.10 - Trends in long-term care for the elderly 
across the crisis
In Austria, long-term care allowance were raised in 2009 but in 
2010 eligibility requirements were tightened, with an overall reduc-
tion in expenditure for monetary transfers related to long-term care. 
In Czech Republic, since 2009 caring family members are cor-
rectly recognised as workers within the public health insurance and 
114  Russell H and McGinnity F. (2011), The Impact of Recession on Work Pressure: 
The Case of Ireland, Paper prepared for the 2011 Spring Meeting of the ISA RC28 
University of Essex, UK 13th-16th April 2011, p. 15
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pension schemes, as well as for the award of unemployment benefits. 
In Germany fixed-term unpaid release from work due to care 
encourages part-time work or temporary career breaks by the ca-
ring person. However, existing regulations do not encourage men to 
take on care responsibilities.
In Ireland, even in a context of vast programmes of reduction 
of public expenditure, services for older people and long-term care 
have been ring fenced and largely protected to date, through the 
Fair Deal scheme, used to administer nursing home subventions to 
older people.24 By 2012 however these are facing a severe funding 
crisis as demand outstripped the fixed budget allocation and with 
applicants for nursing homes now on long waiting lists and having 
to meet the initial period themselves.  Home help services have also 
been cut in 2012.  
In Liechtenstein, the main aim of a new cash benefit scheme in-
troduced in 2010 was to support and promote care at home by 
increasing the cash provisions especially for home care recipients, 
equalising it to the benefit received in case of residential care. Ho-
wever, as the care allowance in Liechtenstein is considered to be ra-
ther high,25 it is possible that this new provision will be in fact pro-
viding an income to informal carers, i.e. primarily women relatives.
In Poland, in 2010 a benefit scheme for carers (especially of di-
sabled members of the family) was expanded through the removal 
of means testing, encompassing a small monetary allowance and 
payment of pension contributions (other European countries, such 
as Slovenia, introduced similar schemes even before the crisis). 
In the Slovak Republic, while the law guarantees  a high level 
of long-term care  services, , a contradiction might arise with the  
actual delivery of provisions due to the cuts in regional and local 
public budgets.26 
Sources: EGGSI national reports.
Concluding remarks
The Europe 2020 strategy is a holistic and integrated work plan 
aiming at inclusive growth. In pursuing this aim, European countries 
show a considerable awareness of the conceptual limits of considering 
poverty exclusively as lack of adequate income, as well as of the limits 
in policy-making that a strategy based only on income support schemes 
would imply. Thus, the European countries adopt a vast array of po-
licies aimed at overcoming European men’s and women’s deprivation 
in several dimensions: in the present report we considered education, 
housing, health and care. As it emerges, in times of financial and eco-
nomic crisis and the subsequent decisions to pursue austerity measures, 
a general trend - though valid only in broad lines and not consistently 
followed by all European countries in all the mentioned dimensions - 
has been to preserve the provision of services relatively more than the 
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disbursement of cash benefits. 
Education and training appear as the policy fields less affected by 
budget cuts, in agreement with the objective to exit from the crisis 
through a smarter growth based on knowledge and information. While 
in the general population women appear to catch up with men’s edu-
cational attainments, vulnerable groups in the education and training 
domain include migrant women, the homeless and those at risk of early 
drop-off (among which men are over-represented). National strategies 
during the crisis have focussed also on extending pre-school and out of 
school time programmes. Such schemes are particularly advantageous 
not only for the children, who benefit from enlarged opportunities to 
learn and socialize, but also for the caring parents, among which wo-
men in particular bear the burden of work and family life conciliation.
In several countries, homelessness and long-term homelessness ap-
pear as substantially gendered phenomena as well, and the economic 
crisis seems to be increasing these social plagues. Especially in some 
countries the housing crisis, besides its macroeconomic consequences, 
is drastically affecting the lives of the most vulnerable households, 
among which for example single mothers or those living on a low in-
come (among which women are over-represented). Besides the instru-
ments adopted well before the crisis, such as cash allowances or social 
housing, a relevant policy instrument beginning to be adopted to cope 
with this situation are the schemes and regulations designed to deal 
with households’ over-indebtedness. Collective debts settlements, con-
sultancy and mediation in mortgages re-negotiations are very effecti-
ve and low cost instruments that also carry a positive gender impact, 
especially in light of the consideration that in the vast majority of cases 
arrears or over-indebtedness are a consequence of low income or inco-
me vulnerability (which disproportionately affect women) rather than 
over-consumption. 
Finally, the economic crisis is reported to bring about negative con-
sequences also in terms of European men’s and women’s health status. 
According to preliminary sources young people, single persons and pe-
ople with low educational attainments in particular as subject to incre-
ases in the prevalence of mental disorders. While women appear to be 
more subject to anxiety and depression, young men and the long-term 
unemployed appear more at risk of suicide. Provisional evidence points 
to the direction of a link between economic conditions and violence 
against women as well. Moreover, the crisis seems to negatively affect 
also health behaviour: especially among men, drug addictions, smoking 
and heavily drinking appear on the rise in more than one European 
country. To cope with such developments, as well as with the increased 
levels of households’ economic distress, some European countries have 
increased health and long-term care facilities. However, many Euro-
pean countries have raised fees or reduced health or care-related cash 
benefits in accordance to plans of public expenditure cuts. Only the 
countries most seriously affected by market tensions regarding their 
sovereign debts appear to have reduced the provision of healthcare fa-
cilities.
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This report has examined the repercussions of the economic and fi-
nancial crisis on the labour market position and social situation of wo-
men and men in Europe, building upon the investigations by the EGGE 
and the EGGSI networks of 33 European countries (the EU Member 
States, the EEA-EFTA countries and the candidate countries). 
At the time of completing this report (2012, September), the pro-
spects for recovery are still uncertain, and only limited macroeconomic 
data series stretch as far as the first quarter of 2012. With the crisis still 
unfolding, the analysis and findings of this report must remain a work 
in progress.
There are three sides to the story of this crisis as it has unfolded in 
Europe to date. The first is the downward levelling of gender gaps in 
employment, wages, working conditions, and poverty, a phenomenon 
that has also been noted with earlier recessions. The second is increa-
sing similarities in labour market behaviour between men and women, 
a process that this recession has helped to bring to light, and may even 
have accelerated. The third is an apparent paradox that only time can 
resolve.   We gathered evidence of a contained and uneven retrench-
ment in welfare and social security provisions in the first three years of 
the recession, with presumably equally limited repercussions on female 
employment in welfare related jobs. But we also garnered evidence that 
the pavented risk that fiscal consolidation may significantly slice off 
these provisions and curtail female employment has already materiali-
zed in the countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis. 
Questionable progress towards equality: the downward 
leveling of gender gaps
One of the most common outcomes of the present crisis across 
countries is the downward levelling of gender gaps in activity, em-
ployment, unemployment, wages, and poverty in the recessionary pha-
se. The basic details of this are as follows: 
•  Men bore the brunt of the fall in employment. The comparative 
size of the employment fallout depends, however, on the meas-
ure chosen: it has been three times higher for men according to 
fairly conventional indicators (peak-to-trough), but (nearly) twice 
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as much if the indicator takes into account the fact that female 
employment was following a stronger rising trend before the reces-
sion started.
•  Male unemployment rose more, and faster. In the depths of the 
recession, unemployment for men surged by 4.6 percentage points, 
more than female unemployment. The latter was stickier, with the 
advantage of a less sharp increase in the downturn, and the disad-
vantage of slightly slower reabsorption during recovery, but differ-
ences are contained. The male rate rose   (just) above the female 
rate a few times during this crisis, including the latest available 
quarter at the time of writing. 
•  As a combined result of employment and unemployment patterns, 
inactivity has risen among men and declined among women. In 
early 2012 men had not yet regained their pre-recession activity 
level, while women slightly increased theirs. 
•  Due to the rise in male inactivity, the 2010 share of men neither in 
education nor in training over the male population aged 15 to 24 
was higher in ten member countries although lower than among 
women in the whole of the EU.
•  Between 2007 and 2010, the unadjusted gender pay gap decli-
ned in the majority of European countries, and by 1.2 percenta-
ge points in the whole of the EU, between 2007 and 2010. One 
instance of a fall in the adjusted wage gap was also reported for 
the Slovak Republic. The experience of the Slovak Republic was 
probably common to other countries, but the scant research on the 
issue hinders our understanding of this phenomenon. 
•  In the first years of the recession (2008-2010) in-work poverty in-
creased only among female workers, and very slightly, despite the 
fact that the incidence of workers in poverty is higher among the 
men. These seemingly positive developments are likely to hide the 
less reassuring fact that job losses were higher among the low paid. 
•  Like severe material deprivation, income poverty is, and remains, 
more widespread among women. In the two initial years of the 
recession (2008-9, the latest available), both measures of poverty 
increased, but less so among women. The gender gap in income 
poverty shrank as a result, and so did the gap in severe material de-
privation. However, the differences among countries are large.115 
Despite the downward levelling of employment and pay gaps, the 
integration of women in the labour market has been rolled back. At 
peak employment values, just before the recession began, 10 Member 
States were above the 65% employment rate mark for women aged 14 
to 64, but this number was down to 6 in the most recent quarter as 
115  While a stable trend in income poverty among women may sound surprising, it 
should be remembered that the indicator for income poverty – the headcount ratio – 
yields a relative measure which improves if income falls for everybody, but a bit less 
for the female component.
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Estonia, Latvia, the UK, and Slovenia slipped below the 65% mark. 
In the vast majority of Member States, moreover, the target set by the 
Europe 2020 Strategy looks further away now than it did four years 
ago. As for unemployment, it is a cause for universal concern that both 
men and women reached over the 10% mark nearly four years after the 
recession set in (first quarter of 2012).  
Nor can a lower gender pay gap or a lower poverty gap conform 
with the idea of progress in gender equality when they are the downside 
of falling earnings (and income) for both men and women (though the-
re is a lesser fall for women). In 10 European countries out of the 17 co-
vered by the European Social Survey, at least 20% of male respondents 
reported having to take a reduction in pay in the period 2008-2010; for 
women, the corresponding number of countries is 7. 
Over-representation in service employment, including public sector 
jobs, and under-representation in manufacturing, construction, and 
male-dominated branches of the financial sector   in short, sectoral se-
gregation – sheltered women’s employment, activity, and, to an extent, 
pay during the downturn. We found that men experienced compara-
tively higher losses in countries where segregation is higher. We also 
found that in Croatia, one of the two countries for which we were able 
to conduct a counterfactual wage gap exercise, the decline in the gender 
pay gap would have been about two-thirds lower if the sectoral compo-
sition of employment had not changed since 2008. This is an example 
of how far movements in the wage gap may have been influenced by 
sectoral changes in the composition of employment.
However, the part that employment segregation has played in shelte-
ring women’s jobs and wages warrants important qualifications. First, 
female vulnerability in one country has sometime been higher than 
male vulnerability in another, as a result of differing degrees of flexi-
bility and employment protection in the two economies, and not only 
of segregation. Furthermore, employment segregation may protect, but 
also expose, females; this can happen if fiscal consolidation significan-
tly curtails welfare-type jobs and public employment.
Women more similar to men in this crisis
In earlier recessionary episodes (as well as earlier theorizing), segre-
gation was thought to be all the more important because it countered 
the tendency for women to behave as employment buffers, called in 
when demand expanded, and pushed back when it contracted. This 
recession has conclusively refuted this idea for Europe. 
The contemporary ‘buffers’ are young men and women on tempo-
rary and other atypical employment contracts, as well as migrants many 
of whom are employed irregularly or temporarily. In accordance with 
expectations based on segmentation theory, temporary employment 
proved disproportionately volatile, its share of total employment going 
down in the downturn and up in the recovery. However, the ‘downs’ 
were quite similar for men and women in the EU as a whole.  The share 
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of temporary employees on total employment went down from 13.7% 
at the peak to 12.5% at the trough for men, and from 15.2% to 14.1% 
for women.
Third countries male migrant workers recorded one of the highest 
employment fallouts across European countries, while outcomes for 
mobile workers from within the EU appear to differ among countries. 
In contrast, female mobile workers from within the EU were largely 
spared. Third countries female migrants were more exposed, but even 
within this group, the largest employment fall was not much higher 
than 3 percentage points compared with 8 points for third countries 
male migrants. This is an instance where occupational segregation mat-
tered: an important component of the ‘protected’ segment of female mi-
grants is workers who have migrated from Eastern to Western countri-
es to care for the elderly, a highly feminized activity where progressive 
ageing has applied a brake to the fall in demand. 
Women also owe resilience of their employment levels to their own 
behaviour. Their income role has changed considerably with respect to 
previous recessions, and the current crisis has clearly shown how far 
the standard of living of households now depends on female earnings. 
In the first two years of the crisis, dual earner couples lost ground (-5.1 
percentage points share), but almost entirely in favour of female bread-
winner couples.  
This could be evidence of women entering employment to compen-
sate for the loss of a job on the part of their male partners, or it may 
indicate that thanks to women’s employment, a non-negligible share 
of dual-earner households has been able to count on female earnings 
when the male partner lost his job. Further research is needed to discri-
minate between these two possibilities, but either developments tell one 
story in no uncertain terms:  that the behaviour of women in the reces-
sion reflects the fact that their income role is in transition between the 
traditional conditions of marginal earners and the modern conditions 
of co-primary earners. Some may still conform to the added worker 
concept, but the majority behave much like men. 
Another indication of similarity of behaviour is that the share of 
discouraged workers in the inactive population  has gone up for both 
sexes, but somewhat more among male workers  ( +2.0 and +1.2 per-
centage points, respectively). Likewise, no fewer women than men ac-
cepted part-time work ‘involuntarily’. Because of the large gender dis-
parity in part-time working, the increase in the numbers of involuntary 
part-timers was actually much larger among women – almost double 
– although in percentage terms the surge was stronger among men.
The worsening of employment conditions affected women and men 
differently rather than simply ‘more’ or ‘less’. According to evidence 
from national reports, the infringement and curtailment of rights in-
clude delays in wage payments, occupational downgrading, violations 
of health and safety regulations or (normal) working schedules and 
trade union rights, pressure and harassment at work, and downright 
discrimination. Overall, there is no clear indication that male or female 
workers were a more frequent target of such infringements, although 
this may be the case for individual countries or for specific allegations. 
201
Gender Differences in Social Exclusion
According to the results of the European Social Survey, however, 
men see themselves as having suffered the impact of the crisis more 
frequently. In the 17 European countries covered by the survey, men 
voiced complaints more frequently than women in at least three re-
spects: heightened job insecurity, cuts in pay, and having to accept less 
interesting work. While this reflects higher male job losses, grievances 
about the quality of work content may also reflect the fact that in ‘nor-
mal’ times, men may be less forced to compromise on work content in 
order to meet family commitments. 
Certain repercussions of the crisis that specifically concern women 
often go unnoticed. Curtailment of the right of pregnant women to 
maternity leave and benefits or to resume their job after maternity has 
been documented (or is believed to have risen) in the wake of the crisis 
in at least five countries: Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and the Czech 
Republic. 
Another hidden aspect of the crisis that may disproportionately af-
fect women but hardly features at all in public debates about the cri-
sis or in official statistics is unpaid work. Authoritative research for 
the U.S.A. has recently disclosed that contrary to the results of earlier 
research, both men and women experiencing unemployment during a 
recession spend extra time on unpaid activities, with few gender dif-
ferences except that women do more housework and sleep longer. No 
such evidence is available at a European level or for single countries, 
but we found that (i) in the depth of the recession household expen-
diture went down in most European countries on the consumption of 
items for which unpaid work may provide a good substitute and (ii) the 
recession unloaded additional care work on to women (Turkey) or may 
have slowed down progress in the redistribution of housework (Italy). 
Turkey and Italy are two of the four countries specifically researched 
for this issue. 
From a policy perspective, the real reason for concern about the 
gender repercussions of the crisis is that progress towards a greater 
integration of women in the labour market may have stalled. The para-
dox of this recession is, however, that the challenges come more from 
policy than they do from the market or from women’s own behaviour.
Uneven setbacks in the social impact of the crisis and 
the impact of fiscal consolidation
The social impact of the crisis. Overall, the initial repercussions of 
the crisis on poverty and access to availability of welfare provisions 
and benefits were moderate in the EU as a whole. For one thing, deve-
lopments in countries that have been relatively unscathed by the crisis 
have compensated for contrary developments in countries where the 
repercussions were more severe, while for another, automatic stabili-
zers such as unemployment benefits and the initial recovery plan have 
softened the blow.
In the report, poverty has been analysed from two interrelated per-
spectives. On the one hand, we assessed insufficient monetary income 
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and financial dependency. On the other hand, we focused on multidi-
mensional poverty (also referred to here as social exclusion), a holistic 
approach to poverty which takes into account access to services, edu-
cation, health, etc. alongside monetary resources.
The data show that European women suffer from a higher risk of 
poverty or social exclusion than European men, at least since 2005.116 
As noted, however, the current economic crisis has (slightly) reduced 
the gender gaps in poverty by increasing the risk among men more than 
among women. 
In 2009 the at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at year 2005 had incre-
ased to 16.1% compared to 13.8% in 2007, the corresponding values 
for women being 15.7% and 17.4%117. Higher increases were expe-
rienced in Ireland, Spain, Latvia, Malta, and Iceland for men, and in 
Ireland, Spain, Lithuania, Malta, and Iceland for women. 
A comparison of the at-risk-of-poverty rates before and after social 
transfers shows that a crucial contribution in mitigating the impact of 
the crisis has come from redistributive taxation and the welfare state. 
Without social transfers, the crisis would have produced relevant incre-
ases in poverty rates in a large number of countries, for both men and 
women. Redistribution was also important for reducing the gender gap 
in poverty rates. Since the onset of the recession, the share of men who 
had fallen into poverty before social transfers and were lifted out of po-
verty by social transfers has increased (although proportionately more 
women still escape poverty thanks to social transfers). This encoura-
ging finding, however, also concerns the early stages of the recession 
(up to 2009).
In most European countries, with few exceptions (Italy and Gree-
ce), various configurations of minimum income schemes are aimed at 
preventing poverty and promoting social inclusion through the provi-
sion of means-tested, non-contributory measures. These measures are 
mostly directed at households rather than at individuals, under the as-
sumption that incomes and other resources are equally shared within 
the household. Various schemes have been introduced in response to 
the crisis, while already-existing measures are under pressure to meet 
increasing demand, and are experiencing structural transformations, 
due to the effect of the recession and resulting austerity policies. The 
scaling back of existing measures may negatively contribute to gender 
equality, given women’s higher poverty rates, while for the same rea-
sons the introduction of new schemes in some countries is expected to 
have a positive effect in terms of gender equality. 
Guaranteed minimum income schemes are often accompanied by 
an integrated set of categorical measures. Categorical measures con-
sist of non-contributory cash and in-kind assistance for specified target 
groups such as families, single parents, children, the elderly, and the 
disabled. Family-related benefits and allowances supplement minimum 
116  It should be noted that the risk of poverty and social exclusion is a broader indi-
cator than the simple risk of income poverty, and typically yields larger values. 
117  This variation compares the at-risk-of-poverty rates in 2007 and 2009. The corre-
sponding survey years are 2008 and 2010, given that the SILC survey collects income 
data for the year preceding the survey. 
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income schemes by providing universal or contributory, means-tested 
or irrespective of income cash payments and in-kind provisions in case 
of maternity, paternity, or parental leave, lone parenthood, and wi-
dowhood. They are formally gender-neutral, but in several cases they 
induce significant gendered effects, given the gender-specific patterns 
of allocation of care activities and paid work. An effort to preserve the 
provision of childcare and other services (or even to enlarge them in 
some countries) is thus apparent during the initial years of the crisis. 
The aim was to boost the labour supply of mothers in particular. By 
comparison, monetary transfers seem to be less efficient at reducing 
gender inequality.
Policies to counteract the social effects of the crisis. While European 
countries have adopted a vast array of policies aimed at overcoming 
European men’s and women’s deprivation in several dimensions, the 
attention in this report has been focused on those factors that appear 
to drive gender imbalances, namely education and life-long learning, 
housing conditions and policies, and healthcare and care activities. 
According to the reports from the national experts, the general trend 
has been for countries to preserve the provision of services relatively 
more than cash benefit schemes, though this is a broad generalization 
that does not consistently reflect developments in all countries. 
Until 2010, education and training appear to have been less affected 
by budget cuts, in line with the objective of exiting the crisis by me-
ans of a smarter growth trajectory that prioritizes knowledge and in-
formation. National strategies during the crisis have also focused on 
extending pre-school and out-of-school programmes. These schemes 
are particularly advantageous not only for children but also for the 
parents caring for them. 
While in the general population women appear to have caught up 
with men’s educational attainments, vulnerable groups in the education 
and training domain include migrant women, the homeless, and those 
at risk of early drop-out (among which men are over-represented). 
In several countries, homelessness and long-term homelessness in-
creased during the crisis. In some countries, the housing crisis is dra-
stically affecting the lives of the most vulnerable households: that is, 
single mothers or low-income households (among which women are 
over-represented). New tools are being gradually introduced alongside 
traditional tools to cope with household over-indebtedness. Collective 
debt settlement and consultancy and mediation in mortgage renegotia-
tions are very effective, low-cost instruments that also carry a positive 
gender impact, especially in light of the fact that arrears or over-in-
debtedness are often a consequence of low income or income vulnera-
bility rather than over-consumption. 
The health status of both men and women is reported to have dete-
riorated as a result of the crisis. There is preliminary evidence that the 
prevalence of mental disorders increased among young people, single 
persons, and people with low educational attainment. While women 
appear to be more prone to anxiety and depression, young men and the 
long-term unemployed are apparently more at risk of suicide. Also, the 
provisional evidence indicates a possible link between economic condi-
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tions and violence against women. The crisis also appears to have ad-
versely affected health behaviour. Drug addiction, smoking, and heavy 
drinking appear to be on the rise in more than one European country, 
especially among men. To cope with these developments, as well as 
with the increased levels of household economic distress, some Euro-
pean countries have boosted their health and long-term care facilities. 
However, many European countries have raised fees or reduced health 
or care-related cash benefits in the wake of public expenditure cuts. 
Only the countries under the most severe pressure from financial mar-
kets are reported to have reduced the provision of healthcare facilities. 
Fiscal consolidation. According to OECD estimates, the cumulative 
consolidation packages announced or implemented between 2009 and 
2015 amount to between 2% and 22% of GDP for the 23 European 
countries included in the 2010 OECD survey on consolidation. 
In order to gauge the magnitude as well as the direction of the effect 
of these fiscal consolidation packages, we asked some of the network’s 
labour market experts to single out the consolidation measures that are 
likely to be more consequential for gender equality from the respective 
country packages, and to assess their expected repercussions. The ex-
perts agreed on an altogether restricted list of measures that includes 
(i) wage freezes or wage cuts in the public sector; (ii) staffing freezes 
or personnel cuts in the public sector; (iii) pension reforms; (iv) cuts 
and restrictions in care related benefits, allowances, and facilities; (v) 
reductions in housing benefits or family benefits; (vi) the tightening of 
eligibility criteria for unemployment and assistance benefits or reduc-
tions in replacement rates; (vii) tax measures; (viii) VAT increases; and 
(ix) increases in fees for publicly-subsidized services. 
In the majority of cases, the experts assessed these measures as being 
likely to roll back progress in gender equality, especially within the la-
bour market. There are, however, cases of discordant assessments – for 
example, with regard to pension reforms – as well as cases of positive 
assessment, such as of a levy on banks introduced in Austria. 
Exploiting the fact that the OECD has expressed each major group 
of consolidation provisions in terms of the share of (national) GDP they 
account for, we have quantified those measures that received a negative 
assessment from the experts. We found that they amount to less than 
1% of GDP in all consolidation years in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In Germany and the U.K., the 
share of GDP accounted for by these measures is little more than 1% in 
at least one consolidation year. In Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and Portu-
gal, the share is between 2% and 5%.
Are the expectations of the experts borne out by facts? Although 
an exhaustive ex-post assessment is premature, evidence was gathered 
about the very latest developments in six countries where the process 
of fiscal consolidation started sufficiently early or is sufficiently pro-
nounced to have already shown up in some statistics, or where the 
process is being better monitored: Greece, Ireland, Latvia, the Nether-
lands, Finland and Spain. In all these countries not much is known 
about the medium and long terms implications of fiscal consolidation. 
More information is available on the short-run implications, although 
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it is still very scant. What is known yields the indication of an emer-
ging divide between countries where fiscal consolidation has been se-
vere and protracted – Greece, Ireland and Spain – and those where the 
scope for consolidation was comparatively smaller – the Netherlands 
and Finland – or the problem was radically addressed early on in the 
crisis – Latvia. In the second group of countries the actual or expected 
impact of consolidation programmes is contained, or it does not appear 
to systematically work against women. In the first group of countries 
the impact is severe for both men and women and may well be rolling 
back progress in gender equality and in female employment in particu-
lar. This calls attention to an unintended, but worrying consequence of 
fiscal consolidation, namely that existing disparities among European 
countries with regard to women’s position in the labour market and, 
more generally, gender equality may be widening back again. 
Are gender mainstreaming and the equal opportunity in-
frastructure at stake?
A question worth asking is whether fiscal consolidation packages 
(and prior to this, recovery and financial rescue packages) would have 
been different had they been effectively gender mainstreamed. One di-
sappointing finding regarding this crisis and policy-making is that gen-
der mainstreaming has been sidestepped both at the policy design and 
the implementation stage. In the vast majority of cases, neither recovery 
nor consolidation measures have been assessed from a gender perspec-
tive. An example of what this means may be seen in Table 7.1, which 
lists the most important policy initiatives in EU27 that have either been 
announced or implemented in response to the crisis, according to the 
2011 National Reform Plans. The number of policies totals 102. Only 
in 9.8% of the cases had gender effects been taken into account at all 
the policy process stages, from design to monitoring. 
Table 7.1. Crisis-specific measures in National Reforms Programme 
2011 in EU 27
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 Gender mainstreamed 
Crisis specific Adequate Partly adequate None 
No. 10 10 82 
% 9.8 9.8 80.4 
Source: Villa and Smith (2011)
What holds for ‘crisis-specific’ measures in general also holds for 
consolidation measures. With the partial exception of Austria, Iceland, 
Finland and the Netherlands, practically none of the national consoli-
dation packages has benefited from some kind of prior assessment from 
a gender equality perspective. 
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Gender equality policy was perhaps more prominent in regard to 
the redesign of gender equality infrastructure. However, the underlying 
motivations, as well as the outcomes, vary greatly among countries. 
Fiscal consolidation packages may impair the functioning of the gen-
der equality machinery in several Member States (Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom). At the same time, some Eastern countries 
have introduced institutional innovations in the field of gender equality 
(Poland and the Slovak Republic) while Denmark, Sweden, and Por-
tugal have attempted to make the existing machinery more effective. 
Perhaps the most inspiring example is Iceland, where the crisis has been 
turned into an opportunity to overhaul gender mainstreaming in order 
to ensure close integration with the ‘normal’ policy-making process.
Recommendations
Based on the findings of this report, the two networks of experts 
agreed on the following set of recommendations (in no particular order):
1. to reconsider the formulation of indicators of gender equality. 
The apparent improvement in most gender gaps despite the worsening 
of employment, wage, working, and income conditions for both men 
and women raises the question of whether ‘gender gaps’ adequately 
capture trends in gender equality, especially during recessions. 
2. to encourage member countries to adopt effective gender bud-
geting routines for their main policy initiatives, including ongoing or 
future recovery plans and expenditure reviews. Statutory requirements 
that policies be vetted ex-ante from a gender perspective may not be 
enough, as the experience of Austria and the U.K. indicates. 
3. to closely monitor the risk that fiscal consolidation significantly 
erodes welfare provisions and public services. 
4. to launch and support initiatives geared towards raising the level 
of financial literacy among women (and the population at large) and 
ensuring ‘critical mass’ female representation in key financial bodies of 
the European machinery. This crisis has made evident how far policy 
decisions that are traditionally associated with women, such as welfare, 
schooling, or reconciliation have come to depend on macroeconomic 
and financial decisions which women have traditionally been excluded 
from, and of which they know little.  
5. to address the disproportionate burden of employment flexibility 
on young people. This includes redesigning customary counter-cyclical 
policies such as short-time working schemes and unemployment benefit 
programmes. While both types of provisions have been important to 
counteract the worst employment and wage effects of this crisis, they 
are often primarily geared to regular full-timers.
6. to gender-mainstream income support schemes. Social expenditu-
re and tax expenditure should focus on women’s financial independen-
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ce as a central concern, especially if they are aimed at lifting men and 
women out of poverty.
7. to channel social expenditure so as to prioritize quality services 
over cash benefits, in order to ensure a fair distributional impact of 
austerity programmes and alleviate the care burden borne by women. 
Recovery funds, in particular, should be channelled towards social and 
care infrastructures, and not only physical infrastructures
8. to strengthen the European Social Fund (ESF) and review its pro-
cedures. Several low female employment countries in Southern and 
Eastern Europe are also countries where the recession and fiscal con-
solidation are downsizing welfare, reconciliation, and equality enhan-
cing provisions in general. The ESF represents an important resource in 
these countries with which to compensate for cuts in local provisions 
and sustaining the 2020 employment goal. In some cases, however, ESF 
spending may need to be reviewed in order to ensure full effectiveness. 
In particular, this review should ensure that: (i) the procedures for ac-
cessing and spending funds are simple; and (ii) the key programmes 
being implemented continue to operate after the ESF funds have been 
withdrawn.
9. to increase surveillance and heighten public awareness of cases of 
violations of maternity and leave rights. Infringements of maternity or 
parental rights may be more common in medium- and small-sized firms 
because of higher organizational costs. Their specific needs and con-
straints should be addressed, as this is also a problem in ‘normal’ times.
10. to address the issue of the poor integration of mobile and mi-
grant workers, especially men. 
All this should contribute to the pursuit of gender equality as a way 
to push the economy out of the crisis rather than viewing it as a cost 
to be reduced in times of restraint. A strategic vision of women’s em-
ployment as a growth engine is warranted, and one area from which 
to make a start is the care sector. Demand for childcare is bound to 
increase if women’s participation rises, and demand for elderly care 
is certain to rise at a fast pace. High-tech and high-knowledge sectors 
such as domotics, robotics, assistive technology, pharmaceutics, and 
medical research are natural companions of the growth of an adequate 
elderly care infrastructure.
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Gender Differences in Social Exclusion
Appendix 1: The timing of peaks and troughs by country and sex (ba-
sed on employment rate for the age group 15-64)
Country 
(men) 20
07
Q4
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q2
20
08
Q3
20
08
Q4
20
09
Q1
20
09
Q2
20
09
Q3
20
09
Q4
20
10
Q1
20
10
Q2
20
10
Q3
20
10
Q4
20
11
Q1
20
11
Q2
20
11
Q3
20
11
Q4
20
12
Q1
EU 27 P T L
BE P T
BG P T L
CZ P T
DK P T L
DE P T
EE P T
IE P L
EL P L
ES P T L
FR P T L
IT P L
CY P T L
LV P T
LT P T
LU P T
HU P T
MT P T
NL P T
AT P T
PL P T
PT P L
RO P T
SI P T L
SK P T
FI P T
SE P T
UK P T
IS P T
NO P T
HR P L
FYROM P L
TK P T
Country 
(women) 20
07
Q4
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q2
20
08
Q3
20
08
Q4
20
09
Q1
20
09
Q2
20
09
Q3
20
09
Q4
20
10
Q1
20
10
Q2
20
10
Q3
20
10
Q4
20
11
Q1
20
11
Q2
20
11
Q3
20
11
Q4
20
12
Q1
EU 27 P T
BE P T
BG P T L
CZ P T
DK P T L
DE P T*
EE P T
IE P T L
EL P L
ES P T L
FR P T
IT P T
CY P T L
LV P T
LT P T
LU P T*
HU P T*
MT P T
NL P T
AT P T*
PL P T
PT P T L
RO P T
SI P T
SK P T
FI P T
SE P T
UK P L
IS P T
NO P T
HR P T L
FYROM P T
TK P T
Notes: see notes to Table 1.1.
Source: own elaboration using Eurostat online database.
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